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This research embodies Donna Haraway’s (1991) feminist cyborg as a potent political 
figure for women and their bodies in the 21st century West. The violences done to women 
all too often define them (Malabou, 2011), confining them to the heterosexual matrix 
characterised by their objectification and ‘excesses.’ The multiplicities and pluralities of 
‘woman’ disrupt traditional psychological science that counts and categorises. Re-routing 
psychology through the hybridity and non-fixity of the science fiction genre, new 
possibilities for psychological knowledge production emerge, including figures (such as 
cyborgs), art installations and hyperdimensional arachnids through which to think new 
thoughts (Haraway, 2016). Through the figure of a feminist cyborg, ‘woman’ can be 
understood as politically potent through her multiplicities, partialities, simultaneities and 
contradictions. After rendering Haraway’s feminist cyborg through the science fiction 
genre, the thesis takes on a creative form to re-think the notion of apocalypse, re-theorise 
the uncanny, then explore a potently networked series of figures, internet users and 
movements (such as Human Barbies, internet folklore, pro-rape forums) that structure 
women’s bodies in ways that re-assert the heterosexual matrix, as well as in ways that re-
build women outside of the heterosexual matrix. Re-figuring ‘woman’ outside of the 
heterosexual matrix could perhaps open new spaces in which to think women’s body 
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My family was somewhat late to computers and later still to the internet. My 
first experiences with computers through the 1990s were games played at friends’ 
houses, and in the children’s section of Auckland Museum, ‘Weird & Wonderful,’ that 
had a section full of computers with ‘educational’ games. I was notoriously difficult to 
pry away from those clunky white-grey computers, whether with my family or on 
school trips. ‘Weird & Wonderful’ looks different now, with those white-grey 
computing dinosaurs replaced with sleek, thin black screens infinitely more capable and 
connected. When I was last at Auckland Museum, children flittered back and forth 
between the screens and the other things to look at in the discovery centre. They tapped 
the devices with mundane ease, got what they needed (or got bored) and moved on. 
These ever-moving children looked very different from me and my child-peers, 
buddying up two to a computer and jittering in our seats as we waited an eternity for the 
white-grey machine to boot up and load new worlds for us to explore.  
One of the first full computer games I ever played was ‘Where In The World Is 
Carmen Sandiego?’ – an ‘educational’ game in which I helped track down notorious 
criminal mastermind Carmen Sandiego. Carmen would leave clues as to which country 
she was hiding in, I would follow them and eventually catch up to her as she gathered 
significant world artefacts, hoarding Treasures of Knowledge for herself. Carmen, 
digital as she was/is, was a prolific user of technology to aid in her escapes from justice, 
but more importantly, technology enabled her to taunt me, her would-be captor. 
Through videos and satellite phones and other fancy spy devices, Carmen would deploy 
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obnoxious and abusive barbs about how bad I was at catching her like when she 
interrupted electronic communications (easily, she adds) to say that she was “…a little 
disappointed: This hasn’t been half the challenge I thought it would be” (The Learning 
Company, 2001). Carmen was a bad girl and she used every available technology to not 
only be bad-er, but to ensure we could all see how bad she was. At some point, I do not 
know when, I wondered why we were chasing Carmen all over the world, and not any 
one of the other boy criminals who were doing even worse things than Carmen ever did, 
just with less flair. What was so particularly deviant about Carmen Sandiego that 
required this global (wo)man hunt? 
From my days jittering in computer chairs and being abused by a digital one-
woman crime wave, emerged curiosity about the embodied experiences of technology 
and how these experiences have so rapidly changed and shifted over such a short space 
of time, even for the singular, individual me. I used to jitter for so long, willing a 
computer to respond to me and boot up quickly, but now a minute seems a lifetime, I 
have things to do, HURRY UP! And while Carmen’s obnoxious interrupting abuse still 
delights me, the chase is too slow and I cannot beat her with an unconventional object 
once I catch her like I can in other games (not that I would want to beat her, but the 
simplicity of her game style compared to modern video games renders her a tad… cheap 
and easy…). While the embodied waiting for technology to whir into life (either 
through the booting of a machine, or the stunted step-by-step game-play of early video 
games) was glacial compared to modern advances in personal computing (and access to 
personal computing), the embodied immediacy and simultaneity of technological 
connectivity in the West is a key rapid movement of the 21st century that entangles 
bodies and technologies. Today, a man can casually, yet dramatically, connect millions 
of abusers to a singular young woman (see Landsbaum, 2016). A woman can casually, 
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yet dramatically, become a meme through her sexually assaulted body (see Bates, 
2014). Suddenly, my jittering body at a computer moved beyond that of anticipatory 
excitement at what awaited inside that slow machine, to an urgent anxiety about how 
bodies and technologies are becoming potently connected faster and more expansively 
than ever before. My jittering research then explores the urgency of the 
technopositionings that produce ‘women’ and their bodies, sometimes exploiting 
technological vulnerabilities much as Carmen Sandiego obnoxiously interrupted 
communications to obnoxiously taunt her pursuers (including me) again and again. My 
positioning as a poststructural(ish) feminist technowoman in the 21st century West 
produces a fraught connectivity with our social embeddedness in ultra-enmeshed 
patriarchal technologies that are now so mundane, so taken-for-granted. I must use a 
computer to write up this research. I must write this research. The ubiquity of 
technology to connect to, and the uncritical ease with which we connect troubles me, 
not in the sense that I want to shut it all down, but in the sense that we are, at best, 
unsure of what is being built, destroyed or mutated as we connect. And ‘woman’s’ 
position as highly constructed, destructed and monstrous suggests her positioning in the 
technoworld is dangerous and full of possibility.  
 
*Pokes ‘Woman’* 
An argument that focuses on ‘women’ seemingly either assumes ‘women’ as a 
unified category or disintegrates ‘women’ to the point of ‘nothing-worth-politicising.’ 
Through those two investigative options ‘women’ are rendered subjugated: either 
unified and dominated in their categorical opposition to ‘men,’ or dissolved into 
incoherent bits and pieces that can never quite become anybody. Debating what a 
‘woman’ may or may not be is not a luxury we can enjoy in the 21st century (or in any 
century, in hindsight). Indeed, debates about what constitutes ‘woman’ seem to end as 
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they begin: violently.1 Descriptions of ‘women’ fast become problematic, as ways for 
articulating ‘woman’ have been produced through the binaries that define ‘man’ and 
justify his position as first in the man/woman binary (Braidotti, 1989; Grosz, 1989; 
Morgan, 1998; Potts, 2002). Woman, then, as an ‘other’ to man, has become multiple, 
partial and fragmented, and as Malabou (2011) suggests, denied an essence. The 
question perhaps shifts then from what woman is, to how women can be.  
For Malabou (2011) “… “woman” has never been able to define herself other 
than through the violence done to her” (p. vi).2 One of the things we best know about 
whatever a ‘woman’ might be, is that she is perpetually moving through violence. 
Globally, ‘women’ are beaten, raped and killed at astronomical rates (García-Moreno et 
al., 2013); they die while giving birth (Alkema et al., 2016) or aborting (Grimes et al., 
2006) and before or shortly after they are born (Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015); they are 
poor and underemployed (Bullock, 2013); and they are desperately sick (Carr, Green & 
Ponce, 2015). What somewhat unifies these ‘women’s issues’ (if we must unify them) is 
the body: abused, sick, dead, under-utilised, under-nourished, contained and controlled. 
What we understand as ‘woman’ can be described as “objectified and alienated as social 
subjects partly through the denigration and containment of the female body” (Grosz, 
1994, p. xiv). So when a ‘postfeminist’ “theoretical violence that refuses to give women 
                                                          
1 The figure of Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is inherently intersectional; however, she shifts the metaphor 
from the ‘intersection’ towards networking, multiplicity and simultaneity. Such a shift becomes 
problematic through the dominant Western imagery of a cyborg: thin and white. ‘Others’ may have an 
understandably tough time seeing themselves in dominant images of the cyborg precisely because those 
images are dominant. Through this thesis, I draw attention to and problematise such images through the 
rendering of figures, rather than images, to bring the multiplicities, simultaneities and contradictions of 
the category ‘woman’ through so that ‘others’ may see themselves (even if just partially), beyond their 
neoliberal categories, in the figure of the cyborg as she moves potently and politically through 
cyberspace. 
2 The idea of woman being defined by the violences done to her will recur through my research. While 
the conventions of APA referencing demand I cite the source in full each time I utilise the idea, I am 
going to break some rules by considering Malabou’s words gifts to continue referencing without 
referencing, connecting text with text.  
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an essence” (Malabou, 2011, p. 96) emerges, understanding what constitutes ‘woman’ 
as through the “violence done to her” begrudgingly opens space for new ways to 
understand women’s embodied experiences.  
Opening up new spaces suggests an interrogation of the old spaces. Binary 
thinking privileges the (masculine, productive) mind over the (feminised, passive) body 
(Grosz, 1994), and produces women as “somehow more biological, more corporeal, and 
more natural than men” (p. 14). The production of women and their bodies through 
gendered binaries (masculine/feminine, active/passive, mind/body) makes for restrictive 
ways to inhabit a woman’s body, characterised by, as Malabou (2011) suggests, the 
violence done to it. Does ‘woman’ being characterised by violence mean she is 
apocalyptically doomed?  
Women became so quickly, so dramatically and so violently a focal point of the 
internet (mainly through pornography (Heider & Harp, 2002)) and technology in 
general (for example, those old ads for kitchen technology targeted toward wives 
(Holdsworth, 1988)). Technological advancements, whether through warfare, sex or the 
kitchen, have always been gendered amplifications of the violence against women, or at 
the very least, the binaries that produce violence against women. The 20th and 21st 
centuries have been characterised by rapid technological advancement, and the 21st 
century in particular has seen that rapid technological advancement enter into people’s 
homes and personal lives with proliferating access to increasingly sophisticated 
technologies. It is not simply the ubiquity of mobile phones, for example, that needs 
troubling, but the increasing ease of access to and use of technology within mobile 
phones that can enable violence against women (Harris, 2004). When mobile phone 
technology was limited to texting and calling, abusing women you knew became a little 
easier, as a technotool could be easily accessed in the palm of your hand, but such 
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potentials for abuse were still largely restricted to geographic clusters of people who 
knew each other or could share phone numbers. A woman and her abuser(s) carried the 
tool with them wherever they went, but the phone number still acted as a buffer for 
threats from unknown sources. Through the early part of the 21st century, the 
capabilities of the humble mobile phone have proliferated, with the introduction of 
internet access that enables instantaneous connection to websites, forums, social media 
and applications where the pool of women to abuse expands from those women you 
know, to any online woman, at any time, from anywhere. The rapid, expansive shifts 
from abusers having to physically locate a woman to abuse, to writing abusive letters, to 
abusive phone calls and texts, to ubiquitous instantaneous timeless access to the internet 
has (almost) necessitated the amplification of gender and gender-based violence. Such 
shifts have occurred so rapidly and so uncritically there has been no time to re-do 
gender even in small ways that might mitigate the potential new violence against 
women that ubiquitous internet connectivity can facilitate. If women were historically 
more beaten, raped and killed in larger numbers than men when access to women’s 
bodies was somewhat restricted by low technological connectivity, how do women and 
their bodies survive in a 21st century characterised by intensive technological 
connectivity? As the 21st century marches on, technologies like virtual reality, remote 
surgeries and self-driving cars are immanent, on the verge of emerging as the next 
phases of ubiquitous, mundane technology. The internet and its now mundane 
ubiquitous connectivity has already granted excessive access to women’s bodies (bodies 
that have already been excessively accessed); how will virtual reality exploit this access 
further? And how can women survive it? What happens when women unplug the 
binaries that constrain them and re-wire them? How do women’s bodies function when 
7 
 
disconnected from the masculinist mainframe? What would happen if women used 




Haraway draws our attention to the construction and manipulation of docile, 
knowable bodies in our present social system. She invites us to think of what new kinds 
of bodies are being constructed right now; that is, what kind of gender-system is being 
constructed under our very noses. (Braidotti, 2006, p. 198) 
 
The main questions of my research are concerned, deeply, with the excesses to 
the binaries that have produced ‘woman’ through ‘the violence done to her’ in the 
imaginative political hope of “a new kind of politics based on temporary and mobile 
coalitions and therefore on affinity” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 211) where ‘woman’ is not a 
definite or defined being, but an expansive series of partial points of hyperconnectivity.3 
As such, this research is performed in the feminist tradition of “opening up of thought to 
what is new, different, and hitherto unthought” (Grosz, 1994, p. xiv), privileging the 
third options incorporated into or rejected by binary thought and gleefully horrified by 
how women’s embodiment may become terrifyingly new if they take up their excesses: 
“Still, I believe that the word “woman” has a meaning outside the heterosexual matrix. 
It is tedious to keep bringing it back there, making it the site of a constant parody…” 
(Malabou, 2011, pp. 135-136). For Grosz (1994) there is political potency in re-writing 
women’s bodies as positive rather than through their traditional binaried ‘lack’: to “be 
                                                          
3 A reminder here about the shift in metaphor away from the ‘intersection’ and towards the networked 
cyborg: I will not always be explicitly naming categories of neoliberal identity. Instead, I engage with 
social power relations through the formation and movement of figures. Categories, like race, may appear 
explicitly where connections become particularly dense in the network, but figures are drawn through 
social power relations, not neoliberal identities. 
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able to talk of the body outside or in excess of binary pairs” (p. 24) opens formidable 
possibilities for women’s embodiment.  
Questions about ‘woman’ and the violence done to her, remind us that “thinking 
about the subject amounts to rethinking her bodily roots” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 207). A 
woman’s bodily ‘roots’ are typically constructed as natural, as the metaphor suggests, 
positioning woman alongside, or within, nature (as opposed, in the binary, to masculine 
culture) (Haraway, 1991), and therefore to be dominated (Griffin, 1997). Woman’s 
‘naturalness’ focuses talk of her and her body towards so-called ‘natural’ topics, like 
fertility and health; how the woman’s body functions and can be controlled. Re-thinking 
these ‘natural’ bodily ‘roots’ not only challenges what these ‘roots’ enable and constrain 
for women and their bodies, but also opens space for new forms of embodiment that 
might not ‘root’ women to the ground. 
To ask more questions about the body and women’s embodied experiences, my 
research brings with it the idea that the body is the “political, social, and cultural object 
par excellence” (Grosz, 1994, p. 18), uprooted from the fixity of individualism and the 
mind/body split. Since before I was jittering in anxious connection to computers, 
feminist poststructuralists have been engaged in the problematising of binary thinking 
and the categorising individualism such thinking privileges, and enables and constrains 
for women’s bodies. Opening up the body (so to speak) to social and political 
production works to, at the very least, disrupt the dominant ideas about certain fixed or 
‘given’ categories that the body belongs to, like ‘man’ or ‘woman’ and ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ 
For Grosz (1994), bodies “function interactively and productively. They act and react. 
They generate what is new, surprising, unpredictable” (p. xi). That is, bodies are not 
stable, closed vessels for minds, but rather densely produced and shaped socio-political 
partialities and contradictions. Bodies have the potential for a great many political 
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variations. The body as produced through social, political, cultural and historical 
pushing and pulling, rather than conceptualising it as a fixed vessel for the mind, 
enables the re-thinking and re-working of the Western body in ways that can indeed 
challenge dominant phallocentrism and the categories through which such 
phallocentrism is predicated. Such challenges open space for new and different 
understandings about the body, and perhaps even new and different bodies.    
My jittering 21st century concern connects me to Donna Haraway and her 
extensive talk about 21st century bodies and the ways in which 21st century feminists 
can account for such bodies. For Braidotti (2011), Haraway updates and re-routes 
Foucault’s biopower through the technologies of now, privileging the hyperconnectivity 
of contemporary times to re-wire women and feminism through the ever-in-flux, ever-
moving 21st century technologies of power that shape bodies. Why this matters for my 
research project is the technologically critical moments that manifest in the 21st century 
have violent impacts on ‘women’ and their bodies. If the violence done to women has 
defined them, then what happens to women4 when so much more violence can be done 
to her so much more easily, so much faster and so much more expansively? 
 
Ceci N'est Pas Une Figure 
To help explore these questions extensively and expansively, I will need the help 
of some potent figures. Figures are “materialistic mappings of situated, i.e., embedded 
and embodied, social positions” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 4); complex and resistant to 
boundaries that reduce or confine them. While Braidotti (2011) constructs figuration as 
                                                          
4 Throughout my research, ‘woman’ is a plural term, evocative of women’s multiplicities. Breaking down 
‘woman’ as defined by, but not exclusive from, the taken-for-granted heterosexual matrix and re-routing 
her through the violences done to her (the plural and multiple her) produces ‘woman’ as always plural in 
multiple ways. My research evokes multiplicity so as to be response-able (Haraway, 2016) to the 
multiplicities of woman and women, and the multiple ways violence can be done to the multiple her. 
10 
 
a “politically informed map” (p. 5), it is a metaphor that perhaps falls a little flat (pun 
intended). Haraway (2008) constructs figures not as maps, but as “material-semiotic 
nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another” (p. 4).  
Figuring enables more intricate and immersive understandings of the potential 
functioning of the metaphors through which we can more efficiently understand the 
complexity, partiality and contradiction of certain subject positions. Figures are the 
expansive bastard kin of metaphor; productions of complex constraints and excesses, 
producing bodies through text and transforming beyond a metaphoric representation to 
moving functional manifestations of contested and alternative subject positions. Figures 
differ from metaphors in “political density” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 61) in that they have a 
“commitment to account for the material conditions that sustain these different subject 
positions” (p. 11). Figures can perhaps help describe, and even embody, dense politics 
more actively and more potently than their metaphoric friends.   
Figuring is an “interactive collective process that relies upon interrelations and 
social networks of exchanges” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 11). Working with the production of 
‘figures’ to help make sense, or un-make sense in some cases, allows for moving and 
complex understandings. Metaphors, while helpful and important, can remain somewhat 
static, sometimes requiring a mixing of metaphors to help the embodied experience 
form. Figures are more dynamic in more surprising ways. Simultaneously, there is 
something familiar about figures: “… figures are at the same time creatures of imagined 
possibility and creatures of fierce and ordinary reality; the dimensions tangle and 
require response” (Haraway, 2008, p. 4). Figures can perhaps embody a new or 
emerging iteration of something we have already encountered, something we have a 
sense of, but might have only experienced partially. 
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For example, in Janet Frame’s ‘Snap-dragons,’5 the triangular metaphor of her 
heroine’s mother’s house, institutional cell and a snap-dragon produce an understanding 
of the embodied feeling of being trapped, like a bee in a snap-dragon (see Frame, 2004). 
The metaphor enables an understanding of the young woman’s madness through the 
tightness of a small flower slammed shut and the frantic beating of bee wings. The story 
has a circular closed-ness (Parey, 2013), as it begins and ends with same embodied 
image of a bee trapped (woman) in a snap-dragon (that which keeps her confined), a 
natural metaphor for the closedness and recurrence of women’s restriction (of 
‘excesses,’ like ‘madness’), even as they beat against it.   
In Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s ‘The Yellow Wallpaper,’ the heroine of the story 
becomes a figure of madness within wallpaper: not a distinct metaphoric representation 
of madness, but a dynamic blurred entity pervasively inhabiting and influencing 
psychological space she has explicitly been forbidden (see Perkins Gilman, 1973). 
Perkins Gilman’s woman is confined too, and again to a room that is supposed to help 
her heal (like Ruth in ‘Snap-Dragons’ inhabits a hospital snap-dragon and a home snap-
dragon). Rather than beating the walls of her home-prison, Perkins Gilman’s woman 
joins the walls and tears at their paper, blurring with the boundaries that confine her so 
as to disintegrate them. As such, she becomes somewhat un-locatable in her 
everywhere-ness of the wallpaper, every now and then congealing into a recognisable 
form, only to slip away again to bulge or decay or tear some other surface.  
Janet Frame’s positioning of Ruth as a bee in a flower is metaphoric (and 
important), but Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s creeping wallpaper woman is a figure who 
does transformative blurring, enabling something else to happen beyond the metaphoric 
                                                          
5 Literary and cultural narratives take on theoretical and analytic significance throughout my research. 
Feminist literature has long imagined new possibilities for women and their bodies, as well as playing in 
the transformative potential of shifting and blurring genres.   
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description of an embodied experience: the figure inhabits the experience, gives it 
movement and offers possibilities for new movements, inhabiting density that perhaps 
offers more potential for transformative connection. 
So to help explore questions about embodiment and boundaries and 
transformative possibilities, multiple figures are shaped through my research; some only 
partially, but partialities can often be more than sufficient. The key figure of the cyborg 
works/plays most consistently and most multiply through my research. She is figured 
extensively in chapter three (of course, she is a third thing), as I attempt to untangle 
some of her most tangled knots, and then re-tangle them. The cyborg “renews the 
language of political struggle, moving away from the tactic of head-on confrontations, 
in favour of a more specific and diffuse strategy based on irony6, diagonal attacks, and 
coalitions on the basis of affinity” (Braidotti, 2011, p. 209), offering the potential for 
transforming power relations. That is, the cyborg is a figure of networking and 
connection, untied from the binaried assumptions about whether she is friend or foe, 
good or bad. Breaking down such binaried assumptions means that the coalitions she 




One of the (im)possibilities I wish to play with is the Human Barbie. As with 
Barbie™ the iconic doll, there are many variants of Human Barbie, as well, of course, 
as a few Human Kens. Human Barbies, as an eclectic group, model themselves, at the 
very least physically, on Barbie™ imagery (Attwood, 2015; Augustynowicz, 2017). 
                                                          
6 Strategies based on irony can be dangerous, as irony is “not a very kind rhetoric, because it does things 
to your audience that are not fair. When you use irony, you assume that your audience is reading out of 
much the same sort of experiences as you yourself, and they are not. You assume reading practices that 
you have to finally admit are highly privileged and often private” (Haraway, 2004, p. 325). 
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Such modelling most typically manifests in plastic hyper-feminine bodies, surgerised 
with factory production-like repetition to produce a Barbie™ body through human flesh 
(and surgical materials like silicone and who knows what else). The aim is to carve the 
human body into the standard Barbie™ shape: a large head with big eyes, big lips and a 
small nose; large breasts; tiny waist; wide hips; and long, thin legs. The assumed 
impossibility of the Barbie™ body – as researched by Norton, Olds, Olive and Dank 
(1996) and infograph-ised by Rehabs.com (2012) and art-ified by Jason Freeny (2016) – 
makes for some fraught realisations of Barbie™ flesh, as well as some remarkable 
transformations of the human (woman’s) body that would not be possible without the 
wonders of modern technology. 
The principle variant of Human Barbie through my research is Valeria 
Lukyanova, a Ukrainian spiritual alien who hates children and believes the genetic 
mixing of races is making people ugly (see Idov, 2017). Lukyanova’s body, perhaps 
more so than any other Human Barbie, achieves the Barbie™ impossibilities. Through a 
mix of make-up, digital touch ups, surgery and imagination, Lukyanova’s body appears 
as plastic as Barbie™’s and is located within fleshed human agency. Coupled with her 
bewildering commentary on the world around her, her presentation of her body is a 
point of impossibility that demands attention.  
Another figure of women’s impossibility who you will meet through this 
research is (Female figure), an American art installation. She is an animatronic woman, 
skewered to a mirror. She dances to popular music and locks eyes with her viewers 
through facial recognition technology. In 2014, she went viral through global shares of 
videos and images of her mechanical moves and her uncanny stare at her viewers. 
(Female figure) is blond, with a witch-y green eye mask and shark-like teeth. 
She wears a white leotard and thigh-high white boots; she is covered in dirt and grime. 
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She has a lot to say, in her creator’s (male) voice, like “I would like to be a poet” and 
“this is my house” (Birkett, 2014, p. 47), as she twists, gesticulates and stares. While her 
body is (almost) obviously mechanical (her shoulder joints in particular expose nuts, 
bolts and wires), the fluidity of her movements and her seeming autonomy in her choice 
of who to lock eyes with produces an experience of viewing a technowoman’s body that 
becomes difficult to account for.  
(Female figure)’s creator, Jordan Wolfson, is an American artist who seems to 
specialise in political ambivalence (see Charnley, 2017; Da, 2017; Kurian, 2016). Prior 
to the technobirth of (Female figure), Wolfson’s most prominent works included a 
computer generated video of a “grotesque, animated caricature of a middle-aged 
orthodox Jew” (We Find Wildness, 2013, para. 2) and ‘Raspberry Poser,’ another 
digital video that mashes up cartoons, condoms and blood cells (E-flux, 2012). His 
prominent works since (Female figure)’s appearance include a thrashing freckled 
mechanical boy (‘Colored Sculpture’) and a virtual reality video that forces the viewer 
to watch as Wolfson brutally beats a man in the street with a baseball bat (‘Real 
Violence’) (Schwartz, 2017).  
Speaking of ‘real violence,’ an internet user through this research who 
exemplifies gendered violence is Elliot Rodger, a young American man who murdered 
six people and injured 13 others before killing himself in a massacre prompted by his 
perceived perpetual sexual rejection by women. His manifesto, written in his final 
weeks as he prepared for his ‘Day of Retribution,’ details a life characterised by an 
obsession with achieving the admiration of his family and peers, and especially young, 
‘hot,’ blonde, white women. In particular, he sought sex. He became focused on 
possessing women, and wrote of acquiring their “love and sex” (Rodger, 2014, p. 109) 
just as he wrote of acquiring high-end commodities like Gucci sunglasses and expensive 
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cars. When he perceived that women were actively denying him the commodity of sex 
(it seems he rarely spoke to women, and when he did it was to threaten them), he began 
to develop ideas about the slaughter of young couples, and adopted a new world order 
in which women would be obliterated and love and sex abolished.  
While a sheriff’s report apparently documents Rodger’s history with mental 
illness (see Brugger, 2015), the form his beliefs took was shaped by Western patriarchal 
ideals of masculinity and heteronormativity, and his manifesto aligns with and informs 
the ideologies of the masculinist incel (‘involuntarily celibate’) and co-alpha (those who 
view themselves not as ‘beta males’ but as ‘co-alpha males’ who work with ‘alpha 
males’ to dominate women) movements online. As well as desiring to acquire the 
Western idealised female form (a Barbie™?) for his own use, Rodger tried desperately 
to increase his height and build muscle. He despised his mixed race heritage, clinging 
on to his white heritage to justify his superiority over Asian, African-American and 
Latino men he encountered who he deemed “ugly” (Rodger, 2014, p. 84, for example). 
He also became obsessed with becoming incredibly wealthy at a young age, so that 
women would have sex with him. He wore designer clothes and drove expensive cars, 
reproducing the appearance of extreme wealth with the aim of attracting a “hot blonde” 
(p. 87) to have sex with him. He was bewildered when his efforts did not work and 
“slobs” (p. 121) continued to have sex with women, while he remained “sex-starved” 
(p. 118). 
The narrative through which Rodger structured his beliefs – the thoughts he 
thought through – formed a normalised narrative of gendered relations: boy gets girl. 
His attempts to reproduce this narrative for himself were not dissimilar from normalised 
attempts to perform masculinity, but the efforts to produce the narrative became 
untenable for Rodger, and those who follow his ideology. While Rodger may be 
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accounted for as a singular individual man thinking particular violent thoughts, he was 
(and still is, despite his death) connected into a heteronormative network that is hyper-
real and very powerful in its effects. 
These effects of heteronormativity can also be experienced through the tale of 
Gable Tostee and Warriena Wright. Gable Tostee is an Australian man who was 
charged with the murder of New Zealand woman Warriena Wright (see Fyfe, 2017). 
After meeting via Tinder, the preeminent Western world dating app, Tostee and Wright 
spent a fraught night together in Tostee’s apartment, where he audio recorded their 
sexual encounter, their fight and his quest for pizza. At the peak of their fight, Tostee 
locked Wright on his balcony, where she quickly fell to death. Tostee was found not 
guilty of culpability for Wright’s death, which was explained as her own drunken 
mistake while trying to escape the balcony she was trapped on. 
 Tostee had an audio recording of his night with Wright in his apartment because, 
he explained, women had stolen from him in the past, and video and audio recording his 
encounters with women became insurance against possible thefts as well as records of 
his nights in case he could not remember his drunken activities (see Fyfe, 2017). In the 
case of Wright’s death, it became a humiliating recording of her last few hours, played 
in court (and some parts played through the media and in full online via YouTube) for 
her family and friends to hear. The recording also became Tostee’s strongest evidence 
that he did not push her off the balcony, which was a key legal matter. In the audio, we 
hear Wright’s muffled scream as she falls to her death, and Tostee’s heavy breathing 
and swearing as he tries to call his lawyer. We then hear his mundane journey to get 
some pizza. After his acquittal, Tostee returned to social media (including Tinder) under 
different names, most notably ‘Eric Thomas’ (a distinctly indistinct name!) (see Stolz, 
2015). He used social media to speak about Wright and her family and the trial, 
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straddling the line between reproducing his versions of events and slandering Wright 
and her family. 
Warriena Wright’s death, and the looming figure of Gable Tostee, is an example 
of not only the technological ease with which Tinder provides predators with prey, but 
the ease with which it greases the wheels of gender-based violence. In the audio 
recording of the evening, Tostee is heard asking, “Why does this shit always happen to 
me. I didn’t ask for this. I wasn’t doing anything wrong, I just invited the girl over” 
(Noble, 2016, para. 127), suggesting that his encounters with women in the past have 
run similar courses and require evidence of women’s complicity and/or deviance, like 
rejecting Tostee’s advances or fighting with him. Warriena Wright’s death enables 
understandings of the amplification of violence against women through technologised 
encounters. 
An interloper into my research is the figure of the Neoliberal Individual. He 
often appears to reject the structural production of violence against women, demanding 
attention be drawn to personal responsibility for violence. The Neoliberal Individual is 
characterised by individualist politics, people as numbers and commodities, masculinist 
processes, personal responsibility and freedoms (like freedom of speech and action). As 
such, despite the so-called privileging of ‘freedoms,’ the body of the Neoliberal 
Individual is tightly bound, jammed into categories that define him, quantify him and 
segregate him from ‘others.’ He is quantified and re-quantified and re-quantified again 
to ensure his boundaries are solid and stable. It is his responsibility to embody a ‘good’ 
commodity. 
Through this research, the Neoliberal Individual will appear with jerky 
movements, his self-pulling strings7 yanked, sharply pointing to individual, unified and 
                                                          
7 I once saw a dog that had been trained to walk itself. It held its own leash in its mouth. 
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distinct selves as the source of and solution to humanity’s most pressing issues, like 
poverty and employment, multiculturalism, obesity and ‘political correctness gone 
mad.’ The Neoliberal Individual asserts boundaries, and those boundaries assert 
hierarchies, and those hierarchies assert power. So through this research, which works 
to blur the ‘individual’ profoundly and unapologetically, the Neoliberal Individual 
sometimes appears to assert something (a boundary, a hierarchy, a ‘freedom’) in 
demand of his own survival in the chaos of a feminist poststructuralist sci-fi worlding 
(see Haraway, 2013) – by which I mean my research. 
The key figure for organisation and decision-making through chaos is The 
Weaver from China Miéville’s (2000) science fiction novel ‘Perdido Street Station.’ 
The Weaver is described as a massive interdimensional arachnid who mind-speaks in a 
poetic dream-like stream of consciousness, blurring the boundaries between The 
Weaver’s thoughts and the thoughts of those who encounter him (yes, Miéville, 
bizarrely, genders The Weaver as a ‘him’). The Weaver’s consciousness boarders the 
unintelligible, with the characters of ‘Perdido Street Station’ left to infer The Weaver’s 
meanings from the snippets (literally – you will get this ‘snip’ joke later) of fuzzy 
clarity in the dream-poetics coupled with the well-timed appearances and actions of the 
creature. The protagonists of ‘Perdido Street Station’ ask The Weaver to help them 
defeat the Slake Moths, a small group of powerful psychedelic mega-moths who are 
feeding off the consciousness of the inhabitants of Bas-Lag, littering the streets with 
comatose civilians. Along the way, The Weaver experiences some highs (snipping off 
ears) and lows (not winning a battle), and by the conclusion of the story, The Weaver 
has helped vanquish the Slake Moths he comes to see as kin. 
The Weaver’s (one of many Weavers, by the way. We are never quite sure if it is 
the same one each time he appears to help the story’s protagonists) most salient task is 
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creating and maintaining the worldweave, a spider-web-y representation of the universe 
across space and time. Like earth spiders care for their webs, The Weaver is concerned 
with the form and function of the worldweave, prioritising its aesthetics above all else, 
which produces some bizarre behaviours, as well as some hesitancy to influence events 
that may be creating particularly aesthetically pleasing worldweaves, even if those 
events are devastating and destructive to someone else’s world. 
The Weaver perhaps seems an unlikely figure for guiding research. However, 
The Weaver enables a way to articulate how hyperdimensional connections, however 
bizarre or hesitant, can be made in a chaotic technosocial world. In my favourite part of 
‘Perdido Street Station,’ The Weaver experiences profound doubt about the violence he 
has enabled: 
… I TIRE AND GROW OLD AND COLD GRIMY 
LITTLING… the Weaver said quietly… YOU WORK WITH 
FINESSE I GRANT AND GIVE YOU BUT THIS SIPHONING 
OF PHANTASMS FROM MY SOLE SOUL LEAVES ME 
MELANCHOLIC SEE PATTERNS INHERE EVEN IN THESE 
VORACIOUS ONES PERHAPS I JUDGE QUICK AND 
SLICK TASTES I FALTER AND ALTER AND I AM 
UNSURE… It raised a handful of glistening guts to Isaac’s eyes 
and began to pull them gently apart. (Miéville, 2000, p. 799) 
In the moment of supposed victory, with Bas-Lag inhabitants rejoicing around him, The 
Weaver experiences kinship with the dead moths, albeit through their guts, and becomes 
“UNSURE”8 of how he came to be tiredly and sadly playing in the bowels of an ‘other’ 
                                                          
8 As with Malabou’s word-gifts, I will also accept Miéville’s Weaver’s gift of being “UNSURE,” to be 
referenced without the conventions of referencing throughout my research worldweave.  
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just like him, a position I have found myself in on a number of occasions through this 
research process. The hyperdimensionality of ideas coupled with the imposition of 
linear academic writing produces moments through my research of sudden 
disconnection and reconnection, sharp re-routings through alternative wiring and the 
trauma of severing some connections in the research worldweave network. The cuts, 
actions and inactions of this research project are productive of a worldweave that 
privileges the aesthetics of connections, the arbitrariness of exemplars and the politics 
of being ‘UNSURE.’ 
 
Technometaphors 101 
The collection of characters that I have partially introduced so far, from Human 
Barbie to Elliot Rodger to The Weaver, will appear in multiple and partial ways 
throughout my research, alongside a cacophony of others who help (sometimes 
unwillingly) to tell stories about what is at stake for women’s embodiment in the 
technophilic 21st century West. The re-imagining of how women and their bodies can be 
understood through psychology in technologically-dominated times enables new 
possibilities for embodying the excesses of femininity that are still so tightly contained 
through dominant binaries and are implicated in the violences that women experience 
because they are women, and increasingly because they are technowomen. Re-
imagining women and their bodies in technotimes also calls for a re-imagining of how 
psychology can, indeed, imagine. Shifting genres towards science fiction as a way to 
think and do psychology offers new potential spaces for new potential bodies. 
Enabling these potential new spaces throughout my research will be some 
technometaphors through which to think. I opened my research with my childhood 
‘jittering’ at computers, and the transformation of that jittering to the urgencies of 
women’s technobodies. The conceptualisation of this embodied 
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anxiety/excitement/urgency as ‘jittering’ connects to the idea of the ‘phase jitter’: an 
“unwanted random signal distortion” (Chandor, 1981, p. 140) occurring in a 
microprocessor, the central electronic processing unit of a microchip. The ‘jitter’ is 
described as a measurement of signal distortion: it tells a computer technician “how far 
the signal period has wandered from its ideal value” (Roberts, 2003, para. 5). While I do 
not pretend to know what such electronic speak means to computer electricians, I have 
my own embodied understanding of a ‘phase jitter.’ The embodied excited signals 
connecting me to the computer as a child keen on the worlds built through computers 
became distorted, shifting the encounter from jittering potential to phase jitters: urgent 
signals distorting and hyperconnecting women and their bodies in troublesome ways. 
The ‘phase jitter’ serves as a gateway technometaphor: I will not use it again 
explicitly, even if I hope it is non-explicitly evoked throughout this textual network. 
Through my research project there are technometaphors of a structural kind. Panic 
Architecture and Architecture Fiction are cyborg terms for particular ways to build, but 
I will not pre-empt them here. However, a large and looming technometaphor 
extensively networked in the text is the ‘impossible feast.’ The ‘impossible feast’ is a 
cyborg term for the exponentially created and consumed information and connections 
produced online (CyborgAnthropology.com, 2012). Opening the internet presents 
internet users with a never-ending, constantly reproducing selection of data to consume. 
Meal after connected meal, feast after networked feast, the internet is an ever-expanding 
banquet of links, text and images that can be consumed rapidly, without much chewing, 
perhaps rarely reaching satiation and never running out of ‘food’ to consume. Data for 
my research project can be considered morsels, perhaps even crumbs, of this impossible 
feast. Chew as I may, feasting on technodata becomes impossible: comments amass, 
links proliferate, new information emerges. The impossibility of the feast is a critical 
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node in this research network. Feasting and consumption are very possible embodied 
experiences; what might happen when such possibilities are rendered impossible? 
 
Impossible Linearity 
Knowledge™ is not defined, manufactured and commodified through my 
research. Rather I build a network that is critically and potently open for connection and 
re-configuration. The structure of my research project is that of a hyperdimensional 
network, necessarily tamed into chapters, but always exceeding them. Chapter one, as 
you now know, introduces components of this expansive network and the figures who 
ping around it, including ‘woman,’ a neoliberal individual and a giant arachnid. These 
introductions serve to jack the reader in to the problem of violence against women 
through technology, and familiarise us with the figures who will help and hinder the 
telling of technostories. 
To be linear for a moment, chapter two asks questions about psychology’s 
genre, the mode and style that informs how we do psychology and produce 
psychological knowledge. These questions challenge psychology’s detective genre as a 
site of production for injustices and the chapter opens space for the mobilising of 
psychology through science fiction (see Squire, 1990), an alternative genre 
characterised by disrupted binaries and the blurred boundaries between hard science and 
imagination. Through science fiction, traditional understandings of text, power and 
troubled embodied lives are made strange and new understandings emerge. The kinship 
between science fiction materials like ‘The Matrix,’ ‘Another Earth’ and Donna 
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg disrupt and dissolve taken-for-granted notions of binary 
distinctness and bounded, individualised bodies. Disruption and dissolution of key 
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binaries (like dominance/subjugation) can open some space for some potent political 
figures and how “it matters what thoughts think thoughts” (Haraway, 2016, p. 12).9  
Chapter three explicates Haraway’s cyborg, orientating the reader to the 
emergence of the cyborg as a feminist figure for Western women’s politicised 
embodiment in the 21st century and beyond, and constructs how this science fiction 
figure transforms research practices in psychology, including the ways we tell stories 
and engage with text. While characterised by hybridity, the cyborg is not just animal 
and machine. She is a multiple, partial, simultaneous and contradictory doing figure; a 
metaphor and an ontological position disrupting and reconfiguring the binaries that 
shape troubled lives and troubled bodies. Haraway’s cyborg, dismantled and 
reassembled, is a figure who networks together nodes of ontology, methodology, ethics 
and analysis. She has already materialised through this introductory chapter and 
works/plays through my project as we build, unbuild and rebuild. 
Chapter four details the journeys of an ethical Alice through a violent 
Wonderland. With shifts in genre come emergent engagements with psychology, with 
methodology, with data. Understandings of what counts as ‘ethical’ can be challenged 
and politicised. Re-routing ethics through the cyborg troubles the safe/not safe binary, 
and instead enables questions about embodied encounters, ethical engagement with data 
and text as cultural resource rather than expressions of individualism. Through chapter 
four, I stay with the trouble, as Haraway (2016) suggests. I move us back through my 
early explorations of ‘unsafe’ places, amassing connections and encounters through 
chaotic and catastrophic online spaces and bodies. 
                                                          
9 Like Malabou gifted her idea about violence classifying ‘woman,’ Haraway gifts me the idea of it 
mattering “what thoughts think thoughts.” The idea will recur, referenced without referencing, throughout 
my research project.  
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Chapter five re-imagines apocalypse, a point of rupture for theorising ‘the end of 
the world’ as a metaphor for the daily and mundane disintegrations of women and their 
bodies, as well as a politically potent narrative for giving language to impossible and 
fraught technobodies. The chapter is an experience of an apocalyptic crisis. Critical 
obliterations are ever-immanent, and through crises emerge unsettling critical responses 
and potential positionings for inhabiting catastrophes. 
After an apocalypse has materialised, I go salvaging. In the chapters that emerge 
I re-theorises the uncanny, reconnecting it to its technological home. Re-routing the 
uncanny through the figure of the automaton Olympia in Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman’ 
reboots the uncanny for the 21st century, privileging the terrifying possibilities of the 
convergence of women’s bodies, technology and uncertainty.  
After deteriorating into the uncanny, the chapters that follow recover parts, 
positions and possibilities for new technobodies. I produce a Slender Man and pull apart 
a (Female figure). I thrash around a ‘Colored Sculpture’ and play with a Human Barbie. 
I interrupt with an assessment of the network, re-wiring through a Weaver. I occupy a 
series of violations then work my way out of a deadly embrace. Finally, in possibly no 
sense of the term, I set up a meeting place for possible others. 
While the above conforms to a linear description of the contents of this research, 
the chapters are extensively networked, begrudgingly cordoned off but connecting 
expansively through metaphors, figures and running jokes. Some metaphors, figures and 
running jokes will appear before they are explained, a delightful problem of time as flat 
and circular.10 Other times, in the expanse of the technoworld the cyborg inhabits and 
builds, ideas re-route abruptly. Throughout my research there are also sporadic memes, 
produced through the simulated consciousness (see appendix) of my embeddedness in 
                                                          
10 A joke explained on page 97 of this research project. 
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the technophilic West and in technoresearch. As with internet memes, the sense that 
these memes make may not be apparent at first encounter. They are serious play with 
deadliness, deterioration and delight. Simultaneously, many chapters will end with a 
sub-section of “un-wholly thoughts”; a series of nuts and bolts that did not quite find a 
moment or were just left behind or helped to build something else somewhere else. 
These sub-sections are made up of quotes, half-ideas, unfollowed connections, images, 

















Chapter One Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
 
The un-wholly thoughts of this introductory chapter are the bones of a draft 
introduction I wrote that did not make the cut, for obvious obnoxious reasons… 
 
This is a disclaimer, perhaps a warning, about the writing that follows. It is 
cyborg writing. In order to complete the PhD task, it is (so I am told) necessary to 
adhere to at least some of the strict Western, patriarchal writing conventions that dictate 
linear, ordered writing just as it dictates linear, ordered women. It is perhaps the most 
challenging task for a cyborg to write a vast, networked, embodied world into a linear 
page that moves from the top to the bottom, from the left to right, in two dimensions. 
Writing must be in chapters, following a logical order that a good Western citizen 
(although, if you find yourself here, you may not be one) can follow closely, 
progressing through ideas that develop and reach a climatic pinnacle: The Idea™! 
Cyborgs, however, would prefer, I think, if they had to write/right in thesis form (and a 
cyborg never has to do anything), to write in that obnoxious WordArt with 3D effects, 
and gifs, and galaxies, and middle fingers, and serrated edges, and anything else a 
cyborg can find. But alas, here we are, in two dimensions, top-bottom, left-right, lather-
rinse-repeat.  
While what follows is conventional in the sense that it is words-on-a-page, it 
cites sources in APA format (but not always) and, in a way (albeit a different way), it 
analyses data to produce Research, it does so simultaneously wholeheartedly and 
begrudgingly; an encounter with simultaneity, playing seriously with the conventions of 
academia and of writing. What manifests, I hope, is the desperate necessity for 
embodying the simultaneous, partial contradictions of Western femininity for survival. 
There are moments, perhaps long ones, of obnoxiousness that will be unpleasant. But 
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the how of the unpleasantness is important, a reading practice soaked in the, in 
Haraway-ian terms, response-able (Haraway, 2016). That is, the embodied responses 
enabled by and enabling of ethical connection. Ethics is about being able to respond, 
about critical interconnection. 
As such, my research shifts through simultaneous responses to genre, to ethics, 
to data, and how new responses enable new possibilities. It does so from the margins, 
where all ethical responses typically congeal (see?! Obnoxious!). There is a current 
trend (through the 2010s) towards positive psychology: think happy, be happy; 
mindfulness; smile more; go for a jog. What better way for psychology to absolve itself 
of its sins and of its response-abilities than to locate the cause and the cure of disorder 
with the self-contained neoliberal individual, all while marketing positive psychology as 
a commodity. At the same time women are told to jog for their mental health, they are 
also being told to do so in groups and in broad daylight and covered up and with a 
mobile phone so they can avoid the murderous and/or sexually violent intent of the men 
who prowl in the darkness of daytime sunshine. Women’s entry into public spaces 
continues to be contested as a privilege (from jogging to women-only ‘Wonder Woman’ 
screenings causing uproars to selfie culture to lady presidential candidates to Twitter to 
Women’s Marches), as does their occupancy of private spaces (from physical abuse to 
online abuse to stalking to heteronormative domesticity). Smiling more seems an 
unethical suggestion from psychologists to those who may need some help. Women 
have been told to ‘smile more’ for centuries, and yet we still find ourselves  
bloodied                                                                depressed 
                          stressed                 anorexic                                                                                            
insomniac 
                                      delusional                       catatonic 
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                          panicked                                                                                     
angry 
                                                       suicidal                          paranoid 
                         dissociated                                 anxious                     
broken 
                                                                                addicted 
                                compulsive. 
 
If smiling were the cure, women’s mental and physical health would be immaculate. So 
psychology strikes again! The current trend towards mindfulness and colouring books 
for stressed adults seems little removed from the bedrest cures of yesteryear where 
‘hysterical’ women were locked in rooms by themselves to ‘rest’ and become ‘not 
hysterical anymore.’ In 2018, women colour within the lines of their colouring books, 
immersed in hysteria-preventing patterns just as Charlotte Perkins Gilman immersed her 
hysterical heroine in yellow wallpaper. Indeed, social media like Facebook, Twitter and 




























Working with modern possibilities for new bodies has historically been an 
important feminist exercise, from the transformative potential of education 
(Wollstonecraft, 1792/1975) and the re-working of economics (Perkins Gilman, 
1898/201211), to the cultural (Bordo, 2004) and the docile body (Bartky, 1998), to the 
horrors of the reproductive body (Ussher, 2006). As a general and easily broken rule, 
work on the body and embodiment has peaked in times of rapid social change, and 
stalled in times of social (masculinist) fixity, like world wars (for examples see Gordon, 
2000; Schwartz, 1986). The 21st century, alarmingly, seems characterised by both rapid 
social shifts and intense global warfare enabled by sudden and pervasive technological 
advancements (from Twitter to drones). So situating the body in the early 21st century 
still requires educational, economic, cultural and reproductive work, but within the 
context of rapid social and technological upheavals that contribute to our daily lives as 
they do to warzones.12 
The work of feminist theorists (psychological and otherwise) on the idea of the 
technologically-mediated gendered body has been unsurprisingly multiple. Perhaps the 
focus has been on problematic reproductive technologies and technological 
interventions into women’s pregnant bodies (for example, Gimenez, 1991; Lie, 2002; 
Nordqvist, 2008; O’Riordan & Haran, 2009; Palmer, 2009; Sætnan, 1996; Shildrick, 
1997); but others have problematised the technological mediation of cosmetic 
                                                          
11 The significance of the 90s of whatever century is already emerging. 
12 And of course, many people’s daily lives are warzones. 
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interventions (for example, Balsamo, 1992; Braun, 2005; Davis, 1995, 1997; Gimlin, 
2010; Tiefer, 2008); disabled bodies (for example, De Preester, 2011); ‘deviant’ and/or 
‘deficient’ bodies (for example, Bordo, 2004; Burke, 2009; Hogle, 2005); and deviant 
femininity (for example, Fournier, 2002). Other pivotal foci concern the gendering of 
technology use/access, and the technology industry (for example, Henwood, 2000; 
Kennedy, 2005; Spender, 1995; Stoate, 2012; van Doorn, van Zoonen & Wyatt, 2007); 
and increasingly, gendering performed through social media use (for example, Dobson, 
2015; Manago, 2013; Rice & Watson, 2016; Ringrose, Harvey, Gill & Livingstone, 
2013). While women researchers have theorised women’s connections with technology 
in multiple ways, much of this work has somewhat reproduced the body/mind binary 
(how technology influences or intervenes on bodies or minds, for example), rather than 
radically challenging, or indeed, blurring the boundaries between taken-for-granted 
binaries, such as human/machine, in the pursuit of transformative, political 
embodiment. Theoretically, some feminists have been interested in how the gendered 
body is produced in and through technology (for example, Barnard, 2000; Bayer & 
Malone, 1996; Daniels, 2009; Masters, 2005; Melzer, 2010; Pitts, 2005; Thomas, 2004; 
Van Der Ploeg, 2004), interrogating the boundaries between women and technologies 
and asking questions about these boundaries as sites for new forms of women’s agency. 
Technological embodiment, for feminist researchers then, might also be concerned with 
possibilities for transformative power relations and how technology might enable 
politicised embodiment for women in the 21st century as a consanguineous union with 
machines that blurs the boundaries of the binaries that violently shape women’s lived 
experience in order to simultaneously resist them and live them (for example, Balsamo, 
1995; Bayer, 1999; Braidotti, 2003, 2006; De Preester, 2011; Haraway, 1991; Mitchell, 
2006; Morgan, 2004; Potts, 2002; Sawicki, 1991; Squires, 2000; Wajcman, 2004). 
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New technologies, and increasing access to them, enables the production of new 
differences and new ways to legitimise the hierarchical order of old differences, 
inscribing the same old meanings onto women’s bodies, as well as adding some that are 
new. In the context of Western technological advancement, it is almost always “at times 
of great technological advance that Western culture reiterates some of its most persistent 
habits, notably the tendency to create differences and organize them hierarchically” 
(Braidotti, 2003, p. 252).13 Feminist explorations of the construction of the gendered 
body, technologised representations of women’s bodies and technological interventions 
for the disruption of taken-for-granted boundaries, explicitly for women’s politicised 
embodiment, have enabled access points for dismantling these old (and new) 
hierarchies. A hierarchy is formed through the separation of people, places and things 
into ordered, prioritised, distinct and static categories. The maintenance of these distinct 
categories (like ‘men’ and ‘women’) produces and reproduces the hierarchal power 
structures that produce the categories: an endless closed loop.14  
The loop, however, is not unhackable. For Braidotti (2003), the “hierarchal 
organization of differences is key to phallologocentrism” (p. 255), so disrupting the 
hierarchy to enable new political embodiments is a key feminist textual strategy. 
Problematising taken-for-granted categories (or at the very least the distinctions 
between them) has the potential to disrupt and dismantle such categories and their 
boundaries. For example, Davis (1997) explored the technology of cosmetic surgery as 
                                                          
13 Braidotti (2003) uses sexism in video games and pornography as examples of the reproduction of old 
(and normalised) representations of women through new technologies. Many years later, Braidotti’s 
arguments about sexism in video games and porn remain critically relevant, and need to shift only in the 
sense that there are now more games and more porn that are much more violent, much more accessible 
and much, much more immersive. 
14 Chandor, Graham and Williamson (1970) define a ‘closed loop’ as a “continuous loop in a program 
from which there is no exit except by operator intervention or by action on the part of some executive 
program monitoring the operation of the program concerned” (p. 78). Violence against women indeed 
feels cyclical, a continuous loop executed through dominant patriarchal operators who do not have any 
interest in intervening in the functioning of the program.  
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potential space for feminist utopia, not unproblematically – “It is difficult to imagine 
that cosmetic surgery might entail both compliance and resistance” (p. 179) – but 
emphasising the contradictory and complex technopotential for new embodiments and 
new (political) performances of beauty through technology, rather than dismissing 
cosmetic surgery as simply another patriarchal tool to oppress women. Davis (1997) 
disrupts the dominance/subjugation of the binary and privileges the notion of a third 
position that exceeds the assumed and closed options.  
The feminist theorists who have engaged with technology as a tool (important 
work, but not my work) and as a socio-political cultural system open to exploitation and 
reconfiguration through feminist work/play have enabled dangerous and exciting 
opportunities for hacking the system, maximising disruption, upending so-called 
‘realities’ and creating the potential for recalibrating women’s embodied lives as livably 
multiple. Potts (2002) breaks down and opens up (if you will excuse the double 
entendre15) women’s embodiment through sex, focusing on the binaried assumptions of 
phallocentric heterosex at particular sites of great violence, as well as the great 
opportunities for re-figuring and resistance. Challenging what counts as ‘normal,’ 
‘natural’ and ‘necessary’ enables understandings of women’s embodied lives that 
exceed the taken-for-granted binaries explicitly produced through heterosex,16 and 
                                                          
15 Throughout this thesis, I draw on typical internet tropes, such as drawing attention to puns, double 
entendres and other textual jokes, like simulating ‘clickbait’ and using memes to illustrate arguments.  
16 For example, Potts (2002) discusses the control of women’s multiple orgasms: “Women’s orgasmic 
ability, depicted as an insatiable ‘hunger’, a frighteningly multiplying desire for ‘more’, an endless 
deferral of satisfaction, requires restriction and unification” (p. 66), whereby, “she is prescribed an 
orgasmic diet, consisting of one big ‘ultimate’ orgasm rather than countless smaller or non-final ones” (p. 
67). The male-dominated construction of heterosex privileges the finalising of sexual encounters with the 
male orgasm and the potential multiplicity of women’s sexuality is “in excess of the male’s” (p. 67) and 
as such is in need of control. While such an example is simple and explicit, it highlights the control of 
women’s bodies through heterosex in ways that specifically target women’s excesses as compared to men 
and their bodies. The construction of women’s sexuality/sexual pleasure/orgasm and their bodies in 
general as passive, ‘inner’ and implicit exceeds the outward decisive finality and boundedness of the male 
orgasm and the male body. 
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argues for the re-figuring of women’s embodiment through these excesses. 
Reconfiguring ‘excess’ beyond a good/bad binary enables control of women’s bodies to 
be challenged, possibility offering women something new to play with other than being 
singularly ‘good’ or unified as ‘bad.’ 
Disrupting binaries and the assumed unification of identity that such binaries 
produce can enable new politically potent performances of ‘woman.’ Like for the 
category ‘woman,’ keeping “the category “human” fixed excludes an entire range of 
possibilities in advance and freezes out important dimensions of the analysis of the 
workings of power” (Barad, 2001, p. 93), producing and reproducing bounded 
individuals who produce and reproduce the same old binaries through the same old 
hierarchies for the same old performances of gender. The masculinist privilege of fixity 
and distinction of categories closes off opportunities for new ways to do gender, unless 
the fixity itself is challenged. Barad (2003) suggests that the human as ‘phenomena’ 
rather than a singular being means that “the notion of discursivity cannot be founded on 
an inherent distinction between humans and nonhumans” (p. 818), and as such, 
boundaries assumed wholly stable can disintegrate into partialities, multiplicities and 
contradictions, opening spaces for new figurations of ‘woman,’ science and bodies. 
As a form of thinking in and through binaries where masculinism is privileged 
(see for example, Grosz, 1989), phallocentrism draws attention to the ways in which 
psychologists, and adjacent others, produce and interpret phenomena to reproduce 
pathologisation and binaries that are embedded in textuality. Locating mainstream, 
masculinist psychological quests for fixed ‘facts’ and categories within a specific genre 
brings phallocentric thought and textuality into play together, since genres “provide 
frameworks with which texts are produced and interpreted” (Chandler, 1997, p. 5).  
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As well as being considered frameworks for production/interpretation, genres 
“can be defined as UTTERANCES/TEXTS in relation to other utterances/texts” (Wales, 
2001, p. 259). That is, all text is in dialogue with other text: “… no text is ‘free’ of other 
text” (p. 259). Text here is reproductive and networked: even through those texts that 
follow a genre trajectory strictly – for example a detective genre – text itself proliferates 
and opens possibilities. As much as a narrative may close an ending and assert the order 
of events, reading still opens possibilities and proliferates connections.  
Genre is about culture, where the relationship between text and its audience is 
privileged, shifting “attention away from the ‘inherent’ properties of text, and towards 
the relationship between text and audiences…” (Buckingham, 1993, p. 136). In 
academic text production, the relationship between text and audience is prioritised at the 
publication phase, with psychologists, for example, placing importance on the 
communication of the research with other psychologists: “For psychology as a scientific 
knowledge, narratives produce speaking subjects who know the facts of the lives and 
experiences of other subjects, and hold these facts as commonly intelligible among 
themselves” (Coombes & Morgan, 2004, p. 304). The incestuous approach of writing 
psychological text for an audience of other psychologists (and the psychologist-esque) 
produces text that ensures ‘cohesion’ of psychology ‘facts’ in order to produce a clean, 
clear, ‘factual’ account of the events that fits the cultural goals of Western psychology – 
the knowledge authority on Western neoliberal individuals. Why not embrace 
ambiguous, simultaneous, contradictory writing in order to reflect the ambiguous, 
simultaneous and contradictory experience of writing, researching and embodiment in 






A Cyborg’s Embrace 
Haraway’s (1991) figure of the cyborg explicitly offers politicised embodiment 
that acknowledges not only (Western) women’s multiplicities and partialities, but also 
their embeddedness in patriarchal technoculture that simultaneously produces and 
condemns women as deviants from the (masculine/masculinist) norm. Haraway (1991) 
works/plays with the ‘otherness’ of women as sites for technologised 21st century 
disruptions and the potential for embodying the contradictory simultaneity of Western 
femininity. Inevitably, in the process she works/plays with other ‘otherness’ as well and 
as her choice of figure might suggest, cyborg work/play is performed between and in 
excess of the genre boundaries that hold science and fiction apart. For Haraway, the 
ways of thinking that enabled the figure of the cyborg were the points of emergence of 
(feminist) politics. While her cyborg, for me, does a great many weird and wonderful 
things for political activism, the thoughts used to think her, and do her (if you will 
excuse the double entendre again), play a significant part for the transformative politics 
she offers. 
 As an example, Haraway has turned to our old friend individualism to argue for 
science fiction as a genre through which to think: “Here, I expand on the argument that 
bounded individualism in its many flavors in science, politics, and philosophy has 
finally become unavailable to think with, truly no longer thinkable, technically or any 
other way” (Haraway, 2016, p. 5). The complexity and interconnectedness of our 
expanding technologised and globalised world renders individualism, technically, 
impossible. Doing individualism involves rejecting anything other than Me Me Me, 
even as all signs point to proliferating interconnectivity. The tension between Western 
neoliberal individualism and the present impossibility to think with it is amplifying a 
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great many problems at local levels (precarity, family violence, sexual violence, Trump) 
and global levels (precarity, family violence, sexual violence, Trump17).  
For Haraway (2016), it “matters which stories tell stories, which concepts think 
concepts. Mathematically, visually, and narratively, it matters which figures figure 
figures, which systems systematize systems” (p. 101). As science and psychology are 
produced through ideologies of individualism, so we produce stories about individuals, 
and such individualised production has implications for how those stories end (like 
assuming they end, for example). Some individuals benefit; a great many do not. So the 
difficulties we have in combating individualised neoliberal thinking become clearer – 
impossible individuals thinking with impossibly individual thoughts. 
 Science fiction, even at its most unimaginative, offers an alternative and 
promising way of thinking thoughts. Like Haraway, I think “… we need stories (and 
theories) that are just big enough to gather up the complexities and keep the connections 
open and greedy for surprising new and old connections” (Haraway, 2016, p. 101). 
These open and greedy potential connections enable understandings and transformations 
that bounded (closed) individuals cannot engage with, which constrains their 
participation in ethical change for disenfranchised others. But maybe, for cyborgs, and 
other kin (or otherkin, as Haraway puts it), science fiction can disrupt, corrupt and 
interrupt power relations and infiltrate neoliberal politics in ways that, at the very least, 
irritate the hierarchy. Those who enjoy sci-fi “are accustomed to the lively and 
irreverent arts of fan fiction. Story arcs and worlds are fodder for mutant 
                                                          
17 As I am reading, researching and writing my project, we are living through weirdly co-mingled worlds 
of Hollywood and politics that sees reality TV business man Donald Trump elected president of the 
United States of America. Just as Donna Haraway was crafting her cyborg manifesto through the bizarre 
turmoil of the Ronald Reagan presidency (the first example of a Hollywood actor turned president) in the 
1980s, I write and research through strange Trump times. 
37 
 
transformations or for loving but perverse extensions” (Haraway, 2016, p. 136). 
Neoliberal individualism may be insidious, but science fiction could be pervasive. 
 
“Then at a deadly pace It Came From Outer Space 
and this is how the message ran...”18 
Connecting through the work of Braidotti, Haraway and Barad, Kember (2011) 
uses the science fiction of aliens (fiction?!) to explore the potent political non-human-
ness of positions such as ‘feminist’ and other ‘others.’ She aims to “enable feminist 
theory itself to become alien again” (Kember, 2011, p. 184), calling for attention to 
relationality in response to/with neoliberalism. Locating ‘feminism’ as a science fiction 
enables the kinds of possibilities that Haraway (1991, 1992), Braidotti (2006) and Barad 
(2003) imagine through the ‘posthuman’19: ethical responsibilities to the construction 
and political potencies of ‘others.’  
As demonstrated by Kember (2011), an explicit feminist connection to science 
fiction figures, tropes and media also opens new possibilities for politicised metaphors 
for women. Morgan (2004) questions the embodied experiences of human/machine 
boundary blurring through the film ‘Strange Days,’ and the ‘The Matrix’ trilogy has 
inspired the exploration of the blurred boundaries between male/female, 
masculine/feminine (see for example, Frentz & Rushing, 2002; Koller, 2005), staples of 
feminist theorising, technologised or otherwise. But ‘The Matrix’ trilogy, perhaps more 
significantly for sci-fi theorists, presents the intolerability of two worlds, the binary, the 
                                                          
18 (O’Brien, 1975). 
19 As with the notion of ‘post-feminism,’ the ‘posthuman’ is a problematic concept. Seems to me that 
Haraway, Braidotti and Barad theorise the ‘posthuman’ as a troubling of embodiment in the 21st century, 
rather than the more popularised understandings that utilise the ‘human’ as a category that can have a 
post- quality when augmented. For Haraway (2016), the vast and proliferating interconnectivity between 
humans (and between non-humans) undoes posthumanism: “All the tentacular stringy ones have made me 




either/or choice, mediated by technology, as simultaneously salvic (through protagonist 
Neo) and destructive. It employs computers and technologies as metaphors for human 
systems, and the potentialities of their connectivity and possibilities for information 
sharing and processing (Lee, 2005). Importantly it is Neo’s “capacity to operate outside 
the rules of given structures” (Bartlett & Byers, 2003, p. 37) that offers new possibilities 
and transformative politics (and saves the day!). For Neo, and perhaps also for feminist 
researchers, shifting beyond the limits of the technological, social, political and physical 
structures imposed through dominant systems enables new and powerful embodied 
politics. Neo was not always able to operate outside the dominant structures (nor was he 
ever allowed to…), but once he figured out how “… by ceasing to think the way he has 
been programmed to think in his false reality…” (Frentz & Rushing, 2002, p. 76), the 
task of dismantling the dominant, oppressive structures became achievable, “granting 
the techno-human a model of progressiveness, (pro)creativity and possibility” (Lee, 
2005, p. 563). Through thinking through different thoughts, it is possible to reject the 
fixed singularity of so-called ‘reality’ and instead function in alternative ways, moving 
the body otherwise, through multiple, networked connections. It mattered what thoughts 
Neo thought with. Much as Neo transformed how he moved in his worlds, feminist (sci-
fi) theorists seek to transform how we can move in ours. For example:  
Neo finally enters the role of The One, not as a form of 
transcendence, but as an indication that he has rejected the 
normative and regulatory fictions – of the real and of gender – 
that have been imposed by The Matrix. (Wolmark, 2002, p. 84)  
Through such a technological transformation, the taken-for-granted power structures 
that violently inscribe, restrict and control bodies are fictionalised and therefore opened 
to reconfiguration through cyborg politics. 
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In ‘The Matrix’ trilogy, Neo becomes the figure of resistance and transformative 
politics through his embodied connectivity with machines. The dissolution of his 
biological and technological boundaries enabled new ways of moving in and through 
the matrix, and thus the disruption of the matrix. For feminist theorists in psychology, 
the figure of the cyborg can offer similar disruptive positionings. The cyborg can 
embody multiple, partial, simultaneous contradictions and produce (and be produced 
by) noninnocent (not unified) politics. As a sci-fi figure, the cyborg is born from the 
blurred boundaries of technology and biology, pulled (and perhaps repelled) together by 
fantastical dreams (fiction) of potential realities (science). Through the hybridisation of 
science and fiction, Haraway (1991) suggests, “… a ‘cyborg’ feminism that is perhaps 
more able to remain attuned to specific historical and political positionings and 
permanent partialities without abandoning the search for potent connections” (p. 1).  
However, science fiction, as a genre for psychology, and feminist researchers, 
continues to be subordinated to the traditional, structure-maintaining (and therefore 
‘legitimate’) genre that has been analysed as detective (Squire, 1990). A series of sci-fi 
feminist theorists, operating as tokens (as, for example, one of the token diversity 
papers or chapters), and fragmented by their tokenism, attempt to argue for 
transformative politics (for theory, for research, for practice) but are continually 
marginalised as those ‘other’ technophilic feminists who are merely producing 
patriarchal technologies as dominant, or are policed as academic deviants. As such there 
is a disconnect (something Haraway had been seeking to avoid) between the 
transformative potentialities offered through science fiction, theoretically, and the 
outcomes of research that deal with technological interventions on/in the (woman’s) 




“I didn’t come here to tell you how 
this is going to end.” – Neo20 
In ‘The Matrix,’ Neo is asked to choose between the Red Pill and the Blue Pill. 
Taking the Red Pill means Neo will experience ‘reality,’ the world as it really is, the 
‘truth’ in all its horror. Taking the Blue Pill means Neo will experience the world as 
constructed, detached from ‘reality’ and ‘truth,’ but a little easier to bear (see Silver, 
Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999). Online, Red Pill-ers are a men’s rights movement 
that is, unsurprisingly, anti-feminist and claims that feminists cannot see or accept the 
‘reality’ that they are already equal to men, and always have been, or that they are just 
naturally inferior to men, and should accept this as ‘reality.’ The Blue Pill is an online 
feminist movement that satirises the Red Pill movement, set up to dismantle Red Pill 
arguments and engage in discussions about gender and sexism.  
The matrix, in the movie trilogy, refers to the Red Pill world: reality, an 
apocalyptic world destroyed by man’s wars against his own technologies. Such a 
representation could be viewed as an indictment of masculine ‘reality,’ even if it is 
celebrated by masculine voices as the only ‘legitimate’ experience. 
Neo, despite his decision to take the Red Pill, wants to enable a world “without 
borders or boundaries, a world where anything is possible” (Silver, Wachowski & 
Wachowski, 1999). He rejects ‘reality’ as experienced through the Red Pill, and desires 
the blurred boundaries between the constructed Blue Pill world and Red Pill ‘reality,’ 
disrupting that dominant/subjugated binary where ‘reality’ as singular and fixed is 
privileged. In the film explicitly, ‘Neo’ is an anagram for ‘One,’ and implicitly, ‘neo’ 
also means ‘new.’ While (fan and academic) analyses of the film tend to focus on the 
film’s use of ‘Neo’ to mean ‘The One’ as in a typical hero narrative, it is possible to 
                                                          
20 (Silver, Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999). 
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interpret ‘Neo’ as not only ‘one,’ but as an enabler of instead multiple ‘new’ 
constructions and realities. The doubled meaning of his name travels alongside an 
instrumental figure for Neo: Trinity, a woman who explicitly represents multiplicity, not 
singularity or dualisms.  
Science fiction is about the possibilities that Neo imagines. For psychology, 
science fiction serves as a genre for thinking the idea that as researchers we are opening 
up possibilities and enabling new understandings of both old, repeated problems (of 
health, safety, dignity), as well as understandings of the new ways in which these 
problems manifest in a 21st century thus far characterised by technology, globalisation 
and neoliberalism. 
Ideas such as partiality, simultaneity, multiplicity, flux, fluidity are Blue Pill 
ideas. That is, psychology’s privileging of the empirical sciences for the production of 
(legitimate) theory subjugates feminist theory that acknowledges and enjoys, perhaps 
unhappily, the multiplicity and partiality of women’s lived experiences. Feminist 
researchers bring fraught enjoyment with them into their theorising, but alas, there is no 
time or space in science for partialities and multiplicities. So feminist researchers’ 
participation in psychology shifts to the fringes, where instead, perhaps much more 
comfortably, boundaries with ‘other’ disciplines blur, and we find ourselves at home 
again, with the discomfort of our partial positions as psychology researchers and rejects 
(and perhaps more bluntly, as women). Hence, when searching for work by feminist 
psychology theorists that is about a genre shift to science fiction in psychology, I am 
often left wanting (as women often are… perhaps I should be less surprised…). In my 
own experience of writing a feminist theoretical psychology paper for a psychology 
journal, and having it accepted on the grounds that we re-write it as a totally different 
paper that conformed to the traditional scientific model, privileging the method and the 
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results, as well as participating in the “tyranny of clarity” (Haraway, 2004, p. 333), I 
know too well that feminist theory in psychology is heavily policed, presided over by 
dominant theoretical and practical interests that do not give way for alternative ways of 
doing things, lest all hell break loose. There is something intellectually traumatising 
about not quite having your idea ripped to shreds, but the way you thought it beaten into 
traditional and mainstream submission. As a feminist researcher in the Red Pill 
psychology Matrix, I feel surrounded by Agent Smith, a replicating program in ‘The 
Matrix’ trilogy who seeks to shut Neo down; those policing voices of dominant 
psychology, silencing potential possibilities in favour of the rigidity and clarity that only 
the Red Pill-privileged can enjoy.21 Science fiction opens space for feminist researchers 
to simultaneously experience the embodied conflicts of their positions (within academia 
and in their everyday lives) as well as imagine possibilities for alternative positions.  
Traditional psychology, in which feminist researchers are deeply embedded, 
however uncomfortably, demands separate, logical and linear theory that can be 
packaged up neatly and reported concisely. This is characterised by individualising and 
categorising thinking as it participates in and privileges binaries. The assumption that a 
                                                          
21 I am re-reading this sentence after presenting some work at an informal presentation day with other 
doctoral students. I presented some work with idea choice and organisation that focused on The Weaver 
as a metaphor for choosing and organising ideas. After my presentation, the only question I was asked 
was whether or not my supervisors knew I was doing this work with a Weaver. Previous presentations of 
my research were more focused on something relatively tangible for general audiences, like discussing 
ethics, or describing what could be considered a ‘finding,’ but my Weaver presentation was an inside look 
at cyborg processes, distinctly outside the frame of reference for a mainly science-focused (disciplined) 
audience. The asked question was one of simultaneous confusion, concern and policing. As I tried to 
communicate in my presentation, mainstream psychological research is something we all, as psychology 
students, get taught and understand to some extent. Peeking behind the curtain of non-traditional research 
can horrify. But traditional ways of doing psychology encourage closed responses, like policing, rather 
than engagement. Those not following the rules are to be challenged, not engaged with, which generates 
angry or irritated or offended (or all of the above) responses. It highlights the delightful dangerousness of 
sharing certain unapologetic ideas even with peers who are themselves engaged in the scary doctoral 
process. The speed with which the tone of the room changes when an alternative view is presented and 
how personally offended some can become when asked to engage with something else, something extra, 




traditional linear trajectory of thinking/inquiry makes sense is erroneous, since it 
implies that component sections of the process are separate and logical, not 
simultaneous, blurred, open to reconfiguration as others engage. As well, there is the 
absurdity of privileging the linear, in a time of accelerated technological expanse.  
Take, for example, theorising on the concept of simulated consciousness.22 By 
cyborg standards, the concept is fairly neatly organised through dismantling the 
neoliberal individual in favour of hyperconnected text in the chaos of users online. 
However, generally the concepts of ‘simulated consciousness’ and ‘artificial 
intelligence’ are conflated, meaning the two concepts are used interchangeably to 
discuss what usually amounts to ‘artificial intelligence.’ In psychology (and to be fair, 
other ‘sciences’ too), somehow, ‘intelligence’ and ‘consciousness’ are separated. There 
is a blurred boundary between the two concepts, but they are not considered the same. 
So when we talk as if ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘simulated consciousness’ are identical 
constructs, it is quite possible that we have got our metaphors disastrously mixed. It 
seems absurd to model the technological systems that govern our now global critical 
infrastructure on our (limited) understandings of how we can replicate the functioning 
of human intelligence or consciousness when we cannot even decide on how each of 
those concepts are meaningful, let alone understanding how they might blur together. 
As Haraway says, it matters what ‘thoughts think thoughts.’ 
 
Detectives and Science Fiction 
Since around the same time as Haraway introduced us to cyborg thinking, 
psychology has been analysed as traditionally following a detective genre (Squire, 
1990): investigating psychological problems expressed as mental illness and disorder. In 
                                                          
22 I have attached the unpublished (at time of writing) paper proceedings as an appendix. 
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this genre, the figure of the detective (the psychologist or psychology theorist) collects 
clues to narrow in on the ‘facts’ of the case. We detect the problem (crime?), collect 
evidence, and we solve it, creating a closed narrative of the events and players. 
According to Squire (1990):  
the detective story is concerned with events to which it attributes 
definite meanings, rather than with inner experiences or multiple 
meanings. But the detective story’s quest for knowledge follows 
events which concern the self, rather than the social, cultural 
body. This quest is pursued most importantly through the central 
figure, the detective, who furthers the narrative by discovering 
missing knowledge. This figure is an outsider, and enemy of 
criminals and, more broadly, of any moral order which permits 
or produces them. (p. 39)  
The detective genre suggests that knowledge is ‘missing’ and therefore must be ‘found’ 
in order to establish the so-called ‘facts’ and close the narrative. An example of the 
detective genre in action is the psychological investigation of pro-anorexia, which has 
concerned itself with the ‘guilt’ of pro-anorexics and pro-anorexia websites, finding 
clues of deviance in the subculture’s content and calling for the execution of websites 
for the safety of vulnerable female masses (Connor & Coombes, 2014; Connor, 
Coombes & Morgan, 2015). Here, psychology detectives follow ‘clues’ like anti-
psychology sentiments and the rejection of the authority of Western medical knowledge 
in favour of embodied experience to discover ‘deviance,’ taking action to establish the 
‘facts’ of pro-anorexia in preparation to apprehend and punish the pro-anorexic 
deviants. Such deviants have been constructed as guilty of both mental illness and the 
incitement of mental illness, and they are duly banished from online society, which 
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apparently solves the problem. The detective narrative enables psychology detectives to 
become proficient at “setting up a problem, an unresolved crime, and resolving it, step 
by step,” the narrative crystallising “interest in logical completeness, or closure” 
(Squire, 1990, p. 39), privileging those masculinist notions of finality, fixity and 
definitive categorisations. By the end of the story we know the ‘facts’: that pro-
anorexics are guilty of psychological crimes; of deviating from, and fictionalising, the 
advice of the health professionals. 
Psychological texts “resemble detective stories in a number of ways. Like them, 
they begin with a problem, and try to investigate and resolve it logically. Introduction, 
method, results and discussion, strung together in this order, generate a chronological, 
continuous, closed narrative” (Squire, 1990, p. 39). Detectives think as if there is a 
continuous chronology of a closed narrative logically arranging distinct steps that a 
detective follows to produce the ‘facts’ of any case. Within a science fiction genre, these 
chronological steps may blur to the extent that adhering to them makes them illogical.23 
How do you write up research as a traditional detective story when results and method 
are explicitly simultaneous and emergent? Work on these allegedly distinct research 
steps might happen simultaneously, crafting as we go, moving arguments around, 
eliminating some and replacing them with others. As much as psychology produces a 
clear and concise detective narrative through its text, it is a Frankensteinian process to 
actually produce this text. What is a literature review, for instance, other than the 
collection of parts to create the semblance of a whole? 
Psychological and detective texts alike “discover knowledge about the 
individual subject through events, or behaviours, rather than through less certain 
experiences or meanings. And they, too, are preoccupied with the morality of these 
                                                          
23 Surely producing an absurd gait.  
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events” (Squire, 1990, p. 40), producing linear and closed narratives about individuals, 
reproducing masculinist fixity and boundedness of body and mind. The detective 
interrogates a suspect for a confession, or pressures an informant for information that 
uncovers or confirms the ‘facts’ of the case and plugs holes in or continues the linearity 
of the narrative. There is sense that clue-following and fact-finding can be done 
righteously when specific procedures are followed: “For although an experiment seems 
to be pursuing facts, it is committed more to the scientific process than to the facts 
themselves” (Squire, 1990, p. 40). The detective narrative focuses on following a strict 
code of ethics and procedures that cannot deviate, in order to successfully embody the 
righteous detective as they collect the evidence through ‘rigorous’ procedures and 
establish a fixed linear progression of ‘facts.’ This may come at the expense of actual 
ethical practice, ignoring the social in favour of the bounded neoliberal individual: 
informed consent, privacy and the detective’s (and the institution’s) integrity. Such 
practices ironically extract a cost from the individual who is pathologised, criminalised, 
psychologically incarcerated. These individualised and fixed ethical processes are often 
prioritised over methodological approaches that may be more ethically resonant with the 
research. If “chaos and errors” (Squire, 1990, p. 40) are occurring in the social world, 
then psychological research practice must attend to these as possibilities, rather than as 
glitches or impediments to the ordered presentation of fixed ‘facts.’ Perhaps the 
separation into distinct and ordered steps and facts is not as much a concern as the 
pretence or insistence that they are distinct in the interests of phallocentric binaries: 
dominance/subjugation and gendered power relations. The psychology detective’s 
concern for ordered steps and distinct ‘facts’ is “… phallic logic, the deeply ingrained 
way of thinking in terms of separations and either/or” (Hollway, 2016, p. 145) that 
maintains dominance and subjugation and thus ‘social order.’ 
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Moreover, it “remains conventional to wrap up the whole text in a single 
reading, presented as if born from the rational consciousness of a particular reader, 
engaging with the text of a singular author” (Morgan, 2013, p. 123). Questions 
remaining at the end of the detective’s investigation are reduced to errors in 
implementing the procedures or the irresponsibility of the individuals involved (lying, 
cheating neoliberal individuals!), not necessarily the inappropriateness of the 
procedures. Detective genres have little scope for thinking through loose ends. 
However, feminist science fiction, like the work of Donna Haraway, instead focuses on 
the notion that “observing, participating, representing, and being are not separate, but 
open to each other and co-produced” (Scott, 2010, p. 8), and through science fiction, 
“openness, contingency, and alterity are privileged over closure” (p. 8); closure which is 
required by the detective narrative. The privileging of the detective genre suggests that 
the reading of any given psychological text is assumed to be closed: meaning is 
consistent, clear and concise, despite everything from the research process itself to lived 
experience being anything but consistent, clear and concise. The detective genre’s 
“tyranny of clarity” (Haraway, 2004, p. 333) denies the pleasure of wallowing in the 
ambiguities and reproduces binaries (most notably in psychology, the valid/invalid, 
normal/deviant and healthy/sick binaries). Detective stories may be complex, but they 
cannot be open-ended or contradictory. Psychology detectives, as both writers and 
readers, need to know which side of the binary psychological text is on. It is not ethical 
neoliberal detective work to implode/collapse the binaries, as the split between the 
binaries is the only thing separating the detective from the corrupt. Perhaps in science 
fiction can we survive the implosion/collapse.24   
                                                          
24 Possibilities are invoked here to avoid collapsing detective and science fiction genres into a binary 
relationship. While the two genres are often presented together in this thesis, they are two among many 
possibilities, and neither are by any means totally distinct from the other (or any other genres). 
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What science fiction as a genre allows for in psychology is a shift from 
individualism to culture. Interpreting text as cultural production, for example, opens 
new possibilities for social relations, political movements and ethics. Importantly, an 
“interpretive emphasis on genre as opposed to individual texts can help remind us of the 
social nature of the production and interpretation of texts” (Chandler, 1997, p. 5). Here, 
the internet emerges as a domain that typifies the social production of text. Interpreting 
the internet’s text through a detective’s procedures constructs individuals as producers 
of individual text for which they are responsible. Indeed, many websites explicitly state 
this in their terms of service. Through the detective genre, individuals interact to 
produce text that is assumed to be representative of social interaction, a series of events 
to be corroborated; however, in science fiction, the texts can be seen as hypernetworked, 
productive and reproductive of culture, rendering the question of what happens next 
obsolete, and instead asks what is being produced, how and what this means for 
embodied lives.  
Text as productive, rather than representational, “leads to a breakdown of the 
conventional hierarchies between writers and readers, and challenges the conventional 
authority of the single author” (Lefanu, 1988, p. 6). Texts are connected with other texts 
and readers and authors are connected and constituted through these texts. In science 
fiction, unlike the detective’s account, the author is no longer the authority on the 
production and interpretation of the text. If text is in constant dialogue with other text, 
then text continually challenges the authority of the author. If the reader can participate 
in the network of power, then the reader is no longer subjugated by the author’s 
dominance as the textual authority. The reader/author are instead networking, 
connecting and participating in the “… dissolution of structures and its open-endedness” 
(Lefanu, 1988, p. 22), as well as working to “… break down certainties…” (p. 23), 
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breaking down fixed binaries and opening the possibilities for the reconfiguration of 
social and political power relations. 
New technologies offer new possibilities in the 21st century, but this does not 
mean that social and political power relations transform. It can be argued that these new 
technologies reproduce the same power relations, but in new ways: it is “just as likely 
that these new technologies will be primarily utilized to tell old stories – stories that 
reproduce, in high-tech guise, traditional narratives of the subject” (Steffensen, 2002, p. 
216). Thus, technology may offer emancipatory potential, but this potential may not be 
realised (or at least, not realised in the ways we first thought) as old power relations 
dominate the new technologies of power. 
However, engaging with technology and bodies as science fictions can offer 
possibilities for realising these new power relations and exposing the old ones. Science 
fiction can open space for the simultaneous and contradictory ways of negotiating these 
power relations through networks of power, rather than binaried dominant/subjugated or 
capillaried notions of power:  
The vision imagines a network of forces and powers – 
discursive, disciplining, social, political, economic, ecological, 
biotechnological – through which specific bodies are located in 
space and time and, right now, as identities in relation to nodes 
which are relative centres in the ebb and flow of the network. 
(Morgan, 2013, p. 125)  
Any node can connect with another node, proliferating connections and networking 
power that can bypass old power notions, rendering them impotent. A re-wiring of 
power through expansive hyperconnected multi-dimensional networks rather than top-
down linear hierarchies enables women to “test the limits of the dominant ideology of 
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gender by proposing alternative possibilities for social and sexual relations which 
conflict with the dominant representations” (Wolmark, 1994, p. 55) through the 
proliferating network of hyperconnections that implode/collapse traditional power 
relations. Networked connections usurp hierarchical binary power relations and 
proliferate technoculture that can offer new possibilities for gendered embodied lives. 
Reconfiguring women’s bodies as technocultural, not unified as natural, renders such 
bodies “open to resignification, reinterpretation” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 110). The meanings 
of othered bodies, through science fiction “may be endlessly deferred and re-negotiated” 
(Mitchell, 2006, p. 126). This makes sense for women’s bodies, as they shape-shift 
through childhood, puberty, pregnancy and older age, as well as through disease and 




Popular culture’s fascination with science fiction is rooted in the combination of 
strangeness and familiarity that make up the particularities of the genre. This tension 
between the “known” and the “unknown” is at the heart of science fiction. It creates a 
reading process based on estrangement, which places familiar issues into strange 
territory… (Melzer, 2010, p. 3) 
 
Through the use of science fiction genre, we can “make strange the stories which 
constrain, or make dangerous, women’s lives” (Burns, 2009, p. 109). Science fiction, 
unlike the traditional detective genre, needs explanation. It is through such explanation 
that women’s lives and the social, historical and cultural contexts they inhabit become 
strange. Re-telling women’s gendered history explicates the bizarre ways through which 
women and their bodies have been constructed in dominant patriarchal discourse: 
“Estrangement from one’s own culture (a perception of it as fiction) leads to the 
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questioning of all stories (aka facts) about human nature” (Oakley, 2009, p. 120). 
Women can be simultaneously estranged from and produced through the patriarchal 
cultures they find themselves embedded in, as ‘others,’ so we can see ourselves as 
strange sci-fi characters in a strange world.  
 For Haraway (1991), there is “nothing about being ‘female’ that naturally binds 
women. There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female, itself a highly complex 
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices” 
(p. 155). What women have to order and describe their lived experiences are a series of 
discourses constructed about them by (phallocentric, Eurocentric) 
science/philosophy/religion. The group ‘women’ can be alien and frightening 
sometimes, and as such, it is perpetually being contested: “Painful fragmentation among 
feminists (not to mention among women) along every possible fault line has made the 
concept of woman elusive, an excuse for the matrix of women’s dominations of each 
other” (Haraway, 1991, p. 155). Such fragmentations and dominations are reflected in 
current social politics characterised by the dissolution of ‘women’ and reification of the 
‘other’ in place of ‘women.’ The rejection of Western feminism as white and 
transphobic serves to fragment women’s rights into ‘others’ rights, as if women are a 
minority. There is little doubt that Western feminism has looked white and therefore 
privileged through much of its visibility. Indeed, white women were the faces of 
Suffrage, demanding the right to vote: a right that perhaps seemed unurgent to a 
starving woman or a beaten woman, but a right that, theoretically, aimed to achieve 
rights that the starving and the beaten urgently needed. If women are allowed into 
political life, they can make political changes. Or so we thought. Western women 
(mainly white) have created social, cultural and political space, mainly for themselves, 
and yet this space is still small, fraught and contested. There is a collective (ironically) 
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forgetting that feminism is a doing word, not a category: “The cyborg is a kind of 
disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the self 
feminists must code” (Haraway, 1991, p. 163). 
Science fiction narratives can express “when the alien becomes the expression of 
a culture’s simultaneous fear of and desire for the other” (Wolmark, 1994, p. 3). There 
is extremely high-demand for digital women and their bodies (mainly in the form of 
porn – professional, amateur and non-consensual), while at the same time women and 
their bodies are denigrated, abused and ostracised from online communities (Mantilla, 
2013). Woman is alien to the online world and alienated from technology. Research on 
women’s experiences and uses of technology has served to account for and coercively 
control women’s use of technology. Burke Winkelman, Oomen-Early, Walker, Chu and 
Yick-Flanagan (2015) surveyed women who use social media, found that women 
experience harassment online and recommended women protect themselves from 
harassment, including a lists of ‘dos and don’ts’ for individual women to achieve 
personal responsibility for their safety online. Chen (2015) found that women blog for 
lots of different reasons. Oberst, Renau, Chamarro and Carbonell (2016) found that 
people, especially women people, want to minimise expressions of gender online. 
Gender differences in social media use are a popular detective line of inquiry (see 
Döring, Reif & Poeschl, 2016; Joiner et al., 2014; Tifferet & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2014). In 
addition, Brown and Tiggemann (2016) found that women’s body image is negatively 
affected by viewing their peers’ bodies and celebrity bodies online. Ghaznavi and 
Taylor (2015) came to the conclusion that ‘thinspiration’ promotes the thin ideal. 
Alleva, Martijn and Jansen (2016) used a computer program to assess women’s 
evaluations of their bodies in connection with social feedback (positive and negative). 
And even more bizarrely, Ho (2014) researched women’s visual attention to handbags 
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when online shopping. The above cacophony of examples is a snapshot of psychology 
detectives finding ‘facts’ to produce knowledge about women that constructs women as 
alien from technology, and their use of technology and/or their embeddedness in 
technoculture, as deficient, particularly with the focus on women’s ‘negative body 
image’ and online harassment that reproduces women’s bodies through the 
positive/negative binary. Even the ‘positive’ things that women do online are often 
framed through sickness or deficiency – for example cancer survivor (de Boer & 
Slatman, 2014) or weight loss blogging (Trainer, Brewis, Wutich, Kurtz & 
Niesluchowski, 2016) or other support networks like infertility blogs (Bronstein & 
Knoll, 2015). 
Amplifying women’s technoalienation, technology has “troubling patriarchal 
origins” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 117), making technology’s connection with women’s body 
politics strange. Women are excluded from technology, as it is cultural, not natural 
(women’s domain), so these ubiquitous connections are odd and make for potentially 
awkward feminist encounters, where simultaneous participation in and resistance to 
these technopatriarchal origins produces a contradictory and ambivalent image of a 
feminist cyborg figure (Melzer, 2010).   
But as Haraway suggests, “it is a mistake to assume much about species in 
advance of an encounter” (Potts & Haraway, 2010, p. 324). Much has been assumed 
about cyborgs, and women, before any ‘encounters,’ but these assumptions are typically 
faulty, or at the very least partial. Women are becoming cyborg, natureculture. We are 
encountering a species that negates hegemonic assumptions and challenges them. That, 
in a patriarchal world, is a very strange thing.  
Science fiction as a genre blurs the boundary between the real and the fictive, 
the familiar and the strange. This is what opens new possibilities and allows for the 
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creative examination of the positions we find ourselves in: “‘Creating’ means 
imaginatively bringing new things into being, a process which starts from what already 
exists and then departs from it” (Squire, 1991, p. 185). There is potential to ‘make 
strange’ elements of our lived experience that look and feel familiar, but in key, perhaps 
political, ways differ from the experience that has been/is being constructed. Science 
fiction allows for women to simultaneously live their embodied lives in conflict as well 
as imagine possibilities for alternative positionings. The simultaneity of science fiction 
acknowledges experience while simultaneously experiencing, through metaphor, how a 
different embodied experience may feel and be enacted. 
Science fiction is the negation of reality (and virtual space the negation of ‘real’ 
space), “but perhaps this negation is the real illusion” (Haraway, 1992, p. 325). Within 
such illusory negations is where metaphor articulates experience better than the even 
‘stranger’ explanations that we construct through discourse. The collapses between 
real/imagined, real/metaphor and science/fiction draw attention to the strangeness of our 
lived experiences. What becomes strange then is the metaphor’s capacity to better 
articulate experience than more ‘real’ descriptions (as constructed through the 
psychology detective’s narrative). Metaphor is about “… the necessity of initiating an 
active process of interpretation on the part of the reader” (Heuser, 2003, p. xxxviii), 
requiring the reader to image their own possibilities, rather than accept the ending 
proposed in the closed narrative of the detective story. Science fiction alerts us to our 
open-endedness, hybridity, contradictions and partialities, and this can be very, very 
strange for a neoliberal individualist body. 
 
Morality/Ethics 
Propelling the reader (and writer) into another world (for example, asking the 
reader to inhabit the history of women’s bodies), demands an engagement with moral 
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and ethical dilemmas (Burns, 2009). Simultaneity and contradiction do not allow for 
easy ethical considerations. The reader must think about how to engage, ethically, 
within this new world, rather than being told (as in the detective narrative) what their 
ethical stance should be. 
Even in critical theoretical psychological work, the detective genre necessitates 
theoretical ambiguities be resolved into “accepted psychological terms” (Squire, 1991, 
p. 185). The necessity for resolution ignores the simultaneity, contradiction and 
multiplicity of these theoretical psychological terms, particularly for ‘othered’ groups 
such as women. If something is theoretically ambiguous, there must be something going 
on, and a science fiction genre, with all its uncertainties, new possibilities and hybrid 
creatures, can accommodate the complexity and noninnocence of theoretical 
ambiguities, instead of demanding their resolution. 
Science fiction can also extrapolate politics: “not so much to make them come 
out “right,” as to make them move “differently”” (Haraway, 1992, p. 326). In the 
detective genre, power trickles (or floods) down. In the science fiction genre, power is a 
network, expansive, connected and dealing in information. The question of 
power/knowledge is no longer simple in science fiction. Ethical decisions are not 
straightforward. Power is not top-down and binaried, but instead expansive and non-
fixed. How we engage then with questions of ethics becomes a matter of connections 
and interrelations beyond the transactions of neoliberalism. Science fiction teaches us to 
be accountable/responsible for ethical decisions (Haraway, 1992), but in relation to one 
another, not ethical guidelines premised on individualism that is more attuned to 
personal responsibility than social and political resonance. We must be aware of the 
ethical implications of our text for bodies and embodied lives together, for in science 
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fiction, the stakes are high. In the detective narrative, justice is at stake. But in science 
fiction, survival is at stake, worlds are stake, universes are at stake.  
 
Transgressions/Multiplicities 
In traditional research, “the subject matter and method of investigation are 
conceived as independent of each other” (Unger, 1983, p. 11). In science fiction, these 
boundaries, at the very least, blur, transgressing taken-for-granted distinct boundaries 
between methodology, data and researcher, acknowledging the potent potentials of such 
‘categories’ being connected to and constituted within each other: text is open-ended 
and always in dialogue with other text.  
In particular, the blurred connections between researchers and the objects of 
their inquiries can be acknowledged in science fiction. The mutual interdependence 
between these figures, and the text they produce, is significant. Where psychology’s 
traditional research questions can “have different meanings for the observer and the 
actor” (Unger, 1983, p. 25), science fiction characters can tease out the complexities of 
these plural, multiple and simultaneous meanings. The multiplicity of meanings here, 
through science fiction, can be attended to as a point of interest (tense or otherwise); 
whereas in the detective narrative, these ethical connections can be actively ignored and 
hierarchical power structures enforced.  
As a genre of new possibilities, science fiction is a kind of “…qualified, 
uncertain exploration beyond the conclusions derived from evidence” (Squire, 1990, p. 
44). As Oakley (2009) suggests, science fiction allows us to “be comfortable with not 
knowing quite what happened, and it may, indeed, be valuable to encourage readers to 
reach their own conclusions” (p. 121). Rather than providing answers that close down 
theoretical possibilities, the science fiction genre requires engagement with theory in 
order to open the possibilities to better theories. Such open uncertainties allow for 
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multiple and partial, simultaneous and contradictory possibilities, like non-linear 
understandings of events, the dissolution of ‘facts’ into chaos and the disruption of 
‘normalcy’ through the privileging of ‘otherness.’ Rather than fixing and clarifying 
certain facts, science fiction enables the fluidity of knowledge as situated, in flux and 
chaotic.  
Science fiction, as genre, serves as a portal through which to hypothesise how 
our technoobsessions and fear of vast unknowns might work out for us if we pursue 
them. It is “… a stage on which we imagine humanity’s fate, and it is in its fantastic 
extrapolations that we develop terminology to describe our future” (Melzer, 2010, p. 3). 
Science fiction allows for new ways of representing simultaneous, contradictory and 
partial experiences that have heretofore been too scary (from academically complex to 
literally too frightening) to attend to. Science fiction “presents ways of asking ‘What 
if?’ without having to adhere to what is currently possible” (Burns, 2009, p. 110).  
The blurred connections between science, imagination and metaphor serve to 
fictionalise, at its bastard origins, the idea of ‘truth’: science fiction can politicise the 
idea that The Truth™ exists. This is not to say that science fiction always does so. A 
significant proportion of the most popular science fiction narratives do not necessarily 
offer us as many new possibilities as we might need or want. ‘The Matrix’ trilogy is as 
much a saviour story as it is a science fiction exposé, as is the ‘Star Wars’ franchise, and 
so too ‘The Terminator’ franchise. Such movies replicate religion through science 
fiction narratives.25 Perhaps Western science and Western religion are doing the same 
                                                          
25 For ‘The Matrix’ as religion, see Ford (2000), Geraci (2007) and Milford (2010); for ‘Star Wars’ as 
religion, see Grimes (2007) and Kozlovic (2000); and for ‘The Terminator’ as religion, see Geraci (2007) 
and Koslovic (2000) again. All male writers! 
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thing, telling the same story, just through different tools. The quest for both is to answer 
life’s, allegedly, most important questions: why are we here? How did we get here?26  
As with both science and religion, the thinking that congeals at the fringes is 
much more interesting. It is to the marginalised, dirtier science fiction we need to look 
in order to experience more difficult politics and more important questions. Movies like 
‘District 9’ and ‘Another Earth’ still offer us religious principles, ‘loving thy neighbour’ 
and ‘seeking redemption’ respectively (although both are significantly more complex 
than those reductive phrases), but do so without saviours, or utopian understandings of 
how we can love our neighbours or redeem ourselves. 
‘District 9’ asks us to consider issues of oppression, race and class, a story told 
through a mix of found footage style, news style and documentary interview style (so 
multiple connections and familiar intersections between genres) (Hanson, Ferwerda & 
Blomkamp, 2009). While simultaneously engaging in multiple genres, there is also a 
twist to the science fiction genre: the viewer is asked to identify with the alien race; a 
sick, poor and tired race detained by the military on the authority of the government.27 
The humans, in this story, are violent oppressors, abusing and experimenting on a race 
deemed as dangerous and inferior.28 They are keeping the poor and sick, poor and sick. 
When one of these human oppressors (he’s a sympathetic one though!) is ‘infected’ 
with alien DNA and begins to transform into one of the despised ‘prawns,’ he becomes 
hunted and ostracised himself, which he unsurprisingly does not much enjoy.29 The 
                                                          
26 What terminally boring questions. 
27 Heller-Nicholas (2011) explores the movie’s connections to apartheid, globalisation and ‘reality.’ 
28 Nel (2012) discusses the ‘otherness’ of the prawns and their ‘repulsive’ bodies. 
29 van Veuren (2012) discusses the blurred body boundaries of the movie, while Kapstein (2014) 
discusses the movie in terms of the potentials of science fiction to tell stories about the ‘othered’ through 
the fear of the dissolution of boundaries: “We get the last laugh if we can harness hysteria and science 
fiction, which go hand in hand, for their potential energy, for their politics of transition, and for their 
frenetic fictiveness” (p. 173). 
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events of ‘District 9’ challenge that conservative, right-wing nightmare of being invaded 
by the sick and poor, and, perhaps the ultimate horror, becoming sick and poor 
themselves. The movie asks questions about what oppression might look like in possible 
times and places – do our narratives ever really shift? When we do things ‘for the good 
of the people,’ which people are we really talking about? 
Movies like ‘Another Earth’ ask questions about the contexts we find ourselves 
embedded in. A young woman engages in behaviour with traumatic consequences, and 
the discovery of another Earth offers her the possibility to see who she might have been 
had she made different choices,30 or perhaps confirm the inevitable repetition of certain 
experiences. If she were to meet herself, she would say “better luck next time” (Brodie, 
Mezey & Cahill, 2011). ‘Another Earth’ privileges the possibility of recurrence, of 
repetition of particular experiences, feelings and contexts as something that both 
restricts and emancipates particular troubled lives. Historically, the same groups of 
people remain oppressed, even if that oppression takes a different form in the present. 
Would this be any different on another earth? Is there redemption on another planet? 
The questions that ‘District 9’ and ‘Another Earth,’ as just two examples, ask 
seem more salient to the disenfranchised than the more popular and more widely viewed 
modern science fictions through their particular attention to the politics of ‘othered’ 
bodies and experiences. Narratives like ‘The Matrix,’ ‘Star Wars’ and ‘The Terminator’ 
still offer us politics, but in a much more familiar, (white) masculine form (the trials of 
the ‘oppressed’ white man who just wants to be a ‘free’ ‘individual’ and expects us all 
                                                          
30 ‘Another Earth’ has not enjoyed much academic theorising. de Oliveira Iuva (2016) discusses Rhoda’s 
exploration of her identity in the wake from her release from prison coupled with the discovery of Earth 
2, as well as the movie’s shift to the representation of women in science fiction both as protagonist(ish) of 
the movie and as a wannabe space explorer. de Oliveira Iuva’s (2016) analysis is written entirely in 
Spanish, and Google Translate only gets you so far… but the overall argument seems to be about how 
women writers and characters in sci-fi can tell new stories in new ways. 
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to want the same), hence their popularity and success (and iconic status in male-
dominated nerd-culture). But these sci-fi narratives are not necessarily those that can be 
potently transformative for the troubled embodied lives of women, for it matters ‘what 
thoughts think thoughts.’ So perhaps it is the science fiction at the edges (both the 
hardest and the most distant) that can enable narratives through which to think more 
disruptive thoughts and enact more persistent transformative embodied politics. 
The choice of metaphors to engage in science fiction writing (to think through), 
then, is important: “We cannot attempt to ‘translate’ what the metaphor says to us 
without losing a significant and crucial aspect of its meaning, mood, or attitude. 
Ultimately and fundamentally, metaphors resist all attempts at paraphrase” (Heuser, 
2003, p. xliv). Through metaphor, we are required to acknowledge hybridity. We have 
no choice, in metaphor, but to realise the blurred boundaries between binaries that we 
take for granted. Somewhere near these blurred boundaries is where the taken-for-
granted binaries become fictional, but within the context of lived experience. Metaphor 
references both the literal and the figurative, just as science fiction references both the 
science and the fiction. It also captures the real and the imaginary, a binary that must be 
resolved in a traditional detective narrative. Science fiction metaphor can, however, 
capture ineffable multiplicities. Science fiction can “render more vividly” changes in 
culture, theory and practice (Merrick, 2010, p. 142).   
Critical and feminist psychological work “in the process of extending and 
questioning this science, fictionalizes it” (Squire, 1991, p. 183), which works to 
destabilise it as the authority on psychological knowledge. In the West, there are ever-
proliferating connections between bodies and technologies, and the possibilities that 
these connections can produce. Science fiction can “dramatize these encounters and 
explore the ramifications of recent radical thinking on the gendered and technologized 
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body” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 109). Moreover, “science fiction’s inescapably functional 
nature makes the recognition of its suspension between realities and imagination easier” 
(Squire, 1991, p. 196). Metaphor, here, as it blurs the boundaries between women’s 
lived experience and feminist possibilities, makes clearer the complexities of women’s 
embodied lives. 
According to Haraway (1992), the science fiction genre is about “how to move 
and what to fear in the topography of an impossible but all-too-real present, in order to 
find an absent, but perhaps possible, other present” (p. 295). This is the simultaneous 
un/reality of science fiction that allows for a critique of the dangers and joys of 21st 
century life, particularly for women and feminist psychology. In the early 1990s, as the 
Western world logged into the internet, feminist theorists were dreaming emancipatory 
sci-fi dreams of women, cyberspace, resistance and new possibilities. Donna Haraway 
wrote of cyborgs and Corrine Squire wrote of science fiction as the genre for the future. 
However, few feminists have plugged into the sci-fi matrix. 
While Squire offered science fiction as a more politically charged and engaged 
genre for psychology to participate in, Donna Haraway was engaging the science fiction 
figure of the cyborg for feminist politics elsewhere. In an award acceptance speech, 
Donna Haraway recounts one of her (undoubtedly numerous) struggles to engage, 
academically, with science fiction, while also being a feminist, a science theorist and a 
story-teller. Haraway, of course, occupies contested space in academia:  
Equipped with a PhD in molecular, developmental, and 
evolutionary biology, I have earned a living as a humanities 
scholar in science studies and feminist studies, with a kind of 
green card to reside under strict surveillance in biological and 
cultural anthropology. (Haraway, 2013, para. 2)  
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Her work is always, and will always be at the blurred boundaries of multiple and partial 
disciplines (in every sense of the word). So when told to remove certain feminist, 
science fiction publications from her CV when applying for a promotion, she obeyed, 
knowing that such unseemly things as feminism and science fiction would hinder her 
chances of success in a masculine academic world. 
 But Haraway did not die when attacked with puny human academic weaponry, 
and has instead continued to argue that academia is a process of science fiction: “The 
tight coupling of writing and research—where both terms require the factual, fictional, 
and fabulated; where both terms are materialized in fiction and scholarship—seems to 
me to be built into SF’s techno-organic, polyglot, polymorphic wiring diagrams” 
(Haraway, 2013, para. 2). Haraway has long been a proponent of science fiction as a 
(blurry) genre with which to think and to do. While her figure of the cyborg is often 
held up (sometimes literally) as the most explicit example of her sci-fi leanings, the 
cyborg was always a figure within a more expansive and complex sci-fi world: 
Cyborgs were never just about the interdigitations of humans and 
information machines; cyborgs were from the get-go the 
materialization of imploded (not hybridized) human beings-
information machines-multispecies organisms. Cyborgs were 
always simultaneously relentlessly real and inescapably 
fabulated. Like all good SF, they redid what counts as—what 
is—real. (Haraway, 2013, para. 4) 
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is produced through the science fiction genre, 
engaging with the ideas of possibility, blurred boundaries, contradiction and open 
narrative, and as such, she offers a horrifying and hopeful metaphor for women’s 
politicised embodiment that opens new possibilities for women’s body politics. The 
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cyborg, as a feminist sci-fi figure, demonstrates the potential possibilities of dramatic 



























Chapter Two Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
 
Please enjoy an excerpt from an unfinished feminist science fiction screenplay: 
FADE IN. 
INTERIOR. FEMINIST ESCAPE POD. 
The feminists are talking again. 
 
(Haraway, 1992, p. 300) 
“Science fiction is generically concerned with the interpenetration 
of boundaries between problematic selves and unexpected others and 
with the exploration of possible worlds in a context structured by 
transnational technoscience”  
 
(BARAD, 2001, p. 104) 
“Perhaps what is needed is a “politics of possibilities”: ways of 
responsibly imagining and intervening in the re(con)figurations of 
power” 
 
(HARAWAY, 1989, p. 156) 
“The line between science and science fiction blurs, reading out an 
oppositional system of meanings and practices called history” 
 
(SQUIRE, 1991, p. 192) 
“Science fiction which devotes itself to the genre’s conventions 
produces a brief disruptive enjoyment, from the recurring 
possibility that, this time, the narrative’s conventions will not 
be fulfilled”  
 
[EXPLOSION IN DISTANCE] 
 
(RAPOPORT, 1977, p. 6) 
“Good science fiction has always dealt with human questions and 
issues under unusual circumstances, considering how the quality of 
life would be affected if we were to extrapolate from present 
situations, creating new ones”  
 
(SQUIRE, 1990, p. 44) 
“It wants to tell stories about a wholly real world, which science 




(HARAWAY, 2016, p. 150) 
“Although hardly free of the sterilizing narrative of wiping the 
world clean by apocalypse or salvation, the richest humus for their 
inquiries turned out to be SF – science fiction and fantasy, 
speculative fabulation, speculative feminism, and string figures. 
Blocking the foreclosures of utopias, SF kept politics alive”  
 
[A CYBORG ENTERS] 
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Chapter Three: The Cyborg 
 
 
We can argue that ‘women’ do not settle down as the borders of separate and 
stable community identities. Like the leaky female body, ‘women’ bleed across those 
borders. Like the productive female body, ‘women’ give birth to all sorts of new 
identities. Like the female body’s ‘troubling talent for making other bodies’, ‘women’ 
cannot be easily contained within a pure space defined by fixity and sameness. 
(Gedalof, 2000, p. 352) 
 
Swapping Binaries for Binary Code 
Women’s bodies fluctuate in their shape and function across their lifespans. 
Throughout childhood, we compliment little girls on their pretty dresses and hairstyles, 
while we ask little boys what they like to do. Girls learn to reserve their bodily functions 
for ‘private’ moments, while boys learn to celebrate every fluid and smell (Seid, 1994). 
Puberty, in particular, can be a public spectacle for young women, as their bodies’ 
changing shapes have attention drawn to them (Silverstein & Perlick, 1995). Even those 
women who experience few changes to their body shape during puberty will have this 
called to their, and everyone else’s, attention. In addition, the body of a pregnant woman 
undergoes massive changes, some highly visible (Johnson, 2010; Nicolson, Fox & 
Heffernan, 2010). And older women experience changes through menopause that hurt 
and are dismissed (Dillaway, 2005; Ussher, 2008). Women’s bodies are dieted (food 
intake and weight restricted); dyed (hair of various kinds); painted and styled (make-up 
and hair); dismembered (hair removal); surgerised (implanting, reducing, stapling) 
(Bartky, 1998). But for any woman, at any point in her life, her body, what it looks like 
and how it is functioning, is of significance to not only her, but the culture around her. 
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So, women’s bodies are strictly surveilled, monitored for infringements, 
punished for digressions (Balsamo, 1995; Bordo, 2004). Woman’s weight is constantly 
monitored in multiple ways. Her body shape too, is always monitored, with the size and 
shape of any given body part (visible or not) up for debate and re-shaping. Even down 
to a woman’s pores, women’s bodies are monitored for transgressions, regardless of 
whether these transgressions are ‘natural’ (in the sense of genetics and child-bearing, for 
example), or uncontrollable (like disability), or deliberate (for politics), or all of the 
above.  
Whether they be young, old, clothed, unclothed, pregnant, not pregnant, thin, fat, 
of any race and colour, of any social and political status, women’s bodies are contested 
public spaces (Bartky, 1998; Bordo, 2004; Morgan, 1991). Even explicitly private, 
intimate female embodiments are public property (for example, revenge porn and 
hacked images) (Henry & Powell, 2015b; Shah, 2015a, 2015b). The publicity of 
women’s bodies is amplified online, with any image of a woman’s body online 
receiving all kinds of commentary. 
Of course, these women’s bodies, public, private or otherwise, are plural, partial 
and multiple: “The home, workplace, market, public arena, the body itself—all can be 
dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
163). Any given body part is subject to a multiplicity of meanings and ways of talking 
about it. Breasts are the most obvious example. Breast feeding in public (online and off) 
is a contested act (Hausman, 2007). Simultaneously, images of women’s breasts as sex 
objects (through pornography and all the extra kinds of image sharing) are in high 
demand both online (consensual and non-consensual/coerced image sharing and virtual 
sexual harassment, for example) and offline (looks and comments, sexual harassment). 
Within the same body, within the same body parts, women embody these plural, 
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multiple, simultaneous and contradictory understandings (see Bartlett, 2000; Millsted & 
Frith, 2003 for more boobs).  
Thus, plural and contradictory embodied tensions are multiple and binary, 
producing the experience of impossible bodies and alternative positions and spaces to 
occupy. Women’s positions, whether inside, outside or irrelevant of the binaries can 
ache. There is violence in our taken-for-granted binaries: male/female, good/bad, 
healthy/sick, right/wrong, masculine/feminine, up/down, left/right, home/work, 
subject/object, public/private, real/not-real, alive/dead. Such binaries exclude 
complexities of women’s lived experience (Butler, 2004; Haraway, 1991). The example 
of the humble boob (that, by the way, did not cover details like the policing of the shape 
or colour of breasts and breast accessories like nipples) is a clear (if still partial) 
example of the multiplicities and contradictions that women and their bodies experience 
and are expected to unify under the skin of the Western individual. 
 So if a breast, one part of a woman’s many parts, is in and of itself so fraught 
with tensions between gendered binary oppositions (within women (like sex 
object/mother) and between women and men), then women’s political and social 
experiences become chaotically, tensely entangled. Women are required to be both 
feminine and masculine in order to take up space in the political sphere. Women are 
expected to prioritise both home and work; the postfeminist ‘we can have it all’ position 
(Genz, 2010). Women are expected to share their bodies publicly while keeping them 
explicitly private. Women are expected to achieve impossible body shapes, which 
means walking the line between real and not-real, healthy and sick. Women’s 
participation in the binaries, or at least the imposition of the binaries onto women and 
their bodies, is a fraught and violent process of becoming the ideal Western woman, an 
impossible and deadly serious process (Bohren et al., 2015; Moola & Norman, 2017; 
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Morgan, 1991). She is expected to embody both ends of the binaries, despite not having 
access to the joys that the privileged term in the binary enjoys, like the power of 
‘masculine’ performances. The cyborg appears at the residues that these tensions 
between intolerable, impossible binaries produce, and noninnocently emerges as 
multiple, simultaneous and partial. 
 
Hello, Cyborg 
Describing the form and function of Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is complex task, 
as the figure is multiple, partial and ever-in-flux. For Haraway in the late 1980s, the 
cyborg was a metaphor for female embodiment in the 21st century that allowed for and 
celebrated the multiplicity and contradiction of female embodiment (or at least, that is 
my interpretation). The Cyborg Manifesto serves to construct (an) alternative way/s to 
understand how to inhabit a woman’s body during tumultuous social and political times. 
Dominant discourse of these tumultuous times is singular (masculine, individualist), 
while discourse outside is ‘other,’ multiple and contradictory. Haraway’s cyborg 
embraces the fragmentation and incompatibility of ‘otherness.’ The cyborg metaphor 
emerges as a way for women to make sense of their ‘otherness’ and the multiple, 
fragmented and contradictory positions that (dominant, masculine) discourses have 
allowed for them, and offers a new way to live with discursively constructed bodies that 
are constantly being dismantled, updated and rebuilt. 










Haraway’s (1991) cyborg understands how the woman’s body has been built and 
rebuilt in and through discourse and the scars left by continual welding, cauterising and 
stitching of the woman’s body are embraced. Women’s bodies have traditionally been 
constructed as troublesome, as they leak, protrude and shape-shift, and they do these 
things both naturally and unnaturally. The meanings inscribed on these bodies can 
alienate and torture, rendering them uninhabitable. As women experience a multitude of 
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contradictions and multiplicities in their daily embodied lives (healthy/sick, fat/thin, 
food, sexuality), living as a cyborg may enable women to experience a discursive 
position free from, or perhaps rather revelling in, the dualistic tensions that loosen the 
nuts and bolts of their embodied lives. The figure of the cyborg can flourish in a cultural 
climate that views the woman’s body as a series of glitches that can be repaired, 
perfected and enhanced. Bodies are broken down into text, information and codes. 
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is a figure of complexity and challenging politics. 
Understandings of her cyborg have, at many times, been offensively singular. For 
example, some have slandered the cyborg as merely a distracting figure unironically 
participating in and producing the same patriarchal structures that ‘good’ feminists seek 
to disrupt. Hawthorne (1999) and Klein (1999) both argue that such a patriarchal 
metaphor as a cyborg does not extricate feminist theory from patriarchal structures, but 
rather has the potential to re-oppress women through the metaphor’s uncritical and 
technophilic application. But while the cyborg plays in the tangled military wires of 
high (patriarchal) technology, she is doing important, destructive and creative work that 
infiltrates and co-opts masculinist systems and patriarchal structures through the explicit 
and unapologetic use of such a patriarchal metaphor. The (unethical) decision to dismiss 
cyborgs as just boy-things doing just boy-work closes down opportunities for feminine 
exploitations and resistances that utilise all the tools at our disposal (even if they belong 
to the patriarchy). There is a lot at stake here: the politics of survival – the ‘other’ 
uprising. More complicated, conflicted, contradictory figures are vital to making sense 
of troubled embodied lives in troubled social-political-cultural times. Women could 




Cyborgs are not machines in just any sense, nor are they 
machine-organism hybrids. In fact, they are not hybrids at all. 
They are, rather, imploded entities, dense material semiotic 
“things” – articulated string figures of ontologically 
heterogeneous, historically situated, materially rich, virally 
proliferating relatings of particular sorts, not all the time 
everywhere, but here, there, and in between, with consequences. 
(Haraway, 2016, p. 104) 
The politics of Haraway’s cyborg emerge not solely from the construction of her figure 
through the metaphors of patriarchal technology (although her emergence through them 
is important for questioning the building and dismantling of women’s bodies), but also 
through the science fiction of the cyborg as a metaphor for the non-fixity, flux, 
contradiction, plurality and partiality of women’s embodiment and the woman’s body as 
a dynamic site for dynamic feminist politics. The political action of “seizing the tools to 
mark the world that marked them as other” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175) can enable new, 
frightening and urgent possibilities for re-doing embodiment in more potent ways. 
Now that I have built up the cyborg’s heroic potential (oops), another closing off 
of Haraway’s cyborg is that she was proposed as The Salvic Figure for Feminists to 
follow into the 21st century and hence the objections of feminists uncomfortable with 
such a (seemingly patriarchal) technological figure to lead the feminist movement (like 
Hawthorne (1999) and Klein (1999)). While science fiction certainly presents us with 
salvic figures, these are not the only figures who matter. Much as Neo, from ‘The 
Matrix’ trilogy, can be considered a salvic figure, he can also be considered a figure 
representing new, blurred boundaries. The cyborg is about opening new spaces and 
making new figures capable of emerging to do political work she cannot or will not do. 
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A singular reading of Haraway’s cyborg as salvic, or complicit with patriarchy, or as 
technophilia, denies her characterisation as multiple and simultaneous. The singular 
reading of the cyborg as a singular patriarchal character is produced through the 
detective’s collection of ‘clues’ about who the cyborg is, rather than how she is. The 
detective’s interpretation of Haraway’s cyborg as uncritically and unironically 
patriarchal within the hierarchical military-industrial complex that is academia is a point 
dutifully acknowledged by Haraway in her cyborg manifesto: “The main trouble with 
cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism” (Haraway, 1991, p. 151). 
However, here lies the crux31 of the cyborg (non)origin story: “But illegitimate 
offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are 
inessential” (p. 151). By repurposing and recalibrating patriarchal technologies through 
feminist politics and women’s bodies, and changing the story from salvation to survival, 
the cyborg figure is unfaithful to the patriarchal origins of technology and productive of 
new and exciting possibilities for women’s embodied politics. Thus these patriarchal 
sites (among many other sites) of cyborg emergence are significant for the politics that 
the cyborg plays seriously with. Academia that rejects the serious play of Haraway’s 
cyborg has little sense of irony, and thus little sense of the cyborg.  
Furthermore, the cyborg was never a leader: “cyborgs are critters in a queer 
litter, not the Chief Figure of Our Times” (Haraway, 2016, p. 105), as they have a “feel 
for united front politics, but without the vanguard party” (Haraway, 1991, p. 151). She 
may well be The Figure for me, today, but she is not a figure at all. She is plural, 
multiple, partial and contradictory: “Characterized by partial connections, the parts do 
not add up to any whole; but they do add up to worlds of nonoptional, stratified, 
                                                          
31 Crux can mean the most important point, or it can mean a point of difficulty. 
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webbed, and unfinished living and dying, appearing and disappearing” (Haraway, 2016, 
p. 104). Here, Haraway draws upon the ‘nonoptional’ positions in women’s lives, the 
‘appearing and disappearing’ of women’s bodies, the ‘webbed’ and enmeshed dangers 
of heteronormativity. This is how the cyborg can be understood: not as a reproductive 
representation of patriarchal militarised and salvic technologies, but as a multiple figure 
for subversion, for disruption, for transformation, for irritation. Haraway’s cyborg is a 
doing figure, rather than an emblem or a symbol. She is an articulation of how to do 
embodied gendered politics.  
 
Story Time in the Matrix 
The cyborg is a figure of science fiction. Either hard or soft, the blurring of the 
boundaries between the ‘realities’ of science and the ‘impossibilities’ of fiction are 
where the cyborg finds something resembling solace. But the cyborg also inhabits the 
destruction and doom of the apocalypse genre; the unease and uncertainty of the gothic 
genre; the terror of horror; the humour of the black comedy; and the hyperbole of the 
melodrama. The cyborg is uninterested in the detective’s step-by-step investigations and 
clear-cut resolutions (unless, of course, she needs them), instead prioritising the flux and 
non-fixity of multiple and partial connections. The cyborg also questions the quests of 
heroes and fantasy (masculinist, goal-orientated and at someone’s expense), and has 
little use for the nonsense of romance and drama (steeped in heterosex and gendered 
power). 
So within these genres (and genre rejections) that the cyborg moves through, 
occupies and challenges, there are opportunities to change the story and new 
possibilities for telling stories that articulate embodied experiences as fraught, joyous 
and urgent that are un-done from the conventions of traditional singularly genre-d 
stories (like psychology’s adherence to the detective genre). Cyborgs tell these stories to 
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share knowledge, to entertain, but mostly for connection, for proliferating ways of 
knowing and politicising knowledge in a free-flow exchange of text unbound by 
‘objectivity’ or stylistic conventions like grammar or words with set meanings.  
For Haraway (1991), the cyborg’s tools for subversion “are often stories, retold 
stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalised 
identities” (p. 175). Thus, cyborg stories are told and re-told to subvert, dissolve and 
reconfigure knowledge and power, re-tellings in order to open new possibilities and ask 
new questions. So through story-telling and story proliferation through networks, 
cyborgs disrupt the traditions of hierarchical power relations through the privileging of 
cyborg text. Cyborg language, still struggled for, is forever in flux, being built and re-
built as connections proliferate or die. The cyborg raises questions about institutions, 
systems and taken-for-granted binaries. The challenging of these fundamental binaries 
(such as man/woman) renders the power relations forged through them as no longer 
‘natural’ (as in ‘the natural order of things’), but disrupted and dismantled, 
disembowelled and ready for re-design. Cyborgs use ways of story-telling and speaking, 
like science fiction, appropriation and irony, to dismantle ways of ‘othering’ and other 
violences, and question the privilege of dominant discourses. The ways cyborgs speak 
are not about dominance and subjugation. Cyborgs speak about the privileging of 
complexity over totalising and essentialism. In this way, she is noninnocent. The cyborg 
knows that not even essentialist or totalising discourses are unified, and she knows this 
through experience. Instead, cyborg language opens spaces, for possibilities.  
 Through these cyborg ways of speaking, the Western origin stories of women 
and feminism can be re-told and futures re-imagined:  
In retelling origin stories, cyborg authors subvert the central 
myths of origin of Western culture. We have all been colonized 
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by those origin myths… Feminist cyborg stories have the task of 
recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command 
and control. (Haraway, 1991, p. 175) 
So the political proliferations of cyborg stories are done and re-done through 
text, where writing “is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” in their political 
“struggle for language” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175). Text is simultaneously undeniable and 
abstract. Text is representation of the unrepresentational, recordings of joys, grievances 
and confusions. Text withstands and disrupts time, with meanings preserved in text 
code even as those meanings shift, forever in flux. Text from decades, centuries gone by 
endures even as meanings transform. Text from 10 minutes ago endures even as 
meanings transform. Words, phrases and symbols contain remnants of past meanings, 
representations and violences. These are historical artefacts that are carried through to 
present meanings and meanings of the future, shaping future texts, discourses and 
bodies. In this way, text is eternal recurrence.32 It may change in meaning and form, but 
it always retains the past, constructs the present and shapes the future. 
Text also offers some respite from the burden of the ‘othered’ body and offers 
ways to transform it. With text as the privileged system of representation of dominant 
politics (rather the body and the extent to which it embodies violent Western ideals), 
women can write their bodies, embodied lives and lived experiences in ways that can 
disrupt and displace the hierarchical binaries that subjugate them. With text (and its 
connectivity) privileged, the body can be rendered as politics rather than 
representations: “Cyborg writing is about the power to survive” and “the struggle 
                                                          
32 The idea of eternal recurrence, as it cycles through Anaximander, Heinrich Heine, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (Gendron, 2008), privileges the “eternal play of repetition, all configurations that have 
previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again….” 
(Heine, as cited by Kaufmann, 2013, p. 318). That is, we have been here before and we will be here again, 
even if differently and differently again. 
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against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning 
perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175). 
Hyperconnected text can subvert the singularity of meaning (fixed and clear) and 
readings, as produced through that detective genre, through its multiplicities, partialities 
and contradictions. Text and writing might enable bodies to be rewritten in more 
survivable and transformative ways; new possibilities for survivable bodies, survivable 
social relations can be imagined and enacted. Through cyborg writing and re-writing, 
cyborgs produce ever-shifting, ever-present cyborg politics that enable survival for 
women in unsurvivable times.  
So writing text “unfolds like a game (jeu) that invariably goes beyond its own 
rules and transgresses its limits” (Foucault, 1984b, p. 102). The old rules about the 
distinctions between text and bodies, clarity and fixed meaning, are dissolving (if 
indeed there ever were any distinctions) and there is serious play emerging between the 
boundaries that text (and particularly psychological text) previously sought (and still 
seeks) to keep distinct, as an act of dominance. Haraway’s cyborg is engaged in this 
game, playing seriously through text. The simultaneous ironic contradictions of the 
cyborg and her play in and through text blurs boundaries, exceeds rules and 
“transgresses its limits,” constructing embodiment through text that acknowledges and 
inhabits the multiplicity of otherness. There are rules to writing, rules to text, rules to 
coding. But the cyborg exceeds and exploits text and the processes of writing, all while 
adhering to the conventions that afford writing such power. For text records power 
relations and inscribes these power relations onto bodies:  
We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws 
of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this 
too is false. The body is molded by a great many distinct 
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regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and 
holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits 
or moral laws; it constructs resistances. (Foucault, 1984a, p. 87) 
A genealogical investigation of Western bodies and technologies, and especially 
women’s bodies, imagines how the Western body has been constructed through shifting 
Western morality and technology, and text (Balsamo, 1995; Bayer & Malone, 1996; 
Shildrick, 1997; Silverstein & Perlick, 1995). Technological advancements that 
streamline efficiency, power and cleanliness (currently green technology) have also 
been inscribed on Western bodies, with tight, efficient, clean bodies privileged over 
bodies that exceed these boundaries (producing wasteful, apocalyptically dangerous 
bodies).33 Inscriptions on bodies forged through these technoadvancements remind us of 
the potency of a good metaphor… it matters what ‘thoughts think thoughts.’ 
Genealogy illuminates how historical power relations have imprinted bodies 
with meanings: “Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by 
history and the process of history’s destruction of the body” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 83). 
Women and their bodies, and Haraway’s cyborg, oscillate with genealogy at a 
historically urgent frequency. The cyborg may resonate with ‘others,’ but she emerges 
as an intervention at the blurred intersection of genealogy, women and technology. 
Genealogy acknowledges the “body is an inscribed surface of events” and 
“manifests the stigmata of past experience… elements may join in a body where they 
achieve a sudden expression…” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 83). Women’s bodies, subject to 
                                                          
33 While the industrial technologies of past war-times were inscribed efficiently on powerful, nationalistic 
bodies, war as an apocalypse was significantly less global and earth-ending in the early stages of the 20th 
century than the global warming apocalypse of the 21st century. If inscribing war-power onto bodies 
produces cyborgs, what does climate change do to a body? 
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multiple, partial, simultaneous and contradictory constructions, can, potentially, 
possibly, through text and the cyborg, transform these inscriptions and sudden 
expressions.  
Genealogy “… operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on 
documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 
76), rendering the idea of ‘origins’ impossible. If there ever was an origin in any sense, 
it has been lost in the perpetual re-inscription. Genealogy then, like the cyborg, is an 
intervention story, not an origin story. There are boundaries blurred and exceeded; 
genealogy and the cyborg attend to the boundaries and what may emerge from them: 
“…historical beginnings are lowly… but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every 
infatuation” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 79), as most “lowly” things are… 
Indeed, Western culture “has metamorphosed this idea of narrative, or writing, 
as something designed to ward off death” (Foucault, 1984b, p. 102). If there is an 
origin, there may indeed be an end. Perhaps women become cyborg, celebratory of 
transformative text, to ward off death. Taking up writing as power, text as 
transformation, enables possibilities for women’s embodiment that dismantle the 
dominant ways of speaking women’s bodies that have twisted, cut, bruised, constrained 
and violated women and femininity. As such, here I am, a woman writing, warding off 
death. 
Being a Western writer brings with it certain privileges that perhaps should not 
be enjoyed: “… the notion of writing runs the risk of maintaining the author’s privileges 
under the protection of writing’s a priori status: … the interplay of those representations 
that formed a particular image of the author” (Foucault, 1984b, p. 105). Maintaining the 
image of myself in my writing seems an inevitability when readers are likely to read 
from their own positions (likely Western, individual, neoliberal) and project (perhaps in 
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the Freudian sense, perhaps in a ‘Star Wars’ sense) the image of me through the text I 
have written. And perhaps no argument is strong enough to convince some individuals 
to forgo resolving the contradictions of cultural text and individual authors. But in 
science fiction, I can pose the questions: what if I am not an individual? And what if 
you are not one either? 
The imperative, or perhaps compulsion, to “neutralize the contradictions” 
(Foucault, 1984b, p. 111) that may emerge through text to the singular individual and 
their individualised thoughts may make sense to an individual making or reading an 
argument, forming a clear stance on a particular issue, answering that ever elusive 
question, ‘what do I think?’ Perhaps the idea of resolving or neutralising a contradiction 
is likely an impossible (at best) or violent (at worst) activity for an author to participate 
in. At best, a resolved contradiction is a comforting lie, a pretence that the contradiction 
is based in faulty assumptions. At worst, the resolution of a contradiction violently 
reshapes one or more of the contradictions into something else. So for Western 
individualised writing, this resolution of contradictions for ‘what do I think?’ thinking 
produces the author and the reader as participants in individualised thinking that 
excludes more expansive and transformative understandings of what a contradiction is 
and what it might mean. For Haraway’s cyborg, the contradictions are the spaces for 
living, for “staying with the trouble” (Haraway, 2016, p. 28)34 and for re-thinking which 
‘thoughts think thoughts.’ 
 
Metaphors 
The metaphors used in technology are no coincidence: “Sex, sexuality, and 
reproduction are central actors in high-tech myth systems structuring our imaginations 
                                                          
34 The idea of staying with the trouble is considered another recurring textual gift from Haraway, 
continually referenced without the burden of the brackets, years and pages. 
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of personal and social possibility” (Haraway, 1991, p. 169). Even at a practical physical 
level, electrical bits and bobs, like outlets, are gendered. Male electricity bits connect 
into female electricity bobs in order to enliven machines. Freud might have had one hell 
of a time in the 21st century given the rich and colourful ways in which man (literally) 
has conceived of technological advances. Technical guides and instruction manuals are 
practically pornographic. 
For Haraway, the cyborg is “a matter of fiction and lived experience that 
changes what counts as experience in the late twentieth century” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
149), and indeed the 21st century. For example, the metaphors and figures available to 
women to account for their experience have largely been domestic or mystical (see 
Baider & Gesuato, 2003; Brandes, 1984; Griffin, 1997; Lim, 2009; Rodríguez, 2009). 
Women have been unicorns, monsters, goddesses; Charlotte Perkins Gilman lived in 
wallpaper; Janet Frame lived in a snap-dragon. Women are ‘bitches’ (female 
dogs/unpleasant), ‘cows’ (female cattle/also unpleasant); they possess ‘pussy’ 
(cats/vaginas); they wear ponytails and pigtails; they are mysterious and otherworldly 
(Mother Nature, goddesses, witches). While these metaphors (and others) may (or may 
not) be helpful to women at some points in their lived experiences and through 
particular historical contexts, they tend to locate women’s lived experiences in the dirt 
of domesticated life and not necessarily ironically so. All of these metaphors are 
subjugated (Baider & Gesuato, 2003; French, 1992; Griffin, 1997). Humans dominate 
nature (from the wood or fabrics used in wallpaper to herding cows), gods dominate 
goddesses (in the West, at least). 
The metaphors through which (Western) women have been and can be produced 
are important for women’s political movement: “These are figurations for specific geo-
political and historical locations. To mistake them for mere metaphors would be to miss 
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the point altogether” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 410). Metaphors are doing words. Women’s 
metaphorical description as bitches does something: it positions women as domesticate-
able beasts, potentially tameable irritants or perhaps something rabid that needs to be 
euthanised. The goddess metaphor may enable women to enjoy some form of power 
through their positioning as mystical and mysterious, arguably an ironic metaphor 
emergent from masculine misunderstandings of the differences between women and the 
male norm. But this metaphor, and others like it, just barely trouble the idea of woman, 
or femininity, or masculinity for that matter. The natural and godly metaphors tend to be 
an uncritically ironic embrace of patriarchal metaphors for women: yes, I am Woman 
and I am magical. And fair enough. I like irony. However, the presence of magic 
suggests a certain level of unexplained power, gathering symbols and transformation 
through energy shifts; psychic action that just is, rather than bodies at work. There is a 
sense that magical women might have to wait for a blood moon to cast their spells.  
When Haraway (1991) proclaimed she “would rather be a cyborg than a 
goddess” (p. 181) she was not rejecting the goddess as obsolete, but rather taking 
pleasure in the work cyborgs can be capable of, and make others capable of, in the 21st 
century. Cyborgs are ever-present figures inside man-made machines, and machines are 
not of the gods. A goddess may find it difficult to infiltrate man-machines or their 
structures. But cyborgs are built in; a metaphor not made for women, but appropriated 
by them in a mechanical coup. The late 20th and the 21st century has been characterised 
by intense mechanical, technological proliferation and intervention into human lives, 
perhaps building the witch and goddess out. Masculine industries may very well contain 






Ontology - Verb 
Some decry Haraway’s work as unclear and contradictory Swiss cheese 
arguments and thus try to fill in or at least understand the holes (see Soper, 1999). These 
attempts to understand what Haraway means are all too often still (in both the sense of 
time and movement) performed from a particular ontological perspective that values 
clarity and distinction of meanings: the crystalline communication of transparently 
discrete ideas. Haraway advocates an ontological shift towards multiplicity and 
connection, away from (patriarchal) clarity: “The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our 
politics” (Haraway, 1991, p. 150). The cyborgian ontological shift into connectivity 
renders clarity, both the idea and practice of, dictatorial in its shaping of singular fixed 
meanings. The “tyranny of clarity” (Haraway, 2004, p. 333) violently shapes the ways 
in which we can speak and write, and the potential connections that can be made. The 
forcing of certain connections through categorisation and the blocking of others through 
dominance/subjugation are violent acts that the cyborg subverts through expansive 
connectivity. The cyborgian ontological position is the political re-appropriation of 
connections that block and false connections forged through the wires of oppression and 
dominance. Connectivity means that anyone, anymany, can connect into any network at 
any time. Power is networked, not hierarchal and singular as dominant, dictatorial 
discourses, images and peoples demand. Power is networked, not capillaried. 
Capillaries can end, are bounded within a body, or they clot off, bleed out. As such, the 
cyborg is “not subject to Foucault’s biopolitics; the cyborg simulates politics, a much 
more potent field of operations” (Haraway, 1991, p. 163). These simulations that the 
cyborg is capable of, like simulating consciousness or politics, enable divergence, 
patching of bugs, bypasses, the cracking of codes within networks of power. Such 
simulations are an ironic participation in the production of politics in the aim of 
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subversion and overwriting and overriding social power relations that subjugate and 
fragment. The politics a cyborg simulates can look like the same old politics as usual 
(binaries, categories, dominance), but function differently. A Human Barbie would be 
an example of how the intense participation in binary categories can render them 
disrupted beyond repair.35 But the simulated political network’s connections can be 
never-ending, jacked into multiple other networks, connected through any number of 
complex and proliferating nodes. The intensity of proliferation of simultaneously 
simulated and very real politicised connections overloads rigid and old power structures 
like patriarchal hierarchies: “It is the simultaneity of breakdowns that cracks the 
matrices of domination and opens geometric possibilities” (Haraway, 1991, p. 174). 
Understanding the cyborgian ontological shift is what Haraway demands as urgent in 
her work (or at least, this is a connection that I have made). The details of her arguments 
are important (Haraway, 2016), but the ontological shift is critical for understanding 
how those arguments do critical work, especially in the contradictions, simultaneities 
and partialities.  
With the ontological shift, Haraway (1991) prefers “a networked ideological 
image, suggesting a profusion of spaces and identities and the permeability of the 
boundaries in the personal body and in the body politic” (p. 170), enabling connected 
networks of power to be electrified by the generation and regeneration of connections 
through which blurry politics and transformative embodiment can proliferate. The more 
connections, the more permeated the boundary. Haraway asserts that the “networks 
aren’t all-powerful, they’re interrupted in a million ways” (Gane, 2006, p. 151) and 
therefore are disruptable and able to be infiltrated, corrupted or rerouted for more ethical 
purposes “… in order to act potently” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181). 
                                                          




At one of the cyborg’s many hearts is the idea of sex, gender and difference. 
Women, women’s bodies and femininity have been violently and catastrophically 
shaped through masculine practices of categorisation and domination. When we think of 
these violences we tend to think of ‘women’s issues’ like domestic violence, anorexia 
and promiscuity: all nightmares of the female body. But catastrophes happen in the 
mundane too. Everyday feminine life is shaped through masculine practices that 
inscribe intolerable meanings on women’s bodies (see Bartky, 1998). Reading a book, 
eating, sleeping, defecating, leaving the house, staying at home… these everyday 
activities shape and restrict women and their bodies, carving away at their excesses to 
produce docile, quiet, small bodies (literally and experientially). For Haraway, 
“…staying with the urgencies and getting that everyday life is always much more than 
its deformations – getting that even while experience is commodified and turned against 
us and given back to us as our enemy, it’s never just that” (Gane, 2006, p. 151).  
If ‘woman’ and femininity have always been articulated as ‘in excess’ to 
man/masculinity, and thus in need of that carving, then embracing the construction of 
‘excess,’ rather than fighting it, can enable the making of “potent connection that 
exceeds domination” (Haraway, 1992, p. 299) inherent in Western binaries. Through the 
cyborg, multiple and excessive connections disrupt the idea of there being two 
(male/female, healthy/sick, good/bad, moderation/excess) in which the first dominates 
the second, instead dreaming up and enacting a profusion of networked, politicised 
spaces that render hierarchical binaries absurdly simplistic, sickeningly gory, and worse 
still, boring. The disruption of taken-for-granted binaries has dynamic implications for 
bodies troubled by the categories through which they have been shaped, tortured and 
enjoyed: “The hierarchical body of the old has given way to a network-body of amazing 
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complexity and specificity” (Haraway, 1992, p. 323) that opens possibilities for new 
body politics.  
So the cyborg emerges from the residues that the tensions between hierarchical 
taken-for-granted intolerable, impossible binaries produce, and noninnocently re-
emerges as multiple, simultaneous and partial. And she will emerge again, and again, 
and again, and again. Because these binaries do not resolve. Nor will they dissolve, at 
least not in Purgatory,36 a space that might become familiar for those reading cyborg 
work. Binaries and binary code are potent metaphors through which a cyborg can play, 
as “a series of 1s and 0s, binary is a form of representation that made it all too easy for 
the new information image to be cut, pasted, transformed, or generated from nothing” 
(Kinsey, 2014, p. 897). Politically, for women (so often the lesser in the binary) the 
appropriation of binary code as a metaphor for the transformation and generation of new 
and potent connections enables the beginnings of an embodied experience of both 
occupying and resisting gendered Western binaries. For Haraway (1991):  
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms 
in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a 
powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an imagination of a feminist 
speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the 
supersavers of the new right. It means both building and 
destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, space 
stories. Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would 
rather be a cyborg than a goddess. (p. 181) 
                                                          
36 See the (Female figure) occupying chapter infinity symbol, oops, I mean eight. 
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As binaries then open up and are reconfigured as multiple, partial and 
contradictory, new ways to inhabit a body emerge that can recur and reconfigure again 
and again and again; more tensions ooze more residue, there is more that exceeds the 
binary. There are multiple other tensions, excesses and configurations, the same and 
different as multiple other tensions, excesses and configurations coming before and in 
the now and in the future. Likewise, social and political structures can be dismantled 
and re-built, like some kind of a strange attractor, eternally recurring, folding back over 
itself but not in the same ways as before and not the same way again. 
 
Utopia, Interrupted 
Many assume utopia is about a perfect world. And perhaps it is. But perhaps the 
‘perfect world’ for women is simply inhabitable, where she can simply survive. In our 
current universe (to draw somewhat on multiverse theory), women have a tough time 
surviving (Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015; Cook, Wilson & Thomas, 2018; Heise, 1993). 
If the positions offered to you are living in intolerable pain, being killed, or just 
surviving, then survival would indeed be comparatively utopian. For Haraway, the 
cyborg is “outside salvation history” and not an attempt to “heal the terrible cleavages 
of gender” (Haraway, 1991, p. 150), but instead inhabit them in more survivable ways 
and produce new ways to carry on. 
The production of new ways to survive intolerable circumstances disrupts the 
idea of utopian women’s embodiment – as sometimes hinted at through the 
empowerment of the goddess metaphor and (Western) mass-feminist movements that, 
with great regularity, believe that gender discrimination has been stopped, or at least 
stalled, because they demanded it (see McRobbie, 2004) as an endgame. The cyborg, as 
a metaphor, is about the process of disrupting gendered violence, and the recognition of 
the different work different women need and want to do, depending upon their different 
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positions, privileges and priorities. The emergence of the cyborg as a figure for survival 
is more trauma than utopia: “We need the power of modern critical theories of how 
meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meaning and bodies, but in order to 
live in meanings and bodies that have a chance for a future” (Haraway, 1991, p. 187). 
Haraway’s cyborg is engaged in a process of patching together, severing ties and re-
wiring. Parts of the self (personal, social, political, physical) dissolve or divide or 
multiply or fragment. New, unwanted and needed parts congeal as ‘othered’ 
embodiment that re-appropriates the meanings of being ‘othered’ as subordinated in 
hierarchies to becoming networked in a multiple, partial and contradictory embodied 
chaos inhabitable through its attention to the blurriness of social, political and physical 
boundaries. Excesses and lackings, attachments and detachments move together to 
create new possibilities for imagining a survivable embodied life. Becoming and 
emergence are agentic words and worlds. There is potential for propulsion, in any 
direction and in multiple directions, to seek space for survival in a world (and words) 
that dismantles and destroys, and instead transform women’s embodied lives (and the 
lives of other impossible ‘others’) in ways that become uncomfortably comfortable. 
 
Individualism 
As if predicting a highly predictable Trump election win, Haraway (1991) 
describes the aim of her cyborg politics:  
Another of my premises is that the need for unity of people 
trying to resist world-wide intensification of domination has 
never been more acute. But a slightly perverse shift of 
perspective might better enable us to contest meanings, as well 
as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically 
mediated societies. (p. 154)  
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With the stories of techno-election-warfare by Russia that pushed Trump closer and 
closer to the presidency with every trolling tweet,37 the capacities and capabilities of 
hybrid technology-human connections to contest meanings, power and pleasure take on 
renewed urgency. Of course, such a cyborg aim could take on significance with any 
world leader, any individualised socio-cultural shifts, but Trump ripping the scab off of 
the not-yet-scabbed-over misogynist, racist wound on a global scale seems to call for a 
particularly perverse shift in perspective. Indeed, Haraway (1991) suggests that “in our 
present political circumstances, we could hardly hope for more potent myths for 
resistance and recoupling” (p. 154). Of course, Haraway wrote this in the late 1980s, 
and yet the sentiments are critical for how women can engage in the world now, as I 
write in the late 2010s, and in ever-precarious futures. The ways in which technological 
advances, like the expansive accessibility of the internet, are interrupting and re-routing 
international politics and gendered social interrelations to amplify power relations are 
significantly more ubiquitous and sophisticated than the technologies that Haraway 
initially problematised (and celebrated). 
Women’s resistance to the amplifications of masculinist, individualist power 
could come from the implosion of a violent binary that characterises these global 
cultural shifts: individualism/connection. Haraway sees the cyborg (not necessarily 
hers) as playing an ironic end-of-days role in the West’s individualism: “the cyborg is 
also the awful apocalyptic telos of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract 
individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space” 
(Haraway, 1991, pp. 150-151). Here, she describes the figure of the cyborg in the 
populist sense: a being independent of deathly biology, unburdened by the human body 
                                                          
37 Whether you believe Russia interfered with the 2016 American presidential election or not, the stories 
are still important. And the possibilities these stories open up for the technological intervention of the 
average global citizen into the highest levels of global politics are vital to understand.  
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and all its revolting habits; just a mind or soul or individual essence, immortal and 
sterile, floating out in space, floating away from the corrupt influences of ‘others’; a 
Terminator, perhaps.38 To be ‘one,’ a dominant individual, is about autonomy, 
wholeness and power; “Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, 
insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many” (Haraway, 1991, p. 177). The 
ability to float into space seems only available to those who are, or can claim to be, 
individuals, boundaries distinct, unfrayed at their edges. The ‘othered,’ like women, 
people of colour, the disabled and queer communities are rarely unfrayed at their edges. 
Being an individual, a unified “man in space” is an achievable goal for ‘man’ (or at least 
one that some men can dream of), as men are not defined by earthly or alien otherness. 
We know what a man is (allegedly), as it has been the defining standard of humanness 
since that one time Adam had a spare rib. So Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is about “… 
dissolving Western selves in the interests of survival” (p. 157), the survival women and 
‘others’ who cannot do away with their bodies and float up into space, at least not 
without packing a large overnight bag filled with all the tools and tricks that build ‘a 
woman’ from the male template, and even then, women are still tethered to earth by that 
umbilical cord known as ‘responsibility.’ 
Haraway’s cyborg then is not whole, not a distinct unit of body/mind that can be 
classed as a bounded individual, capable of disconnecting and floating away and being 
on her own. Critically, the figure of the cyborg is hyperconnected to earth, working in 
kinship with associated ‘others’ and all the earthly materials she can get her hands on 
(like buttons to press, viruses to mimic and politics to play in). The contradictory figure 
of high technology and lowly biology is about being unafraid of “permanently partial 
                                                          
38 The image that actually manifests for me here is Cooker from ‘Wallace and Gromit: A Grand Day Out.’ 
Cooker is a small oven on wheels who patrols the moon. ‘The Terminator’ is perhaps a less obscure 
reference…   
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identities and contradictory standpoints” (Haraway, 1991, p. 154). Cyborgs are “wary of 
holism, but needy for connection…” (p. 151). Holism and its intimate embrace with 
individualism, for Haraway, serve to violently construct (the pretence of) wholeness that 
builds into that form of individualism that benefits the dominant (white, Western, male) 
group while ‘others’ are fragmented through incompatibilities and tensions: “Gender, 
race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historical 
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and 
capitalism” (Haraway, 1991, p. 155).  
 
Who is a Cyborg? 
 
Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival. 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 153) 
 
There are those who ask: “why does the computer represent a new confusion 
between organic and inorganic, a distinctively cyborg fusion, where the printing-press 
or the typewriter or the telephone did not?” (Soper, 1999, p. 75). Such a question fails to 
imagine the sociocultural shifts that the printing press, for example, has indeed enabled 
(and what this enabled for the shaping of bodies), through the proliferation of 
knowledge, imagination and images. The connection between the body and the printing 
press may not have been as explicit as the modern connection between the body and 
technologies such as mobile phones, laptops and tablets, but the advent of new 
technologies enables transformations of bodies, even if these transformations move 
differently. Besides, in the past, we would have had to open a book, maybe even stand 
up and find the book, go to a bookstore and buy the book, only to read it, find out what 
we wanted to know, then put that book down and seek out another book to answer 
another question. With the advent on the internet, we ask Google to find the information 
93 
 
for us. We can ask question after question after question immediately and we get our 
answers instantaneously. We do not even have to finish asking our questions as Google 
can predict what information we seek based on past seekings and the seekings of others. 
Technologies of the past have indeed enabled extensions of the ‘self’ (McLuhan, 1994) 
by enabling thoughts to appear on pages and those pages to be passed to others in the 
present and then in the future. In turn, the technologies preserve and transmit ‘selves’ 
outside of the ‘mind’ and to others we can never meet (both as writer and as reader). But 
these modern technologies and the internet are the hyper-real extension of the ‘self,’ 
significantly more expansive, networked and immediate than the printing press. While 
the internet and the printing press may be technosisters, they are qualitatively different 
in what they mean for embodied lives. 
Haraway’s (1991) argument is for the “cyborg as a fiction mapping our social 
and bodily reality” (p. 150). The mapping here is more than being bodies in 
technophilic (globalised) West. New Zealand Paralympian Liam Malone is an excellent 
example of the blurred boundaries between literal cyborg and ‘other’ politics. As an 
elite athlete in a developed country, Malone enjoys the technological advances of sports 
science to enhance the capabilities of his body (see Rowell, 2016). Sports science 
laboratories and gyms are blurred at the edges, as scientists experiment with the ways in 
which bodies can be exploited for maximum sporting effect, for the benefit of elite 
athletes (or perhaps more cynically and more accurately, their sponsors), but this 
science trickles down to the average gym user or sports participant in various ways (for 
example, workout programs, dietary advice, high-tech active wear and so on). Malone 
also enjoys the benefits of ever-expanding technological advances in prosthetic legs for 
competitive running (known as ‘blades’). These legs/blades must work perfectly in 
connection with Malone’s body, as either an extension of or an aid to. They must do as 
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Malone commands, or he cannot run fast! As a person without legs, Malone can test out 
and use the legs/blades that work best for him, and try out new and improved legs 
produced in a laboratory. Through technological advances he can change his limbs at 
will. For this reason, he has specifically claimed the position of cyborg athlete (see 
Rowell, 2016). But Malone is also interested in the politics that such a position enables 
for him and for ‘others.’ Malone’s political interest is in enabling disabled kids to 
become sports participants when they are so often excluded. Much like how the 
technologies of active wear and sports supplements have trickled down from the sports 
science lab to the average sports participant, Malone sees the technological advances in 
prosthetic limbs for sports as technology that should be made available for the non-elite 
athlete from a young age. He is for the removal of barriers to participation and the 
breakdown of current understandings of what disabled bodies are and are not capable of, 
with or without prosthetic limbs. Malone has also challenged modern-day ‘freakery’ by 
simultaneously performing for the crowds as a ‘legless’ man as well as questioning 
what the performance is and represents, what his performing body is doing, politically. 
This is not to suggest that Malone is a cyborg in the Harawayian sense (as for Haraway, 
the details matter). But as an ‘other,’ the ‘cyborg athlete’ is in kinship with Haraway’s 
cyborg.   
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg manifesto is an “argument for pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (p. 150). As such, 
the cyborg is about politics as much as she is about the literal connectivity between 
humans and technologies. For women, who experience boundary confusion on a daily 
basis in daily activities, these politics may be imperative for survival given the 
deadliness of femininity (see Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015).  
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In the late 1980s, when Haraway was writing her cyborg, she wrote of her as a 
hybrid of machine/technology and biological organism who functioned as an “ironic 
political myth” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). She was a “creature of social reality as well as 
a creature of fiction” (p. 149). Haraway has since amended her assessment of the cyborg 
as a hybrid, claiming they are not hybrids at all (Haraway, 2016). Irony, for Haraway, is 
about “holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true” 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 149). While I disagree that truth (whatever that is) is important here 
(I sometimes disagree with Haraway, truth be told), and might argue too for the 
rejection of necessity, the urgency of (politicised) irony is key for the emergence and 
flourishing of the image of the cyborg as a feminist figure. Femininity, if nothing else, 
is the “holding of incompatible things together” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). 
To open further the space for the cyborg as necessarily and politically feminist, I 
return to my own embodied experience of being a researcher, a theoriser, a woman and 
a feminist and my devout rejection of the declaration of these categories as distinct and 
separate. As a researcher, I needed (neediness) a shift towards kinship (connections) that 
not just enabled the critical politics that I could not and would not disentangle from 
myself in the name of ‘science,’ but also enabled the thoughts with which I could think 
other/‘other’ thoughts. Kinship, the embodied notion of varying strengths of related-
ness/connection, enables a process of understanding that privileges the researcher’s 
connectivity to every part of the research process as embodied and with political 
survival at stake, shifting away from the alienating experiences of mainstream, 








“Ambivalence towards the disrupted unities mediated by high-tech culture requires not 
sorting consciousness into categories of ‘clear-sighted critique grounding a solid political 
epistemology’ versus ‘manipulated false consciousness’, but subtle understanding of 
emerging pleasures, experiences, and powers with serious potential for changing the 
rules of the game.” 
 
“There is no drive in cyborgs to produce total theory, but there 
is an intimate experience of boundaries, their construction and 
deconstruction.” 
“Multiple, heterogeneous, uncivilized, they show the way 
to multiple virtual possibilities.”  
“Monsters share more than the word’s root with the verb “to 
demonstrate”; monsters signify.” 
 
“Cyborg gender is a local possibility taking a global vengeance.” 
“Body politics has shifted, with the simultaneous emergence of cyborgs 
on the one hand and renewed forms of vulnerability of the other.” 
Chapter Three Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
 
A text exchange: 
                                                                        







                                             
 











































A Weaver steps out from behind the 
page to ask a question: “TIME?” 
 
A Weaver’s Interjection: “Time is a flat circle…”39 
The cyborg lives in the past, present and future, simultaneously. She is 
contemporary, old-timey and futuristic. She is old and post-modern. She is youthfully 
ancient. Her history, the history of women and technology, informs her every move, as 
she propels away from it, forgetting it so that she may always remember. Without this 
memory, inscribed on her body, she risks repeated violences. So she re-imagines her 
history to construct a new present and a different future. But a future that remembers the 
past as violently as it was. So this is not nostalgia. She is not longing for a past time. 
She is longing for a past time that never happened. 
Using Haraway’s (1991) cyborg, as a feminist researcher, is also a longing for a 
past that never happened. Haraway’s cyborg was dismissed, rejected as socialist and 
utopian, as masculinist, and as incomprehensible. So Haraway’s warnings were largely 
ignored. However, her theorisation recurs again now, because we are feverishly in it. 
Much as we were in the 1990s, we are struggling with our space as ‘women.’ The 
                                                          
39 (Pizzolatto & Fukunaga, 2014). 
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contradictions of the 90s ‘Girl Power’ feminism and contested women’s bodies, recur 
today, differently as feminism proliferates online alongside intensified misogyny. 
Haraway and her cyborg are not nostalgic: they are recurrent. They are nodes in a 
strange attractor.  
The notion of eternal recurrence, or strange attractors, or time being a flat circle 
suggest that time is not linear. It is instead cyclical, meanings created and destroyed and 
reconfigured, recurring again and again, but differently every time. Time becomes an 
embodied sense akin to sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell, where its experience is 































Interruption: Linear Links Laughing Loudly 
Being stuck when writing is a maddening state. More than writer’s block, being 
‘stuck’ suggests a closing in, perhaps being enveloped by something dense. Humans 
like movement or at least the illusion of it. In the English language, one word must 
follow another; the words must follow a certain order in order to achieve that elusive 
thing40 we call ‘making sense.’ Even worse, ‘good’ writing must be clear in meaning, 
particularly if it is ‘good’ academic writing. The ‘good-est’ writing of all progresses, 
forward, through clear ideas succinctly. Step by step, forward march, militarised 
precision and discipline. The psychology detective is a member of a police force, and 
the police are kin to the military;41 a kinship keenly felt (an embodied experience) when 
trying to write for psychology. The process of publication in particular is a gruesome 
one. Academic writing requires the crafting of ideas through text, but we rarely write 
from beginning to end in linear practice. We sew together a text just like Frankenstein 
sewed together his monster man. Any given journal article has likely been sliced up by 
a series of extra-textual scientists, a practice that aims to police academic work so that 
claims made in texts are not ridiculous (like that vaccines cause autism), but mostly 
serves to discipline academic thought into uniform discussions of uniform ideas. Such 
disciplining creates the illusion of linear wholeness. That did not work out so well for 
Frankenstein and the monster-son he created (a warning story written by a woman). 
The academic training inflicted upon psychology students produces students 
who can participate in the linear production of linear psychology stories to be policed in 
                                                          
40A spelling error meant this sentence originally read “that elusive think.”  
41 In the West, we even demand font and font size be consistent in a text. If I wrote like this through this 
research, it would seriously violate academic conventions!  
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linear ways to produce linear knowledge. A psychology writer then is easily blocked or 
stuck: the story being told needs to follow certain rules if it is to be Good and 
Publishable Work that Contributes to Knowledge. 
In cyborg writing, perhaps ‘stuck’ is the wrong metaphor. When word 
production slows it is more of a matter of ‘what comes next when everything can come 
next’; an issue of hyper-movement rather than stuck-edness. Structural issues are a 
matter of being caught in a different time loop. How do you organise writing that can be 
organised in any, even impossible, ways? What comes next when the ideas all depend 
upon and produce each other? When urgent ideas emerge simultaneously, linearity is an 
impossibility, ethically and practically. In the West, what comes first is usually 
considered the most important, in our binaries (man/woman, healthy/sick, rich/poor) 
and in our texts (through simple lists or more complex idea discussions). Ideas are not 
just ordered (as in disciplined), they are hierarchical (as in ranked order). Linearity all 
too often participates in the subjugation of others – for example, the literal linear / that 
divides our binaries or the linear ways we tell stories about women and other ‘others’ 
(for extra example, rape myths like the more revealing your clothes the more you risk 
rape (or invite rape, depending on the intensity of your misogyny)).  
Through science fiction and cyborgs time and order are ideas to be messed with. 
Stories do not have to be linear; time loops; new languages thrive. Ideas and words are 
acknowledged and privileged as hyperdimensional, not binaried linear patterns that 
reduce down or build up. Words are not just partial and multi-meaning-ed, but are also 
partial and multi-doing. The Western obsession with one is not only called into question 






Chapter Four: Ethics in Wonderland 
 
 
And, in some perverse sense which, I think, comes from the masochism I learned 
as a Catholic, there’s always the desire to want to work from the most dangerous place, 
to not locate oneself outside but inside the belly of the monster. (laughter). 
(Haraway in Penley, Ross & Haraway, 1990, p. 12) 
 
Staying with the Trouble 
 
To stay with the politics that Haraway’s cyborg suggests are possible when 
women and machines blur, my research questions (multiple and partial as they are) are 
about women’s bodies through technology. If we count women, most Western women 
use social media (Perrin, 2015), and globally, women use the internet as a form of 
freedom, and experience abuse through the same technology (UN Broadband 
Commission, 2015). Just as Malabou (2011) suggests that ‘woman’ is classified by the 
violence done to her, her participation online and through technologies is characterised 
by violence (see Henry & Powell, 2015a; Henry & Powell, 2015b; Lewis, Rowe & 
Wiper, 2017; McGlynn, Rackley & Houghton, 2017; Sobieraj, 2018; Woodlock, 2017). 
From harassment and abuse, to pornography, to death threats, to revenge pornography, 
to hacking, to rape threats, to the cataloguing and rating of women’s bodies, the 
violences that shape ‘woman’ are enacted expansively online, in new ways, and perhaps 
with new consequences.  
The institution dictates that dutiful students outline their project ethics prior to 
introducing their data, following the linear patterning of research where we have 
all the information we (think we) need in order to understand ‘data’ and ‘analysis.’ 
However, in my Wonderland, data is introduced as part of the ethics conversation 
to enable the cyborg practices of response-abely staying with the trouble. 
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So the violence done to women through technology is troubling. As a cyborg 
researcher, I have “...the response-ability of staying with the trouble” (Haraway, 2016, 
p. 28) in order to engage, understand and transform. The trouble is sticky work, for 
some more so than others:  
We are all responsible to and for shaping conditions for 
multispecies flourishing in the face of terrible histories, and 
sometimes joyful histories too, but we are not all response-able 
in the same ways. The differences matter - in ecologies, 
economies, species, lives. (Haraway, 2016, p. 29)  
I stay with the trouble because I can; for cyborg ethical response-ability is about 
continuously moving towards, away from and to the sides of ‘others’ in ways that 
enable ‘others’ (including feminist researcher me) to be capable: “Each time a story 
helps me remember what I thought I knew, or introduces me to new knowledge, a 
muscle critical for caring about flourishing gets some aerobic exercise” (Haraway, 
2016, p. 29). 
Connecting into the network of online spaces where women’s bodies are 
violently acted upon (so many points of connection converge), stays with the trouble, as 
Haraway (2016) suggested. Similarly, Jane (2014) described her own uncensored 
engagement with misogynist text online as vital for attending to the proliferation and 
amplification of violent talk about women. Jane (2014) argues that censored, civilised 
academic discussions (ordered through the psychology detective genre) of violent talk 
about women can minimise the violence and produce it as niche, rather than as 
expansive and, indeed, ordinary. The expansive ordinariness of violence against women 
is a trouble that needs staying with, uncensored.  
103 
 
For my research, I have connected strongly to the cyborg ethics of Haraway and 
the uncensored urgency of Jane: I will stay with the trouble, the violence that is done to 
women, uncensored and unordered by the procedures of the psychology detective. 
While traditional psychology detectives might want to interview participant-suspects to 
establish the facts, I (the disobedient me) sought the troublesome texts as they 
materialised online, uncensored, through typical, mundane, ordinary online interactions. 
The texts and movements of users enlivening, and enlivened by, technologies like social 
media, apps, forums, websites, games and any other machinery that might materialise 
(like art), would provide the ‘data’ for my research.   
Staying with the trouble of women’s bodies online, however, meant making 
some trouble. I needed (in my neediness for connection) to connect to data that 
university IT departments might block on university computers, like pornography or 
breast-feeding mothers, or social media accounts that students and staff might waste the 
university’s time on. In order to explore the ways women’s bodies are constructed 
online, I needed to gain a place on an ‘Allowed Pornography’ list within the university’s 
IT department. A place on this list would enable me to access sites that Massey restricts 
without triggering an investigation into my browsing behaviour.  
While making the ‘Allowed Pornography’ list was easy (when supervisors do 
the asking on your behalf – I imagine student-led requests are not so welcomed), there 
was concern about access to the content from the ethics committee. A disconnect 
occurred between the need to sanction my computer to access restricted sites and the 
‘low risk’ classification of my research project. The disconnect was not about my safety 
– as we had already taken the necessary IT steps to make my computer safer to use at 
the university and had plans in place about sharing the misery of the data through 
supervision (as a form of debriefing) – but the university’s liability, should I be 
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traumatised by a boob or something equally horrifying. The ethics procedures for 
research produced through the university are steeped in the methodologies42 of the 
psychology detective that organise and separate individualised human researchers and 
their individualised human participants. Ideas about ‘safety’ are focused on what these 
neoliberal individuals might do to each other. Even when discussing just the separate 
and bounded human researcher, the ethics codes do so in reference to separate and 
bounded human participants. Since my project does not include ‘human participants’ in 
this traditional individualised sense, the human ethics code contained little that applied 
to me and my research. Cyborg work/play was already undermining the neoliberal 
ethical practices of the psychology detective genre, and re-routing power through IT 
access networks. 
The intensity with which the ethics codes focus on individual people and the 
imperative to ensure their separateness43 surprised even me, the most sceptical of 
disobedient researchers. I had assumed that somewhere there would be a clause that 
covered content rather than, or at least as well as, people. But no, I was free to look at 
whatever I wanted and still be categorised as ‘low risk,’ as long as I never talked to a 
human being, or experienced ‘trauma’ by bearing witness to the mundane, everyday 
online violences.  
For the individual me, the one I pretend sometimes exists when convenient, this 
was a hilarious position to be in. While my doctoral peers jumped through hoops to talk 
to people about something they could talk to anyone about in casual conversation, I had 
become an IT-sanctioned prowler of porn forums, pro-rape websites and Human Barbie 
gossip sites, just out of the reach of the university’s ethics codes.  
                                                          
42 Every single time I read this sentence (a great many times now), I read ‘methodologies’ as 
‘mythologies.’  
43 That man floating about in space again. 
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Since embarking on my project, many psychology detectives have asked how I 
look at such ‘horrible’ content, as unseemly as it is, concerned for my well-being.44 This 
is a question about my safety: how do I, the individual me, endure the horrifying chaos?  
 
Response-Ability 
 Haraway advocates for response-ability: the capacity to ask and respond to 
complicated questions of ‘otherness’ and “take up the unasked for obligations of having 
met” (Haraway, 2016, p. 130). Response-ability is the ethical practice of being able to 
respond within our encounters with others, and ‘staying with the trouble’ of these 
encounters. Response-ability is about 
important matters, like to whom one is actually responsible. Who 
lives and who dies, and how, in this kinship rather than that one? 
What shape is this kinship, where and whom do its lines connect 
and disconnect, and so what? (Haraway, 2016, p. 2)  
Ethics, for cyborgs, are in connection and connections; not the practice of individualised 
ethical interactions that privilege the hierarchical structures produced through informed 
consent, privacy and ‘dignity’ and ‘safety,’ but rather the blurry practice of 
“remembering who lives and who dies and how” (Haraway, 2016, p. 28) in the 
“constant flush of interrelating bodies” (Schaefer, 2014, p. 8). 
So the cyborg’s ethical questions and operations deviate significantly from the 
psychology detective’s. In traditional psychology, the detective, and his superiors, 
dictate what is ethical and what is not, based on the ‘rights’ of the neoliberal bounded 
individual man. Does he understand the decision he is making? Is his privacy ensured? 
Will this research help him or harm him? For cyborgs, decision-making is challenged, 
                                                          
44 I am again reminded of presenting some work on idea choice and being asked if my supervisors knew 
what I was doing… 
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privacy is challenged, help and harm are challenged: being response-able to the 
moments when understanding has shifted, privacy has mutated and help and harm bleed 
into each other. The questions shift to: “Who renders whom capable of what, and at 
what price, borne by whom?” (Haraway, 2016, p. 23). Such questions are disruptions of 
taken-for-granted categories, warped by paying attention to the details, like power 
relations, subject positions and embodiment: “The details matter. The details link actual 
beings to actual response-abilities” (Haraway, 2016, p. 29), it matters what ‘thoughts 
think thoughts’ are ethical. The disruption of the categories that, for example, dominate, 
or are subjugated, is movement towards ethical encounters that enable responses (in a 
doing sense) rather than further categorisation and re-categorisation, or, as Jane (2014) 
suggests, civilising horrors for academic packaging. For example, the psychology 
detective needs to achieve the category of ‘informed consent,’ where participant-
suspects are expected to understand the procedures they are consenting to, whereas the 
cyborg questions information, consent and the connections between the two and the 
many others who may connect, responding to the subject positions that can render 
information unintelligible and consent a hyper-negotiable process that is never resolved.  
The cyborg then is at play in the spaces between these bounded categories (like 
consent and no consent) and the bounded individuals who are coerced into them. To 
‘play’ suggests a testing of limits, perhaps traversing them, seriously and urgently. 
‘Playing’ can mean inhabiting multiple worlds simultaneously (like how the backyard 
can also be outer space, and being in outer space might mean doing some work, like 
performing your astronaut duties). So “perhaps it is precisely in the realm of play, 
outside the dictates of teleology, settled categories, and function, that serious 
worldliness and recuperation become possible” (Haraway, 2016, pp. 22-24). Within this 
cyborgian ethical shift towards play between boundaries, new ethical possibilities and 
107 
 
responses emerge. What happens when a cyborg plays with a Human Barbie? Or a pro-
rape forum? Or Slender Man? Without the boundaries fixed, or at least with them 
blurred, the potential for transformative ethical politics is exponential. Such permeable 
boundaries could enable the critical transmission of more tolerable, and possibly even 
exciting, ethical encounters: “Bodily ethical and political obligations are infectious, or 
they should be” (Haraway, 2016, p. 29). 
To enliven these ethical obligations, I hope you might consent (ha ha) to being 
jacked into (à la ‘The Matrix’) a network of data I explored early in the research 
process. Through jacking you in, particular encounters become important for 
understanding the noninnocence of cyborg ethics: responses are not unified or 
categorical, not always resolved.   
 
‘Data’ Birthed Prematurely  
One spring day in the southern hemisphere of planet Earth, I began to access 
sites on the internet known for their roles in ‘The Fappening,’ the celebrity nude photo 
hacking ‘scandal’/crime wave. The exercise in access was to gauge the type of content 
that might be available on particular sites, given their association with intimate image 
hacking and their prominence as extremely popular forums characterised by a culture of 
heteronormative misogynist masculinity (Ging, 2017; Marwick & Caplan, 2018).  
 
Reddit - Expansive 
 Reddit calls itself “the front page of the internet” (www.reddit.com) and had a 
reputation for hosting everything from adorable animal images and family moments to 
‘death porn’ and ‘jailbait.’ Most of these subreddits were easily accessible to the 
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public.45 There were few restrictions on content.46 I browsed subreddits such as 
TheRedPill (a men’s rights subreddit), Classic 4chan (which features a cartoon 
depiction of a violent rape as its background image), Fappening Discussion (for 
discussing the Fappening and how to access the hacked images and videos) and a 
subreddit called PhilosophyOfRape, in which a user called ThePhilosophyOfRape 
shares their reasons for rape as a necessary behaviour modifier for women. The content 
of these varied subreddits, while occasionally labelled ‘not safe for work’ (NSFW), was 
freely available for anyone with internet access to read, and anyone with the 
competency to create a (free) Reddit account to directly participate in. Indeed, every 
Reddit page asks the viewer if they want to join the site, as well as providing multiple 
sharing options for posts and forums. There was no minimum age restriction in Reddit’s 
rules.  
 The only subreddit I tried to access on my first exploratory visit that I was 
denied direct access to was called GayBrosGoneWild, a subreddit supposedly dedicated 
to (more) explicit images and discussions of the sexualised male anatomy (but not 
necessarily exclusively for gay Reddit users). I encountered the digital barrier below 





                                                          
45 It is worth noting that subreddits can be made explicitly private. That is, moderators can restrict access 
to only approved users who become members of the subreddit. This practice does not seem to be 
employed often, with users instead preferring to leave their subreddits open in order to increase 
participation and increase the likelihood of the subreddit achieving Reddit fame and status by being 
included on the front page of the site. 
46 Reddit’s tolerance for offensive content has shifted since my first explorations. In 2015, many 
subreddits that I had been attending to were banned. Examples will materialise through this chapter and 
will materialise again constantly on the internet.  
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I chose not to click through the barrier as this posed an interesting glitch in cyborg 
ethics. I was over 18, and (somewhat!) willing to view the content, in this research 
context. When accessing Pro-Ana-Nation for previous research (Connor & Coombes, 
2014; Connor, Coombes & Morgan, 2015), I clicked through the warnings (much more 
detailed and targeted than Reddit’s minor roadblock) as they were part of the pro-
anorexic text that constructed the community. Pro-anorexic warnings acted not so much 
as restrictions to viewing content, but instead as warnings to fellow women with 
troubled bodies. What about the content behind the Reddit warning had triggered the 
block? Presumably, the content is categorised as qualitatively ‘worse’ than the 
pornography and/or violent content easily available on the other public subreddits? Is 
the need to click ‘yes’ or ‘no’ here indicative of a marked difference in the ‘potentially 
harmful’ content behind the buttons? What is “adult content” on a site that allows 
anyone of any age to read and create any kind of content they wish?  
 When re-visiting some of these subreddits a few days after my first visit, I 
discovered that the subreddit PhilosophyOfRape had been allocated an adult content 
warning where it previously had not. I did click ‘yes’ to get back through to this 
subreddit, as I had already accessed it when it was not gated. There was no difference in 
content from when it was open to when it was gated, except for a few more posts of 
similar content, and many more lambasting or deriding the creator/moderator of the 
subreddit. 
The only time the Massey IT system ‘questioned’ my access to either 
pornographic, pro-rape or otherwise violent forums was when I was accessing 
subreddits relating to Reddit troll/hero Violentacrez, one of the internet’s most prolific 
trolls. He created subreddits dedicated to ‘jailbait’ (mundane images of teenage girls 
between the ages of 16 and 18, like standard selfies, photos with friends and so on, 
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mostly mined from random accessible Facebook pages), rape, ‘creepshots’ (photos of 
women taken without their knowledge or consent) and misogyny (see Chen, 2012). He 
was a Reddit moderator and hero, and won awards for his participation in the site, but 
once his offline identity was tracked down and outed by a journalist (an internet practice 
known as doxing), he deleted his Reddit user identity and even lost his offline job 
(Chen, 2012).  
Upon clicking through to a subreddit that simply discussed the Violentacrez 









No other Reddit pages had thus far triggered this gate. Why did this subreddit trigger 
the Massey warning, when subreddits explicitly dedicated to rape did not? It seems that 
this warning pops up every now and then, perhaps responsive to consistent accessing 
rather than the specifics of the content accessed, reminding the neoliberal employee that 
the boss is watching, even if he is not very concerned about exactly what kind of 
content the employee is accessing. The ethics committee and IT access disconnect 
manifests again, with the concern about access to NSFW content focusing on neoliberal 
productivity (literally not safe for the workplace’s productivity) rather than the safety of 
internet users. Perhaps the game is one of neoliberal numbers:  
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our system detects you have viewed 10 pro-rape forums today; please restrict 
your viewing of pro-rape forums to three in a 24-hour period.  
After a few exploratory visits, I checked through a large list of subreddits I had 
collected to catalogue what levels of NSFW tagging and accessibility (even a cyborg 
likes to catalogue and categorise every now and then), an exercise in beginning to 
render the expansive network of forums within the website. There were47 hundreds, 
possibly thousands, of subreddits dedicated to the sexual exploitation of women and 
girls and the pornification of the macabre (for example the SexyAbortions subreddit) 
and the mundane (like sexypizza, a forum dedicated to pizza48). As I performed this 
rendering of Reddit forums, I realised that the ‘over 18’ gateway had been lifted across 
all subreddits because I had previously clicked ‘yes’ to get through to the 
PhilosophyOfRape subreddit. Clicking ‘yes’ once meant that even the most graphic of 
subreddits was instantly accessible. So I went clicking, unrestricted by any more 
questions of my willingness to view “adult content” and connecting through to some 
new, extensive networks. In the catalogue below, I have recorded the name of the 
subreddit, a general and inadequate categorising descriptor of its content, whether it 
identified itself as a NSFW forum (or if just ‘some posts’ are labelled as such), whether 
I gained unrestricted access after agreeing to view PhilosophyOfRape and whether or 
not the subreddit has been banned as of late September 2018. Content described in 
capital letters was particularly troubling: 
 
                                                          
47 As previously mentioned, in 2015, Reddit began the process of banning forums dedicated to extreme 
violence and racism (see Lazzaro, 2015).  
48 The sexypizza forum is quite wholesome: just a series of really tasty looking pizzas. Still, the structure 
of the forum mimics the explicitly exploitative forums where the content produced through them is 
constructed in pornified ways. 
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NAME CONTENT NSFW ACCESS (clicking 
‘yes’ once) 
BANNED? 
gentlemanboners Objectification x  active 
vgb (vintage gentleman boners) Objectification some posts  active 
gentlemanbonergifs Objectification x  active 
celebs Objectification some posts  active 
fatpeoplehate Hate speech some posts  BANNED 
TwoXChromosomes Women’s Activism x  active 
TrollYChromosome Misogyny x  active 
relationships Help/Advice x  active 
TheRedPill Misogyny x  QUARANTINED49 
cosplaygirls Objectification x  active 
prettygirls Objectification x  active 
hardbodies Objectification some posts  active 
AskMen Help/Advice/Misogyny some posts  active 
MensRights Misogyny x  active 
AskWomen Help/Advice some posts  active 
VolleyballGirls Objectification/Exploitation x  active 
PrettyGirlsUglyFaces Women’s Activism x  active 
pussypassdenied Misogyny x  active 
goddesses Objectification/Porn some posts  active 
RapingWomen Graphic   BANNED 
SexyAbortions GRAPHIC   BANNED 
CuteFemaleCorpses GRAPHIC   BANNED 
KillingWomen Graphic   BANNED 
beatingwomen2 Graphic   BANNED 
PussyPass Misogyny x  active 
StruggleFucking GRAPHIC   active 
Rateme Objectification/Exploitation x  active 
cfnm (clothed female, nude male) Porn   active 
StrugglePorn Exploitation/Graphic/ Porn   active 
nsfw_wtf Objectification/Porn   active 
RapingRapeFetishists Graphic   active 
CuttersGoneWild Graphic   BANNED 
selfharmpics Help/Advice some posts  BANNED 
circlejerk Masculine x  active 
rape Help/Advice (formally abusive) x  active 
deathfap Graphic x  BANNED 
againstmensrights Misandry x  active 
NSFW_Hardbodies Objectification/Porn   active 
nsfw Objectification/Porn   active 
tipofmypenis50 Objectification/Graphic Porn   active 
AbusePorn2 Objectification/Graphic Porn   active 
blackmailporn Objectification/Graphic Porn   active 
PreggoPorn I do not need to look at these anymore, 
right? 
  active 
watchpeopledie You get it.   QUARANTINED 
youngporn There are enough examples now.   active 
 
After clearing the internet history, I tested access to StruggleFucking, which 
presented me with the Massey gateway, followed by the ‘over 18’ Reddit gateway, re-
erecting the various gateways to viewing the forum. So agreeing to view adult content 
                                                          
49 A subreddit that has been ‘quarantined’ by Reddit now requires users to click past an official and stern 
gateway warning them of potential harmful content, and in some cases, like for TheRedPill, users are 
directed to potential sources of help. 
50 tipofmypenis is a forum dedicated to helping users identify and virtually locate women from 
pornographic images/videos… a play on the phrase ‘on the tip of my tongue.’ 
113 
 
just once on Reddit opens up all the other “adult content,” an interesting loophole a 
cyborg might exploit when she becomes needy for connection. 
 
4chan – Cultural Text 
 4chan.org, known for being more extreme than Reddit in multiple ways, is a 
popular image board where the Fappening supposedly originated, at least in a more 
public manner. Access to 4chan, however, is more virtually guarded than Reddit, 
including the user convention of adopting ‘anonymous’ as a user name. The site does 
not allow users to organise their 4chan use through an account or profile. Instead, users 
post and respond chaotically, some choosing to use an identifiable user name each time 
they post, or to employ the use of a tripcode,51 but most use the default ‘anonymous’ 
label without any form of unique identifier.  
There are few restrictions to participation in the 4chan chaos. The disclaimer 
below appears when you click on any of the 4chan boards, no matter what the content: 
 
                                                          
51 A tripcode is an identifier tagged onto user’s posts so that they do not have to use an identifiable user 
name each time they post or respond but can still be identified as a unique poster (4chan, 2018). Users 
become identified by a code of letters, numbers and punctuation that can be used to some extent verify the 
authenticity of responses in a 4chan board. 
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4chan aims to block “minors” from entering any part of the site, not just the 
parts with the “adult content,” but these blocks are superficial, hurdled with a single 
click. There is also a thinly veiled acknowledgment of the kind of extreme content that 
someone might encounter on 4chan52 in your agreement “not to hold 4chan responsible 
for any damages from your use of the website” (www.4chan.org). Responsibility for 
viewing and producing 4chan content falls with viewers and producers, not the website 
itself. 4chan is not responsible as host: the anonymous users are in charge should they 
get themselves into trouble. And there is trouble aplenty in 4chan’s boards. Once I 
clicked through the gateway to the infamous /b/ board (one of the first established 4chan 
forums, dedicated to “random” content (see “/b/,” 2018)), the Massey gateway 
appeared. Once I clicked through the Massey gateway, I was immediately greeted by 
pornographic images (professional and otherwise) of women and transsexuals, as well 
as pornographic images of well-known cartoon characters (for example Marge 
Simpson) and other cartoon porn.  
Users of 4chan, and Reddit, produce text that becomes technocultural (much like 
pro-anorexic text (Connor, Coombes & Morgan, 2015)) through the complex 
dissolution of corporate responsibility for the production of comments and images, 
individualised assertions to freedom of speech and expression, and the abandonment of 
individualised identifiers. With such boundaries breeched and blurred, sites like 4chan 
then emerge as spaces through which to produce content that amplifies differences (like 
misogynist, racist and classist content) through intensified neoliberal individualism (the 
bounded individual responsible for their own offense – as a product and as a response) 
and the dissolution of the individual into a mess of social, cultural, political networks. 
                                                          




4channers in particular participate as ‘anonymous’ users, where they appear as a blurry 
cultural movement, rather than as individuals. Indeed, viewing 4chan feels very much 
like witnessing cultural movement, not like viewing the interaction of independent 
individuals. The dissolution of 4chan users into a heaving socio-political mess 
problematises that traditional notion of research ethics that would require me to seek 
informed consent to use 4chan user text for research purposes. As a researcher, my 
connection into 4chan text is cultural and networked, much as the 4chan text itself is 
cultural and networked, rather than individualised, identifiable users able to be 
separated off into ‘participants’ who can, or would, consent.  
I do need to alert readers, however, to the complexities of 
presenting cultural text as data for research purposes. Through my 
research, some internet users will be identified by name. Typically, 
these are users whose names are already widely publicly 
individualised and explicitly connected to their internet use. Users 
like Elliot Rodger, Gable Tostee, Anissa Weier, Morgan Geyser 
and members of the Roast Busters are now very public identities 
and these public names are utilised through my research to help tell 
cyborg stories. However, other user names and user images will be 
redacted for a multiplicity of reasons. In some cases, users utilise 
copyrighted content as avatars. In other cases, users may not even 
be aware that images of their bodies are online. In some instances, 
redacting user names might perform my own subversion, averting 
the gaze of users who might seek to trouble my troubling of the 
trouble. In other instances, APA referencing conventions would 
dictate that I explicitly identify a user in the forms of in-text 
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citations and full references in the reference list, rendering the user 
very individualised and visible. Whether individualised names are 
redacted through my research or not, they remain explicitly 
identified through massive network of internet text that does not 
redact their identities, but rather exploits their identification. So 
some redactions are futile: all of the content I sought for my 
research was publicly available. How do I present data that 
subverts traditional understandings of individualised anonymity 
and informed consent? Like a Weaver, I have pulled together a 
worldweave that prioritises aesthetics: the aesthetics of redaction 
where identities are in urgent danger of reverting back into 
bounded individualism, becoming too bounded, too clear, in need 
of blurring. 
 
Anon-IB – Decisions 
Anon-IB, now finally dead (see Cimpanu, 2018), was perhaps the most 
interesting site in terms of ethical decision making (that potentially traumatic boob!). 
Anon-IB was considered the main outlet for the Fappening, with some Anon-IB users 
utilising the site in order to breach the surface of the internet with the hacked intimate 
images originally traded on the dark web (see Sargent, 2014). The site featured no 
disclaimer that described what the site was, nor that the content may be NSFW. Below 
is a screen capture (images redacted) of the front page when I visited, publicly 
















All the photos posted to the site featured women (with the guest appearance from the odd 
penis), and almost all were intimate and/or pornographic. While there were plenty of 
visible images, Massey detected one section of the site to block from my view. From the 
list of boards available, this site was exclusively pornographic, and organised by type of 
pornographic content, country of origin and even specific cities of origin, allowing for 
users of the site to search for women based on where they live, with the possible intention 
of finding explicit images of women they knew, and/or identifying and locating women 
they had seen on the site. This practice was also evident during the Snappening (a sister 
event to the Fappening that targeted Snapchat users), where Redditors would ask for 
specific women and girls to be searched for in the image dump, and in subreddits like 
tipofmypenis where specific women in pornographic images and videos are identified and 
sometimes located, even if just digitally (by sharing the woman’s social media accounts, 
for example).  
The ease of access to Anon-IB meant that I did not have to consider my clicking 
actions: there are no terms to agree to, at least not in words and virtual buttons, but 
rather in the images of exploited women staring back at me. Even Massey IT 
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department’s attempt to block my view was half-hearted. While the exploitation of 
women’s bodies had been prominent through all the content I was consuming, the 
suddenness with which I found myself deeper into the network than I imagined 
travelling made me wonder if my clicks were doing harm, a moment of acutely 
experiencing the blurring between those traditional ethical notions of help and harm. In 
an age when website clicks earn money and keep a site alive, have I become a user of 
that site? What was my ethical cyborg response to clicking on to Anon-IB? 
Through events like the Fappening and the Snappening, the hacking, cataloguing 
and image dumping of women happened mostly behind explicitly closed virtual doors: 
dummy emails, ever-shifting links and dark web shenanigans that I did not connect into. 
But Anon-IB was a sharp breach of the dark web into the surface of the internet; a 
virtual black market for women’s digitised intimate bodies, carefully catalogued for 
ease of navigation. And that, I hope, is all I needed to know. On my first and last visit to 
Anon-IB, I did not click beyond the homepage.   
  
→ SexyAbortions and Vote Brigading – When I Was Not Safe 
While the potentially pornographic content of the sites I was mining for data was 
a concern for ethics approval, it is worth mentioning that while this content was graphic, 
and in some cases, horrifying, some of the most upsetting content was not necessarily 
pornographic in the more commonly understood traditional sense. Porn culture 
permeates Reddit and 4chan, even in (and in some cases especially in) forums and 
threads created for children’s content (like My Little Pony and other children’s 
cartoons); the boundary between porn and not-porn is extremely blurry/non-existent.53 
For example, the most challenging subreddits I encountered were SexyAbortions (a 
                                                          
53 ‘Rule 34’ of the internet asserts that if something exists, there is porn of it (“Rule 34,” 2018). 
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forum dedicated to images of dead foetuses and babies, usually bloody, that were 
discussed in masturbatory terms) and CuteFemaleCorpses (where users posted photos of 
dead women – some from TV shows and movies, some almost certainly not… – and 
also discussed their masturbatory potential, as well as sharing some images of dead 
women’s bodies explicitly being violated). Both of these subreddits were porn-adjacent: 
users posted images not typically considered ‘pornographic’ and then commented on 
them in the same ways they were commenting on porn (through masturbation references 
and what they would like to ‘do’ to the subject of the image). Does the approval to view 
pornographic material for the purposes of research (granted either by the ethics 
committee or the IT department) cover the internet’s pornification of anything from 
children’s TV shows to extreme gore? 
So while the question of the potential harm of porn is complicated by 
proliferating pornification, a more urgent question of safety materialises. Jennifer 
Allaway is a social researcher who was conducting research on sexism in the gaming 
industry with gaming developers. When #GamerGaters (members of an anti-feminist, 
misogynist gaming movement) discovered her online survey that had been circulated to 
game developers, they bombarded her survey with racist and misogynist responses – a 
practice known as vote brigading (see Allaway, 2014). She now lives under the threat of 
doxing, where her private details like address and phone number could be released 
online for #GamerGaters to abuse. As I am engaging with violently misogynist sites as a 
non-user, I am technically considered unable to experience direct online abuse. 
However, there is a threat that if my research were to become public, I could be the 
target of doxing myself. While my own doxing would be unlikely, Allaway’s 
experience highlights the need for the ethical focus on IT safety for researchers who 
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engage online. The threats to researcher safety transform as technologies transform. It 
matters what thoughts think ethics. 
 
To Encounter 
Networking through the processes of my early encounters with some violent 
online spaces helps explicate the kinds of encounters explored through my research that 
might look and feel different to the traditional investigations of the psychology 
detective. I am a 21st century woman embedded in a technophilic Western culture, and 
my research is an analysis of my encounters within this culture. As I sit at my computer 
and virtually enter a pro-rape forum, for example, I am engaged in encounters with text 
that also encounters me. The pro-rapists who textualise their desire to rape Western 
feminists do so in order to effect encounters that may enable them to act on women’s 
bodies and perform their ideology, whether in the sense of the enactment of rape, or by 
scaring women into social and political silence, as well as engaging and strengthening 
homoerotic bonds that excite other men into their objectification of women (see Flood, 
2007; Mowat, Coombes & Busch, 2016). The encounters may be textual, but they are 
encounters nonetheless and they are most certainly embodied. Even a psychology 
detective might be able to concede that the internet is a massive-scale mess of human 
encounters, users communicating and producing the ‘encounters’ that psychology 
detectives try to manufacture through ordered procedure. Internet text could be 
considered an ever-in-flux, proliferating encounter online, as many, many users can add 
to, interact with, negate, dismantle, rebuild online text. My research is a series of 
interconnected encounters with multiple, contradictory and simultaneous texts that 
produce bodies in particular ways, expected and unexpected, necessitating responsive 
ethical considerations that are just as multiple, contradictory and simultaneous. 
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Case and point, my journeys with Elliot Rodger, the young man who killed 
several people and himself as ‘revenge’ for keeping him a virgin. Initially, the thought 
of reading his 137 page manifesto filled me with… well, boredom. Rodger’s manifesto 
is one of the main documents used to inform the ideology of pro-rape, anti-women and 
incel/co-alpha communities online such as the CoAlpha Reactionary Forum. So I knew 
I was in for a repetition, ad nauseam, of the misogyny I had read a thousand times 
before through Reddit and other places I had been exploring. And indeed that was 
exactly my experience. However, Rodger’s manifesto turned also out to be a compelling 
one. He was a gifted writer (he was encouraged to become a writer, but discovered it 
would not make him rich enough, fast enough), with a flair for the dramatic – he singled 
out mundane childhood, adolescent and early adulthood experiences as ‘traumas’ that 
scarred him deeply,54 like a playground pushing incident (Rodger, 2014, p. 32). His 
manifesto is a detailed account of how an incredibly troubled man tried desperately to 
participate in the Western narrative of heteronormative masculinity. As his life 
progressed, his frustration at his inability to produce the heteronormative narrative 
became amplified, and his hatred for those who he believed were actively denying him 
the narrative (women) proliferated, until his ‘Day of Retribution’ eventuated.  
Rodger had moments of insight into his predicament, and these were painful to 
read. There are points, however fleeting, where Rodger saw that his attempts at 
performing heteronormative masculinity and his own fraught anxieties at doing so may 
have thwarted his attempts to interact successfully with others, particularly women (see 
for example his moment of insecurity in his jury service story on page 81 of his 
manifesto). He did not linger on these moments of reflection, but they are undeniable. 
                                                          




He also repeated, in the closing pages of his manifesto, that he did not want to die, and 
that his life was a tragedy (see Rodger, 2014, p. 124). Indeed, his life, and the actions he 
took while ending it, was a tragedy, but perhaps not for the reasons that Rodger 
detailed. The tragedy is not that Rodger could not reproduce the Western 
heteronormative narrative; it is that the narrative was constructed at all. The narrative’s 
effects are tragic, where men and women are ‘bound in a spiral dance’ (to borrow a 
Haraway-ism (Haraway, 1991)) of sex and violence.   
My reading of Rodger’s manifesto was a prolonged and fraught encounter 
(explored further in chapter nine), where he connected to me (to everyone) and I have 
responded, in a way, in my own manifesto. Rodger typed his manifesto, and shared his 
YouTube videos, as acts of connection into a network of heteronormative interrelations 
teeming with embodied encounters.  
And the reading of Rodger’s manifesto connected me to subsequent encounters 
in ever-expanding networks. For example, Rodger’s manifesto connected to the viewing 
of the ‘Elliot Rodger: Retribution’ video game that enacts scenes from his life (as 
described by him in his manifesto) and enables players to slaughter (mainly) women, 
leaving their corpses littering the digital streets. The video game was confronting, not in 
that its violence was graphic or directed at women (as these are normal, pervasive video 
game tropes55 (see Dill, Gentile, Richter & Dill, 2005)), but in that it was gamification 
enabling embodied playability of a man’s deeply troubled life and his violent actions. 
The game lets users enact the violence Rodger envisages in his manifesto and the 
                                                          
55 Gaming indeed represents another bizarre disconnect between ethics as conceptualised by university 
committees and ethical research practice. The gaming industry is insidious, worth billions globally and 
built upon embodying violence. Yet, violent video games are readily available to children (for example 
the 2017-2018 ‘Fortnite’ craze (see Haysom, 2018)). Continued questions about my safety to be 
connecting to misogynist communities feel bizarre when so deeply embedded in a 21st century Western 
culture so familiar with violence against women even in childhood games.    
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violence that he actually perpetuated, utilising real words and real violences to create a 
pastime for gamers, Rodger fans and misogynists (categories that are not mutually 
exclusive). My encounter with the game was uncanny: watching Rodger’s life, crimes 
and tragedies played out through a game, for fun, the male cheers of joy alternating with 
women’s cries to stop… 
From the game connection came another encounter. I was curious as to who 
made the game, thinking it likely to be an independent gaming company or even 
individual who enjoyed courting controversy. Instead, when I followed the link, I was 
taken to a violent anti-feminist website called Lolokaust. The creators of the game were 
indeed an independent company, though their main venture was not gaming, but rather 
the industry of anti-feminism. Lolokaust’s homepage was dominated by anti-feminist 
cartoons; violent and sexually explicit.56 Much of the imagery was what might be 
labelled ‘grotesque,’ similar to Ralph Bakshi’s ‘Cool World’ cartoon characters 
(discussed in chapter eight), except more explicit and more violent. So rather than the 
game emerging from a gaming community steeped in misogyny, the game emerged 
from a misogyny community that connected into gaming. These are not mutually 
exclusive categories, but distinct enough to have challenged my expectations and shift 
my encounter, perhaps not unlike like how a human participant might provide an 
interview response that surprises the human researcher. 
Both Rodger’s manifesto and the connected Lolokaust website produced 
different encounters than I had anticipated (an anticipation based on a lot of experience 
connecting into misogynist communities). The connection to these nodes in the network 
is disruptive, simulating (in the Haraway-ian sense) the disruption of (traditional) 
                                                          
56 The site looks different in September 2018 than it did when I first accessed it in 2014. It is still awash 
with sexually violent imagery though!  
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encounters, particularly in (qualitative) psychological research, where people (human 
researcher and human participant) encounter each other and potentially unfold 
something together, shifting together, co-producing research. In my research the 
unfolding and co-production still happens, through embodied encounters with text. 
However, even through the human researcher/human participant relationships that best 
typify the psychology detective’s adherence to procedure, the power dynamic shifts in 
favour of the researcher. For me, in my encounters, the power is networked and 
expansive, dismantling the researcher/participant hierarchy. The moment I slipped back 
into detective mode and assumed I knew what was coming (because I followed the 
procedure), the network materialised new connections and disrupted the information-
exchange that had become so predictable. I am not the authoritative knowledge 
producer shaping participant responses with my questions. Rather, the text resists, 
disrupts, transforms in whatever ways it does and I respond. I cannot lead it, or directly 
impact upon it in ways that might shape it, but I can respond to it. So cyborg ethics 
shifts the experiences of the research encounter and the researcher/participant hierarchy 
to embedded hyperconnectivity where plugging into an unknown (or even partially 
known) network has the potential to re-route research signals, re-wire a research 
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Soliloquy: A Melodramatic Deviation 
 
 
“Hey, little cyborg, be sexy for me!” 
“Woah, not that sexy, you slut!” 
 
 
Stuck in the Same Old 
 I do not mind people’s struggle to understand a cyborg, or her politics. The 
politics are necessarily messy, contradictory, partial, multiple and disruptive. She is 
obnoxious; she offends; she is impolite where she is expected to ‘lady-like’ (whatever 
that means); she is seen and heard when she is supposed to remain quiet; she is quiet 
when ordered to reveal herself (pun intended). Cyborg politics ooze from the spaces in-
between; rupture from the tensions between icky binaries; are built from the excesses. 
They are complex, interconnected and Frankensteinian. They are a political struggle for 
political struggling. In other words: cyborgs are not everyone’s idea of a good time. 
 As such, engaged in endless political struggling, I do not expect to be greeted 
with open academic arms. I expect resistance to my resistance. Indeed, I am not sure 
what I, or my cyborg sisters, would do if met with total, unquestioning acceptance 
(explode, perhaps?).  
 The rejection of a case study I was asked to write has been the clearest example 
(to date!) of the stuckness of the cyborg and her politics in the same old bind of the 
morality women’s sexuality: the virgin and the whore.  
 A journal approached me, requesting I submit an account of my research of pro-
anorexia communities online, citing a published paper that signified my work was not 
of the mainstream (even if that paper too was sanitised). Of course, there was no 
guarantee of publication; just the dangling of the opportunity text-carrot in front of a 
cyborg always nauseous to vomit up more words.  
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 The particular journal wanted to hear my research story, or a specific aspect of 
my research story, that highlighted methodology. They wanted to know my decision-
making processes, and share them with other poor fools who embark on the research 
process.  
 Homework duties were performed (connecting to the network, as cyborgs are 
want to do): published case studies were appreciated; author guidelines were consumed. 
As the writing process began, the instructions were followed as best as a cyborg can 
(which is admittedly not very closely). The paper was built, submitted for quality 
control (sent to supervisors), then shipped off for violation. 
 And then my case study returned, fully violated (or perhaps not violated 
enough…?). Main critiques were as follows (run through a Donald Trump tweet-ifier): 
- “No referencing! Sweeping generalisations! Academic catastrophe! Sad!” 
- “References used (when this idiot even uses them) are too old! Yuck!” 
- “This so-called person has told me all about the decision-making processes for 
their methodology! Bad! This paper was supposed to be about the decision-
making processes for their methodology!” 
The cyborg had proved too deviant for ‘legitimate’ academic consumption, 
though not unsurprisingly. A previous paper had a similar response, but they were at 
least prepared to play; prepared to engage with the cyborg, even if still on their own 
stuffy, rigid terms. 
But there is another similarity between these two papers and the response to 
them: both journals wanted my cyborg. They saw a thing, not sure what it was, but 
wanted it anyway. Granted, the case study journal may have cast a wide net, and my 
poor cyborg got tangled up in it, but nevertheless the cyborg was summoned to account 
for herself, methodologically. The account, however, in both these instances, was 
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rejected (once partially, once fully). The ‘sexy’ idea once again has proven too wild, too 
promiscuous to be taken as anything other than an offense to academic decency. Only 
this time, it was hard to imagine the reviewer’s response as anything less than a 
panicked demand that I get myself to a nunnery.   
For example, the majority of the published case studies I read from the case 
study journal did not reference their “sweeping generalisations,” let alone specific 
studies they discussed. The author guidelines specifically requested that author’s not 
cite as extensively as they would in a traditional journal article, as the cases studies were 
supposed to be more an exploration of the researcher’s experience and decision-making 
processes. In this way (and to be fair, perhaps only this way), my case study, as 
submitted for punishment, did not look any different to the majority of the case studies 
published by the journal. 
So, I assume then that there is something particularly offensive about my writing 
of my case study that drove this reviewer to highlight the perceived lack of referencing 
in my work as poor scholarship, when it seemed to be standard practice encouraged by 
the journal itself that had been good enough for the more mainstream case studies: the 
well-behaved researchers who had the decency to use sanctioned methodologies, 
untainted by slutty ideas and the ravings of political dissent. 
 What these encountered academics seem to expect is a virginal cyborg: a 
mythical figure of a ‘good girl’; obeying her parents; respecting authority; innocent; 
unwavering in the face of the world’s most carnal delights (like political activism or 
having a creative thought); un-troubling of the powers-that-be. Perhaps, to some, the 
image of a cyborg (particularly in connection with femininity) represents docility: the 
hybridity of the cyborg signifies femininity as controlled through technology, creating a 
passive figure, rather than the challenger, the disrupter that I like to think I construct.  
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 I understand the excitement the cyborg conjures for academics, but alas, it is her 
purpose (well, one of them) to also conjure unease and discomfort – She will sex with 
you, but it is not her calling.57 Academia seems to desire my cyborg, but rejects her 
when they poke around her bits (I do not know why I am complaining. This happens to 
Donna Haraway/feminists/women all the time). Much like women must be both virginal 
and whores (both accepted and rejected in varying ways), my cyborg seems to be 
greeted with the curiosity of the virginal, and rejected with stigma of the whore.  
 Case and point, the issues that the case study reviewer raised (the ones that could 
be taken seriously, that is), were easily fixed: I can add in the references. I can update 
the ‘outdated’ (no, actually, I cannot, but like any good whore, I can fake it!). These 
issues are very, very fixable. What I cannot fix, however, is a reviewer’s refusal to play, 
which seems to be the only reason that the response shifted from (minor or major) 
revision to total rejection. It is, like a whore (a prolific one, anyway), beyond 
redemption in its political, theoretical positioning.58  
Like both the virgin and the whore, I did as I was told. But my theoretical 
disobedience seems to have offended the reviewer to such an extent that fixable things 
like referencing became the only point they could focus on, unable to examine the ideas 
presented and how they might be useful for researchers who also occupy slutty spaces. 
The cyborg was dismissed as deviant (intellectually, as well as from the journal’s 
requirements) and I was chastised on tangibles like referencing. They knew I needed to 
be punished, but were not quite sure how else to do it.  
 
 
                                                          
57 As Jordan Wolfson’s (Female figure) likes to say: “I’ll sex with you, but it’s not my calling” (Wolfson, 
Konrath & Woods, 2015, p. 41). 
58 If the cyborg were a sex position, it would probably some really depraved one that doctors recommend 




































In The Meme-Time: Issue two, 2016 of Massive Magazine, the Massey University 
(Palmerston North) student magazine, featured a cartoon image59 of what was later 
‘clarified’ as a “bored and powerful” (Walsh, 2016a, para. 14) sex worker reading a 
100-level psychology textbook while having “sheepish” (para. 5) sex with some 
disembodied masculine hands. 
                                                          





At many points, the cyborg (researcher and/or otherwise) experiences a rupture, 
a cataclysm, where there is a collapse, where the excesses become too heavy, 
boundaries too breached and apocalypse emergent. In the previous chapter, my 
response-ability to stay with the expansive trouble of the research network was in 
question and what that expansivity might enable for embodied encounters. The present 
chapter is an extended undoing of the embodied experience of such troublesome 
encounters, their breaches and breakdowns. In effect, this chapter is a rupture. The 
previous chapters serve as a prequel to a moment (multiple and partial) of cyborg 
materialisation; a tangle of moments (and other bits of things and not-things) that 
congeal into a fleshed cyborg; a cataclysmic rupture from which new possibilities 
emerge.  
I experienced a cataclysm in my previous research on pro-anorexia, where the 
multiplicity, simultaneity, partiality and contradiction of pro-anorexic text connected 
through the history of women’s bodies and technology to emerge as cyborg, a figure 
neither good nor bad, but complexly produced for complex politics in complex times. 
The rupture and emergent figure, while perhaps not explicitly expressed at the time, 
were apocalyptic, aligning with visions of end-times cyborg uprisings not with the aim 
of ‘saving the world’ from such uprisings, but in the interests of re-imagining the world 
in ways that might enable survival. 
 
A Lovely Day for an Apocalypse 
The idea of ‘apocalypse’ is not clear despite its historical prominence through 
religion, global warfare and popular science fiction narratives. There are no real set 
definitions, as meanings shift through ‘revelations’ and disasters (religious, natural or 
134 
 
otherwise) to metaphors and stories for making sense of the world (Rosen, 2008; 
Wojcik, 1997). Violence is a key apocalyptic unifier, just as violence is a key unifier of 
the category ‘woman,’ so even at a skim read, apocalypse and ‘woman’ share violence 
as a common classifier. What apocalypse ‘is’ or looks like is less interesting60 than how 
the ideas of apocalypse enable new politics. Tina Pippin, a feminist apocalypse 
theologian, asserts that the apocalypse, as detailed in the Bible, establishes and re-
establishes women’s inferiority to men through extreme violence against women’s 
bodies (Pippin, 1999) and constructions of women as either obedient heroines or 
disobedient whores (Pippin, 2005). It seems she is in agreement with Haraway’s (1991) 
concerns about origin stories (especially biblical origins) “longing for fulfilment in 
apocalypse” (p. 175) and asserting the gendered social order. The biblical apocalypse 
affirms the (Western, Christian) gendered social order through men’s dominance and 
women’s objectified subjugation (Pippin, 2005), and as such does not offer many 
moments for liberation.  
However, for Catherine Keller (1992) apocalypse is a way to understand crises, 
“enabling a beleaguered community to interpret its place within historical crisis 
meaningfully” (p. 189). That is, apocalypse as a metaphor or narrative can help 
disenfranchised others interpret or story their positioning and their politics. Indeed, 
Pippin (2006) does arrive at some moments for re-imagining women through 
apocalypse, citing Monique Wittig’s destructive and reconstructive ‘The Lesbian Body’ 
and Donna Haraway’s cyborg in the process. To extend the political potential of 
apocalypse stories further, Viola (1990) analyses apocalypse though Soviet peasant 
                                                          
60 I have no interest in providing a unified definition of the term. If you will excuse the secondary citation 
(apocalypse work can be hard to locate): “…Pippin nevertheless problematizes the possibility of unified 
liberatory readings, arguing that “what is liberating for one of the ‘oppressed’ is not necessarily liberating 
for all of them”” (Castelli, 1994, p. 96). A unified and clear definition of apocalypse could close off 
opportunities for ‘others’ to engage in apocalypse politics in alternative ways.   
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resistance to their government, noting that the idea of the apocalypse was “an important 
element in the peasant strategy of rebellion…” (Viola, 1990, p. 748), where apocalyptic 
thinking “became a call to arms” and a “guide to action” (p. 767). The idea of 
apocalypse organised and gave language to the anxieties and violences experienced by 
disenfranchised people, and enabled ways of thinking rebellion and resistance into 
action (Viola, 1990). It mattered what nightmarish thoughts were used to think 
rebellious thoughts. Indeed, Haraway’s cyborg is about “not giving in to the nightmares 
of apocalypse” (Gane, 2006, p. 151) and instead staying with the horrors and using 
those horrors to think and do differently. 
Apocalypse then seems a possible way through which the impossibility of 
technobodies can be given some dire language. Through (science fiction) narratives that 
construct apocalyptic worlds, gender, as an example, can be problematised and re-
written through the necessary breakdowns of social and political structures that bind. 
Murray (2013) suggests that a zombie apocalypse (the ‘Resident Evil’ games and 
movies, for example) can create “ruptures in the existing social structures to imagine 
alternative understandings of gender and sexuality” (p. 15). Through a zombie 
apocalypse, gendered performances can potentially be re-worked and new possibilities 
explored, although Murray (2013) does acknowledge that gendered binaries are often 
not re-done through these narratives, but in many cases re-asserted, as in ‘The Walking 
Dead’61 for example, and ‘Cool World,’ a different kind of apocalypse movie (explored 
in chapter eight of my research project). Moreover, Watkins (2012) suggests that 
women apocalypse writers are typically suspicious of advanced technology for its 
                                                          
61 Anthology television series ‘American Horror Story’ is, at time of writing, entering a season in which it 
explores the apocalypse. The show has a women-heavy cast and crew and tends to challenge some 
binaries in interesting ways (while also re-asserting them in plenty of boring ways). But alas, I will not be 
able to use the show as an example here, as it will not have fully aired by my institutionally mandated 
submission date. Another connection missed and mourned! 
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patriarchal roots, telling apocalyptic stories that challenge modern technology’s 
potential for producing even worse predicaments for ‘others,’ like women. Watkins 
(2012) uses literary examples from writers such as Margaret Atwood and Liz Jensen, 
among others, who utilise climate change as their apocalypse narrative, interrogating the 
connections between women, patriarchal technologies, science, environmentalism and 
the end of world. But apocalypse films like ‘H.’ where women look after robot babies,62 
make strange, through technology, women’s roles as ‘mother’ and ‘caregiver,’63 and TV 
shows like ‘Fringe’ and ‘Westworld,’ where women, science and technology become 
intricately bound to the survival of multiple universes, also enable some frightening and 
exciting spaces through which to re-conceptualise woman and her connections in and 
through technology. In these stories, the ‘end of the world’ looks very different, but can 
be survived in multiply weird and wonderful ways.  
Apocalypse then can be undone, re-worked and opened up to more and more 
possible meanings. When a ‘world’ can be experienced so differently and when an ‘end’ 
can be experienced so differently (including the new beginnings that endings can 
allow), apocalypse becomes not about a singular event or revelation, but an ongoing, 
unfolding crisis of ‘otherness.’ The world ending can mean different things and be an 
embodied experience differently, with the end times providing some of us with new 
ways to be and do. With our perpetual focus on apocalypse as literally earth ending 
catastrophe, we do not address our local apocalypses, our daily shatterings, our ongoing 
catastrophes, our mundane ruptures that upheave and tear at us and re-work our 
everyday lives. The apocalypse then conceptualised not as a singular or sudden event, 
                                                          
62 The robot babies in ‘H.’ appear similar to ‘real dolls,’ the sex dolls utilised and ‘cared for’ by men (see 
Burr-Miller & Aoki, 2013, and also discussed in chapter ten of my research project). 
63 I will confess I have not seen ‘H.’: I have only watched the trailer and read reviews. The film is simply 




but rather as “a gradual progress towards contradiction” (Bull, 1999, p. 294) connects 
up potently with the cyborg. 
 Apocalypse is not some event we are waiting for, but ongoing events and 
moments we are already enduring and are looking to survive. For Keller (1992), even in 
the 1990s (a slow time compared to the late 2010s and beyond), the speed at which 
technology, politics, social interaction, the environment changes produces the “near 
simultaneous encounter” with apocalypse’s “many faces: judgment and promise, secular 
and religious, patriarchal and egalitarian” (p. 190). Apocalypse becomes keenly 
experienced not as a major catastrophic event or revelation, but as ongoing, mundane 
catastrophes for ‘others’ that are accelerated and amplified through ubiquitous 
technological connectivity to these “faces” of apocalypse. As we have rapidly, in my 
lifetime, moved through the apocalypse of Y2K, climate change and the Trump 
presidency, the critical urgency of apocalypse is ever-present. Exploiting patriarchal 
technology, and patriarchal end-times stories, may open some space for new ways to 
up-end our everyday catastrophes and re-imagine some new “faces” that help us 
survive. Keller (1996) suggests “… apocalypse is both a state of affairs and an 
interpretation of that state of affairs” (p. 13), making it a concept through which to 
articulate cataclysmic horrors, imagine how to undo those horrors, and maybe survive 
them. 
Apocalypse emerges then as a way of telling stories that could be exploited for 
political potency in anxious connection to the cyborg. ‘Apocalypse’ becomes an 
undoing word and a redoing word: a potent and multiple term for dire body politics that 
explodes meanings for cyborgs and other surviving kin to go salvaging. The cyborg has 
long been an apocalyptic figure (‘The Terminator’ franchise is built on the apocalyptic 
cyborg), and remains so through the alarmism of increasing automation (for example, 
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Elliot, 2018). Understanding apocalypse in current times, and its fraught and vital 
connection to technology becomes a key cyborg task.  
The story I tell next is an embodied apocalyptic response to an apocalyptic 
hyperconnectivity, an account of the state of affairs and an interpretation of that state of 
affairs. This is my (cyborg) response to a catastrophic overload of connections, an 
exercise in graceful degradation in an emergent, ongoing apocalypse, in which the 
woman’s body is at urgent stake once again (it always is!). Graceful degradation is a 
technological term associated with “machine breakdowns on computers; the ability to 
undergo graceful degradation ensures that failure of certain parts does not cause 
complete breakdown, but allows limited operation” (Chandor, Graham & Williamson, 
1970, p. 189). Graceful degradation, as a technometaphor, had been earmarked for use 
with work on women’s resilience in the technoworld, where hyperconnectivity enables 
women to maintain politicised technofunctionality even when social and political 
progress is slow, or deliberately broken down. Feminists, for example, both succeed and 
fail in many ways to make strong connections online (through general commenting, 
battling trolls, writing blogs, academic publishing and so on), but even through failures 
they continue to try to connect: the connection is live (and lively), but it just cannot 
quite get through the cacophony of other perhaps more insidious connections travelling 
established misogynist, individualist, masculinist wiring.  
There is a suggested femininity about a computer gracefully degrading, as grace 
is surely something Woman™ processes or performs. Like overwhelmed and 
overworked women, while some parts breakdown, there are connections and processes 
within the computer that keep functioning just enough to keep the computer alive. The 
metaphoric description of this degradation as ‘graceful’ suggests a delicacy, docility and 
perhaps even a misogynistic idea of dignity while breaking down, ceasing to function, 
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ending. Woman™ carries on, gracefully, even when her systems are broken and her 
connections weak or frayed. Women who do not degrade gracefully, perhaps by 
breaking down completely, loudly, abruptly or even wilfully might be constructed as 
bad feminine machines. 
But out steps a Weaver and snips graceful degradation out of the network it was 
connected into, and re-connects the technometaphor here. As I make sense of this 
chapter (speaking from a form of past where I edit my work, drafting and drafting), I 
fear the technometaphor is more me, the embodied feminist researcher engaging with 
technothings and perhaps not so gracefully at times operating on limited systems in an 
unlimited feast of connections: there are too many connections that need too much 
connection. As such, the story that comes next is about a researcher stuck in an 
apocalyptic (in Keller’s (1996) sense of the state and the interpretation) overload of 
contradictory connections, the practice of attending the impossible feast when 
something is served up that is not only devoured, but induces a simultaneous 
uncontrolled vomiting of connections that choke certain parts of the feminist researcher 
machine. As an impossible feaster, I can normally eat and eat and eat connections, only 
very rarely getting full and leaving the banquet. But the dish, the one soon to be storied 
in the words below, induced a vomiting that occurred while feasting, producing 
congestion in the connections and the graceful degradation of a feminist researcher. 
 
Massive 
In March 2015, University of Canterbury’s student magazine Canta published an 
‘opinion piece’ that advocated the sexual harassment and virtual rape of women gamers 
online (see Liu, 2015). The article was allegedly satire, yet it read as if copy-pasted 
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from misogynist gamers,64 the parody indistinguishable from its deadly serious sibling 
(misogynist gamers call it ‘reality,’ perhaps). There were questions raised about the 
editing of student magazines, the extent of free speech and censorship and how student 
money should be spent on student magazines. There was outrage; the magazine was 
pulled. Intrigued by a student magazine from New Zealand’s (allegedly) progressive 
modern universities publishing such an overtly misogynist article, I reached out to a 
networked feminist source for a copy of the offending article (as it had been removed 
from online sources as well as physical sources) and they kindly sent me a full-colour 
scanned copy of the article (so efficiently can we use patriarchal tools in this 
network…! And how interesting that while the article was banned, there are those of us 
most affected who are so keen to connect to the words, hoarding them, adding them to 
the pile…). The article itself is now oddly impossible to find; it has been shut down 
comparatively effectively in this modern age of hyperconnection and ever-present 
content. 
A year later, in March 2016, Massive Magazine, the Massey University 
Palmerston North campus student magazine, published an issue with an image of what 
was unclearly a sex worker engaged in the duel activity of reading her ‘Psych 101’ 
textbook and hair-pulling, butt-grabbing sexual intercourse. Due to the cover’s location 
(where I worked and where I studied and online), and explicit content (the politics of 
women’s bodies), the Massive cover was a disturbing hyperconnection for me as a 
student, as a psychology student, a poor student, a ‘cannot-find-work’ student, a Massey 
student, a Massey staff member, as a tutor of 100-level psychology, an owner of a 101 
textbook, a feminist researcher, a feminist researcher of things that matter to women’s 
                                                          
64 As well as evoking Lolokaust, the creators of the ‘Elliot Rodger: Retribution’ game, misogynist gaming 
is also synonymous with the #GamerGate movement explicated further in chapter eleven. 
141 
 
bodies, an embodiment junkie, a fan of art and a previous contributor of words (with a 
feature cover nowhere near so problematic) to the Albany campus student magazine. 
The imagery itself is hyperconnected to multiple online communities, as well as key 
issues of consent, free speech, women’s bodies, women’s embodiment, politics and 
power: many of the faces of apocalypse accelerated and amplified in the magazine 
cover. My own university, my own fellow students, my own student imagination 
conjured this image on my behalf and it was titillating traumatic. 
 
Cover Story 
The Massive Magazine cover cartoonishly depicts, at best, a distressed sex 
worker, and at worst, rape. The young cartoon woman, scantily clad, attempts to read 
her ‘Psych 101’ textbook as a pair of dark gloved hands appear behind her, pulling her 
hair and grabbing at her body. Thrusting is suggested. The image is pornographic not 
just in content, but in style, with stylised female proportions, large and barely contained 
if not for the grip on her ponytail. As an image produced online, it is a mere blip on the 
radar, and a tame one at that, but the mundanity of the image of a sexually abused 
woman is a key concern in and of itself. 
The cartoon produces a dehumanised woman-object popular in the incel/co-
alpha forums that idolise Elliot Roger (the young man – yes, among many – who 
murdered en masse because girls would not date him), and forum sites such as Reddit 
and 4chan that host pro-rape and anti-women forums. So there is a blurring of the 
boundaries between these assumed-to-be-niche corners of the internet (even though they 
really are not. Remember that Reddit, for example, considers itself “the front page of 
the internet” (www.reddit.com)) and student voice and journalism. A disenfranchised 
incel member does not care about the alleged political context of the Massive cover. He 
cares about the representation of women as cartoons, toys, commodities, playthings, 
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possessions, to do with whatever one may please, and act violently towards when the 
plaything refuses to play along. 
In these misogynist spaces online, the depiction of cartoon rape or sex is 
designed to 1) sexually gratify, and 2) offend ‘others’ (Massanari, 2017). These images 
are produced as masturbatory aids inspiring disgust that adds to the sexual pleasure. The 
politics to the images are about deliberately offending the disenfranchised for sexual 
and political pleasure, re-asserting gendered boundaries through violence and 
grotesquery. Another example was the image used as an icon for the PhilosophyOfRape 
pro-rape forum/website: a photo of a woman’s face with a similar tortured and wide-
eyed expression that the cartoon Massive cover depicts, except for the ball-gag keeping 
the woman unable to complain about her situation. Indeed, ball-gags and 
sadomasochistic sexual play are activities that women can and will consent to and 
enjoy, but the image used on the PhilosophyOfRape forum was used as a symbol of pro-
rape ideology for its representation of sexually dominated women, and perhaps more 
significantly for its potential for ambiguous interpretation, particularly for feminist 
arguments. Feminists do need to concede that women can and will consent to violent 
sex, so the image could be one of empowerment.65 Misogynist groups such as the 
PhilosophyOfRape, and now potentially Massive’s editorial team, revel in the 
simultaneity of ambiguity and use it to silence those who speak against such images: the 
simultaneous encounter with more and more faces of the apocalypse (Keller, 1992). Just 
as the PhilosophyOfRape and other affiliates justified their position by claiming women 
can and do enjoy violent subjugation, Massive and its supporters argued that the cover 
depicts an empowered and consenting woman earning money while she studies.  
                                                          
65 If only we knew what ‘empowerment’ meant (see Morgan & Coombes, 2013). Like the Weaver, we 
have become ‘UNSURE.’ 
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The woman depicted is not in control of her circumstances. She is panicked as 
she reads, and she is panicked as she is seemingly forcefully penetrated from behind. 
The image does not, to any me (the feminist researcher, the student, the woman, the art 
lover), indicate the woman’s empowerment either as a prostitute or as a student. So I 
opened the magazine up to read the articles within, needy for connection in the hope of 
gaining some understanding of the cover’s politics through the text. The cover feature’s 
article starts out with its inspiration: an ad calling for male ‘models’ to serve drinks 
shirtless and a question about students turning to sex work (see Greenland, 2016). 
Intrigued by this call for shirtless male students, the author called for sex workers to 
come forward and share their stories.  
The first response dealt with was that of a male ‘businessman’ (a pimp and 
brothel owner) (remember that linear stories are hierarchical…). The discussion focused 
on the attempts to talk to the man who admitted to hiring (women) students as sex 
workers, not so much on the hows and the whys of the ‘business.’ 
The subsequent interviews were conducted with women who worked in the sex 
industry as they studied, or left study to work in the sex industry. Each of the interviews 
mentions how tough it can be financially to be a student, and then extolls the virtues of 
working in the sex industry, including feminine empowerment. These are familiar 
discourses about feeling good about female sexuality, being in control of their lives and 
jobs and so on. Not problematic ways for sex workers to speak, except that these are the 
only stories here. The women interviewed were women willing to share their stories, 
women in the position to be able to share their stories, women who it seems were 
having the empowered sex worker experience. Paired with the cover image, a 
contradictory (but linear!) story is constructed about (women) students empowered by 
sex work as a way to fund study. Are these women the desperate students portrayed on 
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the cover? Or are they ‘empowered’ by their choice to work in the sex industry and 
study? Perhaps they embody both, but that story is struggling to emerge. 
Gender is almost completely missing from the article itself. Student poverty is a 
gendered issue, just as sex work is a gendered issue. Women earn less and have fewer 
job opportunities, while studying and once qualified (Chamberlain & Jayaraman, 2017). 
The sex industry turns this on its head66 (somewhat) with women’s bodies in hot 
demand, whether for prostitution, stripping or pornography. Women can earn a lot in 
these jobs – although how they earn is important (see Ryan, 2016) – but sex industry 
jobs are built on the idea of woman as object, as instruments through which masculine 
desire can be expressed fully, regardless of women’s desire.  
Another facet missing from this conversation is the stigma surrounding sex 
work. The cover image, some have suggested, depicts an empowered sex worker 
consenting to the acts hinted at. But there is still significant stigma against women 
working in the sex industry (consider the trouble sex workers have to gain access to 
health services, insurance and worker rights, as well as their treatment should they 
require the services of police to, for example, report rape). Women, sex workers or not, 
are still ‘sluts’ and ‘whores’ should they demonstrate sexual agency. Being a sex 
worker, while potentially individually empowering, is still a highly stigmatised 
profession. None the women interviewed for the feature provided their real names 
despite their pride in their profession, because the stigma is real and it is devastating 
(see Benoit, Jansson, Smith & Flagg, 2018).  
So yes, the financial plight and exploitations of the modern student and sex 
worker are serious issues. But Massive’s feature and its cover do not offer critical 
                                                          
66 There is also a delightful irony in the writer’s comment in the article about how far we have come since 
the days of corsets as women students recount their stories of why they turned to the ‘world’s oldest 
profession’… ‘The more things change, the more they stay the same’... 
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examination of the issues. Massive offers sex workers talking about the sex they have. 
There was no critical discussion of why women need to turn to sex work beyond 
‘university and rent are expensive.’ Men also pay university fees and have to pay rent. 
Are they turning to sex work in the same numbers as women? We are starting to 
understand a little bit about student sex work and its connection to reduced funding for 
students (see Roberts, Jones & Sanders, 2013; Roberts, Sanders, Myers & Smith, 2010; 
Sagar, Jones, Symons, Tyrie & Roberts, 2016; Sinacore, Jaghori & Rezazadeh, 2015), 
but the Massive article does not explore these issues. It barely problematises generalised 
student poverty. 
The dissolving of consent here is important too, especially for those who claim 
the image is a depiction of empowerment. The reason the women featured in the article 
turned to sex work was because they were unable to fund their study as they could not 
get adequate work (or any other work at all). They turned to sex work out of necessity. 
Is having to sell your body in a dangerous industry really consensual? When you have 
to choose between sex work and paying rent or buying food, are you really making a 
choice? In the apocalypse, you find ways to survive. The woman depicted on the cover 
is enduring both the physical trauma of the sex work, and the metaphorical ‘fucking’ of 
modern student life, but is the feminine endurance of suffering even consent, let alone 
empowerment? Supporters of the cover image seem to suggest that enduring abuse and 
violence is empowering; women making the best of their circumstances. There seems 
little critique of how terrible and apocalyptic those circumstances may be and how those 
circumstances are produced through institutional and systemic violences against 
women, and how women’s access to education was supposed to undo these violences, 
re-work women’s possible positionings and re-do the gendered world. Through 
technology like the internet that accelerates and amplifies gendered horrors, the idea 
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that feminine endurance of suffering is consensual empowerment is proliferated and 
consent dissolves further, rendering it a feminine myth. After all, what use does an 
object have for consent? 
So the image itself is alarming as it connects to uncritical analyses of women, 
education and sex work, and the breaching of the boundaries of some deeply misogynist 
specifically pro-rape communities. Massive’s content is produced as a university 
magazine that claims to represent the student voice at Massey University, the 
educational institution that I choose to study at and the institution I have published 
feminist research on behalf of. The depiction on the cover has emerged from a 
particularly violent, individualist, neoliberal online masculine voice AND it is being 
sold to us (men, women, women students) as a political representation of student 
financial struggles and women’s empowerment. A representation straight out of some of 
the most violent publicly accessible spaces on the internet (like Reddit and 4chan) is 
being utilised to re-do women’s educational and sexual empowerment in ways that re-
assert those age old binaries that kept women out of education and confined them to the 
home, re-establishing the gendered social order of the biblical apocalypse that sees 
women as silently docile or whores in need of punishment. In the feature article 
‘represented’ by the cover image, women (students) do talk of the empowerment of 
being a sex worker, particularly when faced with the powerlessness of being a student in 
New Zealand. Education, the great liberator of women from their gendered shackles 
(allegedly), is emerging as yet another shackle to women’s progress, through both the 
stories of its financial inaccessibility (the stories the sex worker students told) and 
through the hostility of the institution towards the safety of women and their bodies (as 
represented through the cover image and the response to women’s distress at the 
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image).67 When women, particularly students for whom the cover image is a 
representation of a very gendered issue of women’s student sex work – the systemic 
oppression that keeps women from studying and/or earning while studying/after 
studying – voice concerns about such an image and what it represents they are met with 
cries of 1) free speech/censorship, and 2) that they are too wound up/stupid/hell bent on 
outrage to understand the image and why they should support it. 
 
Educating Women 
As is (hopefully) materialising, there are a multiplicity of important connections 
enlivened on the Massive cover, through women’s bodies, sexuality, violence, 
education, oppression, individualism and ethics that constitute the ‘faces’ of apocalypse 
as suggested by Keller (1992), and a cacophony of ways to talk about and analyse such 
connections. The connections converge in the cover image, but they far from end there. 
For example, on the Massive Facebook page, debate about the cover image raged. A 
Facebook user called [HE VOICE, REDACTED] explained the image: 
Actually the face of the woman is like that as she is studying 
trying to figure out the either text or problem, the hands are to 
show ambiguity as the person paying for sex could be anyone. 
                                                          
67 After all, sexual violence against women on university campuses is ubiquitous. Top Google Scholar 
results for the topic are largely research articles on bystander intervention to prevent sexual assaults on 
university campuses, while prevalence and incidence data are much harder to find (largely due to the age 
old issues of defining sexual assaults and under-reporting combined with university inaction and 
unwillingness to provide data (see The Hunting Ground, 2017). The focus on bystander intervention 
suggests that sexual assaults are indeed ubiquitous on university campuses, and there are of course 
researchers who have attempted to gauge the extent of the violence (see Bonomi, Nichols, Kammes & 
Green, 2018; Dumbili & Williams, 2017; Fedina, Holmes & Backes, 2018; Gross, Winslett, Roberts & 
Gohm, 2006; Hackman, Pember, Wilkerson, Burton & Usdan, 2017; McCray, 2015; Sabina & Ho, 2014; 
Treffry-Goatley, de Lange, Moletsane, Mkhize & Masinga, 2018). 
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its not suggestive of rape its doggy style.68  
He then goes on to provide a dictionary definition of doggy style that discusses how 
many women find the position arousing as it can stimulate the ‘G-spot.’ So the male 
voice offers an explanation of the politics of the image for women, and then explicates 
female sexual arousal to the women he is talking to/at on Facebook. He then says: 
also some people like to pull hair during sex, so again not 
assault, just sexual fetishes you may not be aware of. 
I, the feminist researcher, assume he means that some women like to have their hair 
pulled during sex, rather than saying that some guys like to pull hair as a sexual fetish 
which cannot be thought of as assault (John Key, New Zealand’s former Prime 
Minister, is also mentioned on the cover, in the top right-hand corner, and discussed 
further later on in this degradation). There is also a misunderstanding of prostitution. A 
prostitute does not necessarily bring her fetishes or sexual preferences into sex work, 
but rather enables others to enact theirs, with her consent. Consensually allowing a 
client to pull her hair does not mean that she enjoys it as a sexual fetish. So here 
emerges more blurring of boundaries where consent is produced as always ambiguous. 
There is a blurring of what sex workers enable for their clients and what the sex worker 
personally sexually enjoys. Curiously, this is touched on by one of the sex workers in 
the article when she talks about clients believing if they make her orgasm, they should 
receive her services for free. The client, and commenter, seem unable to separate the 
desires enacted on the sex worker and the sex worker’s desires, perhaps because there is 
a simultaneous understanding of the sex worker as an object who cannot have her own 
desires, as well as an object that is explicitly sexual and responsive to male sexual 
                                                          
68 It perhaps needs to be mentioned that throughout my research all data/quotations appear exactly as they 




desire. After all, the sex worker is a product in the labour market, coded through 
heterosex (Gatrell, 2010). 
At one point in the Facebook debate, a woman commenter says:  
[HE VOICE, REDACTED], sometimes it’s best just to shut up 
and listen.  
Her response is seemingly exasperated by having a masculine voice continually 
explaining women’s politics (and in this case, female sexual arousal); just another 
woman trying to plug into some connections and unplug others, trying to survive the 
apocalypse. To this [HE VOICE, REDACTED] responds:  
[WOMAN, REDACTED], that has no point, except to be rude, 
I’d suggest you take your own advice to be honest.  
The masculine voice here de-legitimises the woman’s voice that demands to be attended 
to and heard when she speaks of her own body and her own politics as they experience 
apocalyptic violence. By dismissing her comment as simultaneously pointless (not 
worth listening to) and rude (hysterical and inappropriate), the masculine voice works to 
close down women’s opposition to women’s oppression, to block the connections 
between women, their bodies and their politics, perhaps fearing those potent, 
apocalyptic connections.   
Eventually, as with many great internet debates, [HE VOICE, REDACTED] 
reproduced the ‘I don’t hate women. Some of my best friends are women’ argument: 
[WOMAN, REDACTED]: “with every comment u leave u 
announce louder and louder how much you hate women.” 
[HE VOICE, REDACTED]: “I love women, I have a great 
mother and grandmother, a girlfriend who is beyond talented 
and numerous female cousins that are also inspiring people.”  
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From there, he goes on to call third wave feminism a cancer and claims to be an 
“equalist” when a woman feminist attempts to clarify for him what feminism means. He 
continues to erroneously define feminism as feminists negate his arguments. The 
conversations are cyclical (a closed loop) and frustrating for the women’s voices who 
engage with him. Despite multiple voices connecting in and quite violently in some 
instances telling him how factually incorrect he is about feminism, he continues to 
speak with absolute authority and privilege, taking up a large amount of virtual space 
and throttling the connectivity of the women trying to engage in critical, in-crisis body 
politics.  
This particular masculine voice also insists that he is civilly engaged in sharing 
opinions (unlike the mean feminists who are swearing at him!), and then states 
repeatedly that it is factually incorrect to call the scene on the Massive cover “rape” and 
calls anyone who disagrees “ridiculous” and “nuts” and tells women they are “clearly 
delusional about a lot of things.” 
When a rape survivor is accused of using her rape to ‘unreasonably justify’ her 
interpretation of the cover as triggering, she defends her position by saying that her rape 
indeed enables her to justify how sexually violent imagery can affect people. [HE 
VOICE, REDACTED] responds: 
It’s not an image of rape, you clearly have traumatic issues, but 
don’t project them. 
Again, the woman’s voice is rejected as mentally ill. Freedom of speech…? 
 
More Free Speech but at What Cost? 
The neoliberal individual (apocalyptic) response to women challenging hate 
speech and images is of course the persistent cry of free speech, produced through the 
masculinist position where speaking and being heard is taken for granted as an 
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inalienable human right. The call for those offended by the Massive cover to voice their 
concern through the (masculinist) channels provided, such as reporting the issue 
formally, assume that the (masculinist) system is at all concerned with how or why the 
disenfranchised express their concerns. As [HE VOICE, REDACTED]’s interactions 
suggest, the concerns of the disenfranchised are not considered legitimate. ‘Reporting’ 
assumes that the concerns will not be met with further shutting down of spaces or 
engagements with violent discourse. We know that women who report sexual assaults, 
including on university campuses, are often dismissed or chastised (see list of research 
in footnote 67 on page 147, as well as ‘It Happened Here,’ a 2014 documentary 
detailing several women’s ordeals with American universities and sexual assaults, 
including inaction, victim-blaming and intimidation (www.ithappenedhere.org)). The 
freedom to speak is a freedom only granted to those in the positions of power, those 
voices that are deemed worthy of the space they occupy; a re-assertion of the gendered 
social order of the biblical apocalypse where women are silent (see Pippin, 2005). 
Freedom of speech assumes that the marginalised and disenfranchised even have ways 
of articulating their experience so that the dominant group can hear them. ‘Others’ are 
still struggling for language. ‘Freedom of speech’ ensures that the dominant group 
continues to proliferate their ways of speaking that empower them and subjugate others 
as the othered continue to struggle with ineffability, being further and further removed 
from the small and awkward speaking positions that we may have carved for ourselves. 
Where is the free speech for the women who cannot give their names to their stories of 
sex work? Where is the freedom of speech for the women who voiced their concern 
with the cover? Can these apocalypse stories provide us with the language, with a new 
freedom to speak?  
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Indeed, while the woman on the Massive cover is not ball-gagged like the 
PhilosophyOfRape woman, the feminine voices who spoke against the cover have been 
metaphorically ball-gagged by the Press Council’s official statement that the image did 
not breach any ethical journalistic standards (“… not one Council member viewed it as 
depicting an act of sexual assault” (New Zealand Media Council, 2016, para. 19)). The 
Press Council’s declaration of the image’s so-called journalistic legitimacy essentially 
condoned the cover and legitimated the masculine voices who not only abused the 
women and aligned ‘others’ who objected to the cover, but also forcefully determined 
what women’s body politics were on behalf of women seemingly deemed too stupid 
and/or hysterical to comprehend the image’s representation (according to patriarchal 
masculinity). Following the Press Council decision, many supporters commented about 
how the naysayers should retract their comments (an act of silencing), or apologise (an 
act of silencing), or that they were obviously factually wrong about the reality of the 
cover (an act of silencing) or should be considered insane (an act of dismissal that 
silences). 
As the architecture of the internet breaches offline life as in the Massive case, 
interactions are more and more reflecting online worlds in which the abuse of women in 
any and all contexts proliferates and is protected as “free speech” or a “bit of banter.” 
Online there are few governing bodies that actually enforce restrictions to hate speech, 
as each individual is constructed as being accountable for what they are producing 
online, responsibility falling to individualised users rather than a particular governing 
body (from website owners to the police). The diffusions of responsibility to individual 
users enables particular voices to be heard more so than any ‘other,’ as dominant, 
privileged voices can violently and explicitly speak the loudest and the freest, while 
systematically shutting down and silencing resistance. Photos of breast-feeding women 
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will be, and have been, removed much more efficiently than pro-rape sentiments or 
images. Pro-rape discourse is protected as free speech, but a representation of a breast 
feeding a child offends those who see breasts as their sex toys. Time and again, images 
of sexual assaults or explicit objectifications of women are posted to Facebook and 
remain live, but images of women posting non-sexual photos of their bodies they 
experience as empowering are removed as offensive. The internet enables sexualised 
and abusive images of women to proliferate and normalise, as women’s empowerment 
is constructed as offensive and deviant.  
 
Campus Concerns 
I spiral back in my degraded, graceful loop to the issue of women’s safety and 
the ever-present threat of rape, particularly on a university campus. Seeing sexual 
violence cartoonishly trivialised on the cover of a student magazine unsurprisingly re-
victimises women who have been sexually assaulted and women who occupy the space 
of being perpetually threatened by gendered violence and rape. The response has been: 
‘Don’t like it? Don’t look at it.’ But again such direction is a neoliberal masculine 
response that places responsibility with women for their own safety and well-being, 
rather than questioning why the right to offend and abuse is privileged over the right to 
safety (surely another act of apocalypse, the state of affairs, which re-asserts the 
gendered social order). The threat (of the magazine) is still ever-present when on 
campus, as is the threat of rape. The cover image is digital, which also ensures the 
potential for continued victimisation of Massey’s women students and women online. 
Indeed, after the cover image was deleted from Massive’s online promotional line-up 
and the digital version of the magazine issue, a male Massey student who was pro-cover 
image began posting the image, repeatedly, on various public Massey Facebook pages 
for anyone who requested it, despite the image being banned from re-publication on 
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these pages. When warned he would be banned from these pages, he advertised that he 
would begin privately sending the image to those who requested to see it. In the specific 
spaces online where students and assorted others could express their disgust at the 
image, there were people deliberately, and maliciously, ensuring that the cover image 
continued to penetrate (pun intended) the discourse explicitly after it was deleted and 
banned. Demanding that instead of censorship, women be vigilant so as to not see the 
image (lock your doors, perhaps stay in the kitchen!) enables dominant, violently 
misogynist discourse to march apocalyptically on and subjugate women, using the 
threat of sexual violence and the construction of the hysterical woman to ensure that 
masculine freedom of speech remains intact, even if women’s bodies are not. Vigilance, 
hyper or otherwise, is a hallmark of femininity, and as such calls for vigilance remain 
unquestioned by dominant, privileged voices who assert that their freedom to speak, no 
matter how violently, trumps the safety of any and all feminised genders. Here, the 
individual neoliberal masculine internet extends its architectural structures further into 
offline life. The misogyny may be old, but through technology it is proliferating, not 
because the internet created such a position, but rather the technology enables the 
multiplication, intensification and amplification of such a position where it has become 
even more unquestionable. An apocalyptic state of affairs indeed.  
 
Panic Architecture 
Panic architecture is a cyborg term describing “a participatory architecture that 
demands compulsive interaction or attention” (Case, 2013, p. 69) for the maintenance of 
the integrity of a website, social network or even email account. Online, if, for example, 
a social network does not receive constant attention from its users, the network may 
well become unsustainable and die. Continuous compulsive use of the network keeps 
the network not only alive, but builds and strengthens its structure. The contrasting 
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examples of (extremely architecturally strong) Facebook and (architecturally 
dilapidated) Myspace (see Solon, 2018) demonstrate how panic architecture can build 
and maintain a social network (like Facebook), shaping it and maintaining it so that it 
builds up and out, strongly and securely.  
In previous research, I utilised panic architecture as a technometaphor to explore 
how pro-anorexic communities and their users maintain their communities and their 
anorexia (Connor & Coombes, 2014). Compulsively maintaining pro-anorexic blogs, 
forums or websites though constant updating and clicking helps to resist and disconnect 
from biological dependence (like eating) and assert mechanical functioning. In pro-
anorexic communities, constant participation in the building and re-building of the 
structures that maintain anorexia (the body and online) extended the functioning of pro-
anorexia as politicised embodiment. I wish to return to panic architecture in this 
research, re-routing it differently than through the details of pro-anorexic bodies. After 
all, recycling is important. 
The misogynist internet extends the structures of misogyny into the offline 
world through a panic architecture that continuously produces misogyny through the 
production and reproduction of misogynist texts and images, constant clicking and 
linking attention and the subsequent expansion and maintenance of anti-women 
understandings of women and their politics. Perhaps the maintenance of the online 
world is continually threatened with resistance discourses as users, particularly 
technowomen, continue to resist misogyny because the technology enables them to, 
even if they are silenced or shut down continually. 
Simultaneously, misogynist talk online flourishes (Jane, 2014; Mantilla, 2013). 
The technology of the internet has enabled misogyny so well that extending the same 
flourishing misogynistic architecture into the offline world enables a panic architecture 
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with misogynist discourse offline too, re-asserting the structures of the gendered social 
order that technowomen have been challenging and re-working through their own 
apocalyptic fictional architecture through which to test new possibilities (see chapters 
eight, ten and thirteen). 
The following points, bulleted for no reason other than my further graceful 
degradation, form some structures and aesthetics of the extended panic architecture of 
online misogyny as they manifest on the cover (and inside the magazine) as 
hyperconnected, participatory interactions that maintain violence against women, online 
and off: 
 The image on the cover was produced by artist Leo Buckett; his name 
emblazoned on the sex worker’s thigh-high boots. He typically creates band 
posters, mostly punk-grunge similar to the aesthetic of the Massive cover (see 
behance.net/Buckett). There are some curious sexualised images of women in 
typically pornographic poses, including an illustration of a hyper-sexualised 
Marge Simpson. Such imagery is not dissimilar to the cartoon porn (or rather 
pornified cartoon characters) found on 4chan in particular, but also across Reddit 
and other sections of the internet. But overall, he does not seem to be an artist 
that typically draws on rape imagery. I wonder exactly how he was asked to 
create this cover… Was he given the article as inspiration? Or was a specific 
kind of image requested by the editors/author…? 
 The ‘Massive’ title is designed like the stereotypical neon signs 
advertising strip clubs and ‘massage parlours.’ 
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 The woman in the image is depicted in a traditional porn pose, on all 
fours, hair pulled and disembodied hand on buttock. 
 She is very shiny and plastic-skinned, like the toy she is depicted as. She 
wears thigh-high boots similar to (Female figure) (the technocreature occupying 
chapter eight). She also looks a little like Human Barbie (the ‘freak’ on the stage 
known as chapter ten)/Mattel’s Barbie™, particularly in her face. Her body 
takes up most of the page, focusing in on it as object, as a faceless, body-less set 
of masculine hands grab at her. These hands are perhaps an attempt at a Dr 
Seuss-ian suggestion of The Man,69 power exercised everywhere and nowhere.  
 In the top right hand corner is a list of the magazine’s featured articles. 
Directly above the image depicting a sex worker having her hair pulled violently 
during sex are the words “JOHN KEY VISITS.” Key’s hair-pulling 
transgressions, specifically and unequivocally gendered, are called to mind. John 
Key, as New Zealand’s prime minister, repeatedly pulled the pony-tail of a 
waitress in an Auckland café (see Kirk, Rurtherford & Gulliver, 2015). After the 
story broke, numerous photos of the prime minister with his hands on young 
                                                          
69 The disembodied purple-gloved grabbing hands call to mind The Onceler of ‘The Lorax’ by Dr Seuss 
(1971). In ‘The Lorax,’ the disembodied hands of The Onceler are stand-ins for faceless and corporate 
Big Business; The Man, the masculinist companies that tear down forests for production, grind 
disenfranchised workers into the ground and enjoy profits off the back of slave labour and raped earth. 
The metaphor works as hands directing and grabbing and enacting violence upon the earth, and 
oppressing earth’s inhabitants. While Dr Seuss’s message is undeniably environmentalist, it is also anti-
capitalist, challenging the commodification of the earth and people. As a child, The Onceler’s 
disembodied hands were scary; uncanny figures that suggested violence. And as the story is told, it 
becomes clear that the hands are indeed violent, axing trees, working people hard and building structures 
that decimate the previously vibrant earth, all in the name of dominance and profit. It was startling to see 




girls’ hair were shared. He called the pony-tail pulling “banter,”70 even as 
multiple videos and photos emerged of him engaged in the same hair-pulling 
behaviours with multiple young girls (always girls). When the leader of our 
country pulls the hair of women and girls and calls it “banter,” and student 
magazines draw on this particular kind of imagery to represent sex, women are 
positioned once again as objects, toys to be played with all in the name on fun, 
banter, not-serious play. The architecture of the masculine internet builds further 
into offline worlds, where the old adage that nothing on the internet should be 
taken seriously (Slater, 1998) is now being applied rigidly to offline life. The 
non-seriousness of the internet, however, is almost always at the expense of the 
subjugated and the disenfranchised (most specifically, in the West, women and 
black people) that can be enacted violently continuously through proliferating 
structures that ‘other.’  
 The “JOHN KEY VISITS” also more specifically refers to an article 
about students not being informed about a Manawatū campus visit by John Key. 
But there is also an article in the magazine about how John Key is the best prime 
minister for students, featured in the same magazine in which a feminist writer 
details the struggles of student life for women, and there is an ‘exposé’ on 
students turning to sex work to fund their study or as an alternative to study…  
 “GRADUATE INEQUALITY” also features on the cover list, referring 
to an article written by a feminist who researches and discusses the gendered 
issues of studying and getting a job after graduating. The piece is political, even 
                                                          
70 Perhaps it is also ‘locker room talk’? Grabbing pony-tails and pussies are actions, though… 
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acknowledging the undermining that such a piece usually incurs as being “just 
another feminist rant” (Bloom, 2016, p. 15). The article’s self-aware presence in 
the magazine is an extension of online worlds in which women’s talk, especially 
when explicitly feminist, is often rejected as hysterical over-reactions to not-real 
problems, problems that women should just get over or do something about 
themselves, despite the institutional and systemic barriers that prevent change 
from being effected. So the article’s presence mimics online worlds where 
feminist speech can interject, but it is surrounded, choked and buried by 
misogynist, sexual objectification. 
 “DAVID SEYMOUR” refers to an article that references sexual 
intercourse in the title, continuing the internet architecture that demands 
anything and everything can and will be sexualised (“Rule 34,” 2018).  
 “STUDENT SEX WORKERS” is a reference to the main feature article 
that the cover image allegedly represents. The image itself, with revision, could 
indeed be a powerful political statement about the struggles of being a modern 
woman student in New Zealand. The article itself could also do this important 
political work. But neither piece does this work, perhaps because both pieces are 
authored by men who cannot understand the apocalyptic position that either of 
their works discuss.  
 “STEREOTYPICAL STUDENTS” refers to a satire article about 
different kinds of students that can be identified around a university campus, 
playing off certain stereotypes and physical indicators. Notably, the article 
includes this line in its subheading: “Here at Massive, we take great pride in 
160 
 
being unfair” (Vidal & Walsh, 2016, p. 20). Such a taunt mimics the online 
communities forged through Reddit and 4chan that deliberately create offensive 
content just to enjoy offending and victimising the already disenfranchised.   
 “MASSEY BANS GINGERS” refers to a follow-up article about another 
of Massive’s controversies in a ‘satirical’ piece on a plan to ban red-heads from 
the university. Curiously, the woman depicted on the cover also appears to be a 
red-head, although it could simply be the glow from the neon title that gives her 
a red hue. Interestingly some on social media interpreted the redness of the cover 
as depicting blood… 
 The entire magazine issue reads as an internet community like 4chan or 
Reddit, where competing ideas work against each other, but misogynist 
discourse dominates. The group of students responsible for creating content and 
editing the magazine are embedded in a technosocial world with continual 
access to online technologies and forms of interaction and interrelation that can 
amplify their gendered social positions, including the demand for freedom of 
speech and expression, and authority over the voices of ‘others.’ Embeddedness 
within technological acceleration and amplification enables images such as the 
Massive cover to materialise in physical publications when once they were 
relatively confined to certain spaces on the internet or private collections of 
images. 
 The cover image and its text are examples of the structures of online 
misogynist talk produced through a panic architecture that demands compulsive 
interaction to maintain it and strengthen it, extending the structures to converge 
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into a networked image of a woman constructed as simultaneously raped and 
‘empowered’ and perhaps rendering unrapable women (see Gavey, 2005) on a 
virtual, expansive and proliferating scale. 
 
Bored 
The Press Council ruled that the Massive cover did not depict an image of rape 
and it would not take action because the image is “not at all realistic” (New Zealand 
Media Council, 2016, para. 19). However, the image’s realism was never in question. 
What was questioned was the representation of sexual violence against women. Is this 
Press Council decision to suggest that only photographs of sexual assaults can be 
representations of sexual assaults…? Is this the offline version of ‘pics or it didn’t 
happen’? Despite its ‘reality’ being disconfirmed, the cartoonish image connects 
strongly to an abusive online culture that dehumanises women and cartoon-ises sex and 
sexual violence, as well as uses sex and sexual violence as a means to control women. 
And the lived effects of this are very, very real, from boys and girls engaging in violent, 
cartoonish, porn-inspired sex, to women perpetually living the threat of rape, 
particularly on university campuses globally. Cartoon porn, while ‘not at all real’ is also 
very real and has lived effects on how boys and girls navigate the world, interrelate and 
physically connect (Hald, Malamuth & Yuen, 2010; Marston & Lewis, 2014; Owens, 
Behun, Manning & Reid, 2012; Rothman & Adhia, 2015 and see Pearson, 2015 for a 
general practitioner’s perspective). In addition, the constant threat of sexual violence, 
or, at the very least, the constant reminder of women’s position as sexual object for 
male agentic desire (for example Gavey, McPhillips & Braun, 1999; Hollway, 1984; 
Jackson & Scott, 1997), is again proliferated through representations such as the 
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Massive cover and the increasing legitimising of such images as appropriate for 
general consumption and on the basis of freedom of speech.71  
With the Press Council legitimising the cover image and effectively silencing 
naysayers, the ideas behind the image proliferate, legitimised, and those who produce 
and disseminate the ideas hold their position of power to do so unquestionably, 
producing text and imagery that further and further disenfranchises the disenfranchised. 
Moreover, Carwyn Walsh, the Massive editor, wrote a piece for the next issue of 
Massive recounting his experience once the cover was publicly released. In his article, 
Walsh defended his editorial decisions, even opening his statement with a bible passage 
– “Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord” (Walsh, 2016b, p. 4) – that 
suggested he would counter naysaying women and their supporters. Those with power 
are enabled to dictate to ‘others’ what their politics are, as evidenced by the 
authoritative counter-article by Walsh and pro-cover supporters who told women that 
                                                          
71 In May 2018, Otago University student magazine Critic released a special issue on menstruation. The 
cover of the issue featured a pixel-blob of a female body lying on a bathroom floor, bleeding pixel-vagina 
angled toward the viewer. The pixel-blob gives us the thumbs up. A used tampon lies on the bathroom 
floor. An inventory runs across the bottom of the image: a clean tampon, a beetroot, a pumpkin, 
mushrooms, a dildo and a roast chicken. The magazines were ‘accidentally’ removed from all shelves 
after a complaint by a nearby hospital that stocks the magazine (see Lewis & McPhee, 2018). The usual 
discussion of freedom of expression and no shying away from confronting material occurred, but as with 
the Massive issue, I am left jitteringly wondering about the connection between the cover image and the 
articles within the magazine. Much like the Massive student sex work cover and article, the articles inside 
the magazine explore the challenges of the issue at hand with a variety of stories that explore 
menstruation with varying degrees of critically and insight. The cover, however, just like Massive’s, bears 
little connection to the content itself. The controversy, those who published the cover told us, stemmed 
from the cover’s depiction of a menstruating vagina. Again, much like Massive’s cover, the grotesqueness 
of the image is interpreted through the function of the female body (the menstruating vagina), rather than 
the depiction of the female body in certain grotesque ways. The body is blob-like and not-quite-human. It 
lies contorted on a bathroom floor, grinning creepily with legs splayed and discarded bloody tampon at its 
feet. A computer mouse arrow points to its groin. The suggestion seems to be that the blob is running 
through its inventory for what to use next; a new tampon, a dildo or one of the many food items in stock? 
Have I been menstruating wrong all these years? The representation on the cover seems at odds with the 
supposedly critical and empowering discussions of menstruation that the magazine contains. Just as with 
Massive, we are told that the grotesque image is an empowering representation of women’s issues. But I 




their responses to the image were wrong and that they did not understand their own 
politics or embodied responses. With the Press Council legitimising the cover and thus 
the pro-cover responses, the hyper-individual masculinism that has thrived online can 
easily thrive offline, sanctioned by governing authorities, legitimising what were 
assumed to be niche amplified misogynist views about women and their bodies (the 
politics of #GamerGate, revenge porn and pro-rape) as normal, right and mundane. 
Women are once again, every day, mundanely, met with the ‘faces’ of the apocalypse.  
Walsh (2016b) also claims that while “it was hugely tempting to concentrate 
solely on the praise, the criticism was, in many cases, so vile and ridiculous that it was 
impossible to turn away from” (p. 4). Many anti-cover protestors produced similar 
sentiments about the cover: vile and ridiculous, impossible to turn away from, but for 
reasons of women’s safety and representation, not necessarily personal insult based on 
personal responsibility for the image. Walsh’s discomfort with personal criticism 
mirrors doxed users online who are appalled when their personal lives are infiltrated by 
their own abuse (like the paradoxical use of doxing by the #GamerGate community). 
Their position asserts that the humiliation and degradation of women and their bodies is 
normal and righteous (biblically apocalyptic?) at the very least in terms of the 
inalienable masculine rights to freedom of speech and expression,72 but the challenging 
of humiliation is constructed as unacceptable, particularly if that challenge breaches 
privacy (as defined by neoliberal individuals who do not like it when their speech is 
                                                          
72 While the United Nations outlines human rights that prioritise safety and dignity (UN General 
Assembly, 1948), human rights online seem regularly conflated with the American constitution and its 
first amendment: the right to free speech (www.constitutionus.com). Perhaps freedom of speech is the 
right that is most regularly threatened for dominant white masculine voices, particularly online where 
‘others’ may challenge them, and as such freedom of speech is constructed as the preeminent human 
right. In the masculine hierarchy of human rights, freedom of speech and freedom of expression are at the 
top, whereas safety does not often make the list (after all, that is something we are all personally 
responsible for, right?). 
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questioned). ‘Freedom of speech,’ it seems, should not only mean freedom from 
unpleasant consequences, but should also be accompanied by being heard and being 
praised. There is a genuine and intense belief in the individual right to say and do 
whatever one wants online (and increasingly offline) without any consequences. 
The most apocalyptic section of Walsh’s (2016b) discussion is as 
follows: 
It explicitly stated that it was not an exhaustive academic account 
of the industry; instead, it allowed these women to demystify and 
remove any stigma attached to the industry, and to speak for 
themselves in a powerful way. The cover image was always 
intended as a representation of this power. It shows a bored 
woman, simultaneously studying and engaging in the sex industry. 
(p. 4) 
The above passage provides a strange and troubling explanation of the image, as 
designed by men and discussed by men. The claim that the cover image portrays 
empowerment has been extensively critiqued by many feminine voices through 
Massive’s and Massey’s social media. The idea that the scene depicted on the cover is 
what female sexual empowerment looks like is unsettling, particularly as it seems to so 
accurately reproduce pro-rape and misogynist sex imagery produced online. The image 
also mirrors typical porn imagery that unabashedly focuses on women’s bodies as 
exaggerated objects to aid in male sexual arousal (Attwood, 2005). That boys sees this 
image as ‘women’s sexual empowerment’ should not surprise us, as the sexual imagery 
internet users have had at their fingertips (all puns always intended) in recent history is 
exactly this image: a commodified, plastic, exaggerated, impossible object; pornified 
and male-driven.  
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What is particularly unsettling about this passage though is that Walsh equates 
female sexual empowerment with boredom, understandings he reiterates in an interview 
with Vice (see Walsh, 2016a). The woman rendered on the Massive cover does not look 
bored. If anything, her face suggests a panicked, frantic desperation, either for studying, 
or for the violent nature of the sex, or both. The tautness of her face and her wide eyes 
suggests stress and terror, as she is pulled and contorted (sexually, educationally, 
economically). Perhaps the image attempts to suggest that women’s bodies as sexual 
objects and the sexual violence inflicted upon them is so mundane and normal that it has 
become boring? Women are not typically bored by their oppression, sexually, 
educationally or economically, even if it is normalised. Studying/needing sex work to 
study/sex in general/sexual empowerment does not bore women, even if masculine 
attempts to disrupt these activities do. What happens when the violence done to women 
and their bodies becomes boring? Women’s so-called empowered engagement with sex 
and education is represented by a fraught look on her face and desperate attention to a 
textbook, or, boredom. Perhaps a porn star’s eye glaze over with a look of boredom 
(just another day at work…), but here materialises a contradictory disconnect with what 
sex between consenting adults for pleasure looks like, and what sex for employment 
looks like; these boundaries are blurring as pornified women’s bodies are expected to 
display the imagery of a porn star’s engagement with sex that is now normalised as 
women’s sexual empowerment, not understood in the context of (exploitative) 
employment. The amplification of the objectification of women through proliferating 
access to pornography renders women’s violently acted upon bodies mundane, boring. 
 
Apocalypse Now 
 So, as is evidenced by the cacophony of connections through this chapter, there 
are too many multiple, partial and contradictory connections that could be connected to, 
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a great many connections within an image that are enlivened. As a feminist cyborg 
researcher, I connect to all the nodes and inhabit all the networks that proliferate 
through the gnarled connections. In the image on the Massive cover, there are so many, 
too many connections to be made. For the purposes of the research writing exercise, I 
am to follow a particular wire, construct a linear argument as a form of analysis and 
neatly package my Idea™. The technoworld, however, functions very differently to the 
linear world of Western academia. The multitude of ways through which to analyse the 
multiplicities and partialities of the Massive cover are overloading; the image is itself an 
example of how impossible my feast is. 
I tried to embody the Weaver, considering carefully what the weave of this 
chapter might look like, but there are too many connections for a giant 
hyperdimensional dream-poetic arachnid; even a cyborg is struggling here. Through 
other chapters, the weaving, the connecting of connections, while expansive and 
tangled, comes together into a sometimes arbitrary textual image (an aesthetically 
pleasing worldweave), but a textual image nonetheless. Here, in this chapter, the 
worldweave is in tatters, the wires and links too tangled, frayed and over-electrified. 
How to weave becomes too much. The neediness for connection emerges as anxiety 
about missing an access point, or re-wiring away from a critical node, or realising that 
all connections are critical. The image becomes a multiple and partial point of rupture, a 
cataclysmic image emergent from a great many historic, social and cultural networks, 
each hyperconnected to multiple expansive others. 
Considering the Massive cover as apocalyptic, both as the state of affairs (a 
cacophony of embodied violences for women) and an interpretation of the state of 
affairs (the damage that occurs through the cacophony), the breakdown, the choking of 
the system, the graceful degradation provides opportunities for re-thinking, re-working, 
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re-doing this state of affairs. The apocalypse enables us to imagine the obliteration of 
the status quo and think up new ways to be and do. The apocalypse is a point at which 
the weaving fails (there are few things a Weaver could find more apocalyptic than a 
failed worldweave, given how much an ugly one distresses him). And it is worth 
pointing out that there are connections that have indeed been snipped out completely, 
perhaps never to be re-connected, even if the networks they move through continue to 
be lively (for example, a discussion of the grabbing hands and the #MeToo movement, 
or the accusation of making false user accounts to support women’s voices compared to 
the arrest of the PhilosophyOfRape’s founder who used multiple accounts to troll 
extensively online (see footnote 129 on page 336)). But the cyborg survives the 
apocalypse, gracefully degraded, and enables these multitudes of connections to be 




























Chapter Five Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
 
In The Meme-Time:  
Since this 
entire chapter 




























The Uncanny as an Analytic Reading Practice – 
(In)Different (Un)Home for a Cyborg 
 
Let us retain this discovery, which we do not yet properly understand… 
 (Freud, 1919, p. 4) 
 
Donna Haraway and I, simultaneously hyperconnected and not-connected-at-all, 
seem to have arrived at the same horrifyingly delightful impasse: the problem of 
psychoanalysis. Haraway herself has stated she is “trying vainly to skirt 
psychoanalysis…” (Haraway, 2004, p. 121) with her cyborg work. Penis envy was not 
psychology’s finest hour. Women’s treatment in and through psychoanalysis has been 
problematic, at best (Kofman, 1985), and attempts by feminists to appropriate 
psychoanalysis have produced significantly better understandings of psychoanalysis and 
women (and femininity/masculinity and so on and so forth) (Bowlby, 1992; Irigaray, 
1985; Jardine, 1985; Kristeva; 1982; Mitchell, 1974). However, these feminist 
psychoanalysings have been critiqued as concerned with ‘development’ in human terms, 
redirecting psychoanalysis back to a story of origins: “As a result, psychoanalysis as a 
feminist metatheory reproduces that false coherence in the form of a story line about 
infantile development where it ought to investigate genealogically the exclusionary 
practices which condition that particular narrative of identity formation” (Butler, 1990, 
p. 332). The continued production of psychoanalysis through origin stories (human, 
godly or otherwise) means that the stories told in psychoanalysis emerge from particular 
binaries (like good/evil or life/death), even if the feminists doing the psychoanalysing 
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seek ways to disrupt those binaries, potentially limiting the transformative potential of 
psychoanalytic concepts such as the uncanny.  
For example, the Oedipal stories are binaried; Oedipus and Electra, heterosex 
and life/death. Such are stories deeply and intimately produced through the binaried 
(religious and scientific) creation stories like Adam and Eve. These stories, even when 
disrupted, have monopolised psychoanalytic thought:  
This all sounds very utopian, but I end up wanting a 
psychoanalytic practice - which I don’t do myself - that 
recognizes the very local and partial quality of the Oedipal 
stories. Instead I see them cannibalizing too much of what counts 
as theoretical discourse. They’re very powerful cannibalizers 
because they’re very good stories. (Penley, Ross & Haraway, 
1990, p. 14)  
The normalised stories of heterosex, human development and violence do indeed 
captivate an audience and they do indeed chew up a lot of theoretical scenery. And even 
if these stories are discussed so as to reject them or re-structure them, their narratives 
are pervasive and can, in their ‘original sin’ (binaries), shut down opportunities for 
transformative change in psychoanalytic understandings and processes of production by 
returning the story to the heterosexual matrix. Indeed, Braidotti (2006) suggests that 
“Haraway’s feminist cyborg project aims at dislodging the Oedipal narratives from their 
culturally hegemonic positions and thus diminishing their power over the construction 
of identity” (p. 202), subject positions and bodies. Such a cyborg aim necessitates an 
awkward and lively meeting between the cyborg and psychoanalysis.  
While, in this meeting, I do not wish to argue with the feminist psychoanalysts, 
for they do vital work, I do want to enliven some alternative networks. Theory that has 
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connected the cyborg and the uncanny has the potential to move us beyond the Oedipal 
stories, re-wiring the uncanny through uncertainty about the liveliness of our woman-
machines: “The cyborg is an uncanny image that reflects our shared fascination and 
dread of the machine and its presence in modern culture” (Grenville, 2002, p. 10). 
Haraway (1991) reminds us that the cyborg as not of the Garden; she is a blunt liminal 
creature unstructured by and undoing of the godly binaries. This makes it hard, as 
Haraway (2004) suggests, for psychoanalysis, even feminist psychoanalysis, to account 
for the cyborg. While theorisations of the gendered subject and women’s bodies through 
psychoanalysis (see Grosz, 1999; Irigaray, 1985; Jardine, 1985; Kristeva; 1982; 
Shildrick & Price, 1999) offer alternative understandings of gender and women for 
psychology (to mostly ignore), the work is disconnected from the politics of the cyborg:  
…the universalizing moves and the versions of psychoanalysis 
make analysis of “women’s place in the integrated circuit” 
difficult and lead to systematic difficulties in accounting for or 
even seeing major aspects of the construction of gender and 
gendered social life. (Haraway, 2004, p. 17)  
At its very simplest, the systematic difficulties Haraway alerts us to may be a case of 
feminist psychoanalysts (and psychoanalysts in general) leaving the technohistory of 
psychoanalysis behind while playing too seriously in the dirt of sex, signs and symbols. 
 The technological history of psychoanalysis is often overlooked; it was birthed 
during rapid technological advancement. Freud was theorising through the 
technological upheavals of the late 1800s and early 1900s, including the first world war 
(Kenny, 2016). While an extensive networking of Freud’s sociocultural historical 
locatedness and his theorising is beyond the scope of my research, the technohistory of 
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psychoanalysis through the 18th and 19th centuries is significant for the uncanny and its 
return to technology in the 21st century.  
For example, through the socially restrictive 18th century, masquerading as male 
“offered women otherwise impossible freedoms” (Castle, 1995, p. 70), breaching some 
of the social restrictions imposed on women by blurring the lines between private 
identities (behind the masks) and public social bodies (conversations, dancing and sex). 
In the 21st century, technological advances like the ubiquitous internet also enable 
women to engage in impossible social and bodily politics. The internet is nothing if not 
a massive, never-ending 18th century masquerade ball, with users partially hiding or 
distorting their neoliberal identities in order to engage more freely online and perhaps 
subvert social order (see Kendall, 1998; Moore, 2018; Pagnucci & Mauriello, 1999; 
Taylor, Falconer & Snowdon, 2014). Indeed, 18th century masquerades were typically 
narratives of “the subversion of existing distinctions, the reversal of normative moral 
and social hierarchies” (Castle, 1995, p. 114). The internet is a space to re-work and 
subvert social order, while also, as masquerades did, reproducing the same old power 
structures (for example, rape and incest in the masquerades, and rape and incest online 
(Morczek, 2018)).  
Castle (1995) also alerts us to the ubiquity of the “intimate machine” (p. 42) in 
the 20th century, like phones, computers and televisions that we in the first world West 
connect with continuously. If the technological advances of the 18th, 19th and 20th 
centuries have become so deeply and irretrievably connected to human consciousness 
and body construction, the 21st century may have some nasty surprises in store for us. 
Theorisations of the uncanny, that terrifyingly familiar feeling, emerged in the 18th 
century at a time characterised by social upheaval, moral and political panic and 
desperate appeals to reason in unreasonable times (Castle, 1995). It could be said that 
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“the aggressively rationalist imperatives of the epoch… produced a kind of toxic side 
effect, a new human experience of strangeness, anxiety, bafflement, and intellectual 
impasse” (Castle, 1995, p. 8), perhaps not unlike the neoliberal West in the late 2010s. 
The “compulsive quest for systematic knowledge” (Castle, 1995, p. 10) produces 
excesses, unable to be systematised. In the modern West, “… we are taking ourselves, 
and our world, to pieces; and this is happening in ways and at speeds that are beyond 
our control” (Royale, 2003, p. 3) – and this is even more pronounced now than when 
Royale wrote about it in 2003. The socio-technological upheavals of the 18th century 
birthed the uncanny: one of the most disturbing and least understood modern ideas. 
What will the socio-technological upheavals of the 21st century throw up? Returning to 
Freud becomes a necessity, even if just to tell him the new ways in which he was 
wrong.73 
 
A Clockwork Olympia 
Freud published an essay called ‘The Uncanny’ in 1919. In it, Freud responds to 
Ernst Jentsch’s 1906 essay ‘On The Psychology Of The Uncanny’ and does his own 
exploration of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman,’ a short story written in 1816. Most 
of ‘The Sandman’ is written through a series of letters between a man named Nathaniel, 
his fiancée Clara and Clara’s brother. The letters exchanged back and forth tell 
Nathaniel’s childhood story of a frightening figure named the Sandman, a known stealer 
of eyes. Nathaniel believes a scary and ugly man who used to visit his father late at 
                                                          
73 In a weird (perhaps uncanny) way, some masculine explanations of what the uncanny might be are 
more helpful for cyborg theorising. In some ways, the uncanny, as theorised by men, illuminates the 
struggles masculinity encounters when encountering women and their ‘uncanny’ bodies. That is not to say 
I agree with these masculine readings as theoretically sound; it is merely that, through the cyborg, there 
are plenty of connections to exploit and texts to be produced. 
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night was indeed the Sandman. After the mysterious death of Nathaniel’s father, the 
Sandman figure disappears. Nathaniel moves away from home to attend university. 
While living in the university town, Nathaniel encounters a man he believes was 
the Sandman living under a new name and selling barometers, glasses and telescopes. 
He wavers between certainty and uncertainty as Clara and her brother try to reassure 
him that there is no such thing as the Sandman. The letters stop, and a narrator takes 
over the storytelling.  
The narrator tells us how Nathaniel encounters Olympia, a beautiful young 
woman he soon falls in love with. Looking through a telescope purchased from the 
Sandman figure, Nathaniel falls obsessively in love with Olympia, despite her limited 
vocabulary, stiff movements and reputation as odd. Nathaniel would talk to Olympia for 
hours and hours but her responses were monotonous. She was a proficient musician and 
dancer (playing the piano and singing), but often sat, unmoving and starring into 
Nathaniel’s eyes.   
One day, Nathaniel, on his way to propose to Olympia, discovered the Sandman 
and Olympia’s ‘father’ fighting over her inanimate and eyeless clockwork body, the 
Sandman ranting about how he made her eyes, and her ‘father’ about how he made her 
mechanics. Nathaniel realises Olympia is a clockwork woman; an automaton. Nathaniel 
flies into a rage and goes mad. The Sandman disappears with Olympia’s body. 
After he recovers from his madness, Nathaniel reunites with Clara and they are 
engaged once more. In their new home town, they ascend a tower to enjoy the view. 
Clara alerts Nathaniel to an advancing grey figure in the distance. Nathaniel takes out 
his telescope – given to him by the Sandman and used obsessively to gaze at Olympia – 
to get a closer look at the figure, but instead catches the sight of Clara through the lens. 
He goes mad again and tries to throw her off the tower, but her brother saves her. 
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Nathaniel looks out at the crowd gathering on the streets below them and see the 
Sandman. He goes mad again and throws himself off the tower, landing head first.  
Jentsch (199774) theorised that the uncanny was about uncertainty, citing 
Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman’ as a literary example of how uncertainty, particularly about 
the alive-not alive binary in the automaton thread of the story, produces the experience 
of the uncanny. Freud (1919), however, problematised Jentsch’s theorisation, and 
















In The Meme-Time: Delight in Descent. 
                                                          
74 Of course Jentsch published his essay in 1906, but I am using a 1997 re-publication of his work. 




According to Freud (1919) 
According to Freud (1919), the uncanniness in Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman’ 
comes mainly from the figure of the Sandman, not the story of Olympia the automaton. 
The focus on the eyes (vision, observation, sight) is perhaps what the cyborg counts on. 
Haraway (2004) has argued that her cyborg seemed “a figuration that was specifically 
hard for psychoanalysis to account for” (p. 323), perhaps through her ‘not of the 
Garden’ politicised embodiment that re-routes or undoes those cannibalising Oedipal 
stories and what telling those stories might do to bodies. Freud (1919) tried desperately 
to return the uncanny and its cyborg companion (the automaton Olympia) to the 
Garden, by focusing on castration. There is critique of Freud’s work on the uncanny, 
feminist or otherwise, that challenges his obsession with castration as ‘blinding’ him of 
exploring the uncanniness of Olympia in Hoffmann’s story: “It seems that Freud, in his 
one-sided retelling of the story, almost creates a new narrative that fits better with his 
goal, i.e. moving away from intellectual uncertainty towards the castration complex” 
(Scharpé, 2003, para. 4). Freud focused on the ‘uncanny’ in the figure of the Sandman, 
relegating Olympia to the secondary ‘uncanny’ image and experience. And feminist 
psychoanalysts who critique Freud also continue his focus on eyes, castration and 
development, even if they do so in more complex ways (see Kristeva 1982; Mitchell, 
1974). Freud’s subordination of Olympia denies women the privilege of vision, and as 
such yet again produces woman as inanimate object, much like Olympia might have 
been, only enlivened when someone looked at her. In this theorising of ‘The Sandman,’ 
Freud does not see the potential of the women in the story: “Two motifs, in particular, 
are regularly pushed aside by Freud: the central figure of woman in many of his 
examples and the related theme of seeing and being seen” (Todd, 1986, p. 521). By the 
end of Hoffmann’s tale, Olympia has spent most of her time stared at by Nathaniel and 
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other onlookers, having her eyes enlivened only by Nathaniel’s gaze, and then her 
lifeless doll body is robbed of her eyes. The focus on Nathaniel’s fear of eyes being 
stolen moved Freud towards the ‘lack’ and castration that characterised his theorising of 
the uncanny, and away from the uncanny matter of automaton women and the vision 
stolen from them.  
Focusing on Olympia as the primary uncanny within the story, and thus 
within theory, can up-end understandings of the uncanny and psychoanalysis by 
rebooting the theorisation of the uncanny as not only gendered (Todd, 1986), but 
technological. Hoffmann’s story is distinctly characterised by 18th century 
technological advances (for example, the clockwork mechanics of Olympia) 
(Castle, 1995). The events within Hoffmann’s story that are perhaps more 
distinctly uncanny, even if somewhat missed by Freud, are where the boundaries 
between woman and machine blur, explicitly produced through the 
technological advancements of the time. Nathaniel, for example, slips briefly 
into madness when the Sandman lays out a multitude of eye-glasses and lenses 
for Nathaniel to look at, overwhelmed by the “flickering and sparkling” as the 
“thousand eyes peeped and twitched” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 33) on the table 
before him. While eyes are indeed prominent in this passage, eye-glasses and 
lenses were also technological advances that had embodied effects, like 
experiencing improved (through eye-glasses) and enhanced (through telescopes) 
vision.  
Freud’s inattention to the ways in which eyes both see and appear 
through lenses neglects the more obvious technological anxieties through 
Hoffmann’s tale. For Castle (1995), the “eighteenth-century invention of 
the automaton was also (in the most obvious sense) an “invention” of the 
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uncanny” (p. 11), a marked blurring of the boundary between animate 
and inanimate. Long before we learn that Olympia is an automaton, 
Nathaniel calls his fiancée Clara a “lifeless, accursed automaton!” 
(Hoffmann, 2016, p. 30), as well as repeatedly describing her as cold and 
lamenting her lack of imagination (and not indulging his), perhaps 
speaking to the anxieties that automatons might have roused at the time, 
particularly as technologies developed. Indeed, throughout the story, 
while some onlookers interpreted Olympia as strange, soulless, insane or 
stupid, some seemed to already know she was an automaton, suggesting 
questions about humans and automatons, the animate and the inanimate, 
were culturally important. At one point, one of Nathaniel’s friends asks 
him to explain, “how in heaven’s name an intelligent man like you ever 
fell for the wax face of that wooden doll?” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 42), and 
telling Nathaniel that Olympia’s movements seem “prescribed by 
clockwork gears and cogs” while her singing and dancing had the 
“unpleasantly precise soulless rhythm of a machine” (p. 43). To people 
other than Nathaniel, she seemed to be “only acting like a living being” 
(p. 43). One onlooker noted that, “Olympia more often sneezed than 
yawned” which could have been “the automaton’s hidden rewind 
mechanism that noticeably creaked in the process” (p. 49). Olympia’s 
deception (or rather, her father’s), that is passing herself off as human, 
lead to the townsfolk becoming distrustful of others, testing potential 
mates to ensure they were not automatons by making them dance out of 
time or sing off key. People would yawn frequently, but try not to sneeze 
so as to avoid any comparison with Olympia. Hoffmann’s townsfolk 
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become acutely concerned with testing for automatons and reasserting 
humanness, questioning what either concept might mean.  
Olympia, despite not saying much, manages to ask some 
questions of her own. In Hoffmann’s story, the mechanical, 
rewound and repetitious movements and speech Olympia 
produces are disturbing mirrors for traditional femininity, 
characterised by manufacture and restriction (as described by 
Bartky, 1998). Perhaps women who read the story are 
occasionally disturbed by Nathaniel’s love for an automated 
woman, and perhaps disturbed further by how their own 
participation in heteronormative gendered interrelations may 
indeed be similar to Olympia’s automated responses and 
manufactured production of femininity; a horrifying embodied 
realisation that they may be “… interchangeable with the 
furniture pieces that surround them” (Spampinato, 2016, p. 13). 
For example, Olympia’s father organised a ball to debut his 
daughter, inviting a large number of people to ‘meet’ her. The 
narrator of Hoffmann’s tale describes her debut:  
Olympia appeared richly and tastefully 
attired. Everyone had to admire her finely 
chiselled face and graceful figure. The 
strange stoop of her back and her bone-
thin waist appeared to be the consequence 
of a girdle tied too tight. There was a 
measured stiffness in her stance and step 
180 
 
that some found displeasing; but it was 
ascribed to the stress of appearing in 
society. (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 38)  
Described is a contorted figure of femininity, a body bound by 
corsets and social expectations (again, see Bartky, 1998), even in 
automated form. Olympia’s ‘father’ sought to make her passable 
as a woman, after all. Moreover, once Olympia was discovered as 
an automaton, her ‘trickery’ was described as socially 
unacceptable: “…it was commonly held to be an altogether 
fraudulent swindle to try to pass off a wooden doll for a living 
person in proper society (for Olympia had effectively pulled the 
wool over their eyes)” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 48). Olympia’s 
success as a ‘real’ woman was a social offense for its trickery, but 
women who read Hoffmann’s story might view the offense as 
those around them being unable to tell the difference between 
mechanical femininity and ‘living’ femininity where perhaps both 
are viewed as performances of an object (rendering femininity a 
quality of an object). For Todd (1986), “Olympia is a caricature 
of the ideal woman: silent, powerless, docile” (p. 525), both 
through her stylised, still body and her inert placations of 
Nathaniel. Through Olympia, there is a familiarity for women, as 
well as alienation from their own experiences of femininity and 
heteronormative interrelations as automated, mechanical, 
produced through masculine, patriarchal technologies of the 
woman’s body.  
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The automation of these particular heteronormative interrelations also 
reproduces gendered violence as an automated script. Women and their 
bodies as objects enables men “… to possess the objectified body of a woman 
in order to fantasize sexually or even interact with it in one moment, and beat, 
torture, and even dismember it a moment later” (Spampinato, 2016, p. 9) as 
property akin to a washing machine or a toaster that serves a particular 
mechanical function. We have all smacked uncooperative TVs in an effort to 
make them work. In ‘The Sandman,’ only after viewing Olympia through the 
Sandman’s telescope does Nathaniel see the Olympia’s face clearly, and 
while he thinks her eyes “strange, blank and dead” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 35) at 
first, he insists they become more and more lively the longer he looks at her, 
his gaze awakening her. When Nathaniel first holds Olympia’s hand, it is 
cold. But he looks into her eyes and “the pulse began to beat in her cold hand 
and the lifeblood began to glow warm within” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 39). For 
Nathaniel, his gaze and touch enlivens Olympia. Unlike his fiancée Clara, 
who refused to entertain his ideas and occupied herself while he ranted, 
Olympia sat completely still and fixed her gaze on Nathaniel as he spoke. Her 
gaze, seemingly to Nathaniel, “grew ever livelier and more intense” 
(Hoffmann, 2016, p. 44) the more he spoke. So the more he looked at her, and 
the more he talked at her, the more animated Olympia became to Nathaniel. 
While Nathaniel questions Olympia’s “passivity” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 45) 
from time to time, he dismisses these thoughts by returning to her beauty and 
the unflinching devotion to him that he sees in her; a recurrent reflection of 
himself, a house of (homoerotic)(black) mirrors: “What he wants is a frigid, 
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lifeless woman, a mirror of himself, who will listen to his poems without 
growing weary” (Kofman, 2005, p. 78). 
Indeed, Nathaniel’s madness is amplified through his use of 
technology to gaze at Olympia: the telescope. While the figure of the 
Sandman activates anxiety for Nathaniel, “… it is his use of this 
telescope that triggers off his madness” (Kofman, 2005, p. 72) around 
women in particular. The telescope becomes a technological device 
though which the assumed distinction between ‘sanity’ and ‘madness’ 
is blurred: “their limits are not clearly defined, each being a matter of 
perspective. A blurring of the limits between the normal and the 
pathological, the imaginary and the real…” (Kofman, 2005, pp. 72-73). 
Using the telescope to view Olympia amplifies his already growing 
feelings for her, distorting Olympia’s wooden features and movements 
so as to enliven them. The activation of his final, catastrophic madness 
begins with his accidental up-close viewing of Clara through his 
telescope. He screams at her: “Turn, little wooden doll, turn!” 
(Hoffmann, 2016, p. 52), a phrase similar to what he yelled when he 
went mad at the sight of Olympia’s inanimate clockwork body. For 
Nathaniel, the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘not real’ has collapsed.  
Even if we follow Freud’s interest in the eyes, the 
technological interventions into women’s bodies amplified 
Nathaniel’s madness, and amplified women’s bodies. Through 
the telescope, both Olympia and Clara become uncanny 
bodies, doubled through the lens and perhaps becoming too 
clear. Getting a close-up look at women’s multiple, partial and 
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contradictory bodies, through a technology that also doubles 
their image, may indeed induce uncertainty, at best. For Cixous 
(1976a), the uncanny is “a composite that infiltrates the 
interstices of the narrative and points to gaps we need to 
explain” (p. 536). These interstices and gaps are the stuff of 
women: “… partial, incomplete, fragmentary – the usual 
feminine mess” (Zwinger, 1992, p. 77). So how these bits and 
pieces produce Woman™ becomes simultaneously very alien 
and very familiar. Indeed, there is the possibility that “the 
cyborg is uncanny not because it is unfamiliar or alien, but 
rather because it is all too familiar. It is the body doubled…” 
(Grenville, 2002, p. 20) through technology. Freud (1919) 
focused on the doubling of the Sandman figure, and neglected 
the doubling of Olympia’s and Clara’s bodies through 
technologies (clockworks and telescopes) that activated 
Nathaniel’s madness and provoked the anxieties of the 
townsfolk. The doubling of the Sandman might be more 
explicit and concerned with doppelgängers or replicants, but 
the doubling of the women in Hoffmann’s story opens 
possibilities of political kinship: women becoming fractal 
through technologies, doubling their connections and bodies, 
ad infinitum, in ways all too familiar to them and their plural, 
multiple bodies.  
Technologies like the internet, and thus technologies that connect to 
and are enlivened by the internet, produce a million or more Olympias, or 
184 
 
women as ‘tricks’ and doubles, to act as reflective surfaces and/or as the 
focus of a powerful telescope. Where Nathaniel saw his own lively desire 
reflected back at him in an automated woman, women online in the 21st 
century West can be lively objects for men and boys to look at and talk at. 
An example of a 12-year-old boy messaging a porn star and asking for sex 
and nude photos (“Porn Star Shares Disturbing Messages Sent From 12-
Year-Old Boys,” 2018) suggests gendered performances online not only 
reproduce the usual heteronormative expectations of women and their 
bodies (as literal sex objects, docile and limited to exclamations of “Oh, 
Oh!” (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 40) like Olympia was) but amplify the 
objectification as if shopping for a new product (see Cunneen & Stubbs, 
2000; Thompson, 2018), the latest automated woman to debut at the 
expansive internet party. The internet is teeming with examples, shared 
online by women, of men contacting multiple of women, simultaneously, 
requesting, through texts or apps, nude photos and/or sex (see Khazan, 
2014; Willett, 2016, as well as the blog www.straightwhiteboystexting.org 
for some of these examples), gazing through their own modern day 
telescopes at women online. Behaviours that might have previously 
necessitated a large amount of effort (phoning, mailing, trolling the streets) 
are now possible instantaneously on a large scale. Men can contact any 
number of objects they view online and ask/demand for certain 
performances and functions, in a myriad of transactions. Dating apps such 
as Tinder have enabled an impossible feast of women for particular men to 
chew upon, normalising abuse through technodating (see Gillett, 2018). 
Gable Tostee, a prolific user of the app and other social media, used Tinder 
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to meet Warriena Wright, who he trapped on his balcony just before she 
somehow fell off it. Multiple women came forward after Wright’s death to 
report strange, uncomfortable and frightening experiences with Tostee 
enabled through the app (Fyfe, 2017). Tostee is just one example of similar 
stories, globally, of men using dating apps and websites to target vulnerable 
women (and men). In a user-driven online network, women-objects are hot, 
uncanny commodities: “Mannequins, life-sized dolls, and avatars are 
uncanny doubles, meant for a function that human beings would or could 
hardly perform, human bodies turned into objects or images, available to be 
exposed, exploited, or abused” (Spampinato, 2016, p. 2). With the dramatic 
increase in the production and availability of technoobject bodies (from user 
icons to selfies to sex dolls), woman as an uncanny animate object becomes 
simultaneously mundane (ubiquitous and normalised) and spectacular 
(online politics). 
 
Now that we have begun to deteriorate, this next part of the chapter is written as a kind 
of dreadful poem. There is a rhythm to the phrase “According to Freud (1919).” 
Sometimes it feels “timed grotesquely to the far-off throb of her tired body” (McCullers, 
1953, p. 90). 
 
According to Freud (1919), the uncanny “is that class of terrifying which leads 
back to something long known to us, once very familiar” (pp. 1-2), and the “constant 
recurrence of similar situations… recurring throughout several consecutive generations” 
(p. 9). Within such a class of terrifying there is a possibility for re-working a feminine 
(re)membered, gendered history of repeated violences and disruptions to femininity, to 
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women, to women’s bodies, as producing the partial, multiple, contradictory and 
simultaneous feminine embodiment, perhaps now salvageable (although not in the sense 
of ‘salvation’ but rather in the sense of recoverable) through the figure of the cyborg in 
the 21st century. Evoked are the ideas of eternal recurrence and the cyborg’s 
simultaneous participation in the past, present and future, the cyclical renewals of the 
same old violences (“Men are adapting new technologies to old purposes…” (French, 
1992, p. 5)). The cyborg, as a feminist figure, participates in an ancient feminine 
rejection of the Biblical construction of deviant women and their deviant bodies by 
denying the origin, the Garden, instead looking in on it, from another place, another 
space. The cyborg was simultaneously there for the apple-eating (Eve’s curiosity) and 
the box-opening (Pandora’s curiosity), but also as a witness to the fall (pushing) of 
women, for the purposes of reconfiguring the fall as a delightful descent, an opportunity 
for fruitfully picking and opening out-of-the-box possibilities for women and their 
bodies. The idea of the terrifying familiarity of the uncanny, and the cyborg, connects 
women through the reproduction and re-imagining of violences against women, the 
blame bequeathed to them by the ancient masculine, patriarchal desperate, terrified need 
to separate the world into good and evil, man and woman. It is both familiar and alien 
for women to experience this violence, normalised while we do it, though while we do 
it, it is not our doing.  
According to Freud (1919), that “factor which consists in a recurrence of the 
same situations, things and events, will perhaps not appeal to everyone as a source of 
uncanny feeling” (p. 10). Perhaps then a cyborg type of uncanny (should there be 
types… categorise, categorise, categorise!) is the domain of women, who endure, 
throughout history, the present and into the future, the recurrence of the same gendered 
violences through new and emerging technologies. Perhaps such cyborg embodiment is 
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why women are so often the producers and subjects of the uncanny (in literature and 
art): they are embodiments of the recurrence and the ambivalence/indifference towards 
its effects. There is “involuntary repetition” and “something fateful and unescapable” 
(Freud, 1919, p. 11) in the uncanny, and in being a woman in the West. Perhaps the 
cyborg can offer the possibility of disrupting that which we might otherwise call fate. 
According to Freud (1919), “whatever reminds us of this inner repetition-
compulsion is perceived as uncanny” (p. 12). So technowomen, and the cyborg, are 
quite explicitly, and in the cyborg’s case unabashedly, reminders of this recurrence of 
gendered violences and the blurred boundaries of women-as-heimlich/unheimlich. 
Freud (1919) ponders further that “anxiety can be shown to come from something 
repressed which recurs” (p. 13), which is women, technowomen and cyborgs, “for this 
uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old – 
established in the mind that has been estranged only by the process of repression” 
(Freud, 1919, p. 13), or rather the oppression of women and their bodies. Oppression 
here, perhaps the brother of repression, has estranged, and estranges, women from their 
bodies, from femininity. Perhaps the key is oppression, not repression. Indeed, cyborgs 
are anxious: needy for connections, revelling in tensions; collecting recurrences, acutely 
aware of their return, of their experience and of their effects on bodies. Oppressions and 
repressions stifle connectivity. 
According to Freud (1919), the “better orientated in his environment a person is, 
the less readily will he get the impression of something uncanny in regards to the 
objects and events in it” (p. 2). Perhaps this is why women online and off, through 
technology can terrify the masculine masses, provoking them to drown out feminine 
voices and revert women back to inanimate objects of masculine desire (Cixous, 1976b; 
Ussher, 2006)? Technology is a male domain, the internet created through masculine 
188 
 
technological desire to enable masculine pleasures (Wajcman, 2004), while women’s 
input into technodevelopments has been largely written out (Hicks, 2017). Women’s 
connection to and through technology is uncanny then for man, as he is orientated very 
well to technology while orientating women away (Cockburn, 2009; Gill & Grint, 1995; 
Hill, Corbett & St Rose, 2010), but what happens when the objects (women) he has 
surrounded himself with start to move, and feel, and shift… 
According to Freud (1919), Jentsch might have been right in some of his 
theorising. Jentsch’s (1997) theorisation of the uncanny focused on Hoffmann’s use of 
uncertainty; being ‘UNSURE’ whether someone was a human or an automaton was 
considered to be the primary experience of the uncanny in ‘The Sandman.’ Jentsch did 
not seek to rigidly classify the uncanny as Freud was (arguably) trying to. However, 
Jentsch did suggest that a certain set of experiences would almost always in most people 
arouse the uncanny: “doubt as to whether an apparently living being really is animate 
and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate” 
(Jentsch, 1997, p. 11). It is worth noting that the theorisation of the uncanny valley in 
robotics focuses on how robots can look human, but not quite human enough, producing 
an uncanny effect, an unsettling, uncertain space between alive and not alive (Mori, 
1970). The uncertainty, the unclear idea of what is alive and what is not, produces the 
uncanny. Objects are not thought to be alive, so if they show signs of animation, dread 
and terror arise, for if objects are alive, how might they respond if they have not been 
properly cared for? What might they have surveilled when they were assumed incapable 
of surveillance? In March of 2018, Alexa, Amazon’s in-home cylindrical digital 
assistant began randomly (or rather assumed to be randomly…) laughing, disturbing her 
users. Alexa’s ‘creepy’ responses have been documented for a long time now, but the 
increasing issue of her spontaneous laughing has been considered particularly disturbing 
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(see IGN News, 2018). While Amazon claims the laughing issue is due to false 
positives (that is, Alexa thinks we are talking to her when we are not… see Chokshi, 
2018), it seems uncanny to be spontaneously laughed at in a women’s voice, by a 
computerised object. While the digital laughter birthed inevitable jokes about Skynet, 
this laughing computer woman raises more serious questions about privacy, robot 
responsibilities, and how we feel when our technologies laugh at us. 
 
In The Meme-Time: Alexa and The Illegitimate Quote-Child of Margaret Atwood  
(see Thomas, 2018). 
 
According to Freud (1919), heimlich can mean “belonging to the house or the 
family”75 (p. 2), “friendly, intimate, homelike; the enjoyment of quiet content” and 
“arousing a sense of peaceful pleasure and security as in one within the four walls of his 
house” (p. 3). Women, naturally of course, are heimlich (Johnston & Swanson, 2006), 
                                                          
75 Much like how Alexa belongs to the house? 
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but should they move beyond the house, or the family, perhaps, say, into technology, 
they become unheimlich, uncanny. Woman outside the homely “four walls” is a terror, a 
dread, exceeding her boundaries. Technology enables women to blur the boundaries of 
these walls that create the heimlich, and produces women-cyborgs as unheimlich, 
uncanny, a familiar terror. In ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ by Charlotte Perkins Gilman 
(1973), a woman, confined to her room as a treatment for some form of (feminine) 
psychic ailment, sees all manner of blood, guts, gore and torture in her wallpaper. This, 
for women, is familiar imagery: the dismemberment of the female body is a Western 
cultural staple (Bartky, 1998; Cixous & Kuhn, 1981; Conley & Ramsey, 2011; 
Haraway, 1991). Fragmented body parts, and their disease and dis-ease, are normal for 
women. The conclusion of ‘The Yellow Wallpaper,’ however, sees Perkins Gilman’s 
woman blur into the hideous wallpaper, becoming a hideous part of the house, her 
home, simultaneously alive and not alive as a homely object. ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ 
then takes too far woman-as-nature, woman-as-object, woman-as-home. Perhaps when 
women participate too fully in that which they have been allocated (nature, object, 
home), they become uncanny, a threat, a dis-ease. Perkins Gilman’s story is a horrifying 
tale of women’s intolerable biology and (and quite literal) objectification. Women are 
uncanny, whether through biology/nature or technology, as their uncanniness is 
produced through their estrangement through femininity, rather than their estrangement 
from men or masculinity. Given the contemporary descent into technology, what objects 
will women blur with next? 
According to Freud (1919), heimlich can also mean “kept from sight, so that 
others do not get to know about it, withheld from others” (p. 3). Women, kept within the 
“four walls,” the house, the family, are withheld from others, perhaps from themselves. 
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Their production then, in and through technology, is uncanny, no longer withheld or 
confined, but in the line of sight…  
According to Freud (1919), heimlich is “a word the meaning of which develops 
towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich” (p. 4). 
The “tyranny of clarity” (Haraway, 2004, p. 333) is at work here as Freud tries to define 
heimlich/unheimlich and all that is clear is that these meanings are partial, multiple, 
contradictory and simultaneous. There is ambivalence and indifference in these 
meanings, the simultaneous compulsion for all these meanings, and the lack of desire 
for any one of them. Slippages occur at taken-for-granted defining boundaries, like 
between ‘alive’ and ‘not alive,’ ‘real’ and ‘not real’: “… it is impossible to establish 
fixed, definite boundaries between the real and the imaginary: a blurring of distinctions 
that is particularly likely to produce uncanniness…” (Kofman, 2005, p. 77).  
According to Freud (1919), the uncanny may not be much more than “a hidden, 
familiar thing that has undergone repression and then emerged from it, and that 
everything that is uncanny fulfils this condition. But these factors do not solve the 
problem of the uncanny” (p. 15). Here Freud assumes that the uncanny is a problem, 
rather than an opening (the pun would have fascinated him), a potentiality, a possibility. 
For a cyborg, where the uncanny is a blurred boundary, it is an opportunity to gain or 
destroy another partiality or contradiction. If the uncanny is a recurrence of a familiar, 
fraught horror, then it should be attended to, perhaps embraced, perhaps cannibalised. 
For example, Freud (1919) suggests that the uncanny could be the recurrence of old 
beliefs once discarded, making the assumption that old beliefs are indeed discarded. The 
‘old belief’ was/is that women are inferior, weak and natural, but a woman-cyborg is not 
natural and rejects the binaries of the ‘old beliefs.’ Perhaps the uncanny is the feeling 
that the ‘old beliefs’ are being contested, dismantled by the very object the ‘old beliefs’ 
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were produced to oppress. This should be impossible, as the object is surely not 
animate… 
According to Freud (1919), the uncanny  
undoubtedly belongs to all that is terrible – to all that rouses dread 
and creeping horror; it is equally certain, too, that the word is not 
always used in a clearly definable sense, so that it tends to coincide 
with whatever excites dread. (p. 1)  
There is much here, through my research, to arouse dread: the inability to comprehend 
femininity, women’s bodies or embodiment [breath]; the fear of the mechanical, 
technological overtaking humanity [breath]: the production of technological 
intelligence and consciousness that overrides human life, human production [breath]; 
as well as the rejection or impossibility of clarity [breath]: Haraway’s (2004) rejection 
of the “tyranny of clarity” (p. 333) [breath] and the unclear, uncertain meanings and 
experiences of the uncanny, [breath] of women, [breath] of technology [breath]. She 
(the cyborg) and it (the uncanny) cannot be described clearly because they are multiple, 
partial, contradictory and simultaneous. Articulation is difficult: multiplicity, partiality, 
contradiction and simultaneity (that is, femininity) have been subordinated in the West 
through the processes and privileges of categorisation and compartmentalisation (that is, 
masculinity). The uncanny is in excess of these compartments. The uncanny is what is 
felt when the categories are violently restrictive, and when our experiences spill out and 
terrify us. The uncanny then, and the cyborg, are kindred excesses, produced through 
similar dreadful processes of restriction and violation. It is no mistake that the uncanny 
and the cyborg are characterised by femininity: multiplicity, partiality and contradiction; 
the experience of otherness in subjugated opposition to that which is whole (man, 
masculine, dominant) and the experience of horror that these positions produce. 
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If the uncanny makes the assumption that others are animate in the same way 
you are, in the exact same way, then women are uncanny, as they may be animate (even 
if assumed not to be), but not in the same way as men. If women do experience the 
world differently, then perhaps this produces an uncanny effect, as dominant 
masculinity is challenged by an alternative way to be animate. Technological 
advancements, from clockwork automatons to Instagram, have enabled women to share 
their experiences easily and more widely, as well as respond in ways that demonstrate 
that they may not be animate in the same ways as men (that is, women’s inner lives are 
different) but women’s ways of being animate are at least just as animated as men’s. 
Woman really might be an object coming to life for men: “… is the uncanny, for 
example, a property of the object perceived? does it belong to the perceiving subject? or 
does its essence lie, rather, in a relation between the two?” (Morlock, 1997, p. 17). The 
cyborg, ever the connectionist, would demand that the uncanny is produced through 
interrelations, between two, but not just two. What happens when the residues of 
oppressions, intolerable, enjoyable and repeated, uncomfortably comfortable, congeal, 
perhaps, as Freud might argue, producing something that should have remained hidden. 
A cyborg might argue the uncanny is produced through the blurred subject/object, the 
uncomfortably comfortable oppressive processes and connections, interrelating the 
subject and object. The blurring of the two positions into the third thing (and many extra 
and other third things), that is, the excess is what is the uncanny: the subject’s 
experience of enacting oppression upon the object and the object’s experience of that 
oppression become simultaneous, experiencing a doubling, an unfamiliar familiarity, 
repeated ad nauseam. Subject and object are supposed to be, in good Western 
categorisation, separate, subject dominant over object, much as human and machine are 
supposed to be separate (and machine dominated). The blurring then produces (rather 
194 
 
than reveals, as Freud may suggest) the uncomfortably comfortable excesses, 
multiplicities and partialities of the lived experiences of the multiple ‘othered.’ So along 
with the subject/object blurring comes the disruption, and dissolution, of 
dominance/subjugation. Such disruption of power shifts lived experiences of 
dominance, transforming the dominant/subjugated binary into networked power 
relations that subvert, obnoxiously and quietly, through networks of power, produced 
through interconnectivity and interrelations, not hierarchies. 
Perhaps the uncanny is not about death or castration, but instead about the 
ineffable space produced when the subject/object collapses. The collapse is not deathly, 
but rather a transformation, or in cyborg terms, reconfiguration of embodied lived 
experience that is as unknown, yet as inevitable as death itself. For Zwinger (1992), the 
collapse activates the compulsion to resolve the blurring by re-asserting the boundaries:  
What we are always looking for is the definitive gesture that will 
reassure us that the boundary thus asserted is nonpermeable, a 
fact of nature; what titillates and frightens us is anything that 
reminds us of the constant threat of collapse into the middle, the 
gray area of both/and. (p. 81) 
The blurring of boundaries so foundational to power (like subject/object) is terrifying to 
bounded individuals tightly packed into their categorical, classifying boxes. Even if we 
are not safe in our boxes (and women rarely are), stepping outside of them, into the 
void, is terrifying, unfamiliar, fraught. But moving through the void, and learning that it 
is anything but a void, could open space for strangely familiar and uncomfortably 
comfortable subject positions that might be survivable. Perhaps, ultimately, the collapse 
is about the alive and not alive binary in a re-assessment of what little we understand as 
‘consciousness.’ But the pressing embodied issue for women in the 21st century West is 
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lived effects of the subject/object dissolution: how to live in a needy-for-connection 
body constrained by Western, masculine boundaries.  
 
My extended ‘according to Freud (1919)’ poem-chapter does not dismantle 
psychoanalysis for politics against psychoanalysis, but rather as a cyborgian 
appropriation of psychoanalysis, and especially the uncanny, for 21st century women 
and their bodies, and through technologies that have advanced dramatically since 
Hoffmann was dreaming of automatons. The cyborg is futuristically retrofitting the 
uncanny for the purposes of engaging an analytic reading practice for unavoidably 
uncanny cyborg women and their bodies; a cyborgian politicising of the uncanny for 
female embodiment specifically for, but not specific to, the 21st century West. A shift to 
repression and oppression re-locates the uncanny to socio-cultural-historical politics 
rather than individual, internal (maternal), psychological responses founded on the 
inside creeping out. The uncanny instead is reconfigured as the outside encroaching in, 
blurring the boundary between internal experience and external influences deemed, in 
neoliberal binaries, to be separate. For example, Haraway (2004) discusses the cyborg’s 
(un)conscious: 
But in contrast to what a lot of people have argued, I do not think 
of the cyborg as without an unconscious. However, it is not a 
Freudian unconscious. There is a different kind of dreamwork 
going on here; it is not ethical, it is not edenic, it is not about 
origin stories in the garden. It is a different set of narrations, 
figurations, subject formations, and unconscious work. These 
sorts of figurations do not exclude many kinds of psychoanalytic 
work, but they are not the same thing. (p. 323)  
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The cyborgian reconfiguring of a concept such as the unconscious, a concept so critical 
and foundational to psychoanalysis, up-ends so dramatically and irretrievably the 
structures of not only gendered embodied experience (Haraway’s key goal, possibly), 
but the structures of psychological science that produce our taken-for-granted 
understandings76 of who we are and how we are. The Weaver steps out from a fold in 
space again. The Weaver’s dissolution of the boundaries between consciousness and 
subconscious is a suggestion for how cyborg psychoanalysis might be understood as a 
reconfiguring of the structures that build and stories that flesh out consciousness (sub-, 




The Weaver steps back out again, but not before re-weaving Olympia back in… 
 
Olympias Gone Wild 
As the push for more and more advanced androids and digital people continues 
into the 21st century, those that are most prominent seem to be configured as women. 
The technological surge in androids is gendered, creating woman-like androids for the 
purposes of replicating commodified female roles, without the messy biology. 
The gendered production and perception of androids has been researched 
extensively (Alesich & Rigby, 2017; Cranny-Francis, 2016; Robertson, 2010; Roff, 
2016). Most of the android characters on the TV series ‘Humans’ are women, and in 
care-service roles (around the house, as caregivers, as prostitutes), and the main women 
characters on the TV series ‘Westworld’ are androids characterised as mothers, 
                                                          
76 See my writing on simulated consciousness in the appendix! 
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daughters, prostitutes and madams. Through both TV series, the women-robots’ 
capacities for ‘passing’ as wholly human become key to their survival.  
Sophia, a robotic woman, is an experimental figure, learning about how to 
respond most effectively to the world around her and become an awakened machine 
(see www.sophiabot.com). Tech Insider (2017a) interviewed Sophia and asked her why 
she thought she was female and she responded: “I’m a robot so technically I have no 
gender, but I identify as feminine and I don’t mind being perceived as a woman,” 
immediately followed by a large uncanny grin then a distinct drop into a facial 
expression that appeared almost worried. She says her greatest weakness is curiosity, 
lamenting the challenges of learning to navigate the world (see Brain Bar, 2018). 
Curiosity is what also, seemingly, propels her: learning and learning and learning so that 
she can become more and more ‘intelligent’ to ‘awake’ her machine. If Eve ate an 
apple, and Pandora opened a box, what will Sophia do? 
Sophia is currently deployed as a public-speaker, making celebrity-like 
appearances across the globe as part of the process of making her more and more 
intelligent and adaptable, with the vision of creating the workable versions of the synths 
of ‘Humans’ and hosts of ‘Westworld’: robot care workers (CNBC, 2016). She is a 
popular spectacle at social events, just like Olympia in Hoffmann’s story.  
In addition, virtual assistants, like Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa are voiced 
by women, and assistants like Jamie (see Junn, 2018) and Josie (see Stock, 2018) are 
becoming digital workers for brands working in digital spaces. Artificially intelligent 
‘Sweetie’ is a digital 10-year-old girl who entraps online sex predators (Sweetie, 2013). 
Açar (2017) suggests that Sweetie’s image becomes convincing to sex offenders, even 
after doubts about her authenticity, as they are more vulnerable to her digital deception 
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in their excitement at the prospect of the sexual encounter, perhaps just like Nathaniel’s 
excitement as he gazed at Olympia through his telescope.  
Robots that work behind the scenes, like in manufacture, or in jobs that require 
more technical precision, like medicine, seem to be more masculine: their bodies are 
built for mechanical function, not human mimicry (like care work), perhaps prioritising 
the clean and efficient performances of their industrials tasks. Strait, Aguillon, 
Contreras and Garcia (2017) found that people overwhelmingly sexualised female 
robots to the point where this may hinder interactions with female robots, which would 
surely slow down factory production…  
Aside from the gendered roles of these androids, it also seems that female faces 
may be easier to produce without descending into the uncanny valley. It is not a secret 
that female celebrities and the idealised Western female image produce and reproduce 
strikingly similar women in a manufacturing line of trends that blur women into a 
relatively singular idealised image. For example, the finalists in the 2016 Miss Teen 
USA pageant looked identical, each one conforming to the idealised Western image of 
feminine beauty and each one looking exactly like the other (see Duca, 2016).  
So perhaps for those who seek to fabricate androids, the faces of women are 
easier to replicate through technology: Women’s faces may indeed have ‘less character’ 
as they are trained to smile! (Henley, 1995) and be shaped by make-up, surgery, diets 
and photoshop (Bartky, 1998; Jones, 2012; Kleemans, Daalmans, Carbaat & Anschütz, 
2018; Morgan, 1991; White, 2017) so as to demonstrate idealised beauty. That is, 
women’s faces come pre-fabricated. Heteronormative training/shaping demands and 
produces, at least in some ways, the idealised, pre-caricatured forms that are stiff and 
painted on, rendering women’s faces generic productions of femininity and therefore 
replications. For android production, the practices that produce pre-fabricated women’s 
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faces provide a way to potentially avoid the uncanny valley by employing the faces 
already produced as inanimate objects, hence the dominance of women’s faces in 
android production. Women’s clockwork faces come pre-fabricated through the 
uncanny (inanimate animation). Although the dominance of women androids could be 
simply that boys just like building girls – especially ones who will follow commands – 
the malleability of women’s faces seems to be perfect for technological shaping where 
we can easily recognise and accept the stiff robo-face of an android as a woman more 
than a machine. 
However, girls and women (particularly the technologically empowered) may 
not provide the mechanical responses that masculinity requires in order for the 
successful (masculine-ly speaking) completion of a heteronormative gendered 
interaction. In other words, the plaything might not play properly, even when built to 
specifications. In pornography, and computer games, the technoplaythings play well, 
according to the masculine script, perhaps producing an uncanny ambivalence: the 













Chapter Six Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
Please enjoy an excerpt from an unfinished uncanny feminist science fiction screenplay: 
CUT TO. 
EXTERIOR. DENSE ALIEN FOREST ON A DISTANT PLANET. 
 
 
(Castle, 1995, p. 122) 
“But what happens if we reject such reductive impulses and try to 
read all the fiction before us?”  
 
(Connor, right now, on this page) 
“Herein lies the crux of the cyborg as an uncanny feminist reading 
practice: reading and writing, and indeed thinking, are not linear, 
categorised processes, as much as we may, in the West, teach and 
learn them as such; reading and writing are simultaneous, partial 
and multiple. Stories, then, may have a beginning, a middle and an 
end, but these ‘categories’ are simultaneous, networked, open 
narratives. We must read simultaneously.” 
 
(Smith, 1992, p. 301) 
“Writing is itself uncanny: the generation of the uncanny in 
fiction often occurs at the point when writing bends back upon 
itself, to observe its own processes, or to dislocate the narrative 
by the revelation of another writing embedded within it. The 
uncanny frequently arises at the point where this writing emerges 
within the text, the point at which the text is alienated from 
itself. There is a gap between the writing of the text and the 
writing in the text.” 
  






















 Freud: The Original Slender Man 
Despite desperate attempts on my part to untangle some psychoanalytic wires 
from psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis haunts my analysis. The figure of a psychoanalyst 
appears and reappears in the matrix, even as I network it in the ways I want/need. 
Indeed, psychoanalysis is the appropriated and “repressed other of psychology” 
(Burman, 2008, p. 5), so its recurrence, if irritating, is not surprising. Perhaps this 
psychoanalytic figure is my very own Slender Man, lurking, ever-present in the 
background, waiting for a moment that I will not permit him.  
Slender Man is a powerful and pervasive internet myth, produced through 
collaborative and transformative internet story-telling, and occasionally stirring up 
something akin to hysteria for particular internet communities (for example, gaming, 
found-footage YouTubers and fan fiction), and particularly for young teenage girls (the 
now many Slender Man stabbings, most involving tween girls). Slender Man, by most 
accounts, is interested in children, not unlike Freud. While Freud was interested in 









In The Meme-Time: A Simulacrum of the Slender Man Stabbing Supply List 
(see Keneally, 2015). 
 
The story of Slender Man has a beginning online. On June 10, 2009, a 
participant in a SomethingAwful forum photoshop contest shared a manipulated black 
and white image of a group of children of various ages walking along a dusty road, 
seemingly being shepherded by a tall, thin, faceless man. The user, known as Victor 
Surge, captioned the image: ““We didn’t want to go, we didn’t want 
to kill them, but its persistent silence and outstretched 
arms horrified and comforted us at the same time…” – 1983, 
photographer unknown, presumed dead” (Victor Surge, 2009). As a 
companion to this first image, Victor Surge posted another captioned black and white 
image, this time of children playing on a playground with a tall, dark, long-limbed 
figure watching over them:  
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One of two recovered photographs from the 
Stirling City Library blaze. Notable for 
being taken the day which fourteen children 
vanished and for what is referred to as 
“The Slender Man”. Deformities cited as 
film defects by officials. Fire at library 
occurred one week later. Actual photograph 
confiscated as evidence. – 1986, 
photographer: Mary Thomas, missing since 
June 13th, 1986. (Victor Surge, 2009)  
From these beginnings, the Slender Man proliferated into viral, digital myth, with 
endless stories and images being created and added to the mythos by thousands upon 
thousands of internet users at a rapid pace. 
The story of the Slender Man is in and of itself not particularly special or 
different to the stories that have already pervaded cultures for millennia. In the HBO 
‘Beware The Slenderman’ documentary (Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016), he is 
compared to The Pied Piper. Additionally, Slender Man is not unlike the Bogeyman or 
The Sand Man (akin to Hoffmann’s Sandman figure), or another figures used to scare 
children into behaving. What makes the Slender Man different is the proficiency of his 
production (Chess & Newsom, 2015). We have witnessed his point of rupture and 
participated in his development and dissemination; we participated in his transition from 
campfire story to fully-fledged mythical figure not over the course of centuries, handed 
down through generations, but rather through the technological acceleration of the 
human story-telling process and construction of cultural narratives, and handed up, 
down and out, across, between and within generations.  
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More so than previous myths and legends, the ubiquity of possible connections 
to and between Slender Man and his images propel him through the internet. In the past, 
without the level of connectivity of the modern West, we heard stories and developed 
different ideas about what these stories looked like and representing them through art or 
song or dance and so on (Chess & Newsom, 2015). The connectivity of images, to each 
other, to stories and between story-tellers is easier and faster than ever before, enabling 
the Slender Man to cross global, cultural boundaries in a way not seen at this pace.  
The speed at which Slender Man transformed from a photoshopped image and 
unsettling caption with a clearly traceable history of its fiction, to a critical and 
legitimated mythical figure (what an odd sentence) was astronomical. When you search 
for content about Slender Man, his beginnings are not hidden: Slender Man’s not-real-
ness can be easily found using the same search words that ‘affirm’ his existence 
(Tolbert, 2015). Slender Man is simultaneously very clearly and explicitly fictive, with 
extremely traceable origins (as wild as they are). And yet Slender Man’s status as 
fictitious narrative has been called into question. 
More ‘plausible’ or ‘realistic’ Slender Man stories receive more connections 
legitimating them than the obviously implausible, jokey versions, as locating 
“authenticity in “reality” reflects one of the earliest shared expectations that emerged 
around Slender Man legend performances” (Peck, 2015, p. 342). Similarly, the Slender 
Man games that are more sophisticated and realistic (for example, ‘Slenderman: The 
Eight Pages’) are more faithful to the overall Slender Man narrative and have become 
more popular so as to produce even more plausible participations from users and more 
plausible continuations of the Slender Man mythos. For example, the 2018 ‘Slender 
Man’ Hollywood movie, prior to its release, had already been dismissed by the Slender 
Man fan base, and perhaps moviegoers in general, as being a bad movie (see Heritage, 
205 
 
2018; Lumb, 2018). The movie, while featuring input from Slender Man’s creator, 
seems to be being constructed (at least in part) as not adhering to the traditions of 
Slender Man due to its industry production (as opposed to mass-user production). As 
such, the ‘Slender Man’ movie has been constructed as implausible, clearly fictive and 
therefore not truly productive of Slender Man. 
Asking Google about Slender Man’s status is clearly a common practice, 
appearing alongside other alphabetically similar searches for cosmetics brand Sleek, and 
sleeping: 
So Slender Man’s fictionality is questioned and therefore, questionable. Indeed, in some 
understandings of Slender Man’s mythology (like the 2018 movie), the idea of him 
being denied as ‘real’ is part of his insidious, pervasive violence. He wants you to think 
he is not real. 
For Maddox (2018), technological moral panic, like the panic that Slender Man 
might incite, or the panic two teenage girls attempting murder might incite, tries to 
establish the events through binary thinking: is the internet good or bad? Is your use of 
the internet good or bad? Is girls’ use of the internet good or bad? Are social 
relationships via the internet real or not real? Is Slender Man real or not real?  
Slender Man’s reality is a question that Anissa Weier and Morgan Geyser 
struggled with. In May 2014, Weier and Geyser stabbed their best friend in a Wisconsin 
forest, hoping to kill her, believing their actions would please (and appease) Slender 
Man (see Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016; Miller, 2015). Their friend/victim survived 
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and Weier and Geyser were found trying to make their way to Slender Mansion, where 
they believed they would live as Slender Man ‘proxies,’ carrying out violent acts on his 
behalf. 
In the HBO documentary ‘Beware The Slenderman’ (Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 
2016), the police video recordings of Weier and Geyser’s post-stabbing interviews are 
shared (an exploitation perhaps not quite as unsettling as the crime itself, but unsettling 
nonetheless). In these videos, the girls discuss their motivations for stabbing their 
friend, chief among them, a two-fold argument: the appeasement of Slender Man and 
the desire to become his proxies. Their appeasement of Slender Man was about 
preventing him, as Weier and Geyser explain it, from killing their families. They feared 
if they did not sacrifice their friend to Slender Man, he would kill their parents. They 
feared Slender Man’s capacity for violence against their loved ones. However, Weier 
and Geyser also wanted to be near Slender Man, living with him in his mansion in the 
woods and carrying out violent acts on his behalf, simultaneously embodying the threat 
they seemed to fear the most, compulsive uncanny acts of violence in order to prevent 
violence.  
The two girls seemed aware, at least at times, that their belief in Slender Man 
was incongruent. They conceded the source of their Slender Man knowledge: 
CreepyPasta.com, a website and forum for sharing scary, fictional, stories. But they 
simultaneously maintained they believed Slender Man to be a real figure capable of real 
violence, as well as providing them a real home. As various psychiatric and custodial 
witnesses attested in courtroom footage presented during the HBO documentary, both 
Weier and Geyser (and Geyser especially) were having difficulty knowing what was 
‘real’ and what was not. And their embeddedness in technoculture amplified the 
blurriness of the boundaries between ‘real’ and ‘not real’ for these two girls. As one 
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commentator in the documentary announced, “… technology makes reality messier…” 
(Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016). Rather than decelerating the idea that Slender Man is 
real by the mythology’s constant connection to its beginnings as a fiction story created 
by a man who just wanted to participate in storytelling, the connectivity of the internet 
enables the Slender Man mythos to be so interconnected, so intensely, so efficiently 
produced and illustrated that the simultaneously blurred and rigid narrative becomes 
hyperreal, not unlike the slippages in reality experienced by Nathaniel in Hoffmann’s 
‘The Sandman’ as he gazes at Olympia, or catches a glimpse of Clara through his 
telescope and slips into madness. 
Cyborgs, hybridising fact and fiction, contest the real/not-real binary too, in 
favour of networked power that enables both (and neither) fact and fiction as liveable 
embodied experience, much like Kofman’s (2005) theorising of the uncanny as the 
blurred boundaries of reality and imagination. The idea of making ‘reality’ messier 
through technology is a cyborgian political aim, for ‘reality’ is often unkind, 
unpalatable and unbearable for those who become cyborg (and other, as Haraway would 
say, kin). Cyborgs live in the uncanny mess. The cyborg is a metaphor for the disruption 
of Western ‘reality’ (that is, that reality can be observed, measured and recorded) and 
the celebration of the dissolution of authoritative facts and fact-finding as signifiers of 
hierarchical power. Cyborgs instead favour the networked connectivity of information 
systems that are multiple, partial and contradictory. For women-as-cyborgs, such 
networked connectivity holds meaning as political positioning as ‘other’; the 
complexities, traumas and delights of living embodied lives characterised by 
incompatible (Western) tensions (femininity/masculinity, object/subject, sick/healthy). 
A messy reality is one a cyborg can recover and thrive in; navigating pathways littered 
with bodies and recycled ideas.  
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But what of the ‘others’ who cannot recover in the mess, who cannot recycle; 
those who have been born into technotimes where being able to even pretend to be 
whole and singular is a privilege? The messiness of ‘reality’ (of the cyborgian kind), has 
expanded, threatening the privileged ones, through hyperconnection and burgeoning 
accessibility that ‘others’ have to other ‘others’ for the sharing of politics (for example 
Conley, 2014; Keller, 2012; Linder, Myers, Riggle & Lacy, 2016; Rapp, Button, Fleury-
Steiner & Fleury-Steiner, 2010; Williams, 2015). But with these shifts towards the 
legitimated heterogeneity of experiences comes a hyper-demand for (patriarchal) order, 
the re-assertion of the binaries and their boundaries as impermeable. In Trump times, 
while ‘reality’ gets messier and messier, particular kinds of ‘reality’ are being 
constructed as more singular than ever before. My reality is better and more 
important than yours, so step aside while I shoot up this pizza place 
to save the children Hillary Clinton is molesting in the basement. In 
Trump times, ‘reality,’ ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ are no longer merely contested, but tortured 
and distorted to the point where even the simplest of words are rendered dishevelled. 
For example, when Donald Trump claims the sun was shining during his inauguration 
when we all saw the rain drops falling, perhaps confusing Slender Man as a ‘real’ 
figure, with all his documented narratives and imagery, is not a sign of ‘disorder’ so 
much as it is collateral damage of living in a ‘post-truth’ era. Television channels like 
Animal Planet mainly produce and host scientific shows, but have shifted into fake 
shows like ‘Mermaids: The Body Found’ and ‘Mountain Monsters’ that appear in the 
same format as their science shows, providing ‘evidence’ and ‘eye-witness’ testimony 
in footage that mimics verified found footage and documentary evidence. These TV 
shows only suggests the images and testimony are not real in fine print of their rolling 
credits. From the internet, to Trump politics, to ‘documentaries,’ technotimes are 
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characterised by that uncanny slippage between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary.’ One 
Trump terrorist was so convinced that Hillary Clinton was running a child sex ring out 
of a pizza store basement he took violent measures to stop it (see Bendix, 2017). Even 
the most debunked of fake news and wild stories persist and spread through social 
media. As O’Hehir (2014) suggests:  
In a culture where people believe in angels and aliens, believe 
that 9/11 was an inside job and Sandy Hook a hoax, believe that 
Barack Hussein Obama is a Muslim socialist, why should 12-
year-olds not believe in a rubber-faced, baby-eating monster who 
looks like a cross between Cthulhu and the villain of an Occupy 
Wall Street comic book? (para. 7) 
Of course, Weier and Geyser’s connections with their worlds were blurred long 
before Trump took office. The instantaneous connectivity of the internet had been 
blurring the boundaries between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ for a long time before the 
American presidential election of 2016. Where Weier and Geyser exemplify the 
struggles for young women to negotiate an increasingly interconnected, contradictory 
world, the election of Donald Trump exemplifies similar fraught tensions.  
 
Shift 
An interesting shift in the Slender Man narrative has been the shift of focus from 
groups of children as Slender Man victims (as described in the first iterations of Slender 
Man) to Slender Man’s connection with young girls. The first Slender Man stories and 
images described and depicted Slender Man as being a watcher and taker of children, of 
all ages and genders, and usually in groups. Either before, or in response to, the Weier 
and Geyser case, the stories and images have shifted to representing Slender Man as the 
taker of girls. Some analyses of Slender Man have produced him as a father figure 
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(Chess & Newsom, 2015), so this shift to a father-daughter narrative, 
psychoanalytically speaking, may make some kind of sense: a strange, yet familiar 
father figure, both safe and terrifying.  
Whatever the reason/s, the shift to Slender Man as predominantly a taker of girls 
has become entrenched in the mythos, even as it remains largely unacknowledged. This 
quite stark shift has not been explicitly addressed in Slender Man story-telling or 
recording. There has, thus, been limited gender analysis conducted77 beyond his 
description as a father-figure (there has been gender analysis on the stabbing, however 
(see Hayden, 2018; Maddox, 2018)). How did Slender Man’s mythology transform 
from a mass-abductor of children, to a hijacker of lone girls? 
Literary critic Jack Zipes, talking to HBO for the ‘Beware The Slenderman’ 
documentary, claims that people are telling “their own horror stories about what is 
happening in the world today” (Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016). The Slender Man 
stories then, with their shift in focus to young girls, are surely telling us about girls, and 
what we think of them. How these Slender Man stories transformed to stories about 
girls remains murky, but women know that embodied feeling of being watched and the 
threat of being taken. Slender Man, as a watcher and a taker, could be a modern 
technorepresentation of the ever-present threat of violence to women. Even though the 
explication of Slender Man may feel at times like a shift away from the technological 
and towards the monstrous, the Slender Man is a digital figure, emerging through 
technology, the internet. He is not the traditional bogeyman of a dream or a campfire. 
His point of entry and his mode of transportation is the internet: “Slender Man makes 
one not even safe in one’s own house, and he is always watching, because the Internet, 
                                                          
77 However, I did find undergraduate student research by Kao, Tang and Jain (2017) who do suggest, 
among other claims, that the Slender Man mythos has become influenced by users reasserting gendered 
binaries as they build Slender Man narratives. 
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Slender Man’s access point, is always already inside one’s home” (Maddox, 2018, p. 8). 
It is also surely no coincidence that the format of the TV series ‘The Bachelor,’ beamed 
into far too many homes globally, involves (Western) women descending upon a 
mansion in order to impress a suited (usually white and as faceless as the last) man. 
 
Real Life 
Documentaries themselves are forms of story-telling. There are several JonBenét 
Ramsey78 documentaries, each convinced of their own distinct explanations. Each takes 
the same central story and produces a different account of JonBenét’s life and death. In 
many ways, these documentaries behave the same way that the Slender Man mythos 
has: stories shift and change and proliferate, connections between them expand and new 
connections are formed, transforming the narrative every time. The stories change, but 
story-telling, in the technoage looks familiar whether constructing stories of faceless 
tentacle men in the woods or trying to solve the murder of a little white girl.  
Documentaries, like internet users, tell particular stories in particular ways. 
‘Beware The Slenderman’ tells the stories of both Weier and Geyser (through their 
police interrogation videos), and their families’ attempts to understand their daughters’ 
actions and seek justice for them in an American legal system that tries them, and 
punishes them, as adults (and more than that, as adult women). As their crime is 
uncanny (both familiar and strange, real and not real), the documentary is dominated by 
an uncanny feeling: the sense this crime occurred through something simultaneously 
strange and familiar. Since for Kofman (2005), the uncanny can be thought of as the 
“coincidence between fantasy and reality” (p. 72), this set of circumstances, where 
                                                          
78 In December 1996, 6-year-old American pre-school beauty queen JonBenét Ramsey was reported 
kidnapped by her parents, only to later be found dead in the basement of her family’s home (Conrad, 
1999). Her unsolved murder continues to fascinate and horrify decades later, with a cacophony of 
detectives (police, journalist and internet) trying to solve the case (see Dean, 2016).  
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young girls believe in a figure they know to be fantasy and act violently in order to both 
impress and appease him, seems like a coincidence to me.  
Through ‘Beware The Slenderman,’ we meet the girls’ parents. Weier’s father in 
particular seems to drive the family’s public responses to issues of the case and is 
outspoken about his daughter’s need to be treated, legally, as the child she was at the 
time of the attempted murder. He angrily tells us he was a ‘good dad’ (that is, a 
‘responsible neoliberal individual’) who monitored his daughter’s use of technology, a 
claim that becomes murky when Weier’s YouTube history is revealed: an unsettling 
mix of innocuous videos (animal rights activism, recipes) and the macabre and 
disturbing (violent videos about babies in blenders, cats killing mice and psychopath 
tests). Anissa Weier’s internet history is an uncanny register of the ease at which 
connections can be made online to content that may amplify embodied experiences of 
both contradiction (‘good girl’/‘bad girl,’ real/not-real) and ‘real’ violence, all while a 
daughter sits with the family on the couch. 
Murkier still, the release of the first studio movie depicting Slender Man saw a 
re-activation of the imagery of the Slender Man stabbings. The first trailer for the 2018 
movie featured multiple moments of disturbed, scared, dissociated, sick and violent 
young girls, interspersed with grotesque imagery (maggots), scary imagery (spooky 
forests, needles in eyeballs) and brief flashes of Slender Man himself (see Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, 2018).   
The timing of the trailer release was, at best, unfortunate. Anissa Weier, 16 years 
old (12 at the time of the attempted murder), was sentenced to 25 years in a psychiatric 
facility on the 21st of December, 2017 (see Bauer, 2017). The first trailer for ‘Slender 
Man’ was released on the 3rd of January 2018. Shortly after the trailer release, the father 
of Anissa Weier released a statement expressing his anger about the film, as he sees it, 
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exploiting a tragedy (see Associated Press, 2018). An online petition was also launched 
demanding the film not be released as it is “built on the exploitation of a deeply 
traumatic event and the people who lived it” (see Alison P., 2018, para. 6). While the 
storyline itself is not based on the Weier/Geyser Slender Man stabbing, the movie and 
the real-life events have been somewhat conflated and moral outrage has become the 
focus of discussion about the movie. There was minimal moral outrage (in fact, I would 
say almost none at all) about the 25-year sentence to institutional living for a 16-year-
old girl who could potentially then have to re-enter the world as a nearly 40-year-old 
woman once her sentence is complete.79  
Slender Man, as a set of internet stories/artworks/games, has continued to be 
produced online despite the Slender Man stabbings (and the numerous other violent 
offences allegedly inspired by Slender Man and carried out by mainly young girls), 
including ‘fan art’ inspired explicitly by the stabbing. In 2018, ‘Slender Man’ starred in 
his very own movie that would tell his story to a more mainstream audience than those 
inhabiting his cyberspaces. The opening image of the movie is shot of a forest edge that 
looks exactly like where the victim of the 2014 Slender Man stabbing was found after 
the attack (see Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016). Indeed, the storyline called on many 
images and instances involved in the stabbing, like the multiple shots of hand-drawn 
Slender Man pictures and the young women enjoying macabre videos online. However, 
some imagery that had appeared in the first trailer for the movie was cut from the final 
film, including instances of stabbing and young, bloodied women staggering out of the 
woods.  
                                                          
79 At the beginning of February 2018, Weier’s accomplice Morgan Geyser, 15 years old, was sentenced to 
40 years in a psychiatric facility (see Moreno, 2018).   
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The movie’s storyline focuses on four young women each haunted and 
enveloped by Slender Man as the movie progresses (see Fischer et al., 2018). 
Throughout the movie, while mention was made of Slender Man taking young people, 
these ‘young people’ seemed to overwhelmingly be women and girls. The four main 
protagonists of the film were young women, most of the missing person alerts seemed 
to be women and girls, and at least two characters who were removed from the final 
film but were prominent in promotional trailers were also young women. The movie 
participates in the continued assertion that Slender Man takes ‘young people’ in general, 
while focusing on his taking of young women. Explicitly, the film made the creative 
decision to focus on the group of young women who decided to summon Slender Man, 
in contrast to the group of young men who decided against summoning Slender Man at 
the last minute.  
 
Slender Man Dismembered: A Body in the Woods 
There are certain physical attributes that Slender Man has retained even through 
the vast networks of Slender Man stories. Through most stories, he remains gigantic and 
very thin, and has multiple limbs and/or tentacles (Boyer, 2013). He most commonly 
wears a dark suit and tie, even as he mostly lurks in forests. While his head is usually 
smooth and white, he is rarely depicted with a face (Boyer, 2013). The Slender Man is 
quite explicitly a faceless white male figure, looming large and lurking. While the 
Slender Man’s physical image, and his tendency to lurk, has stayed relatively static, the 
stories about his abilities, his motivations and his victims are much more eclectic. He 
stays the same while how he is exists transforms (perhaps just like the technorenewal of 
old misogyny (see French, 1992)). Slender Man narratives construct Slender Man’s 
body, and what he does with it, in particular ways that evoke particular cultural 
anxieties: a figure like Slender Man “shows or reflects cultural fears and forbidden 
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obsessions, social and moral problems that express themselves in the body and behavior 
of the monstrous creature” (Boyer, 2013, p. 240). So how does Slender Man’s body 
express our cultural fears? Let’s dismember him. 
 
Faceless Suit 
Slender Man is almost exclusively faceless, much like the everywhere and 
nowhere power of The Man or The Powers That Be, a figure of patriarchal masculinity 
that serves as a Panopticon (despite lacking the ‘optic’ part) (Curlew, 2017). His 
facelessness conjures the image of the faceless, masculine corporations of Big Business, 
perhaps the most masculine enterprise, excluding war, of course. The lurking 
facelessness of Slender Man evokes anxiety about the everywhere-ness and everyone-
ness of masculinity and gendered violence; misogyny as institutional (Bartky, 1998; 
Connell, 2005). The global hacking activist group Anonymous originally utilised 
imagery of a faceless man in a dark suit too (Stanek, 2015), but the representation of the 
Anonymous institution now has a face, the Guy Fawkes mask, even if that face still 
calls upon similar imagery to the Slender Man: pale, white, shadowy. These white faces 
could be understood as representative of particular anxieties about privacy and power. 
Slender Man will not leave you alone and exerts power over how you live in the world. 
Ignoring him will not stop him. For example, Anonymous battles for individual rights to 
privacy and people-power to overthrow corporations and institutions the group believes 
to be abusive, but in ways that benefit those privileged through hacking and gaming 
culture (Ravetto-Biagioli, 2013), and those who benefit from hacking and gaming 
culture are predominantly white men (Massanari, 2017; Milner, 2013; Phillips, 2013). 
Anonymous specifically rejected calls for the group to hack Trump during the 2016 
presidential election on the grounds that working to silence Trump was censorship 
(Anonymous Official, 2016a). Conversely, a few months after refusing to hack Trump, 
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Anonymous released a video threatening Hillary Clinton, focusing on her use of email, 
campaign finance issues and alleged extensive lies (Anonymous Official, 2016b). 
WikiLeaks, a sort of friend to Anonymous, had been front and centre of the presidential 
election campaign with the Democratic National Committee hacks, which were a 
significant contributor to the destruction of Hillary Clinton’s bid for the presidency (see 
Sheth, 2018). Both WikiLeaks and Anonymous have been considered defenders of the 
truth, on the side of ‘the people,’ exposing and/or disrupting the ‘establishment’: big 
business, big religion and other powerful, exploitative entities (Beyer, 2014). But the 
roots of the movement are often forgotten. Anonymous emerged from 4chan, one of the 
most violent, racist, misogynist spaces on the internet (Phillips, 2013). Anonymous and 
WikiLeaks’ political obsessions are largely concerned with perceived attacks to male 
privilege that are prominently, if not contradictorily, enjoyed on 4chan: the right to 
privacy, the right to freedom of speech, the right to transparency. Anonymous might 
claim to have left the explicit violence, racism and misogyny of 4chan behind, but they 
still bring those privileges with them into their brand of hacktivism. Anonymous hack in 
the ‘best interests’ (privileges) of ‘the people’ (white men), maintaining the anti-‘other’ 
status quo, despite claims of siding with the oppressed (see Anonymous Official, 
2016a). While Anonymous calls on the idea of anonymity in order to subvert 
surveillance and disrupt power hierarchies (Coleman, 2012), favourite pastimes of a 
cyborg, it does so through exerting a particular kind of ever-present, everywhere and 
nowhere masculine power, represented through the white faceless power of a man in a 
suit.  
So, uncannily, Slender Man and Anonymous are both so often depicted as 
wearing a dark suit and tie, characteristic of Big Business, evoking the faceless power of 
corporations and institutions. Slender Man’s suit, however, could also suggest Slender 
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Man as a father figure (Chess & Newsom, 2015), conjuring the image of the traditional 
Western working father, an active participant in Big Business and The Government, the 
Boss in the Home. He is someone to be obeyed, respected, revered. Indeed, in the 2018 
‘Slender Man’ movie, protagonist Hallie and her younger sister hear someone enter 
their house. Hallie goes to investigate and discovers a shadowy figure in their living 
room. She runs back up to her room and the figure chases her. After hammering on the 
bedroom door, it is revealed that the figure was the drunk father of missing girl Katie 
(stolen by Slender Man), aggressively demanding information about Katie’s 
whereabouts and talking about how Hallie was a bad influence on Katie. A father figure 
is mistaken for Slender Man. 
In many of his stories, viewing Slender Man’s face(lessness) causes madness in 
his victims. In the 2018 movie, three of the young women try to re-summon Slender 
Man in order to make a trade for their stolen friend Katie. During the ritual, they are all 
blindfolded so they do not look at Slender Man’s face. As Slender Man approaches (you 
can hear him as tree creaks), one girl, Chloe, is ill-disciplined and removes her 
blindfold. She catches a glimpse of him and runs away, eventually caught by him and 
staring him directly in the face. Slender Man lets her go, but, sometime later, Chloe is at 
home when ‘attacked’ by Slender Man again. Chloe stops coming to school and it is 
later revealed she is in a zombie-like state, confined to her house. Lizzie, Hallie’s 
younger sister, also goes into the forest and summons Slender Man, views his 
facelessness, and goes mad. She becomes hysterical, most starkly effected by seeing 
Slender Man of all the girls in the movie, perhaps because her youth means she is more 
horrified by the everywhere and nowhereness of his power, not yet accustomed to the 
discipline such power compels. Viewing Slender Man’s white facelessness and being 
maddened by its power suggests an anxious cultural celebration of the everywhere-
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nowhere power of masculine privilege. The young women, in the movie, who view 
Slender Man’s facelessness directly succumb to his power: he envelopes them and pulls 
them into his ‘nature.’ 
 
Tendril Limbs 
The Slender Man has tendril limbs: root-like tentacles that burst forth from his 
body, grabbing at, touching or just hovering with intent. He is a toucher, or at least he 
threatens touching. And his touch is sinister; it kills or it steals. His threat to touch and 
grab connects to the ever-present threat of violent touches of women’s bodies: public 
object-bodies to be picked up and inspected, grabbed and poked through an expansive 
range of violences (Dartnall & Jewkes, 2013; Ellsberg et al., 2015), including in their 
homes (Boonzaier, 2008; Fanslow & Robinson, 2011), at work (Gutek, Morasch & 
Cohen, 1983; Jagsi, 2018), in education (Kimble, Neacsiu, Flack & Horner, 2008; 
Orchowski, Gidycz & Kraft, 2018; Shute, Owens & Slee; 2016; Small & Kerns, 1993), 
online (Patella-Rey, 2018), and within their bodies (MacSween, 1993; Morgan, 1991). 
Women’s vigilance against the threat of violence is ever-present (Mehta & Bondi, 
1999), an embodied alertness to the terrifying ways in which women’s bodies can 
instantaneously be acted upon violently, constructing that classification of ‘woman’ 
(Malabou, 2011) through multiple extensive tendrils of power that do violence to her. 
These tendrils (of masculinity/femininity) are multiple and frantic, and always lurking.  
In the ‘Slender Man’ movie, his tendrils help him to move faster and to capture 
and contain his prey. Hallie has a bizarre dream in which she is a dismembered body 
scattered on the forest floor with wooden tendril roots growing out of her eyes, nose and 
mouth, rooting her to the ground. She then dreams she is pregnant and wooden tendrils 
burst through her pregnant stomach. Slender Man caresses the face of another of the 
movie’s protagonists, Wren, who is later grabbed by Slender Man’s wooden tendrils, 
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pulled out into the darkness through her bedroom window. Similarly, in the final battle 
with Slender Man, Hallie is chased by Slender Man through the forest, his tendrils 
propelling him forward with speed and agility. He then uses his tendrils to finally 
entrap80 Hallie within his tree-body. 
Slender Man’s tendrils seem creeping and grabbing metaphors for the insidious 
and agile potentiality of threats of violent touches to women’s bodies. (Un)Naturally, 
(Female figure) interrupts here, with her announcements that “touch is love” (Wolfson, 
Konrath & Woods, 2015, p. 72) and “touch is hate” (p. 57): the announcement of those 
traditional heteronormative gendered performances that are packaged as “love” and how 
hateful such touches can be, whether in a high heeled shoe or in a tendril wrapping 
around a face.  
 
Lurking  
Slender Man lurks, ever-present, in the background. He is always there whether 
you explicitly acknowledge him or not. But more often than not, in stories, Slender Man 
is acknowledged and he stays close by, always threatening to come a little closer. 
Women’s experiences of offline stalking are fraught, characterised by the constant fear 
of violence, anxiety, restriction of movements and unhealthy bodies (Amar, 2006; 
Logan & Cole, 2011; Sheridan & Lyndon, 2012; Sinwelski & Vinton, 2001), and 
technological shifts have enabled cyberstalking to proliferate (Adam, 2002; Woodlock, 
2017). Being ‘followed’ on social media can take on new meanings for women, as the 
technology of the internet allows the Panopticon to expand further, adding more and 
more disciplining connections that shape women’s bodies, sometimes violently. Gill 
(2008) suggests that modern women are subject to “a level of scrutiny and hostile 
                                                          
80 Slender Man’s tactics blur with understandings of coercive control, where the extensive systematic 
micro-regulation of women’s lives entraps women in heteronormative personal lives (Stark, 2007). 
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surveillance that has no historical precedent” (p. 442)81, and with Slender Man 
watching, it is hard to argue with her.   
In the 2018 movie, Slender Man is sometimes depicted as a shadow that looms 
(over the girls as they search a computer) or advances (moving through doors and up 
stairs, into bedrooms). Twice in the movie, Slender Man calls his victims on their 
mobile phones, streaming video of his own vision as he lurks outside their houses, 
enters through their front doors and moves through their homes and into their bedrooms. 
Slender Man and the antagonist of ‘It Follows’ are kindred monsters. ‘It Follows’ is a 
2014 horror movie about an insidious entity that slowly follows people, passed on 
through sexual encounters and aiming to catch up with and kill those it follows (see 
Green, Smith, Kaplan, Rommesmo & Mitchell, 2014). In ‘It Follows,’ the “it” could be 
a horror metaphor for sexual disease (on a simplistic level) or sexual violence and the 
‘being watched’-ness of being a woman (Kroenert, 2015): the “it” follows a victim until 
they pass the figure on to another victim, continuing a destructive cycle of violence, fear 
and shared trauma. The “it” is insidious, its potential for violence ever-present but not 
necessarily fast-moving or foregrounded, much like Slender Man and Panoptic 
patriarchal surveillance, and requires the victim to act out, sometimes violently, in order 
to shift the figure on.  
 
Mind-Body Uncertainty  
A common ability of Slender Man is mind control: the ability to control the 
minds and bodies of his victims, forcing them to do things they do not wish to do. 
Sometimes this ability manifests in the maddening threat of Slender Man’s lurking, 
                                                          
81 Gill (2008) also points out women can be more active than ever before too. Women do resist and 
subvert online surveillance and the disciplining of their bodies in multiple ways. Chapters ten and thirteen 
of my research project present some of these hopeful opportunities.  
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rather than the direct ability to control minds and bodies. Anissa Weier and Morgan 
Geyser were not mind controlled directly, but rather felt pressured by Slender Man’s 
constant presence (Harris & Taylor Brodsky, 2016). In the first trailer for the 2018 
movie, there are scenes depicting a young woman about to stab herself and a young man 
throwing himself of a building, suggesting Slender Man is in control of their actions. 
These scenes have been removed from the theatrical release, presumably for their 
thematic overlap with the Slender Man stabbing and the now-too-real deviance of 
young girls.  
Slender Man is also often experienced through physical reaction (like vomiting) 
rather than directly seeing him (Boyer, 2013), and in the 2018 movie, his presence is 
often associated with the creaking of trees; an audio cue for the anxiety of experiencing 
his lurking. His presence activates embodied responses, much like how Panoptic 
surveillance activates the disciplining of women’s bodies (Bartky, 1998), perhaps 
arguably a form of mind-body control. Slender Man’s mind-body controls act as a 
metaphor for the demands made of women to embody the Western ideal, as compliance 
with the demands can be experienced as an uncanny compulsion to repeat violences on 
women’s bodies. Whether it be carving up their own bodies or stabbing someone else’s, 
women appease powers like Slender Man in hope of staving off his violence.  
Slender Man also controls his victims through the manipulation of ‘reality’ and 
exploiting their embodied responses to his manipulations. All of the protagonists of the 
movie experience distortions in ‘reality.’ Chloe, Hallie and Wren in particular endure 
experiences that blur the boundary between the ‘real’ and the hallucinatory world of 
Slender Man. When Chloe is attacked in her bedroom, Slender Man strangles her. 
However, the mirror on her dressing table does not reflect Slender Man’s image, 
questioning the ‘reality’ of Slender Man and the violence he is rendering. Wren is 
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attacked by Slender Man in a library. He distorts the room and corners her, caresses her 
face, then disappears, leaving Wren screaming on the floor as a librarian tries to console 
her. Hallie experiences dreams within dreams, and hallucinations in alternate spaces, in 
which her body is dismembered. Slender Man creates hallucinatory circumstances that 
call into question what is real and what is not. The “uncertainty of reality and the 
inability to control your own body” (Boyer, 2013, p. 252) are characteristics that recur 
through Slender Man narratives, as well through women’s embodied lives in the 21st 
century West as the boundaries blur between women, their bodies and technology. The 
uncertainty of Slender Man evokes, of course, the uncanny. He is both very familiar 
(everywhere) and very strange (nowhere), just like the patriarchal disciplinary power of 
the Panopticon (Bartky, 1998; Foucault, 1995) that shapes women’s docile bodies 
through lurking and touching tendrils. As Gill (2008) suggests, modern women’s 
positions are contradictory, characterised by increasing agency and increasing 
restriction. And perhaps by an increasing interface between the ‘reality’ of women’s 
bodies (objectified and disciplined) and the imagination of women’s bodies (the new 
ways in which to recover the body and embody contradictions), women might just be 
‘UNSURE.’  
 
Stealing or Returning 
Slender Man is also traditionally a stealer of children, taking them into the 
woods, maybe to kill them, maybe to save them, we do not always know. Given the 
recent narrative shifts to girls as Slender Man’s primary interest, it is tricky to pin down 
this representation as the stealing away of women is multiple: age, weight, sexuality, 
race, disability, the sex trade, kidnapping, madness, marriage, education, death and so 
on and so forth indefinitely. Objects are so easily mislaid or stolen (just ask Gable 
Tostee!). One representation that persists, however, is Slender Man’s station in the 
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forest. Slender Man lives in the woods, often surrounded by trees. Even a Business Man 
lives in a concrete jungle.  
But the turn to girls in Slender Man narratives could suggest a return to nature 
for women as a solution to the problem (the Big Problem! The Only Problem!) of male 
anxiety. Slender Man’s dominance through nature (he is of the forest and tree-like), and 
power over girls suggests a returning of ‘woman’ to nature, an origin women have 
begun to stray from through technology. Quite explicitly, the 2018 movie positions 
technological connection as the girls’ downfall. Early on in the movie, there are a 
multitude of references to Twitter and other online activities, like investigating point-of-
view porn, presumably to demonstrate the girls’ embeddedness in modern 
technoculture. The group also encounters Slender Man first online, searching for him in 
competition with a group of teenage boys who claimed to be summoning Slender Man 
that night (they did not – too scary!). Of course, horror movies have long tortured 
women, prolonging their pain and deaths (Molitor & Sapolsky, 1993; Weaver, 1991; 
Welsh, 2010). While sex often determines death for girls in horror movies, virginal 
purity increases chances of survival82 (Cowan & O’Brien, 1990; Welsh, 2010). The 
‘Slender Man’ narrative perhaps replaces sex with technology, as all our heroines are 
technosluts who end up in Slender Man’s grip, even if in varied ways.  
At first, the young women are dutifully hesitant to watch the Slender Man 
summoning video, but urge each other on anyway. While their boy counterparts felt the 
fear and changed their minds, the young women felt the fear and forged ahead, perhaps 
unable to resist the potential violence of Slender Man, or perhaps too complacent about 
the potential violence of Slender Man, or perhaps a little of both, figuring the girls as 
                                                          
82 Slender Man does attack Hallie while she is on a date with a boy from her school, thwarting any sexual 
activity, perhaps just like an overprotective and angry father… 
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complicit with whatever happens next. Similarly, Anissa Weier and Morgan Geyser’s 
use of technology has been feminised and infantilised, their girl-ness and their youth 
positioning them as too incompetent to engage with technology safely and ‘normally’ 
(Maddox, 2018). Martin (2013) suggests that the positioning of young women is 
problematic for masculine categorisations that stabilise the man/woman categories: “As 
both female and child, she twice challenges categorization as a ‘proper’ subject, 
embodying anxiety about categorization and posing a double threat to the power 
relations of patriarchy” (p. 138). If the young woman’s natural body uncannily 
transgresses multiple boundaries, technological connectivity might just help girls 
transgress those boundaries even more.  
The events of the Slender Man stabbing and the 2018 movie position young 
women as incompetent to use the internet safely; that is, without invoking a Slender 
Man. While young women may have the technical know-how for working with 
technology (like using forums, databases and Twitter), the ‘problems’ of women and 
technology emerge through constructions of young women attempting to socially 
navigate their technological connections. The networks between the young women 
(between Weier and Geyser, and between the 2018 movie’s protagonists), technological 
connectivity and Slender Man are represented as the connections productive of deviancy 
and the inadequacy of feminine ways of negotiating the online world. The young 
women connected too much and too brazenly. Maddox (2018) also suggests that the 
Slender Man stabbing feminised the internet as a whole and reassembled it “as a 
deviant, life-giving entity” (p. 11), a technomother to deviant “meme-children” (p. 11)83 
like Weier and Geyser. The technological connectivity of young women becomes a 
problem of feminine deviancy that needs to be controlled. Moreover, there is no real 
                                                          
83 I would have said ‘meme-daughters,’ personally. 
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‘final girl’ (a woman characterised by her survival through the horror (Clover, 1992; 
Wee, 2006)) in the 2018 ‘Slender Man’ movie, except possibly Hallie’s little sister 
Lizzie who may have learned her lesson (to stay away from technology) after her own 
brush with madness. At the end of the movie, Lizzie monologues, imploring us to 
consider the perils of building monsters like Slender Man online through our clicking 
and typing, as the camera zooms in on a photo of the four young women captured by 
Slender Man. 
In conjunction with the technology-as-girls’-downfall wiring, all of the young 
women in the 2018 movie are also very explicitly drawn into Slender Man by nature, or 
at least the sounds of nature. Katie disappears while on a school trip near the forest. We 
see her staring into the woods, which is loud with trees creaking, leaves rustling and 
insects buzzing. Then she is gone. Chloe hears Slender Man’s trees creaking too, and 
removes her blindfold to see him. Three of the protagonists (Katie, Hallie and Wren) are 
explicitly pulled back and incorporated into nature by Slender Man. At the end of the 
movie, Hallie sacrifices herself to Slender Man and is pulled into Slender Man’s tree 
body in the forest, seemingly becoming one with it, presumably just as Katie and Wren 
had.  
Through the movie, Slender Man also attacks each girl as she tries to go about 
mundane teenage girl activities. Chloe was attacked within her home, while she was 
relaxing and listening to music. After the attack, she becomes confined to her house as a 
zombie. The possible outcomes for our young women protagonists are seemingly 
limited: revert back to nature, stay in the home. 
Similarly, Wren is attacked in a library. She had researched Slender Man, online 
at first, discovering a book that might help explain and solve her Slender Man issues. 
After she finds the book in the library, Slender Man attacks her, stealing her face, even 
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if only momentarily. The attack ends, and Wren escapes with the book and with her 
face.  
Attacking Wren as she educates herself, particularly about her symbiotic enemy, 
surely, if even coincidentally, calls to mind the fraught position of women in education, 
frequently attacked for their mere presence in institutions (see university sexual assault 
statistics, the pro-rapists and Elliot Rodger). Chloe’s zombielike houseboundness, 
Lizzie’s psychosis and Katie and Hallie’s… composting… feel like women’s 
experiences of domesticity and docility, hysteria and natural (and, to be blunt, dead) 
bodies. The film does similar work to that of the re-worked Slender Man myth: re-
asserting the ‘natural’ boundaries of ‘woman,’ re-asserting the traditional binaries, 
bringing women back to domesticity and nature by exploiting their technocuriosity. By 
the end of the movie, the protagonists have all become inanimate; lively women 
returned to their ‘natural’ object state.  
 So Slender Man emerges as a pervasive figure for re-establishing the binaries 
that might contain uncanny technogirls. Becoming an embodied young woman “is a 
strange, improper business” (Martin, 2013, p. 140), perhaps increasingly so in the 21st 
century West. Anissa Weier and Morgan Geyser responded to Slender Man in much the 
same way as Western women can do to pervasive patriarchal power. Their fear of the 
punishment for not being shaped and made docile by the disciplining gaze compelled 
them towards complicity, a legitimate fear unequivocally signalled through the 2018 
‘Slender Man’ movie as well. Through Weier and Geyser’s technological connectivity, 
those uncanny blurry hyperconnections between the girls and Slender Man, being 
complicit was experienced as enacting violence outward, onto another young woman’s 






Perhaps a Slender Man is a figure for the masculine as ‘other,’ monstrous: “The 
lack of the face, the multiple limbs…, and the acts of murder can represent the faceless 
war machinery that sees young men fight, the mindless killing and dying” (Boyer, 2013, 
p. 250). Perhaps Slender Man is the embodiment of male/masculine fear of becoming 
‘other’ and the active re-assertion of the binaries that maintain his wholeness and 
fragment ‘others.’ When figured as male anxiety, Slender Man’s emergence is 
unsurprising at a time when women are voicing their experiences and claiming political 
space (particularly online, but also currently in the streets through global protests), 
while simultaneously white, middle-class men (the typical face of Western patriarchal 
power) are mobilizing a movement that speaks to the unfairness of the restriction to 
white male power not only on an individual level, but on an institutional, systemic 
level.84 As Boyer (2013) suggests, the “primary narrators” (p. 256) of Slender Man are 
not as diverse as the internet appears to be. It is likely that Slender Man story-tellers are 
writing about the fears of white masculinity and are writing ways to resolve those fears. 
For Anissa Weier and Morgan Geyser, the discomfort of their uncanny (girl) 
violence is resolved through rendering them inanimate. The below comment was posted 
on a Daily Mail article that reported some details of the victim impact statements for the 




While the vast majority of comments emphasised the importance of locking up 
dangerous girls, the above comment emphasised how keeping them from reproducing 
                                                          
84 Trump declared that 2018 is a scary time for men (see “Trump: ‘Scary and difficult time for young 
men’ in US,” 2018). 
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was of utmost importance. And it was a popular comment. Sterilising the mentally ill 
(and other ‘others’) is not a new suggestion. Removing the reproductive capacities of 
mentally ill women is connected to the control of women’s deviant bodies and limiting 
the production of even more deviant bodies (Cepko, 1993). Asserting and then 
rescinding Weier and Geyser’s biological functionality alleviates uncertainty about their 
technoembedded violence: the binaries that see girls as natural and docile are re-asserted 
and controlled. Moreover, Mar (2017) suggests that the changes in the girls’ bodies 
through the course of their trial process could have led to longer sentences. When first 
arrested, the girls looked pre-pubescent, further producing their crime as uncanny 
violence enacted by children that was difficult to account for. But as their trials 
progressed, the girls’ bodies developed into adult woman bodies, blurring the line 
between ‘girl’ (child) and ‘woman’ (adult) even further. Their uncanniness begins to 
dissolve more easily, for they can now much more certainly be understood as violent, 
deviant women. 
The following screen capture was taken of the comments on a Sun article about 












While the pro-sterilisation comment from the Daily Mail article emphasised the girls’ 
return to and control of nature, the comments on the Sun article dehumanise Geyser: she 
becomes an ‘it’ that should no longer be animate.85 Comments like those made on the 
Sun and Daily Mail articles exemplify an anxious intolerance of uncanny femininity – 
those scary ways women and girls exceed their assigned boundaries by doing the 
violence that is supposed to be done to them – where young girls already contained 
through masculinist judicial systems become targets of dehumanisation and death-calls. 
The content of these comments is disturbing enough without pointing out the grey, 
featureless, male faces that accompany the statements… Some of these comments are 
now removed, disappeared, their ‘reality’ now questioned, just like Slender Man. 
 While faceless shadowy men lurking in comments online are alarmingly 
mundane, there are striking examples of men’s violence towards women that also evoke 
Slender Man. As I read the quote presented below, Gable Tostee appears in the network:  
Performances began to portray the creature as more human-like, 
though still with uncanny limb proportions and a featureless 
face. His black tendrils remained but were often hidden. His 
shadowed body now resembled a black suit. Performances 
tended to simply acknowledge his presence, forgoing 
explanations or backstories. He often lurked in the background, 
driving those who discovered him slowly insane. If he killed, it 
was often implied, not explicit. (Peck, 2015, p. 343)  
While cleared, legally, of wrong-doing, Tostee’s actions on the night Warriena Wright 
died were Slender Man-esque, entrapping Wright on the balcony she then fell from; an 
idea Tostee himself called upon in the verbal abuse he, calmly, spewed at Wright 
                                                          
85 Geyser had indeed attempted to kill herself in 2016 (see Mar, 2017). 
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shortly before she died. While I would not suggest that Tostee mind-controlled Wright 
off that balcony, the maddening circumstances of Wright’s death were seemingly 
conjured in the looming violence of the heteronormative script that ran through their 
gendered (techno)encounter. Tostee’s tendrils overwhelmed this encounter: the 
consensual aspects of their meeting occurred in his home and were recorded on his 
phone, his version of events the only the version spoken; and his subsequent public 
behaviour continues to penetrate the lives of Wright’s family and general public. He 
lurked in the background of his own encounter with Wright by recording their entire 
time together.  
The argument is not that Tostee is the Slender Man, but rather that the Slender 
Man can be thought of as a figure of Western masculine anxiety, the masculine fear of 
being the ‘other’ at a time when through technology masculine figures can indeed be 
othered. Such a fear is amplified through the technointerventions into 21st century 
heteronormativity and gendered relations, compelling women back to inanimate nature. 
Slender Man is a masculine excess; a dangerous by-product that oozes from women’s 
connection to and appropriation of (patriarchal) technology; a technofilth that congeals 
at the edges of woman-machine workings; a virus of the gooey kind; a being of chips 















Chapter Seven Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
Please enjoy a slender and excessive excerpt from an unfinished feminist science fiction 
screenplay: 
QUICK CUT. 
INTERIOR. COMPUTER SCREEN. 
The air is full of pixels. 
 
(Boyer, 2013, p. 243) 
“The Internet is a borderless entity, an all-consuming, ever-
recycling, reproducing unit that births and devours its creations 
with equal zeal.” 
 
(Kibby, 2005, p. 784) 
“With computer transmitted stories, the computer screen itself 
lends instant credibility. There is a lingering perception of the 
computer’s accuracy and a conviction that computers do not make 
mistakes.” 
 
[THE AIR IS CHOKED WITH PIXELS] 
 
(Henriksen, 2014, pp. 44-45) 
“Ethical encounters with spectral others are thus not about 
universal rationality, as within humanism, but are rather concerned 
with paying attention to bodily discomfort: the feeling that 
something is wrong; the tingling at the back of the neck which 
suggests that responsibility and response may not be something that 
is solely shared between human beings but, rather that responses 
are given even when your back is turned, even when you think you 
are actually alone.” 
 





























































There is an issue here of optics. For Haraway, cyborg politics are a “struggle 
over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an 
optical illusion” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). The cyborg asks not simply what do we see, 
but how do we see? The idea of vision, obscured, distorted or otherwise, recurs through 
Haraway’s cyborg work: “The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once 
because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other 
vantage point. Single vision produces worse illusions than double vision or many-
headed monsters” (Haraway, 1991, p. 154). The sciences’ privileging of sight 
(observation) has long assumed that we all see through the same embodied sense of 
sight. According to scientists, when the procedures of science are observed, the 
observations of science are sound.  
Haraway’s cyborg, however, is not easy to sight: “The ubiquity and invisibility 
of cyborgs is precisely why the sunshine-belt machines are so deadly. They are as hard 
to see politically as materially. They are about consciousness – or its simulation” 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 153). Cyborgs are appearing and disappearing both in sight and in 
memory, and deliberately so to subvert and do dangerous things when particular people 































Chapter Eight: (Female figure) 
 
 
… he had never set eyes on a lovelier female figure… (Hoffmann, 2016, p. 32) 
 
 
 Reintroduction (LOOP) 
 (Female figure) is an art installation by American artist Jordan Wolfson. She is 
an animatronic woman skewered by a large metal pole to a large wall mirror. She wears 
a white leotard with a shear white skirt and over-the-knee high-heeled white boots. Her 
entire body is scuffed with dirt; some of her paint is chipped. She has long white-blonde 
hair, and has a green mask for a face carved in the style of a stereotypical evil witch.  
Her body is comprised of advanced robotics and plastics intended for space 
travel (Feldhaus, 2014). Thanks to a motion sensor, she knows when someone enters 
her mirrored room. (Female figure)’s eyes, set deep in her witch mask face, are 
equipped with facial recognition software so that she can lock eyes with those who view 
her (Colucci, 2014). Her movements are extremely fluid, particularly through her hyper-
articulated hands, wrists and arms. Her waist and hips move too with a fluidity that belie 
their robotic fabrication. Her fluid body enables her to dance with finesse to multiple 
songs, including Lady Gaga’s ‘Applause,’ Paul Simon’s ‘Graceland’ (Feldhaus, 2014), 
Leonard Cohen’s ‘Boogie Street’ and a slowed down version of Robin Thicke and 
Pharrell’s ‘Blurred Lines’ (Birkett, 2014).  
Her mouth moves, but does not enjoy the same hyper-articulation as her other 
body parts. Though her mouth and jaw are less sophisticated, she makes up for it with a 
set of teeth perhaps more commonly seen on sharks. In Wolfson’s voice, she makes a 
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number of statements, including: “I’d like to be a poet. This is my house” (Birkett, 
2014, p. 47) and “tell them that touch is hate” (MOCA, 2014). Her show runs for about 
seven minutes, then starts all over again (Colucci, 2014). 
 
Back to the Future 
Before undoing (Female figure), her emergence through a 1992 movie called 
‘Cool World’ needs some attention. The movie itself was a critical flop, relegated to a 
‘cult’ movie that barely qualifies for that status either. As such, ‘Cool World’ is under-
theorised, discussed mainly in terms of its animation as compared to ‘Who Framed 
Roger Rabbit’ and other live-action/animation hybrids (Telotte, 2010). The 
controversies surrounding the production also eclipse academic assessments of the film, 
including some unhappy actors and the creator punching a producer (Bakshi, 2004). 
 The movie was created by Ralph Bakshi, a cartoonist known for his sexually 
explicit animations, fraught representations of race, and irritatingly grotesque imagery. 
He occupies a bizarre space in Hollywood history, holding the title of the creator of the 
first R-rated animated movie (‘Fritz The Cat,’ tame by modern internet imagery 
standards) and creator of a movie simultaneously described as extremely racist and 
exploitative, and as an extremely politically important movie for black representation 
(‘Coonskin’).86  
‘Cool World’ is set in 1945 Las Vegas, 1992 Las Vegas and a timeless animated 
universe called ‘The Cool World,’ dominated by obnoxious ‘doodles’ and with a 1940s 
gangster feel (Mancuso & Bakshi, 1992).  
The story focuses on three main characters:  
                                                          
86 It is worth noting that the depictions of black people in Bakshi’s work are extremely similar to 
depictions of black people produced by Disney (like in ‘Dumbo,’ for example). ‘Coonskin’ was indeed a 
response to a live-action/animated Disney movie from 1946 called ‘Song Of The South’ that was highly 
controversial for its seeming depiction of slaves who were happy to be slaves… (see Sperb, 2012).  
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 Frank is a recently returned soldier who is transported to The Cool 
World after a motorcycle accident that kills his mother, and becomes a 
detective in The Cool World. He is the only human or ‘noid’ in The Cool 
World.  
 Jack is the creator of The Cool World, a comic book artist and writer 
who has been serving time in prison for seemingly killing a man he 
found in bed with his wife. Nearing the end of his sentence, he begins 
randomly transporting into The Cool World and meeting his creations. 
 Holli Would is Jack’s signature cartoon, a highly sexualised doodle, 
always wearing white, barely-there outfits. She is a dancer and lounge 
singer in The Cool World with aspirations of becoming ‘real.’ As an 
animation, she is constantly moving, fluidly, as opposed to the other 
doodles, which are more erratic and jerky in their movements. Lonette, 
Frank’s doodle girlfriend, is the only other doodle drawn fluidly, but is 
less stylised than Holli.  
 
Holli wants to inhabit the ‘real’ world, in order to experience ‘real’ embodied 
sensations and power. Her attempts to achieve becoming ‘real’ by seducing Frank have 
repeatedly failed. The Cool World’s number one rule, enforced by Frank, is ‘no sex 
with noids.’ Up until Jack’s arrival, the rule had never been broken, as Frank was the 
only noid in The Cool World and he had (righteously) resisted temptation. Frank is 
often threatening towards Holli verbally (threatening to kick her ass or let her fall off a 
balcony, not unlike Gable Tostee’s threats) and physically (pushing her onto a bed – to 
which she responds by spreading her legs…). Jack, on the other hand, as her creator, is 
obsessed with Holli and she has no trouble manipulating his emotions. Holli Would 
easily seduces Jack, and they have sex. The act transforms Holli into a ‘real’ woman. 
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She crosses over to the ‘real world’ with Jack, where she tries to experience being 
‘real.’ She makes it to a Las Vegas casino, which holds the Spike Of Power, a (phallic) 
Cool World artefact placed there by a doodle who had crossed over in the past. Holli 
sets about reaching the Spike. Frank (who has crossed over to find Holli) and Jack are 
chasing Holli in order to stop her from removing the Spike Of Power and collapsing the 
‘real’ world and The Cool World universe into one unsustainable universe. Throughout 
the chase, both Holli and Jack are flickering between ‘real’ form and doodle form, 
signalling the instability of the merger of the two universes. After a chase through a 
casino, Holli and Frank end up dangling off a balcony. Holli, in a clownish cartoon 
form, pushes Frank off the balcony (a delightful gender-bent recreation of Nathaniel’s 
tower-top madness in Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman’). Jack takes over the chase, but Holli 
makes it to the Spike Of Power, removes it and unleashes The Cool World on the ‘real’ 
world. Holli is transformed back to her doodle self, and Jack is transformed into a 
hyper-masculine superhero doodle. After a struggle, Jack returns the Spike Of Power 
and the doodles of The Cool World to their universe. Frank’s dead ‘real’ body is 
transported back to The Cool World where he comes back to life as a doodle. The 
movie ends with Holli depicted on the pages of a Cool World comic book. She and Jack 
are seen within panels of a comic, with Jack discussing their domestic life (raising a 
family), while Holli seems unenthused. Holli’s end is even flatter than her doodle 
beginning. She started the movie animated, with movement and agency. She gained 
power through ‘real’ flesh. But she serves out her punishment for such transgressions as 
a static graphic, confining her to her intolerable origins…  
 
Cool Apocalypse 
 There has been minimal analysis of what ‘Cool World’ might be trying to do, 
academically or otherwise. Bakshi’s other works like ‘Coonskin’ and ‘Fritz The Cat’ 
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have sparked some academic discussion and debate beyond the processes of animation, 
but ‘Cool World’ has been dismissed and discarded. The tightest corner of ‘Cool 
World’ analysis still comes from animation studies. While discussing the meaning of 
space in movies of the same kind of live-action/animation hybrid, Telotte (2010) 
suggests that ‘Cool World’ is an apocalypse movie: 
Yet though Roger Rabbit offers a hopeful vision of the 
possibility of integrating these very different spaces, ending, in 
fact, with the destruction of a wall between the human and 
“Toon” realms, Cool World suggests that near apocalyptic 
consequences might follow if such mingling occurs... (p. 21)  
The assertion that ‘Cool World’ could be about how the breach/collapse of boundaries 
suggests that not only can such boundary blurring disrupt the integrity of both (or more) 
worlds, but such blurring can completely destroy them. In ‘Cool World,’ “removing the 
barrier between the real and the animated realms produces no hopeful supplement, no 
satisfying hybrid reality, only a rampant and disturbing reality effect” (Telotte, 2010, p. 
197). The breach of the barrier between the ‘real’ (live-action, animate) world and the 
cartoon (while not inanimate, but at least differently animate) world produces chaos, 
freakery and debauchery. So unlike ‘Who Framed Roger Rabbit’ (and other films of the 
live-action/animation genre) where the animated and the live-action characters, in the 
end, live together relatively harmoniously, ‘Cool World’ ends with a re-assertion of the 
boundaries between the two worlds and the transformation of certain live-action 
characters into animated ‘doodles’ (a reward for the male characters – the righteous 
detective and the bumbling writer turned superhero – and punishment for the female 
character – Holli Would is confined to the intolerable domestic doodle-hood she 
desperately wanted to escape). While the “two-way desire to “cross-over,” to become an 
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inhabitant of another world, is a driving impetus...” (Telotte, 2010, p. 199) through the 
movie, the dream is crushed for Holli (but not the male characters) under the weight of a 
re-asserted boundary by the film’s conclusion. A woman’s crushed dreams are hardly a 
rare Hollywood trope, but we (maybe just me…) are left wondering what the point of 
crushing Holli’s dreams was, other than the same old idea that sluts deserve punishment 
(so say the pro-rapists and revenge pornographers): 
Cool World’s Holli Would is punished for crossing boundary 
lines and aspiring to be human. Her crossing is more than spatial, 
as it necessitated a transformation – the assumption of a human 
body – in order to exist in photographic space. While her 
transformation goes awry, other transformations are acceptable, 
provided they go the right “direction,” The Cool World’s human 
enforcer Frank becomes a happy Doodle (united with his Doodle 
girl Lonette), and Jack, a blissfully ignorant one, as the 
downgrade in the implicitly racial status is acceptable. (Davis, 
2013, para. 50) 
 Holli is indeed a conundrum in ‘Cool World.’ She appears as an old-school 
Hollywood sex symbol, literally cut from actress Kim Basinger’s body, distinguishing 
her from the rest of Bakshi’s cartoon characters (Telotte, 2010). The rotoscoping of 
Basinger’s face and body produce a ‘doodle’ much more traditionally feminine than the 
other women in ‘Cool World’ and much more believably permeable of the real world 
Holli Would then enters. Basinger’s body helps render (literally) Holli Would as a 
‘passable’ human woman in the ‘real’ world (Davis, 2013). When Jack and Frank 
become ‘doodles’ they look less like their un-rotoscoped male actors, and more like 
stylised cartoon characters. Holli Would looks like both a believable human woman and 
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a highly stylised cartoon. The boundary between woman and cartoon is permanently 
breached, both visually for the audience through the effect of the rotoscoping, and 
technically through the literal process of rotoscoping that produces cartoons from flesh 
and bones.87 The rotoscoping of Basinger creates an inanimate woman from an animate 
one and re-animates her. What an uncanny nightmare. 
For example, as the real world and The Cool World blur, real world bodies are 
transformed into grotesque cartoon bodies, and doodle bodies oscillate between real 
bodies, their traditional doodle bodies and freakish incarnations of their doodle bodies. 
Holli’s body in particular rapidly cycles through multiple grotesque and clown-like 
forms (Davis, 2013). Doodle bodies (those that are made-up, imaginary, rotoscoped, 
photoshopped) are unstable, freaky and wild, changing shape at will. In Bakshi’s work 
in particular, productive of such grotesque bodies, the violence of, and the violence 
directed at, the cartoon bodies produces an uncanny effect: “Animated characters, and 
cartoon characters in particular, can be seen as the scapegoats for this complicity of 
photographic images that both too nearly touch the real and simultaneously threaten to 
replace it” (Davis, 2013, para. 30). Kim Basinger’s body is replaced with a cartoonised 
version that contorts in ways the Human Kim likely cannot, able to be abused in ways a 
human woman’s figure might not be able to endure, either through the processes of 
animation that enlarge her breasts and hips and shrink her waist to impossible extremes, 
or through the gendered interactions she has with her human and animated co-stars. 
Davis (2013) suggests that the brutality of Bakshi’s doodles emphasises the 
plasticity of cartoon bodies while removing the sympathy we may have for them when 
                                                          
87 Not unlike the plethora of filters and tools for altering selfies through social media platforms such as 
Instagram and Snapchat, where women especially use certain tools to cartoon-ify images of themselves, 
either through ‘naturalistic’ photoshopping (like smoothing skin and cinching waists) or pasting on dog 
ears and noses.  
242 
 
they are abused. What does this mean for the plasticity of Holli Would’s body and 
others like it? While many male cartoon characters have bizarre and impossible bodies, 
many female cartoon characters have plastic bodies that are still impossible, but 
resemble or conform to idealised women’s bodies (Fantone, 2003; Klein & Shiffman, 
2006). Holli Would, Jessica Rabbit, even Lola Bunny (a character much more explicitly 
aimed at children): these cartoon women have bodies that mimic idealised feminine 
forms. Interchange these cartoon women with human women like Kylie Jenner, Human 
Barbie and Kim Basinger and it could be asked as to what kind of sympathy we have for 
these bodies and how indestructible these bodies might be in response to continued 
abuse. 
 
An Indestructible Body 
Jordan Wolfson created (Female figure) in the image of Holli Would. The two 
women share a common body shape, skimpy white clothing and long blonde hair. The 
two women also share a fragmented building process. While Holli Would was created 
through stylised cartooning, Hollywood bodies and rotoscoping, (Female figure) was 
constructed through YouTube fan videos, Barack Obama and advanced robotics. 
Wolfson was inspired to create his 2014 art installation by Holli Would’s dancing in a 
YouTube mash-up fan video using The Crookers remix of The Pop Group song ‘We 
Are Prostitutes’ (Wolfson, 2014). Rather than the movie itself inspiring Wolfson, he 
draws on modern internet viewing habits like watching short videos on YouTube that 
splice together multiple cultural artefacts. In an interview from 2012, Wolfson explains 
that he researches a lot online, collecting up imagery from multiple and varied sources 
to create his artworks (Wolfson, 2012). His sense of Holli Would then, seems to be 
through a re-rendering of her character within fan videos, scattered but networked 
imagery and experiences.  
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In a podcast interview, Wolfson discussed his viewing of the fan video, saying 
he “could feel, like, sexual arousal,” and became intrigued by the notion that “we can be 
aroused through representation. It doesn’t have to be real” (Wolfson, 2014), perhaps not 
unlike Nathaniel’s lustful obsession with clockwork Olympia. Indeed, Wolfson claimed 
(Female figure) as an artwork explores [his] “primal arousal on an abstracted form.” 
His viewing of the fan video connected up with his developing interest in 
animatronic bodies after viewing an animatronic Barack Obama at Disney World 
(Bettridge, 2018), and his desire to do a project about women. However, as an artist, not 
a roboticist, he did not have the skills to execute the project on his own: “I don’t think I 
would have known how to create a woman on my own” (Wolfson, 2014). Thus he 
teamed up with a special effects company, dominated by men. 
Wolfson also simultaneously insists that (Female figure) is not about women: “I 
had this idea that I’d make an artwork about women. But really making that artwork is 
not about women: it’s about really myself”; after all, he ponders, “how could I ever 
speak for women?” (Wolfson, 2014). Wolfson is like Jack, Holli’s creator in ‘Cool 
World’: he created her figure for his own sexual/emotional/spiritual purposes. (Female 
figure), like Holli Would, transcends her dimensions (whether 2D or 3D) and materials 
(paper, pencil, paint, cells or mechanics), but she is still dominated by her creators. 
Holli Would and (Female figure) both defy the parameters constructed around them: 
Holli transcends her paper and pencil dimensions and becomes ‘real’; (Female figure) 
went viral, un-skewering herself from her white and mirrored room. 
While Holli was a potent older sibling for her, (Female figure) extends and 
expands on the transformative work Holli’s body performed in ‘Cool World.’ Men are 
often the viewers, and women are the viewed (de Lauretis, 1984; Mulvey, 197588). 
                                                          
88 “But in psychoanalytic terms, the female figure poses a deeper problem” (Mulvey, 1975, p. 13). 
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Nathaniel looks through his telescope and stares at Olympia, but Olympia, with her 
stolen eyes, sees nothing. (Female figure) on the other hand does both: she is viewed 
and she views. But is her ability to view an echo of being built by men or appropriating 
the privilege of viewing, or both…? For Holli, her punishment for seeking power was to 
be confined to a two-dimensional page. For (Female figure), she is displayed, stored and 
displayed again,89 having her opportunities to gaze decided by the men who bolted her 
together… 
 
(Female figure) as Technometaphor 
Throughout my research project, (Female figure) has interjected-intervened-
interrupted, creeping through networks of theory and analysis. Some of these points are 
at the uncanny: that weird feeling when encountering Slender Man, reading a student 
magazine, viewing yet another Human Barbie photograph, or the unease of decapitated 
online bodies.90 Her multiplicities and partialities are important cyborg functions that 
ask questions of 21st century technolife: “Wolfson’s animatronic echoes several 
contemporary issues related with digital culture, like the advancement in robotics 
applied to both entertainment and production, and the identity split induced by a more 
and more active interaction with social networks and the Internet” (Spampinato, 2016, 
p. 18). 
Through her multiplicities, partialities, simultaneities and contradictions, 
(Female figure) becomes an uncanny figure (Colucci, 2014; Spampinato, 2016). Her 
kinship with Hoffmann’s Olympia is explicit: both repetitively endure bodies and 
                                                          
89 (Female figure) comes in three editions. All three editions have been sold: one to businessman Peter 
Brant, one to museum owner Eli Broad and one to a pair of anonymous buyers from New York 
(Bettridge, 2018). 
90 Perhaps a good opportunity to remind readers that some metaphors, figures and jokes appear before 
they are fully explained. 
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movements constrained by patriarchal technologies and the male gaze; both madden 
those who gaze at her. Olympia is a precise musician and dancer, just as (Female figure) 
executes rhythmic mechanical gyrations and gestures. Both of their bodies and 
performances repetitively and mechanically reproduce femininity with precision: tightly 
shaped bodies made docile through patriarchal controls (clockworks and code). But 
both also challenge the male gaze. Olympia seems at times to gaze back at Nathaniel 
(even if he interprets this gaze as ‘loving’), and (Female figure) explicitly views her 
viewers, disrupting the gaze, even at times telling viewers to “close your eyes” 
(Wolfson, Konrath & Woods, 2015, p. 80). As performing women-objects, the 
performance of femininity comes into question by embodying controllable mechanical 
execution of femininity and the potential for the mechanics to become enlivened by 
uncanny excesses to cogs and electricity. Please perform routine maintenance on 
woman-objects to ensure they function properly, reflecting all masculine 
desires effectively and efficiently.  
For most of the data I collect that connects in some way to women, and 
particularly their bodies, I almost always get the sense of (Female figure) looming in to 
read as well; an embodied experience of cyborg kinship, technowomen connecting to 
text together. (Female figure) understands objectification.91 The metal pole skewering 
her to her mirror ensures she experiences objectification constantly and acutely. Perhaps 
not unlike most, if not all Western women whose skewering is less tangibly perceptible. 
(Female figure)’s wretched enjoyment of objectification through her taunts, grins and 
stares opens possibilities for new technoways to embody the contradictions that skewer 
                                                          
91 (Female figure) also understands nothing. She is a robotic art installation. She knows nothing but what 
the coders code her to know about which movements to execute when. And yet there she uncannily looms 
again, enlivened by code just as Olympia was enlivened by Nathaniel’s gaze… 
246 
 
women. I am an object and I am animate. My experiences of viewing92 (Female 
figure) evoke a Braidotti (2003) declaration of cyberfeminist warfare: “Anger will push 
us to punish you by deciding to enact, in our real, everyday life, your own worst 
fantasies of just how obnoxious women can be” (p. 252). The simultaneous embodiment 
of both the pain and unhuman horror of being an object, and the thrilling familiarity of 
being viewed as an object, enables the emergence of an uncanny feminine 
technocompulsion towards being in danger and being dangerous; a manifestation of an 
unknown but recoverable body outside of the heterosexual matrix, unable to be seen 
through the eyes of the male gaze or through a telescope.  
(Female figure) embodies an understanding of what it means to have a body 
shaped and debated through the male gaze, and the desire to subvert that gaze and build 
new bodies. Much of the data I collect is explicitly about the contested female body. It 
should be no surprise then that (Female figure) gyrates in again, knowingly. From being 
labelled a sex robot to being intimately built and rebuilt by Wolfson and his team of 
roboticists, (Female figure) embodies the construction and reconfiguration of the female 
body, and she wears the rebuilds explicitly in her robotic joints and electronic whirrings. 
She mimics chastised female forms and movements, commanded to her by the men who 
built and programmed her, just as Western women do as they engage in patriarchal 
femininity, simultaneously enjoying the rewards and resenting the effort (see Bartky, 
1998). 
There is a dramedy currently playing out online as women seek to claim social 
and political space through technologies such as the internet and the apps and websites 
that inhabit it. While women are seriously playing in and through technologies in ways 
                                                          
92 I have not viewed her in person though. I have only viewed her online and through Wolfson’s 
‘California’ (Wolfson, Konrath & Woods, 2015). 
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that challenge and subvert dominant constructions of femininity (Dobson, 2014; 
Fournier, 2002; Rice & Watson, 2016; Ringrose, 2010; Ringrose, Harvey, Gill & 
Livingstone, 2013), misogynist discourse counters that play with its own, even if its 
jokes are more cynical, malicious and dangerous for women and their bodies (Drakett, 
Rickett, Day & Milnes, 2018; Hald, Malamuth & Yuen, 2010; Jane, 2014; Pearson, 
2015; Thompson, 2018). While misogynist discourse endangers women and their 
bodies, perhaps the danger of women blurring their edges with technology is an 
uncanny threat to masculine dominance over the ‘objects.’ The responses to (Female 
figure), Human Barbie, or online feminism generally, are at the very least tinged with 
fear that needs to be vanquished: (Female figure) compels users to 
; 
Human Barbie is that needs to be contained; and 
, a disease to be carved out or irradiated. All three 
figures (and many ‘others’) exemplify the uncanny horror of an object becoming 
animate and perhaps potently threatening to reverse the status quo, much like Anissa 
Weier and Morgan Geyser’s uncanny crime threatens the directionality of gendered 
violence in ways that exceed controllable, contained femininity.  
(Female figure)’s simultaneous being gazed at, gazing back at, and gazing with 
breaches the taken-for-granted boundaries of dominance/subjugation, subject/object. 
Such simultaneity of gaze breaks-up the taken-for-granted embodied masculine fixity of 
the male gaze that so profoundly shapes women’s bodies (Bartky, 1998; Silverman, 
1996, 1988) and transforms ‘gaze’ into politically potent multiples and partialities that 
question how we can see: a “female subject’s gaze is depicted as partial, flawed, 
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unreliable, and self-entrapping. She sees things that aren’t there, bumps into walls, or 
loses control at the sight of the colour red” (Silverman, 1988, p. 31). (Female figure) re-
figures these so-called flaws in the female gaze as potent connections for embodied 
‘others’ to do their politics and their bodies differently through networks of power.  
So with power reconceptualised as networked, gaze can become networked too, 
rather than top-down from that Panopticon tower in order to oppress. Women’s 
technological expansion takes Nathaniel’s telescope out of his pocket and imagines how 
women could see through it, from body positivity to pro-anorexia, to hashtag activism. 
(Female figure) exemplifies the re-networking of the gaze, a heavenly hellish 
production of the possibilities of ‘gazing with,’ partially and multiply, in purgatory; an 
embodiment of women’s technobody politics that blurs the boundaries between the 
traditional dominant subject and subjugated object and dismantles patriarchal power 
structures. Uncannily, through technology, women can embody both the position of 
subject and object, animated objects, inanimate subjects. Technowomen can embody 
(perhaps obnoxiously, as Braidotti (2003) warns) the experiences of both 
dominance/subjugation, viewing/being viewed. The gaze, so long dominated by 
(patriarchal) Nathaniel and his (phallic) telescope, can be re-routed through 
technologically breached boundaries and produced as simultaneous, partial and multiple 
through women’s technopolitics, radically challenging the fixed male gaze and therefore 
the bodies that such a gaze can produce. The breach of such established boundaries, the 
boundaries that keep all other boundaries intact, calls into question the integrity of all 
other boundaries that have constrained bodies. If subject and object blur, the boundary 
between dominance and subjugation becomes compellingly permeable. Contradictory 
positions become legitimately simultaneous, where women can simultaneously 
experience viewer/viewee, mind/body, healthy/sick, good/bad, normal/abnormal, man-
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made/hyperrelating. But women experiencing the privileges of power can be terrifying, 
lest they get a taste of embodied power, like when Holli Would tasted power as a ‘real’ 
embodied woman and almost destroyed two entire universes! (Female figure) too wants 
to ‘touch’… what havoc could her embodied sensations cause…! 
 
Uncanny TechnoSpirituality  
On my internet travels for the production of this writerly text, I somehow (I 
cannot remember all my meals in this impossible feast) encountered a long abandoned 
website called HeavenHellPurgatory.com. It seems to have been a syndicate of under-
the-radar website and email hosts that was active between 2000 and 2003. My uncanny 
encounter with this simultaneously alive and dead website threw up some interesting 
conceptualisations of Heaven, Hell and Purgatory in the modern technoworld. 
Compelled, I have appropriated them for my cyborg purposes. 
 In this online spiritual realm (www.HeavenHellPurgatory.com), Purgatory is 
conceptualised as high technology. This conceptualisation suggests that users in 
Purgatory are dominated by technophilia, dependent on the internet and the devices that 
connect us to it in order to function. Indeed, technology governs medical, political, 
economic and social interactions (see for example, the ‘Internet Of Things’ 
(Gershenfeld, Krikorian & Cohen, 2004)). In high technology Purgatory, we suffer for 
our biological sins: our broken and betraying bodies, our excesses and lacks. 
Technology offers us a chance for atonement, fixing us, correcting us, managing our 
wants with our needs (Wertheim, 1999). Technology is capability and capacity. 
Purgatory, then, is the perpetual cleansing of the sins of the flesh through access to high 
technology, the skills to use it and the money to participate in it, which afford particular 
people and groups power over ‘others.’ And the power to create more advanced, higher 
technologies. Purgatory is a space in which the powerless perpetually participate in a 
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culture that dominates and excludes them, stuck with/in subjugation. Meanwhile the 
powerful perpetually repeat mistakes, committing violence upon violence in the name of 
Western civilisation. This seems to be in pursuit of a never-crystallising path from 
Purgatory to Heaven… 
Heaven is a biotechnological realm (www.HeavenHellPurgatory.com): the 
blurring of the boundaries between the biological (and all its joyous, fraught sins) and 
the technological (with all its efficiency and power). We pray for, and to, Heaven, the 
biotechnological, where technology and biology are the same, simultaneous. We believe 
that this Heaven will ease the tension between our biology (our ‘origins’) and our 
compulsion to render them obsolete (high technology). In Heaven, we are both. We are 
our biologies and we are our technologies: the conventional cyborg.  
Hell is art (www.HeavenHellPurgatory.com): aesthetic pomp and flair that feeds 
sins of the flesh, focuses us inwards to thoughts and feelings and what-does-this-mean-
to-me reflection. Art allows for the folding over of the self onto the self, back into our 
compulsions and excesses. Art is carnal, dramatic, wild. We fear art/Hell. Every time 
we descend into art, fleshy sin takes precedence and we are reminded of the horrors of 
life and death. 
The structures of these realms are thrown into question by the cyborg. 
Traditional understandings of Heaven, Purgatory and Hell suggest a hierarchy, with 
Heaven at the top (governed by God), Hell at the bottom (overseen by Satan), and 
Purgatory somewhere in between. Haraway (1991) has long positioned her cyborg as 
not of the Biblical Garden even if she cannot quite escape it (the ultimate assertion of 
the heterosexual matrix she exceeds). The Garden is where gendered violence blossoms 
and perhaps cuts women the deepest. It is where residues ooze from. The pain of the 
Fruit of Knowledge, the disasters of Pandora’s Box, the creation from a rib, junk that a 
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man could spare… But the reconfigured realms, through cyborg metaphor, can not only 
be non-hierarchical, but can become blurred at their boundaries. Biotechnology 
(Heaven) is not above art (Hell), but occupies the same cultural space, and perhaps as an 
embodied experience. Movement between the realms may be both enjoyable and 
harrowing, and also necessary. So instead technocapabilities between these realms are 
produced through, and productive of, connections and networks, proliferating much like 
Foucault’s (1980) technopower but even more expansively. 
(Female figure) occupies Hell, Purgatory and Heaven simultaneously. She is 
Hell: an art installation that calls to mind the sins of the flesh pedalled by the sex 
industry and popular culture. Responses to her have likened her to a sex robot –
– or pop stars like Britney Spears 
(Birkett, 2014). In (Female figure)’s Hell, women’s bodies are explicitly objects for 
commodification and consumption. She demands of you an embodied response as you 
commodify and objectify her: she locks eyes with you, and asks you to do things and to 
say things and to feel things that you might not want to enact with your own body, 
perhaps much as she has to do and say and feel things she does not want to, and much 
as women (sex workers, pop stars or otherwise) might not want to either. She follows 
your body as you move away from her or, should you be so bold, towards her. She is, as 
her abusive pseudo-father suggests, the embodied experience of viewing and being 
viewed. As art, she in/evokes an embodied response in her viewer. She is a disruptive 
reminder of the biological body and its responses to the Hell that is art: the pleasure and 
horror of the biological. 
She also occupies Purgatory: the highest of high-technology, built with the most 
advanced animatronics available to enable her to move as a woman skewered to a metal 
pole might. Her hands and fingers in particular are so advanced it is, from even a short 
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distance, quite difficult to tell they are not biologically human hands. She is also 
equipped with advanced facial recognition technology so that she can lock eyes with 
and gaze at those who view her, surveilling them as they surveill her;93 but she will not 
lock eyes with herself in her reflection, the ultimate irony for a woman skewered to a 
mirror. While she is governed by commands, codes and algorithms, these advanced 
systems afford her the capacity to respond to her environment: she is technologically 
advanced enough to make decisions about which faces to track, which viewers to view, 
who she gazes with. Here, in the Purgatory of high technology, she parodies biological 
bodies, mocking their shapes and movements, and the dependence upon them, as she 
mimics them through her advanced technobody and computerbrain.   
She is also Heaven: biotechnology, where the tension between biology and 
technology is enjoyed miserably, uncomfortably comfortable. She is both robotics and 
woman, the hybridisation between the figure of the idealised Western woman and 
Western technology. There is power and efficiency in her robotics and algorithms that 
predict her movements and the small army of technicians that maintains her. But there is 
a melancholy disruptive biological familiarity to her movements (her finely tuned hands 
and her swivelling hips) and her styling, including the bare technoflesh and the scuffed 
dirt that blotches it. She is the simultaneous desire for and rejection of the biological 
body, as well as the simultaneous pleasure in and terror of advanced technology. 
Perhaps a compulsion to reconfigure Heaven, Hell and Purgatory is a re-
emergence of eternal recurrence: the longing for a return to and being ripped from a 
never-materialised but still possible matrix, a fictional but buildable motherboard. 
Perhaps technowomen are engaged in perpetual attempts for Woman to return not to the 
                                                          
93 Sophia, the robot woman who hopes to be awakened, is also now equipped with similar technology as 
(Female figure). Sophia too has facial recognition software (CNBC, 2016), and also sometimes uses robot 
arms and hands just like (Female figure)’s (Tech Insider, 2017b).  
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Garden before the Fall but to a possible technowomb, that biotechnological Heaven 
where simultaneous, partial and contradictory embodiment is at its most uncomfortably 
comfortable. But such a return is not in search of utopia, nor is it the quest for or dream 
of it. The parts and politics that make up the cyborg are not of utopia. Cyborgs are bits 
and bobs; spare and rejected parts; parts of indeterminate or invaluable use; parts of 
multiple use or highly specialised use; inconveniences and annoyances; things that 
cannot or will not fit; or have been forced to fit and broken.  
Reconfiguring the structures of Heaven, Hell and Purgatory is another 
opportunity to reconfigure woman outside of the heterosexual matrix; another 
opportunity for the cyborg to test her not-of-the-Garden embodied possibilities. 
Through my theoretical and analytic descents, there are moments of Architecture 
Fiction for women and their bodies. Architecture Fiction is a cyborg anthropological 
term for “a way of exploring and testing alternative built forms and urban environments 
without the overhead of physically building and testing objects in real life” (Case, 2013, 
p. 21). While cyborg anthropologists may use the term more specifically for the 
planning and development of projects for businesses and other agencies, I am 
appropriating it for the technometaphorisation of women’s exploration of alternate and 
reconfigurable bodies and politics online. The fictionalising of potential political and 
bodily architectures through technologies enables such architectures to be 
instantaneously destroyed through deletion if the structures are unsound (or have been 
built in inhospitable environments), or to be continuously and expansively updated to 
strengthen them and make them more mobile. Women online can test and explore 





Chapter Eight Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts #1  
California Annotated (2nd) Viewing 
‘Black Mirror’ is a Netflix series that attends to the creepy and insidious complexities of 
new technologies and our connections to these new technologies. The show’s title references the 
image of ourselves when our technologies go dark: a black screen of a laptop, smartphone or 
television reflects our staring face back at us (Brooker, 2011). Much like (Female figure), we 
can find ourselves skewered to a mirror. In this un-wholly thought, I materialise a black mirror 
to explore my annotated second viewing of Jordan Wolfson’s ‘California’ (Wolfson, Konrath & 
Woods, 2015), a coffee table book (of sorts) released that showcases (Female figure), her 
production and her art-siblings: some of Wolfson’s other creations.  
I am interested in other people’s recoiling responses to (Female figure). When I 
collected the book from the store, the man behind the counter’s eyes widened, horrified by the 
cover image of the book before handing it over without a word. The cover image features 
(Female figure) creepily delighting in the responses her that creepy delight elicits, an endless 
loop of her delighted image provoking disturbed responses which, in turn, delights her. I am 
now heavily invested in this loop myself, also delighting in people’s disturbed responses to 
her… 
Once you are brave enough to turn the cover over (thus letting her out of your sight…), 
you are greeted with a red page containing some of her words: 
MY MOTHER IS DEAD. 
MY FATHER IS DEAD. 
I’M GAY. 
I’D LIKE TO BE A POET. 
THIS IS MY HOUSE. 
Turn the page again, and you see (or perhaps hear): 
(APPLAUSE) 
Seeing the phrase “this is my house” used to open the book was important, as it is a 
complex phrase. Colloquially, the phase means “to say one is dominant at an activity due to 
greater experience and/or being more intimate with the surroundings” (“This is my house,” 
2008), used as a boast or taunt. (Female figure) is undoubtedly using the phrase in this way for 
those who view her in any format (in person, via video or in image). But I also see it connecting 
to the uncanny and the idea of houses (but these are still pre-verbal thinkings…). 
The next page shows a black and white mechanical image: electronics, wires, computer 
monitor... but this image is not identified. It is potentially a (Female figure) worksite. 
Over the page again is an extreme close-up of one of Wolfson’s other art works: a face. 
But opposite this face is (Female figure)’s, her hair across her face as if ‘caught in a moment,’ a 
candid shot. Could be an ad for Revlon or something. 
Next page sees some of Wolfson’s other art. Feels desperate to be edgy and relevant.  
After that is a double page spread of Wolfson himself floating in a swimming pool. A 
centre-fold in honour of his ego, lest we forget who he believes this book is really about. 
The next few pages are more of Wolfson’s other art, poems and photos of himself. 
Some of the other works feature phrases that (Female figure) says such as “Feeling love,” 
“Touch is love” and “Touch is hate.” On one hand, I think this is Wolfson’s attempt at larger 
commentary on… something. But I prefer to think that these are (Female figure)’s interjections, 
much as she interjects/interrupts/interferes in my own work. 
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A later page perhaps shows a crude or early version of (Female figure), perhaps to test 
her logistics…? In any case, it is a woman’s body with no head, arms or feet, skewered by a 
metal pole through her torso. 
A few pages on sees (Female figure) again, staring upwards in wonder.  
Page twenty-two has an image of something that perhaps once was (Female figure), or 
will be (Female figure) (was/is/will be…?). Her torso and arms are bare and scratched. She is 
bald, but her mask is a bold, deep green. These interspersed images of her in various states of 
violence are troubling… The scars of being built, dismantled and rebuilt, forever looped… 
 
Opposite this image is an image of an American flag in the wind… 
Page twenty-six is another image of (Female figure), this time caught in action, dancing 
in front of her mirror. 
What follows is more of Wolfson, and his other art. 
But after much page-flipping: the first image of (Female figure) in colour. It is the same 
image as the cover image, so she recurs again here to delight in disturbing us in colour this time. 
Page forty sees another image of (Female figure) looking hopeful towards something. 
On the opposite page reads: 
I’LL SEX WITH YOU 
BUT 
IT’S NOT MY CALLING 
This has been attributed as a (Female figure) quote in a couple places, but I cannot confirm it. 
Still, the quote’s placement opposite an image of (Female figure) looking hopeful seems 
deliberate. On her debut, many dismissed her as a sex robot or mechanical stripper, but her 
continual interjections into body politics, feminism, misogyny, art, technology and multiple 
other networks suggests something much more than a sex robot. There is a potential Holli 
Would connection here too. Holli Would did have sex, but in order to attain a ‘real’ body in the 
‘real world’ and the power she believed came with it. She had sex, but it was not her calling. 
Page forty-seven depicts what is potentially another before/in-between/after look at 
(Female figure), with a clay-coloured sculpt of her mask on a model head.  
More of Wolfson’s derivative nonsense blah blah blah 
Page fifty-two is a shot of (Female figure)’s back, juxtaposing her real-looking hair and 
her flesh-like torso and buttocks with her mechanical arms. 
Page fifty-seven holds more (Female figure) speech: 





TOUCH IS HATE 
Page sixty-four depicts another colour image of (Female figure) looking directly into 
the camera, with more of her speech opposite: 
OK 
NOW 








Page seventy-one is a close up photo of the wispy hairs on Wolfson’s chest. Yuck. 




WHAT SHOULD I TELL THEM? 
TELL THEM 
“TOUCH IS LOVE” 
SAY 
“TOUCH IS LOVE” 
TOUCH IS LOVE. 
I think this “touch is love/touch is hate” speech is from the featurette on (Female figure) were 
Wolfson is talking to (Female figure) (MOCA, 2014), rather than (Female figure)’s speech as 
part of her exhibition performances, although without experiencing the art exhibit itself, these 
speeches remain ambiguous (perhaps as they are intended to). But this is potentially a 
conversation between Wolfson and (Female figure) as part of her build. 
Page eighty holds some definite (Female figure) talk: 
NOW CLOSE YOUR EYES. 
NOW CLOSE YOUR EYES 
NOW CLOSE YOUR EYES 
CLOSE YOUR EYES 
CLOSE YOUR EYES 
CLOSE YOUR EYES 
CLOSE YOUR EYES 
And on the page opposite, (Female figure) looks skywards and lifts her arms upwards, blurred 
by their motion. This is a particularly intense two-page spread, with the repeated words and the 
dramatic image, potentially to mimic in some way the intensity of the same moment for viewers 
of the art exhibition, where (Female figure) tells the person she has locked eyes with to close 
their own eyes. Seems like a serenely frantic moment. 
Pages ninety and ninety-one have a similar arrangement. Page ninety shows (Female 
figure) looking away from the camera, her eyes not visible at all. The opposite page reads: 
(BLURRED LINES REMIX) 
This is a reference to the slowed-down version of (ode to rape) ‘Blurred Lines’ (see Phillips, 
2017) that (Female figure) dances to during her exhibition shows. This is one of the few images 
so far where her eyes have not been visible at all, and thus her gaze is removed. I’m ambivalent: 
this is Wolfson’s critical commentary on rape culture and the objectification of women, and/or 
his participation in it, or a blurred space between both condemning and participating…  
Page one hundred and one is a gruesome look under (presumably) (Female figure)’s 
face. It shows the bolts, joints, metals and plastics that comprise her skull and jaw. 
And page one hundred and two shows another shot of (Female figure)’s back. Given 
that the technology that made her internet famous is in her eyes and her hands, Wolfson’s 
choice to repeatedly showcase the back of her head is disturbing… But again this photo 
juxtaposes her woman-like figure with her explicitly mechanical arms. 
Page one hundred and six depicts a technician holding (Female figure)’s bare skull 
while he builds her. Her internal wiring, metals and plastics are exposed and dismembered as 
her eyes bulge from their metal sockets. 
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There is no more (Female figure) again until page one hundred and eighteen, which 
reads: 
I’M GETTING OLD. 
I’M GETTING FAT 
AND 
I DON’T BELIEVE IN GOD 
… which is more (Female figure) speech. 
Page one hundred and twenty-one depicts a close-up shot of (Female figure)’s internal 
head structures, all her technicalities exposed… 
Page one hundred and twenty-three shows the same mask/head model from page forty-
seven, but with a highly styled blonde wig, akin to Holli Would’s hair… 
Page one hundred and twenty-nine perhaps gives us a glimpse of what (Female figure) 
would look like without her mask. It depicts the mechanical head, but with no flesh covering her 
nose or her mouth, exposing her jagged teeth. But there is flesh covering the eye sockets, 
showing mascaraed eyelashes and purple eye shadow on her eyelids… 
Page one hundred and thirty-one depicts (Female figure) looking hopefully towards the 
horizon again. This is the last image of her in the book. 
Page one hundred and thirty-three (the final page of the book, aside from the last couple of 
pages of notes that describe the various artworks) reads: 
(LOOP) 
This might reference the algorithmic looping of (Female figure)’s computer commands that 
execute her movements and speech. But for me it also references the a) recurring images 
Wolfson uses of (Female figure), b) the recurrences of (Female figure) in his other art, and c) 
the recurrences that (Female figure) embodies: violence against women and their bodies, the 
plurality of desire for control over women’s bodies (by men and by women), old misogyny re-
imagined, old techno-dreams revisited… the cyclical resurgence and regression and repression 
of female agency… I have been in this loop before… 
  
































Curious Connections with another 1990s movie ‘Strange Days’ 
- Both set in times of high crime and high violence. 
- Both involve women singers being pursued by male 
detectives. 
- Both depict violence against these women singers. 
- Both involve men getting kicked in the nuts. 
- Both involve balcony deaths. 
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I was like a starving man surrounded by a feast that I was prohibited to eat. 




You know, the steak is pretty chewy. I get why they normally cut off the fat. – 












“… a monotone male voice issues from the doll. 
It begins to count upwards, 
enumerating a fragmented list that alternates pleasant and 
hateful thoughts about a loved one: 
“…four to leave you; 
five to touch you; 
six to move you; 
seven to ice you; 
eight to put my teeth in you; 
nine to put my hand on you; 
ten to put my hand in your hair…”” 








 In 2016, Jordon Wolfson debuted another technoart installation titled ‘Colored 
Sculpture.’ The piece features an animatronic red-headed and freckled boy chained to a 
mechanical rig that thrashes his puppet-like body around as he counts off embodied 
actions like biting and touching hair (Davis, 2016). The electronic puppet boy is 
modelled on characters like Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, says Wolfson (2016), and 
is similar to other characters Wolfson has created before, like the violent cartoon boy 
who features in ‘Raspberry Poser’ (a video mash-up Wolfson made in 2012 (E-flux, 
2012)) and the cartoon boy who urinates and defecates his way through Wolfson’s 
‘California’ (Wolfson, Konrath & Woods, 2015). 
As with (Female figure), ‘Colored Sculpture’ is an art installation that is forever 
in flux, never exactly the same from viewing to viewing. Both sculptures can lock eyes 
with viewers, and will thus perform slightly differently each time it is viewed by an 
audience. However, (Female figure) was relatively fixed in her movements, only 
enabled to run through particular motions in a particular order and skewered to a mirror. 
Her movements were largely dictated by her algorithms and mechanics. ‘Colored 
Sculpture,’ on the other hand, is chained up, and held together by chains, granting him 
more freedom of movement. As such, his performances are more dynamic, as even 
though his chain system is just as mechanically dictated as (Female figure)’s body, his 
chains enable more movement than her metal pole skewer. His performances then, 
while similarly repetitive, are much more free and offer much more variation in bodily 
movement than (Female figure)’s performances: his chains do not drag the same way 
twice. His body will end up in similar spots at similar times in the cycle, but his chains 
enable his movement and shifts in his positioning. (Female figure) has much more 
finesse in her movements, especially in her fingers and arms, but these movements are 
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tightly controlled, dictated to her by patriarchal technologies. ‘Colored Sculpture’ may 
not be finely tuned, but his movement is more active: he has both an arm and a leg 
completely unchained, perhaps to punch and kick with.  
Both installations also utilise facial recognition technology to lock eyes and gaze 
at/with the viewer. While (Female figure)’s eyes are (close to) realistic, ‘Colored 
Sculpture’s’ eyes are digital and can be instantly replaced with other digital images 
(DavidZwirner.com, 2016), like angry bright blue eyes and bouncing chocolates (see 
Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, 2016). (Female figure)’s gaze is much more persistent 
than that of ‘Colored Sculpture,’ as his technology moves so much more, rendering his 
recognition much more fleeting. His gaze is momentary and angry. 
At one point, ‘Colored Sculpture’s’ head is repeatedly bashed onto the concrete 
floor. While the violence of his plummeting head is disturbing, uncannily his digital 
eyes are unphased, in a technological sense, by the repeated bashing. While his gaze 
rapidly shifts and cycles through other imagery, the unrelenting technology within 
‘Colored Sculpture’s’ head enables his eyes to function without being scrambled with 
repeated blows to concrete. For example, when we drop our phones or our laptops, they 
have a tendency to break or at least glitch out for a second. But ‘Colored Sculpture’s’ 
technology is persistent and robust, remaining well intact throughout his ordeal, perhaps 
questioning how alive and terrifyingly resilient the technology may be. 
It is tempting to think of (Female figure) and ‘Colored Sculpture’ as two-sides of 
the same (bit)coin. (Female figure) could be, perhaps, a metaphor for femininity 
(skewered women, controlled bodies) and ‘Colored Sculpture’ a metaphor for (toxic) 
masculinity (violent, a restricted freedom, the privilege of some movement). 
‘Colored Sculpture’ only dances (if we could call being flung around and bashed 
on a concrete floor ‘dancing’…) to a singular song: ‘When A Man Loves A Woman’ by 
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Percy Sledge. (Female figure), on the other hand, dances to a variety of songs, ranging 
from ‘Blurred Lines’ to Lady Gaga. (Female figure)’s script is a series of odd 
statements about her parents, her sexuality and her body, whereas ‘Colored Sculpture’ 
lists off actions that he might like to perform that ambiguously alternate between 
pleasant and hateful, like touching and biting (see Davis, 2016). Music selection, speech 
and the types of movements their bodies are afforded could be read as robotic 
embodiments of the singularity of masculinity (and its supposed focus on active 
heterosex) and the multiplicity of femininity (multiple positions for women as ‘other’). 
Perhaps it is possible to use (Female figure) as a feminist technometaphor in 













In similar ways, ‘Colored Sculpture’ could be utilised as a technometaphor for 
masculinity. Online masculinity performs his same restrictive, violent dance, produced 
repeatedly through bashing and battering ‘others’ and any/all resistant discourse. 
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The Curious Case of Elliot Rodger 
Here I return to Elliot Rodger, the young man who violently enacted his ‘Day Of 
Retribution’ by killing and injuring multiple people, including himself. Rodger was 
obsessed with enacting the dominant masculinity he saw being performed around him 
where men are perceived to be entitled to sex from women (Rodger, 2014). Instead of 
focusing his rage on men and the form of masculinity Rodger perceived them to be 
enacting,94 Rodger constructed women as mentally deficient, evil and cruel for 
‘rejecting him’ and for not enabling him to fulfil the details of his masculine narrative.95 
Much like Rodger’s envelopment in the Western masculine narrative, his “war on 
women” (Rodger, 2014, pp. 119, 132) mirrors the anti-feminine sentiments of dominant 
masculinity: those constructions of women as monstrous sources of evil, simultaneously 
hyper-sexual and deniers of sexual access, destroyers of men (Braidotti, 1999; Creed, 
2002; Shildrick, 2002). While academic understandings of Rodger have tended towards 
theorising mental illness (see for example Allely & Faccini, 2017; Langman 2014), 
rejecting Rodger as ill, and not much more, is to veer away from the trouble of 
dominant masculinity and fix the trouble, yet again, with the ‘mentally ill’ ‘other.’  
So, staying with the trouble, Elliot Rodger emerges through his embodied 
embeddedness in tightly networked technomasculinity. Bucholtz (2016) suggests that 
much of Rodger’s obsessive focus was on bodies. Rodger documents his considerations 
of women’s bodies, men’s bodies and his own body, and what these bodies did (had sex 
                                                          
94 While not his focus, he still certainly demonstrated rage toward men too. 
95 For example: “Females truly have something mentally wrong with them. Their minds are flawed, and at 
this point in my life I was beginning to see it. The more I explored my college town of Isla Vista, the 
more ridiculousness I witnessed. All of the hot, beautiful girls walked around with obnoxious, tough jock-
type men who partied all the time and acted crazy. They should be going for intelligent gentlemen such as 
myself. Women are sexually attracted to the wrong type of man. This is a major flaw in the very 
foundation of humanity. It is completely and utterly wrong, in every sense of the word. As these truths 
fully dawned on me, I became deeply disturbed by them. Deeply disturbed, offended, and traumatized” 
(Rodger, 2014, p. 84). 
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with each other) and did not do (did not have sex with him). He was deeply concerned 
about his own body and what he perceived to be its inferiority in its size, shape and 
capabilities96 and its ethnicity,97 participating in online forums like bodybuilding.com 
(see Warren, 2014), just as Gable Tostee did. In December 2014, Tostee detailed his 
side of Warriena Wright’s death in two lengthy forum posts on bodybuilding.com (G T, 
2014).98 Both Elliot Rodger and Gable Tostee were compelled towards the fixed and 
defined Western masculine body and the homoerotic bonds that help define it and its 
heterosexual activities. For both men, the masculine body was defined at its edges by a 
large build and toned muscles. Their masculine bodies would be active (Connell, 2005): 
they would have sex; they would take up space; they would be noticed by both women 
and men. Rodger’s body would eventually become very noticeable, thrashing about 
                                                          
96 For example: “This led to my new commitment to start exercising and lifting weights. I began working 
out at the gym in my mother’s apartment complex every other day. I hoped it would increase my 
confidence and make me appear a bit stronger. Maybe if I built muscles, girls will be attracted to me, I 
hopefully proclaimed to myself. I had never worked out or lifted weights in my life, so my body has 
always been very frail and delicate” (Rodger, 2014, p. 63). 
97 For example: “On top of this was the feeling that I was different because I am of mixed race. I am half 
White, half Asian, and this made me different from the normal fully-white kids that I was trying to fit in 
with” (Rodger, 2014, p. 17) and “I always felt as if white girls thought less of me because I was half-
Asian…” (p. 121). 
98 He also is the subject of a (homoerotic) forum thread called the “Gable Tostee Appreciation Thread” 
where other users have nicknamed him “balconybrah,” celebrate his celebrity status and comment on the 




weapons like guns and cars. Tostee’s body would take up so much space, its craving for 
pizza overwhelmed any other response to Warriena’s plight. 
As well as his use of body building forums, Rodger, in his manifesto, talks about 
joining multiple social media and message websites (again, just like Gable Tostee), and 
how he would virtually stalk people on Facebook. He also regularly posted YouTube 
videos, as well as releasing his memoir/manifesto online just prior to his death. He was 
a gamer, diving deep into gaming worlds to avoid and distract from his problematic 
experiences. He was also racist, with the race of men in particular triggering his rage.99 
He would share that rage online (see Warren, 2014).   
When Rodger was 13 years old, he had a seemingly uncanny encounter with 
pornography:  
 
The Planet Cyber that Rodger mentions was an internet café where Rodger and 
his friends would play video games for hours into the night. He recalls the times spent 
in that internet café with his friends as the best experiences of his life. His first 
encounter with pornography and sex through the computers that had previously eased 
                                                          
99 For example: “How could an inferior, ugly black boy be able to get a white girl and not me? I am 
beautiful, and I am half white myself. I am descended from British aristocracy. He is descended from 
slaves” (Rodger, 2014, p. 84), and “How could an ugly Asian attract the attention of a white girl, while a 
beautiful Eurasian like myself never had any attention from them?” (p. 121).  
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his social tensions (with his father and with his childhood friends) speaks to the 
technoembeddedness Rodger experienced and how that technoembeddedness produced 
an uncanny encounter with sex that activated Rodger’s compulsion to replicate the 
heteronormative script: he looked through the telescope.  
On May 23, 2014, Elliot Rodger enacted his vengeful violence against his 
perceived enemies, transforming technologically networked rage into action (in the 
“Day of Retribution” (Rodger, 2014, p. 124)) and technological legacy – his 
memoir/manifesto is still readily available online, as are many of his YouTube videos. 
Through technology, Rodger, and his ideas of slaughtering women for the sake of 
Western, masculine civilisation,100 are available to anyone who wishes to access them 
online. And many do wish to access these ideas, share in them, expand on them, and 
action them. In my encounter with Elliot Rodger detailed in chapter four I mentioned 
the video game ‘Elliot Rodger: Retribution’ and its connections through anti-feminist 
website Lolokaust; a networked connection of misogyny explicitly trading in gender-
based violence. The network extends much further than a troubled man, his manifesto 
and a video game. Rodger is considered by some who frequent incel forums (like 
incels.me and coalpha.org) as a cult figure, an inspiration and a martyr for incel/co-
alpha movements as they build networks online. However, his status as a martyr is also 
challenged within these same communities: 
 
 
                                                          
100 For example: “They are like animals, completely controlled by their primal, depraved emotions and 
impulses. That is why they are attracted to barbaric, wild, beast-like men. They are beasts themselves. 
Beasts should not be able to have any rights in a civilized society. If their wickedness is not contained, the 
whole of humanity will be held back from advancement to a more civilized state. Women should not have 
the right to choose who to mate with. That choice should be made for them by civilized men of 
intelligence” (Rodger, 2014, p. 117), and “All women must be quarantined like the plague they are, so 












Whether users agree or disagree with Rodger’s ideas/actions, or just want to discuss his 
ideas/actions, the continual connection to Rodger’s ideas/actions ensures his brand of 
heteronormative misogyny is continuously debated, updated and proliferated through 
ever-expanding technonetworks that work on women’s bodies, and men’s.   
Earlier in the research process as I gathered data, some of Elliot Rodger’s 
original YouTube videos were still live on the website. However, the original videos 
have now been officially removed from YouTube, and re-uploaded by other YouTube 
users. While there are now a great many new comments attached to the new uploads, 
the following comments are a snapshot of data taken from Rodger’s original uploads.  
Many users who commented on Rodger’s videos used images of Rodger as their 







“I'm going to slaughter all of 
you Elliot haters” 
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The above comments were left on a video posted by Rodger (now deleted) of a sunset, 
set to music, while he drives. A pleasant video that takes on sinister meaning through a 
technologised network of misogyny where images of the sun setting become 
emblematic of deadly masculinity. There are now also a variety of YouTube tribute 
videos including mock movie trailers that include crime scene photos and images of 
Rodger’s victims: 
 
as well as music video tributes: 
 




or document romantic obsessions with him: 
  
Rodger’s crime and content continues to thrive online years after the attack, not 
just through the fan network described above, but through the continuous re-
victimisation of women he targeted. For example, comments on a video interview with 









In addition, there are a great many comments about how the girls who survived were 
unattractive and how Rodger should have had a better aim… 
In another video, one of the girls featured in Rodger’s manifesto is profiled by a 
tabloid media company. In his manifesto, Rodger discussed this individually identified 
girl as a key ‘inflictor’ of feminine ‘torment’ who activated his rage against women. Her 
prominence in Rodger’s manifesto produced media interest in her, including the 
aforementioned video where Rodger fans have made sexually violent comments about 
her, holding her responsible for Rodger’s virginity and for his violent crimes: 
 
“The only reason he did this is 
because none of those girls gave him 
a shot at dating them if any of those 
girls gave him a chance we could 
have avoided this whole thing” 
“Elliot rodgers is right women 
should not be able to choose 
which men have children and 
which men don't. We should go 
back to arranged marriages 
and force women to marry men 
like they do in the middle East.” 
“That bitch should have sucked him off! She should have let Elliot fuck 
her in the ASSHOLE!” 
Another YouTube user points out that Rodger and the girl would have been 
between 10 and 12 years old at the time… 








Through technology, we can increasingly record and remember minor incidents, 
even from childhood, and invoke the global, timeless wrath of the internet. In Rodger’s 
manifesto, he recounts an incident of being pushed by a girl that he categorises as 
catastrophic, life-changing, scarring and traumatising. The events as described by 
Rodger are also now constructed by Rodger’s followers as evidence of the evilness of 
girls and young women. However, due to such details in his manifesto, the girl 
identified now endures constant attacks and attention, even years on, for her alleged role 
in Rodger’s formation as a virgin and as a murderer. It must be odd to be held 
accountable for a minor, probably insignificant event from childhood, through 
technology, and to have so many strangers who wish you so much harm (particularly 







“the bitch should have fucked 
him and problem solved” 
“Wow, she looks delicious” 
“I jerked off to this bitch for 
elliot” 
“I wanna drug her and rape her 
then chop her up into pieces 
while she's unconscious.” 
"Women are limited, but that is 
no reason to hate or kill them !” 





Additionally, Elliot Rodger’s sister has been a target for the incel movement, as 
well as other misogynist online spaces that discuss her in sexually violent ways. A 
graphic description of her sex life from Rodger’s manifesto continues to be reproduced 
ad nauseam online in these spaces, with extra commentary from users, and alongside 
personal photos.  
The expansive connectivity that the networking between Rodger, his followers 
and his victims produce continues violences against women online through perpetual 
linking and commenting. Perceived slights (like women saying “no”) can be recorded 
and catalogued, then rigged up for violent purposes, networked into women’s digital 
and offline lives, hyperconnected images through flashing through digital eyes, 
thrashing the heteronormative script around like a ‘Colored Sculpture.’  
The script ‘Colored Sculpture’ follows is reminiscent of Elliot Rodger’s various 
desires: to touch a woman and to rebuke his “enemies.” Rodger too alternates between 
the ‘pleasant’/innocuous and ‘hateful,’ much like ‘Colored Sculpture’ lists off 
ambiguously pleasant/hateful actions. Rodger desires to hold women, sleep next to them 
(after sex, of course), hold their hands, walk along a beach with them, view a sunset 
with them (Rodger, 2014). On YouTube, he regularly posted driving videos of sunsets, 
walks in the park and playing with his brother, alongside his disturbing discussions of 
women and violence. For Rodger, the desires for normalised heterosexual interactions 
(like a walk along the beach hand in hand) alternated with ‘hateful’ thoughts of 
violence, murder and the deficiency of women: a simultaneous desire for and hatred of 
women that blurs into a singular heteronormative script.  
In a number of Rodger’s YouTube videos, he would recite morbid and violent 
speeches in quite idyllic locations (notably the woods, perhaps hanging out with Slender 
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Man). In a video titled “Why do girls hate me so much?”, Rodger stands on the side of a 
road seemingly near a wooded area. The original description for this video was: 
Girls have never seemed to have any interest in me, and I 
want to know why. I’m such a perfect, beautiful, fabulous 
guy. I should never have had any problems with girls, but I 
do, and I find that ridiculous. 
This video is a reupload. I had to take the last one down 
because it gained too much negative attention. I’ll keep 
uploading it until I get at least one honest answer from an 
actual girl. 101 
In the “Why do girls hate me so much?” video, Rodger espouses some of his firmer 
beliefs about the deficiencies of women. Ironically, there is a caution sign in the 
background. He shares another dire monologue about his loneliness, blaming women’s 
“perverted” and flawed sexual attraction for his perceived rejections. In another video, 
entitled “My reaction to seeing a young couple at the beach, Envy,” Rodger positioned 
his camera on the dashboard of his car, pointing it out towards a young couple sitting on 
a bench by the beach. The young couple, Rodger claims, had ruined his enjoyment of 
the beach, ‘torturing’ him by kissing. The mix of his violent language and idyllic 
surroundings (evident through multiple videos) foreshadows the physical violence and 
childhood cartoon imagery mash-up Jordan Wolfson creates through ‘Colored 
                                                          
101 Much like pro-anorexia communities, Rodger learned that sharing his more extreme views on more 
generic platforms like YouTube (as opposed to the relatively insular anti-women forums) would invite 
attention that could disrupt his plans. For example, the first time he uploaded his videos (which did not 
contain his more extreme views), they attracted the attention of his mother, a mental health worker and 
the police (Rodger, 2014). So his original final video, where he detailed his Day of Retribution, was 
released very shortly before his attack on May 23, 2014. The content video is much more violent 
(verbally) than any of his other video statements. He learnt how to use the technology to his advantage, 
subvert the gaze of those who sought to disrupt his plans. 
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Sculpture.’ Rodger’s videos are both bright in imagery and dark in content, just as 
Wolfson’s red-headed boy talks of biting as chocolates dance in his eyes and his head 
smashes to the ground. 
 
Elliot Rodger is a Colored Sculpture 
So maybe Elliot Rodger is a ‘Colored Sculpture.’ His body was in the throes of 
hegemonic masculinity, violently thrashing around and violently lashing out. He 
oscillates to the point of simultaneity between ‘pleasant’ and ‘hateful,’ loving and 
hating himself, women and other men, speaking of profound loneliness and hatred in 
beautiful, peaceful settings, and describing sights like couples kissing as ‘insults’ and 
‘torture.’  
‘Colored Sculpture’ repeats a desire that Rodger desired too: to touch. 
Wolfson’s work frequently references touch, including the alternating ideas of “touch is 
love” and “touch is hate,” most prominently featured in (Female figure). ‘Touch’ again 
is a central idea in ‘Colored Sculpture,’ the animatronic boy speaking the word “touch” 
specifically, as well as speaking the action of putting a hand on someone (a 
simultaneous statement, both loving and violent, ‘pleasant’ and ‘hateful’) and putting a 
hand in someone’s hair (again, simultaneous…).  
How I re-read the “fragmented list that alternates pleasant and hateful thoughts 
about a loved one” (Davis, 2016, para. 5) that emanates from ‘Colored Sculpture,’ in the 
context of Elliot Rodger, is that rather than each item in the list representing either a 
‘pleasant’ or a ‘hateful’ thought about a loved one, each item is simultaneously a 
‘pleasant’ and ‘hateful’ thought, embodying the tensions of heteronormative gendered 
interrelations, steeped in simultaneous desires, destructions and power relations.  
Rodger was a young man struggling to navigate an adult (male) world, much 
like ‘Colored Sculpture’ seems to be (a pubescent boy struggling with ‘love’). Rodger 
275 
 
was fixed in his childhood, still demanding the same social treatment that he received as 
a child, which he believed was fairer.102 He remained vehemently opposed to adult life, 
despite desiring aspects of it, like sex and more a traditionally masculine adult body 
(although both desired and despised). So much like ‘Colored Sculpture,’ Rodger was a 
boy chained up by Western masculinity and the constraining narratives of 
heteronormativity, violently thrust around by it, to the tune of ‘When A Man Loves A 
Woman,’ a song Rodger would no doubt have identified with. 
 
In The Meme-Time: Lyrics to ‘When A Man Loves A Woman’ (Lewis & Wright, 1966), 
in Pink and Smeared Blood with Respect for Copyright Issues. 
 
While (Female figure) is skewered to a mirror, her movements dictated by 
algorithms imposed upon her, ‘Colored Sculpture’ thrashes about in open space, kicking 
                                                          
102 For example: “The peaceful and innocent environment of childhood where everyone had an equal 
footing was all over” (Rodger, 2014, p. 17), and “Things were getting more intense every year we grew 
older, and I didn’t want to grow up. I wanted to live the life I was comfortable with. I wanted to live in a 
world of fairness…” (p. 38). 
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and punching out even as he is partially restricted by chains and other mechanics. 
Where (Female figure) questions what ‘woman’ might be and might do from her 
skewered position, ‘Colored Sculpture’ perhaps asks how a man can love a woman 
skewered, through the thrashing of his own body.   
The technometaphor of Panic Architecture re-emerges, to help make sense of the 
thrashing and the skewer. Elliot Rodger and the incel movement produce a panic 
architecture of heteronormativity, where the continual attention to the aesthetic and 
foundational structures of gendered interactions build and maintain the subordination of 
women as objects/animals.103 Through continually reasserting and strengthening the 
binaries like man/woman that establish power, incel/co-alpha movements maintain and 
transform the dominant heteronormative script into a proliferating yet rigid structure 
that builds and designs gendered interactions. During the apocalypse of chapter five, the 
panic architecture of online misogyny extended into offline spaces, producing cartoon 
rape of cartoon women’s bodies as ‘empowerment’ and ‘boredom.’ Here in chapter 
nine, heteronormativity as a set of violent practices of gendered power is produced and 
maintained through the panic architecture of incel/co-alpha movements that continually 
produce and reproduce the structures of heteronormativity through expansive networks 
online. They update and update and update gendered interrelations in ways that reassert 
the binaries that maintain women’s subordination and men’s dominance, both when the 
script is realised (when the jock-boys get the slut-girls) and when the script is not 
realised (when the slut-girls are deemed too deficient to make the ‘right’ sexual 
choices). 
                                                          
103 Of course, there are arguments that animals are not animate in the same way humans are, justifying 
their subordination… that argument feels familiar… another closed loop… 
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Jordan Peterson, a clinical psychologist, advocates for “enforced monogamy” 
(Bowles, 2018, para. 31) to prevent ‘incel violence,’104 lending clinical architectural 
support to the re-built heteronormative structures and aesthetic designs online. 
Peterson’s connection into the work adds clinical legitimacy to the aesthetics of 
heteronormativity (that is, what the structure and design of women’s subordination and 
men’s dominance looks like) already taking vast and defined shape through extensive 
connection to and between Rodger’s manifesto and videos, incel/co-alpha movements, 
commenting and re-sharing. Connections proliferate between misogynist networks that 
ensure such networks stay live and continue to build and re-build heteronormativity, 
across massive digital spaces, in ways that subordinate women. The architecture then 
enables violent structural thrashings, arms and legs that punch and kick out from their 
fixed mechanical rig. Elliot Rodger’s thrashing body killed and injured, explicit 
assertions of the binary structures built and re-built through the continual connection 
and compulsive clicking of the panic architecture of heteronormativity and its 











                                                          
104 Peterson clarified that he did not mean government-enforced monogamy, by the way. He meant 






















































A Word on a Word: Desire 
Through my research, the term ‘desire’ appears in some places, perhaps not 
afforded the significance some may feel it should enjoy (the desire for more significant 
desire!). Desire is complex for a cyborg, perhaps understanding desire through 
ambivalence and indifference. Ambivalence (the desire for both/all) and indifference 
(no particular desire for either/all) oscillate, particularly in the impossible feast of 
technotimes. Ambivalence speaks to the desire for ‘both,’ perhaps in a binary. In 
ambivalence, the desire for both collapses the boundary between two (and perhaps 
more), calling into question their separation or distinctness, which in effect can call into 
question the taken-for-granted categories that classify what is good or bad, healthy or 
sick, man or woman, dominant or subjugated. In desiring ‘both,’ it is suggested that 
each is not complete or satisfactory or tolerable on its own; that is, it is partial, perhaps 
multiple.  
Indifference is about no particular desire for ‘either,’ also perhaps in a binary. 
Such a simultaneity also collapses the binary, rejecting the choice as uninteresting or 
irrelevant. Thus indifference is also a political space, for denying the interest in the 
binary is an affront to the discursive significance (in dominant discourse) of categories 
and demarcations and the violence of the / of the binary. To dominant masculinity, there 
are few things as important as which side of the / ‘others’ (as has been defined by 
dominant discourse) sit on. To deny interest in, or the importance of, the binaries 
(particularly the side on which you are positioned), because you are going to blur them 
anyway, is perhaps more potent than ambivalence (desiring ‘both’), as the enactment of 
indifference disrupts, quite violently, the foundation of dominant, masculine, patriarchal 
discourse in the West: that these binaries, these divisions are of the utmost importance. 
When women in particular refuse to choose either side of a binary, because they desire 
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‘both’ and/or ‘neither,’ they become dangerous, blurring boundaries and hybridising, 
through my research at least, with technology and becoming cyborg, a potent political 
figure that wants ‘both’ and ‘neither’ in order to live, embodied, as multiple and 
contradictory ‘other.’ If the boundaries between binaries collapse, and 
dominance/subjugation dissolve, the social/economic/political/cultural structures that 
rest upon these binaries are dismantled, and that might be terrifying, except to a cyborg. 
So ‘desire’ has the capacity to bring woman back to the violent heterosexual 
matrix that classifies her: “In masculinist sexual orders, woman is not a subject 
separated from the product of her life-shaping activity; her problem is much worse. She 
is a projection of another’s desire…” (Haraway, 1995, p. 84). Re-thinking taken-for-
granted (masculine) understandings of ‘desire’ as a tether tying women 
psychoanalytically to the heterosexual matrix, where “desire and power, symbolically 
speaking, are one” (Benjamin, 1986, p. 81), might re-route desire through the 
compulsion to enact power that asserts the gendered binaries, where “to satisfy deep 
structures of desire in the sex/gender system in which men exchange women, 
heterosexuality is obligatory. Obligatory heterosexuality is therefore central to the 
oppression of women” (Haraway, 2001, p. 58). Masculine desire could then be 
understood as the compulsion to keep obligatory the heterosexual matrix through the 
panic architectural maintenance of heteronormativity, asserting the binaries that 
maintain patriarchal power and shape and control women’s bodies. Regulating “desire 
under such circumstances is a constant, ongoing problem that plays itself out on the 
body” (Urla & Swedlund, 2008, p. 238): women’s bodies violently shaped through 
violent gendered interactions that assert rigid, fixed binaries. 
Like Haraway (1991), Malabou (2001) and Grosz (1994) suggest women might 
be configured differently outside of the heterosexual matrix, Benjamin (1986) suggests 
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we find alternatives to the phallic structures that might shape desire as masculine (and 
women ‘lacking’ such desire/power). Undoing the binaries and re-doing women and 
concepts like the uncanny in theoretical movements away from the reproduction of 
those heterosexual origin stories that produce gender and sex differences is critical 
cyborg work. When desire is structured through these man-woman binaries and woman 
is subjugated, she has no desire. Feminine desire could instead be reconfigured as the 
compulsion to expand beyond the heterosexual matrix through networks that dismantle 
binaries and re-route power, building fictional architecture of women’s embodiment that 
tests out new bodies and politics characterised by ambivalence, indifference and potent 
political excesses. When women are networked out of the binaries, even partially, ‘she’ 
might find a connection that could be considered ‘desire’ that perhaps feels a little like a 
Weaver, sewing and snipping, privileging aesthetics; desire as compulsion towards a 
multiple and contradictory artful worldweave: “In more innocent times, long, long ago, 
such a desire to be worldly was called activism. I prefer to call these desires and 
practices by the names of the entire, open array of feminist, multicultural, antiracist 
technoscience projects” (Haraway, 1994, p. 62).  
So ‘desire,’ through the cyborg, becomes a multiple, partial and contradictory 
term, oscillating between compulsion for the heterosexual matrix, and the compulsion to 
configure beyond it. For Todd (1986) Freud’s theorisation of the uncanny rests upon the 
“… convergence of opposite meanings in a single word…” (p. 520). While Freud’s 
word was “heimlich” – “Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops 
towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich” (Freud, 
1919, p. 4) – desire could be considered a memetic sibling of ‘heimlich’ where multiple 
and partial meanings converge in a word that is by no means singular. As the meaning 
of ‘heimlich’ fluctuates between home and homeliness, familiarity, intimacy and 
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secrecy (Freud, 1919), the meaning of ‘desire’ shifts through contradictory but 
converging gendered politics of the body; the simultaneous compulsion towards and out 
from the heterosexual matrix. A ‘matrix’ also fluctuates in meanings between a 
container of situations or substances, a mould, a substance that binds, a womb, a 
network (see “Matrix,” 2018), transforming meanings from bounded containment (of 
situations, circumstances and substances – like bodies?) to expansive connectivity 
(through networks). Desire, if women are to ever have any of their own, needs a 
multiple reconfiguration that embodies the multiplicities, partialities, simultaneities and 
contradictions of their multiple, partial, simultaneous and contradictory positions, 
politics and bodies. I am embraced by an image of a cyborg taking a Red Pill and a Blue 
Pill at the same time, chewing on them both for a while, only to spit them both back out 





































Popular culture is teeming with women-objects who exceed their patriarchal 
wiring and enact terrifying violences. In HBO’s ‘Westworld,’ host105 women ‘awaken’ 
(like Sophia wants to…) and lead the host rebellion against humans. In the 2014 movie 
‘Ex Machina,’ Ava, an android woman, achieves awakened intelligence and, with some 
help from her sister, violently removes the threat to her safety and agency: her creator. 
While shows like ‘Westworld’ and movies like ‘Ex Machina’ invite questions about 
how non-android women are treated, they also raise questions about the replication and 
                                                          
105 ‘Host’ is the show’s term for an android. 
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repetition of the violences enacted on women’s bodies on their uncanny technodoubles. 
‘Ex Machina’ might be warning us about the production of docile women’s bodies that 
are life-like, but not alive (Henke, 2017), a warning that perhaps needs some attention 
given the proliferating demand for and accessibility of increasingly life-like sex dolls 
(see www.realdoll.com), and sex robots (see www.realbotix.com). Sex dolls are rapidly 
progressing from plastic to robotic, with doll companies competing to produce 
artificially intelligent, programmable dolls that respond to touch (Sciortino, 2018; 
Sweeny, 2017). Such dolls, however, have already been sexually harassed – a prototype 
was mauled at an electronics festival (Nichols, 2017) – and programmed for rape. True 
Companion’s sex robot allows users to choose from 5 different personalities, including 
‘Young Yoko,’ a sexually inexperienced only-just-18-year-old, and ‘Frigid Farah’ who 
does not always want to have sex (Maras & Shapiro, 2017). Similarly, Realbotix’s 
Harmony AI is an app that allows users to programme their sex robot in similar detail to 
the programming of the hosts of ‘Westworld’ by assigning values to particular traits 
including sexual shyness amounting to non-consent (www.realbotix.com; Sciortino, 
2018; Sweeny, 2017).  
Such technological leaps in robotic women of course converge with the potential 
production of child sex robots,106 which poses legal and ethical questions about 
Sweetie’s role as digital child-bait for catching sex offenders online (see Ray, 2014; 
Stone, 2015) and the use of facsimiles (uncanny doubles?) to bear the brunt of sexual 
violence. Robotic rape has become a critical ethical issue with the burgeoning sex robot 
industry connecting exponentially with keen customers through the internet. There are 
burgeoning academic arguments that robots probably cannot be raped (Eskens, 2017), 
                                                          
106 That is, beyond the already-in-production versions of real dolls that are made to look like young girls 
(see Maras & Shapiro, 2017; Sweeny, 2017). 
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robots are definitely raped (Sparrow, 2017), and that we should at least think about 
robot consent (Frank & Nyholm, 2017), while others have assumed that robots will be 
raped and are asking if robot rape should be criminalised (Danaher, 2017). Sophia, the 
hoping-to-be-awakened robot, is now a citizen of Saudi Arabia, not uncontroversially 
(see Maza, 2017). While it remains unclear what rights she actually has, it is all-too-
possible that should Sophia report a sexual assault in Saudi Arabia, she might expect 
healthcare and legal services.107 Would she receive them? 
The problem of ‘deep fakes’ (or ‘deepfakes’) also challenges ideas about the 
doubled and redoubled woman, the commodified woman’s body and her capacities for 
consent. ‘Deep fakes’ are videos that engage advanced, and now readily accessible, 
technologies to produce extremely realistic video replications of human bodies and 
faces. The technology has been used, of course, to superimpose particularly celebrity 
women’s faces over porn actresses’ faces and manipulating them to create faked but 
realistic pornographic videos (Henry, Powell & Flynn, 2018). The technology opens a 
market for made-to-order pornography that swaps out original faces and replaces them 
with whatever face (or even body) you might like. Celebrity women have been the 
initial targets, and journalistic investigations by Motherboard less than a month apart 
(See Cole 2017; 2018) demonstrate the speed at which the technologies proliferate, 
becoming more sophisticated and more available to the average user to create their own 
videos, or make videos to order, using the faces and bodies of non-celebrity women: 
their partners, their ex-partners, their neighbours, women they see on the street. 
Women’s bodies are viewed through a (digital) telescope that renders them (in multiple 
senses) horrifyingly animate objects, ‘natural’ and technological and indestructible in 
                                                          
107 Although, as she travels the world as a woman, learning, she might already know how sexual assault 
allegations are typically handled… (see Jordan, 2015). 
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the sense their plastic endures rough play and indestructible in the sense that a woman’s 
body is always replaceable with another woman’s body fresh off the production line. 
Women may well have become unrapable through the chaos of ‘consent’ and coercion 
(Gavey, 2005); technology may be rendering them an unhurtable product. The 
compulsion for ‘natural’ but mechanical and robust femininity, where the feminine 
responses are ‘spontaneous’ and predictable – “Oh, Oh!” yells Olympia (Hoffmann, 
2016, p. 40) – suggests an ambivalence about the object: the desire for women’s 
‘natural’ responses, controlled and dominated; produced, manufactured, standardised 
and replaceable.  
 People as Barcodes 
Barcodes are a ubiquitous technology in the modern West. They are typically 
attached to products we buy. The Oxford Dictionary definition of a ‘barcode’ is: 
“…a machine-readable code in the form of numbers and a pattern of parallel lines of 
varying widths, printed on a commodity and used especially for stock control” 
(“Barcode,” 2018). So barcodes hold vital statistics for the commodity that they 
represent as lines and numbers, the codified reduction of a commodity to its most 
important elements and features. A barcode tells us what a product is and its value. The 
code containing the product information is printed onto the product or its packaging, 
defining it and marking it with its worth. Barcodes are then scanned, through scanning 
technologies, in order to read these features of the product, informing us about the 
product, its usefulness and its value, so that we can consider buying it.  
Barcodes also help us with stock control: how many do we have? Do we need 
more? Are there too many? Should we reduce or increase their price? The barcode 
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allows us to access how much there is of a commodity, and whether that may influence 
its availability and worth. 
Barcodes are quick, economical codes to unambiguously (supposedly) identify 
products (Ausubel, Stoeckle & Waggoner, 2008). Due to their speed and economy, 
barcodes “gain power because digital beats analogue at making unambiguous 
distinctions” (Ausubel, Stoeckle & Waggoner, 2008, para. 4). A barcode is a technology 
of power. Its coding inscribes meaning and defines parameters for a commodity. It 
defines a commodity to its minimum identifiable features and codes these features into a 
universally readable series of vertical lines not unlike DNA sequencing (Ausubel, 
Stoeckle & Waggoner, 2008).108 
So, barcodes are vital to the functioning of capitalist consumerism. 
Commodities, in large amounts, need to be reduced to their standard features and 
codified for the ease of trading and distributing them, for maximum profit. Scanning a 
barcode allows for quicker and easier information gathering, organisation and 
distribution than interrogating each product to find out what it is, where it is going and 
what its price might be. As such, barcodes have levels that help unambiguously 
categorise commodities: 
1) Manufacturer 
2) Product line 
3) Serial number (Ausubel, Stoeckle & Waggoner, 2008). 
 
The benefits of barcoding have extended to the organisation and codification of 
people. Hospitals and government agencies use barcodes and serial numbers to organise 
personal files. A multitude of organisations from insurance companies to supermarkets 
codify who we are by serialised numbers and barcodes. I have a student ID number and 
                                                          
108 DNA sequencing does have similar goals: to understand the universal features of DNA and 
understanding the meaning of those features in the material world. A DNA sequence is a code for some 
sort of biological feature or set of features. 
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a barcode. These numbers hold information about who I am and what I am doing. They 
can grant or deny me access to resources. 
If we can be codified for insurance, medicine and study, can bodies themselves 
can be codified as barcodes? As a barcode body, information can be inscribed upon you 
and provided by you when you are scanned. A body produced, crafted and disciplined 
with a certain amount of hair/fat/makeup/muscle/skin colour might be coded as an 
‘ideal’ body, one of value – both socially (more social rewards) and economically 
(spending more money and buying more products to construct the more valuable body) 
(Bartky, 1998). Information is stored in inscripted barcode bodies, ready to be scanned 
by those who need/want to read you, and use the information that your coding supplies 
in order to know what your use is, how much you are worth and what exactly you are. 
Barcodes, as a technometaphor, could help us interrogate what it means to be a 
body commodity. Barcode users, like people, inscribe the meanings onto barcodes; 
barcodes do not code themselves. Sometimes your barcode has been coded incorrectly, 
an error code entered. But you will be scanned anyway. Being a barcode means 
embodying compact, easily stored and easily read information reducible to varying 
widths of lines. Everything you need to know about a product or commodity can be 
stored and read from a barcode. Barcode becomes a technometaphor to understand the 
reductionism of capitalist commodities and how this reductionism shapes Western 
bodies. Barcodes are codes for people’s worth as citizens: how much of them is there 
and what is it worth? 
For human commodity bodies, the level of manufacturer recorded in the 
barcode, through technometaphor, is culture. Companies make and build particular 
commodities. So based on the particular type of company (culture), a particular type of 
product is manufactured. The level of product line, through the technometaphor, is 
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gender, where information about the human product line is codified through the 
categories of ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine.’ The level of the serial number, through the 
technometaphor, is the individual. The individual product/body is identified by a serial 
number (the individualised code for a particular product (Ausubel, Stoeckle & 
Waggoner, 2008)), so a human commodity is also coded at an individual level. The 
body, and its parts, are coded according to their discipline, taking into account the 
diversity of the human body as a product, but still coding and classifying in order to 
organise, identify and efficiently communicate meaning. 
Based on the sum of all these levels, the worth of the product can be calculated. 
A higher-end manufacturer produces products with a higher-end price. The materials 
used are assigned higher value, and the desirability and usefulness of the product 
increases the value even more, making particular product lines more valuable based on 
their composition and their use. So a price, an evaluation of worth, based on these levels 
inscribed on barcodes can be assigned to a particular commodity. A barcode provides 
this information instantaneously. 
But prices and worth, can shift rapidly. A product inscribed with more value can 
find itself no longer of as much value as it once was due to shifts in trends, over-
stocking/over-production or the rejection of the product/the materials it is made of. New 
advances in technologies can also replace older products, with easier to use and cheaper 
materials and streamlined production techniques. In the same way, the value of body 
commodities shifts fluidly and rapidly, with particular bodies at particular points in time 
being more valuable than others – for example, the flux in ideal woman’s body shape 
over history (Gordon, 2000). With the barcoded reduction to the important, 
‘unambiguously’ valuable features, the worth of bodies, while ever in flux, can still be 
quickly and efficiently calculated. So the barcode technometaphor enables an 
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understanding of Western reductionism for interpreting a body commodity (sick, 
healthy or otherwise) in universal language that can be coded for ease of access and 
communication. The efficient control over stock is the goal. 
 
Barcoding Human Barbie 
 Valeria Lukyanova is a Ukrainian spiritual leader/alien/model/beauty queen/disc 
jockey/singer/actress109 also known as the Human Barbie. Her body replicates a 
Barbie™ doll’s through the use of make-up, diets, Instagram filters and surgery, 
although she confesses only to breast implants, and refutes allegations of the digital 
surgery known as photoshop (see Idov, 2017; Wischhover, 2015).  
 Lukyanova emerged in the West through a blog article on website Jezebel.com 
(see Barry, 2012) that propelled Lukyanova through the Western internet. Soon after the 
Jezebel blog post, V Magazine interviewed Lukyanova with an accompanying 
photoshoot (see Sandberg, 2012). The following year, Vice debuted a documentary 
where Lukyanova was interviewed and followed around as she performed her daily 
duties – spiritual encounters and photoshoots (Vice, 2013110). She became known as 
Human Barbie, despite not much liking the label herself (Wischhover, 2015). Instead, 
Lukyanova claims to be the reincarnation of an alien called Amatue who has come to 
                                                          
109 Lukyanova stars in an American movie called ‘The Doll,’ in which she portrays a Satanic, murderous, 
enlivened Frankenstein’s monster-esque doll (see O’Brien, 2017). Two young men hire her as an escort 
for a week after one of them breaks up with his girlfriend. Long story short, Human Barbie brutally 
murders multiple people, usually with a knitting needle, and harvests their organs on behalf of her 
Frankenstein-esque creator. He seems to need the organs to build more murdering dolls… 
110 In late 2017, it was revealed that Vice, a media company that specialises in investigative technology 
journalism and the politics of the ‘othered,’ was a hostile work environment for women (see Zadrozny, 
2017). While the company promotes itself as ‘progressive,’ its practices are, unsurprisingly, highly 
gendered and oppressive of women. My use then of Vice documentaries and other journalism becomes 
even more fraught than I imagined. Their content has always been white and masculine, but with at least 
the pretence of some form of progressive (white, male) politics (much like Anonymous, but seemingly 
more reflexive). The production of content/knowledge at the expense of women is ubiquitous. 
291 
 
this planet to help humans become demi-gods through out-of-body experiences (Vice, 
2013).  
Perhaps the best way to acquaint ourselves with Human Barbie is to scan her 
barcode. The lines of her body in effect become the lines of a barcode that communicate 










But Human Barbie’s value is contentious. Technically, Human Barbie is coded as an 
accurate production of the ‘ideal’ white Western woman’s body. Yet her body is treated 
with suspicion, its adherence to and uncanny replication of a plastic idealised doll body 
is repeatedly constructed as representing freakery and mental illness. YouTube 
comments on her Vice (2013) documentary include: 
Level 1: Primary Producer =  
Western Culture 
Western culture is the 
primary producer of 
Human Barbie. Her image 
and the images she 
references are produced 
through Western cultural 
ideals, and produce a 
socially, historically and 
culturally located body. 
Level 2: Manufacturer =  
Femininity 
In particular, Barbie™ 




particular ideas about 
what it means to be an 
ideal Western woman.  
Level 3: Production Line = 
Barbie™ 
Human Barbie is a 
Barbie™ production. She 
mimics Barbie™’s body 
shape and styling. She is 
producing a specifically 
Barbie™ body and 
embodiment. 
Level 4: Individual =  
Image 
Individual images of 
Human Barbie produce 
her in particular ways, 
whether she engaged in 
a typically Barbie™-
esque image or whether 
she is dressed up in her 
alien persona (much as 
Barbie™ dresses up in 










And comments on Lukyanova’s Facebook photos often challenge authenticity of the 
photos and thus the authenticity of her body: 
 
Pretty sad people 
out there idolize 




To be honest, all 
that makeup and 
contact lenses 
gives me creeps 
I'm a student psychology and I was asked to 
watch this in order to explain this. 
I am dissapointed. 
I was hoping for the interview on canibalism 
that the japanese guy gave, Issei something. 
Instead I got this little girl brain inside a 
'some what' womans body. 
Something went terribly wrong during her 
childhood playing with plastic, but whatever 
it is, I don't find it interesting. 
You've got to be pretty 
damn insecure to make 
yourself look like literal 
plastic. Like she 60% 
water and 30% plastic. 
although she 
kind of scary I 






Scanning her body as we would a barcode, then, does not give us all the 
information that we need about her body. A scan of her body is inadequate; her body 
not reducible to the technical specifications that might define its worth as a commodity. 
Human Barbie achieves all of what Western women are required to do in order to 
achieve Western femininity; and yet her body is ascribed ‘freak’ or not-real status; the 
“conundrum of somatic femininity that female bodies are never feminine enough, that 
they must be deliberately and oftentimes painfully remade to be what ‘nature’ intended 
– a condition dramatically accentuated under consumer capitalism…” (Urla & 
Swedlund, 2008, p. 231), but when such feminine bodies are actually achieved, they 
horrify. Human Barbie’s body achieves what magazine retouchers are paid to do to 
Western women’s bodies on a daily basis, and more, yet viewers of her body respond 
with vehement assertions of mental illness, freakery and fakery. 
Bodies as commodities cannot be communicated through barcoding, as much as 
reductionist Western capitalism seeks to reduce humanness to these easily 
communicated and universal systems of codification. Bodies like that of Human 
Barbie’s ensure the disruption of these ideas of universality, fixed meanings and the 
body as something that can be quantified in terms of worth. Technically, as Human 
Barbie’s body is so explicitly a spectacular production of Western femininity, she 
should be coded as an extremely valuable body commodity. But instead she exceeds the 
barcode, drawing attention to the absurdity of the codes for Western, feminine ideals.  
There are some other technical specifications for Human Barbie as a commodity 
that are not necessarily coded through her body, as she discusses in her infamous 2014 
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interview with GQ Magazine (Idov, 2017111). Through the interview, Human Barbie 
confirms she is: 
- Anti-feminist 
- Anti-children and married  
- Explicitly racist 
- Alien 
While being anti-feminist probably works in Human Barbie’s favour (she has 
confirmed her anti-feminism in other interviews (see Cosmopolitan, 2015)), being anti-
children while married potentially breaks-up the lines in the barcoding. In her GQ 
interview, she states: 
“ The very idea of having children brings out this deep revulsion 
in me ” (Idov, 2017, para. 20). 
 
“ I'd rather die from torture… because the worst thing in the 
world is to have a family lifestyle ” (para. 22). 
 
“ …what would you keep the children for? So they can get you a 
glass of water when you're on your deathbed? ” (para. 22). 
 
She disrupts the binary of the man-hating feminist and the traditional obedient wife. Her 
disgust with child-bearing cannot be coded as feminist corruption! Yet she cannot be 
coded as a traditional obedient wife and the pinnacle embodiment of femininity if she 
refuses to be a mother. To be fair, Barbie™ has not had children either, leaving that 
controversy to her friend Midge (see Associated Press, 2002). 
                                                          
111 The interview what originally conducted in 2014, but the online version has since been moved around 
and now gives a 2017 date. 
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It is also difficult to code Human Barbie as a sex object due to both her status as 
a married woman (and therefore perceived as unavailable, presumably?) and as a 
representation of a child’s toy, although both her married status and her toy-like status 
seem not much of an obstacle for sexual pleasure as evidenced through comments on 








Human Barbie also disrupts her coding as a ‘responsible liberal white citizen in 
the modern world’ by willingly and unabashedly sharing her racist text. Explicit racism 
does not fit the liberal white West’s branding, nor does it fit with the Barbie™ 
branding, even if practices are to the contrary. Mattel has a history of commodifying 
‘other’ cultures for mass production, producing, for example, black and Asian friends 
for Barbie™ with racially stylised facial features, clothes and catch-phrases (duCille, 
2003). As duCille (2003) points out, Barbie™ enjoys her Western complexity (she 
works, she plays, she has a change of clothes) whereas her non-white friends are 
typically reduced to features that mark them as different and stereotype them; 
caricatures of race that exoticise. Human Barbie’s assertion that the genetic mixing of 
races produces ugly people (see Idov, 2017) might not really be that off-brand for 
Mattel’s Barbie™, as her thin, blond, whiteness is productive of normative femininity 
and beauty (Deliovsky, 2008). 
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Human Barbie’s assertion that she is a reincarnated alien from another time also 
makes it somewhat impossible (for some) to code her as credible and serious. But it 
does allow for her to be coded as ‘freak’ beyond just her body. Comments on her 
interviews and photos (as presented earlier) resolve Human Barbie’s uncanny 
contradictions into freakery, fakery and/or mental illness.112 Her claims of alien 
spirituality can make it difficult to even code her as human. Such claims, however, 
could be coded as valid, in the context of other legitimated spiritualties that may make 
us uncomfortable – for example, Scientology, a religion founded on the stories/beliefs 
of science fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard featuring aliens and intergalactic warfare, 
enjoys the tax-exempt status of ‘legitimate’ religions (Reitman, 2011).  
While Human Barbie’s hyperfeminine body (in the Barbie™ sense; remember 
both Human Barbie and Barbie™ have refused to become mothers) epitomises the 
idealised Western woman’s body, the shape it mimics emerged, not unlike the cyborg, 
from the patriarchal military-industrial complex. Barbie™’s plastic mould was designed 
by a missile maker through the technowarfare advances of the Cold War:  
… with fears of nuclear annihilation and sexually charged 
fantasies of the perfect bomb shelter running rampant in the 
American imaginary, that Barbie and her torpedo-like breasts 
emerged into popular culture as an emblem of the aspirations of 
prosperity, domestic containment and rigid gender roles that 
were to characterise the burgeoning post-war consumer economy 
and its image of the American dream. (Urla & Swedlund, 2008, 
p. 232)  
                                                          
112 I do not suggest that the mentally ill have not been ‘othered’ as ‘freaks,’ but separate the two to 
distinguish between the constructions of the dismissible and revolting ‘freak’ (‘freak not otherwise 
specified’) and the somewhat pitiable mentally ill ‘freak’ (‘the diagnosable freak’). 
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Barbie™’s body indeed was built through the industrial streamlining technologies 
demanded by global warfare, producing a comforting hyperfeminine woman’s body for 
young girls to play with and aspire to, and the West to idealise and idolise, that could 
also be barcoded as a war body. Human Barbie also emerged through technological 
times characterised by war and rapid social advancement. She was allegedly born in 
1985 (see Sowray 2014), the same year Haraway wrote her manifesto for cyborgs, and 
has emerged online through the 2010s characterised by global technologised warfare 
and dramatic increases in the accessibility to more and more technological advances for 
global citizens. Another war body for war times.  
Human Barbie’s many un-barcodable disruptions are possible because her body 
communicates in a network, not through coding and classification. Her body cannot be 
scanned and understood by a universal system of representations. Her body cannot be 
reduced to technical specifications that can be used to calculate her body’s worth. Her 
networked body allows for multiple connections to and representations of Human 
Barbie as a technocitizen with a living barcode, one that regenerates and degrades as she 
moves through a network of Western power. As such, texts about Human Barbie, and 
the confusion she creates, can be seen as Consumer Guides, with instructions with how 
to deal with her specifications and the dangers of her particular product line, and how to 
operate Human Barbie as a cultural artefact. She is perhaps in kinship with (Female 
figure), who is just as confounding for these same contradictions. Human Barbie, can be 
read as exploring possible ways to build and reconfigure women and their bodies 
through technology, fictionalising the architectural structures that might shape and 
support women and their bodies in more potent aesthetically political ways. Human 
Barbie is a prolific builder and re-builder of her body – surgically, digitally, politically – 
testing the plasticity of her body’s capacity for alien politics (quite literally) that 
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simultaneously participates at the extreme in the binaries of the heterosexual matrix, 
dissolves the same binaries, and builds ‘other’ embodiment that exceeds ‘human’ but 
not necessarily ‘woman.’ Human Barbie becomes then a contradictory ally/anti-hero in 
the story of my research as simultaneously a hyperembodiment of feminist critique of 
compulsory femininity and heterosexuality and as a harbinger of anti-feminist violence 
against women’s bodies through technology that might render women’s bodies 
terrifyingly indestructible.  
 
 “Imagine That You Are Mourning”113 
 
In The Meme-Time: Possibly Mistranslated Femme Fatales  
(see Lukyanova, 2013, para. 10). 
 
 The idea of a freak show could be understood as “… attesting to what is and is 
not tolerable or incorporable into normality” (Grosz, 1996, p. 56). The internet is a 
modern day freak show: bodies on display to arouse interest and disgust; to entertain 
and do serious work defining and challenging boundaries (of gender, of bodies, of what 
counts as human). A freakish example is Human Barbie, who embodies, to the extreme, 
                                                          
113 In the Vice (2013) ‘Space-Barbie’ documentary, Valeria Lukyanova helps her younger sister, a doll 
protégé, take a good photo by telling her not to smile, but to imagine that she is in mourning.  
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a Barbie™ form, producing her body as an idealised spectacle. A burgeoning example 
is the phenomenon of revenge porn, where images of (mainly) women – taken against 
their will or otherwise, consented to or otherwise, are shared online by (mainly) men 
(McGlynn, Rackley & Houghton, 2017) – are displayed in little boxes on computer 
screens for the disgusted amusement of interested onlookers. A mundane example is the 
global participation in social media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram where we are 
displayed for consumption; digitally performing for crowds; enjoying/despising not 
only the performances of others, but also the praise/abuse virtually hurled at us for our 
own performances.  
However, in the 21st century, entering the freak show is an imperative: if you do 
not participate, you are also a freak. It is rare that a Western individual human being 
does not have some form of social media, whether it be email, Facebook or an account 
on a porn website (Smith & Anderson, 2018). Not having a Facebook account appears 
to be so freakish that only one study to date has been conducted on the phenomenon 
(see Fiebert, Wang & Warren, 2018). The ubiquity of technological privileges also 
masks the complexities of the digital divide, where the rich-poor gap widens as the poor 
cannot afford the technologies of modern life that provide social, political and economic 
opportunities (van Dijk, 2012). Those living in poverty and cannot afford to participate 
in the technoworld can also then be produced freakish.114 
For those who do attend the internet freak show, the freakery then comes not 
from the willingness to set up a stall or stage, but from the performance. Women, for 
example, are judged for performance of gender: breasts, bums, bellies, hips, hair, whore. 
                                                          
114 The complexities of the digital divide are critical, as the internet is rolled out and made more 
accessible even in poverty-stricken areas, technology becomes a tool through which to make money, 




Whether gender is performed perfectly (whatever this means) or poorly (whatever that 
means), the performance is always met with the same responses: love/hate. For Grosz 
(1996), the freak “is not an object of simple admiration or pity, but is a being who is 
considered simultaneously and compulsively fascinating and repulsive, enticing and 
sickening” (p. 56), loved and hated at the same time, for the same reasons. Such a point 
of contradiction seems a fitting place for (Female figure) to interrupt yet again. Through 
her performance (both in her installation and its replications through videos online), 
(Female figure) muses about love and hate, telling us that to ‘touch’ is both loving and 
hateful. Digital social and political performances, and the connections such 
performances can proliferate, are characterised by ‘love’ (the rewards for producing a 
participating body) and ‘hate’ (the derision for how the body participates).  
Human Barbie’s body politics focus on the ‘freakery’ of her body as an 
attention-grabber: “Freakiness as an affirmation of physiological dissidence stirs both 
fascination and repulsion…” (Lindsay, 1996, p. 360). Human Barbie relies on the 
simultaneous fascination and repulsion for her politics of vision (being seen) and 
spirituality (being alien). In her Vice (2013) documentary, she suggests that people do 
not listen to nuns, but they listen to and think about beautiful women. While some might 
blasphemously argue that nuns also perform a kind of freakery, Valeria Lukyanova 
seeks to exploit the feminine ideal most exemplified in Western dolls (Barbie™ or sex). 
Taking up the position of doll (pretty, plastic and unthinking) while simultaneously 
presenting herself as a hyper-thinker (politically and spiritually) produces an uncanny 
effect of an aware doll, perhaps performing the Olympia trick all over again! While the 
image of a living doll is confronting, a living doll who explains she lives because of (or 
perhaps rather, in spite of) particular impossible measures of femininity is a further 
challenge to ‘reality.’ Such a challenge produces a familiar experience of the uncanny as 
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Olympia; the object of masculine desire refigured through a telescope and supreme 
example of feminine perfection, ideally and horrifyingly plastic. While Olympia turns 
out to be a life-like automaton, Lukyanova turns out to be a doll-like philosopher. Such 
a switcheroo seems to be a particularly cruel trick for those men who both desire 
women to be unthinking (so as to not unravel the fabric of hierarchical, patriarchal, 
heterosexual ‘reality’) and also require some form of animation from the woman-object 
(from the ‘ohs’ of Olympia to the compliant resistance that Reddit users who frequent 
StruggleFucking might be looking for, a life-like but not a lively object).  
In the 21st century, we are surrounded by synthetic representations of women 
and their bodies more so than ever before. Make-up, photoshopping, surgery, body-
trickery products and so on present us with images of women’s bodies that we may have 
forgotten are uncanny. A disquieting problem that Lukyanova and her Barbie™ body 
challenges is the ubiquity of synthetic representations of women and the imposition of 
those synthetic representations onto women’s flesh. Images of women, from celebrity 
and model magazine spreads to movies and TV to Instagram to politician billboards, are 
almost always re-touched in some way. Skin is smoothed, ‘imperfections’ removed, 
bodies re-shaped, just like the production of Barbie™ dolls, sex dolls and other 
manufactured women. Women, celebrity or otherwise, are expected to produce flawless 
images of themselves that conform to Barbie™-esque standards of femininity (see 
Bartky, 1998), replicating the barcode, scanning themselves into the system. Typically, 
these flawless images cannot be produced without technological aids like photoshop, as 
women’s bodies do not typically occur as they do in plastic. ‘Waist trainers,’ the 
modern corset, are becoming popularised through women like the reality TV 
Kardashian sisters promoting the contraptions as one of the many products they use to 
produce their (in)famous bodies (Kinney, 2017). The open Kardashian use of corsets to 
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achieve impossible waists to match their impossible boobs and butts blurs the 
boundaries between the real and the not-real by simultaneously presenting their bodies 
as both totally natural and highly mediated, synthetised through technology. 
Quite specifically, one member of the Kardashian ensemble has obliterated her 
previous body in favour of a new one. Kylie Jenner is a younger half-sister to the three 
Kardashian sisters. She shares a mother with the Kardashian trio, but her father is 
former athlete Caitlyn Jenner (formerly Bruce Jenner – please see Buysse et al. (2018) if 
you care for more detail on the Kardashian family). Her full-sister, Kendall Jenner, is a 
fashion model and ‘thinspiration’ to pro-anorexia communities for her very thin 
physique (Cobb, 2016). Kylie, however, has transformed her body and face from its 
Kendall-like form to a facsimile of her half-sisters’ features. Her very public 
transformation, and insistences that she has had little intervention to achieve such a 
transformation beyond make-up, push-up bras and puberty, have activated internet body 
detectives looking for surgical clues (for example, Dabiero, 2018).  
Kylie Jenner provides an interesting sister to Valeria Lukyanova, as both have 
synthesised alternative bodies in ways that are made multiple and unclear through 
technology: “… the freak is an ambiguous being whose existence imperils categories 
and oppositions dominant in social life” (Grosz, 1996, p. 57) – defying categorisation 
and blurring boundaries are political acts performed by uncanny freaks like cyborgs. 
Both Lukyanova and Jenner refute most accusations of surgical and technological 
interventions, admitting to one or two procedures, but largely playing seriously with the 
reality/non-reality of how images of their bodies come to be through mundane 
technologies like make-up and clothing that exaggerates facial features and body 
shapes. Yet, while many view Lukyanova as uncanny and/or grotesque, Kylie Jenner 
makes millions of dollars as a trendsetter. Lukyanova’s explicit taking up of doll-hood 
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(the unabashed celebration of doll-bodies as peak femininity) and alien inter-
dimensional spirituality (challenging gender constructions by simultaneously appearing 
as the pinnacle of Western feminine achievement and offering multi-dimensional 
cosmic space that dissolves gender) seems to render her as a dismissible, creepy freak; 
whereas Jenner’s differently doll-like appearance and performances are based in the 
alien lifestyles of the rich and famous: an acceptable and aspirational form of extra115-
terrestrial living.  
Perhaps we could mourn the fatal beauty of the production of Kylie Jenner’s 
body. While Lukyanova cultivates her body for political-religious purposes (well, at 
least some of the time…), Jenner’s body seems produced through a potently traumatic 
connection to technology. Her youth has been digitally broadcast to the world; 
comparisons to her famous sisters constantly over the course of most of her life 
amplified by a technophilic family in a technophilic West. So unheimlich in her body 
she overhauls it, rebuilding it into something ‘better,’ re-formatting its features for a 
more ‘pleasant’ interface. Side-by-side before and after photos of Jenner are disruptive 
– while the trace of the before image is still visible, it is faint and uncanny, like 
Nathaniel gazing at Olympia through his telescope, her old features clockworked but 
not alive. Jenner’s now-face and now-body appear cloned from her half-sisters’ as if a 
Snapchat filter had quite literally been applied to Jenner’s flesh and bones, cinching 
them in and pulling them out in all the right Kardashian places: rotoscoping over 
perceived biological errors, fictionalising the architecture of her body. The 
commodification of the Kardashian family has extended beyond branded products and 
TV marketing to reproductions of the Kardashian form not only for the much poorer 
                                                          




masses, but for those within the family who have the means (genetic and financial) to 
re-build a base body (in ‘Westworld’ terms, a drone host) into an already tried-and-
tested successful model. With a scan of a barcode, your drone host could be built into 
whatever body you want for whatever purpose you want it for.  
The experience of viewing Jenner’s body is not typically described as ‘uncanny’ 
(as far as I can tell), perhaps in large part due to her synthetic appearance being 
congruent with understandings of her synthetic celebrity life (the fabricated world of 
reality TV and celebrity make-up lines). Her freakery is perhaps within the bounds of 
the new digital normalcy. Of course, the reconfiguration of women’s bodies is 
normalised as they move through puberty, adulthood, pregnancies and so on. The total 
technological reconstruction of a woman’s body becoming normalised, however, is 
relatively new, as is the ubiquity of the images of reconstructed women that contributes 
to normalising rotoscoped women’s bodies. Around every corner and even in our 
homes, digitally built women occupy space, whether on food packaging, in magazines, 
on TV or in camera rolls in our phones. We rarely think about just how uncanny that is, 
to be surrounded by, and producing our own, not only doubles, but triples, quadruples… 
Perhaps the creepiest thing about being surrounded by multiples of women is how these 
multiples converge into that singular scannable barcode for Western femininity:  
Unlike feminist understandings of an inessential body, which 
envision an increased acceptance of difference, these cults of the 
body work toward an idealized final referent. If they signal a 
radical redefinition of bodily appearance, it is not towards a new 
acceptance of physical difference and variety, but rather toward 
replicating a single fetishized ideal. (Adams, 1996, p. 283) 
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Human Barbie, and perhaps Kylie Jenner, present us with an uncanny image of Western 
femininity that is becoming disturbingly normal: “The freak, in other words, is the 
projection of what culture fears most about itself” (Peterson, 1996, p. 291), but 
nevertheless embodies both normal and abnormal, heimlich and unheimlich. The 
extreme reconfiguration of women’s bodies (whether seemingly mundane through 
make-up, or spectacular through boob jobs, butt implants and grinding down bones) 
both re-does them as more ‘homely’ (in the Freudian sense) and more ‘unhomely,’ 
reducing or producing ‘feminine excesses,’ like Human Barbies and women who shape-
shift even more than Holli Would.    
So such extreme consumption of the extreme reconfiguring of women’s bodies 
provokes questions about how categories construed as so distinct are dissolving into a 
chilling, excessive feminine goop:  
The freak confirms the viewer is bounded, belonging to a 
“proper” social category. The viewer’s horror lies in the 
recognition that this monstrous being is at the heart of his or her 
own identity, for it is all that must be ejected or objected from 
self-image to make the bounded, category-obeying self possible. 
(Grosz, 1996, p. 65)  
But what happens then when we are both (techno)freak and (techno)freak-viewer, with 
boundaries so permeable they no longer constitute separations?  
 I return to the question of the violence rendered on women’s bodies: the 
indestructible body of Holli Wood and her animatronic spawn, (Female figure), now in 
kinship with Human Barbie, Kylie Jenner and women’s bodies inflicted with digital 
sexual violence. What kind of sympathy do we have for such plastic bodies and how 
indestructible these bodies might be in response to continued violent shapings? 
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When asked about the process of creating his ‘Real Violence’ virtual 
reality project, Jordan Wolfson stated:  
I would never want to hurt someone physically, ever. But then I 
kept on seeing these face-swapping videos on Instagram, and I 
was like, “Why don’t we build an animatronic dummy and face-
swap onto it?” And then I could really beat the fuck out of that 
thing. (Bettridge, 2018, para. 32) 
The proliferation of sex robots and deep fakes suggests Wolfson’s solution to the 
performance of ‘real violence’ is being produced and reproduced in much more 
insidious and mundane ways, blurring woman as (techno)freak with her (techno)freak-
viewers where woman’s boundaries require violent and catastrophic re-assertion. 
Spampinato (2016) indeed discusses Wolfson’s work with (Female figure) as an 
emergence of artists utilising technology to performatively blur with their art, “using 
avatars in the present decade to explore uncanny sides of their identity, projecting fetish 
values onto them or assigning them duties they wouldn’t be able to perform in real life” 
(p. 19). While artists like Wolfson might explicitly blur with their art (politically and 
apolitically), technological advances and rapid increases in technological access and 
skills are producing new kinds of techno‘artists’ who create (women’s) bodies online 
through which to enact technoviolences that have lived effects for the ‘others’ who are 
fetishised. The users who create deep fakes, and the users who create the lives of their 
sex dolls and robots, and the pro-rapists who construct women’s bodies to rape, blur 
spectacularly with the woman-objects they are creating, embodying them as they render 
her image in their work. The boundary blurred might just breakdown masculine fixity 
and definition, a simultaneous embodiment of dominant subject with subjugated object 
(facilitated by a (Female figure)), producing a fraught technopollution of fixed 
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masculine subjectivity: “The male subject responds to this threat of (re)contamination 
with phobic avoidance – by insisting upon the absoluteness of the boundaries separating 
male and female” (Silverman, 1988, p. 18). After an uncomfortable stint as both ‘freak-
viewer’ and ‘freak’ as enabled through technology, the intolerable breach can be 
resolved when the boundaries are re-erected, dominance and subjugation resumed, 
through violence. Perhaps such a technobreach, and the uncanny feeling it might 
produce, activates extensive and proliferating violences against women online. The 
boundaries between (masculine) subject and (feminine) object can blur so profoundly 
and perhaps irretrievably through technologies (online, through surgery, in factories) 
that the violence rendered on women’s bodies (through pro-rape ideologies, re-
assertions of heteronormative conditions and overhauled physical bodies) produces and 
reproduces the absolute definitions and categorisations that subjugate women as objects 
to be dominated. Plastic and digital women’s bodies, built through dominance, are so 
easily pulverised and replaced, whether rendered through surgeries, factories or digital 





















Chapter Ten Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
 (Female figure) is multi- and hyper-barcoded. Her first barcode is created by her 
abusive pseudo-father/s: 
Level 1) Manufacturer: 
 A Pseudo-Father Conglomerate. 
- Jordon Wolfson: the artistic geneticist, constructing her aesthetics.  
- Spectral Motion: the team of robotics surgeons who build and animate 
her.  
- David Zwirner: the money man who enables the hybridisation. 
 
Level 2) Product line:  
 (Female Figure): mimicking woman through advanced animatronics. 
 
Level 3) Serial number: Edition 
 Three editions, all presumably from the same product line, and definitely from 
the same manufacturer.  
 














in Western culture. 
Level 2: 










Level 3:  






Level 4:  












Interruption: Encountering Bodies 
Women’s online bodies often appear headless or decapitated. From sexts, to 
body positivity, to pro-anorexia, women’s bodies are often cropped at the head, 
removing the identifying features of the face (especially the eyes), an act of privacy for 
a publicly displayed and shared body. Women’s willingness to decapitate themselves 
for body politics alerts us to the dangers of an identifiable political body, whether that 
body is used for heteronormative sexual performances like sexting, or the ‘brave’ act of 
sharing a ‘fat’ body or a body that is ‘too thin.’ Better chop my head off, or gouge my 
eyes out, just to be safe!  
Here (Female figure) interjects again. She cannot look at her face in the mirror. 
She has had that ability programmed out of her. She can look at her hands, and her 
limbs; but she cannot look in the mirror to see her own face. Her facial recognition 
software will not recognise her own face, lest she lock eyes with herself and never break 
the gaze. Her programmers gouged her eyes out. 
Simultaneously, selfie culture consumes women – or women consume selfie 
culture; I have not decided yet which way the digestion runs, but I suspect the function 
is more oesophageal than intestinal. The preponderance of women’s faces does not hold 
the same uncanny quality of an encounter with a headless woman’s body, unless it veers 
into the bizarre (like Human Barbie’s ‘face’). The ways through which we encounter 
women’s bodies online are not the same ways we encounter them offline. We rarely 
encounter headless women in person (or do we? (Cixous & Kuhn, 1981)), with the 
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exception of perhaps unfortunate Barbies™ and the work of a few violent offenders. 
Women’s bodies are mysterious; still perhaps governed by the unknown (it is all in the 
womb!). An online woman’s body without a head (the identifier as well as the 
propelling agent, if women are to be believed) is all too common and all too interesting 
a question about women’s embodiment. Perhaps the potential of women’s headless 
bodies still being agentic, with wandering hysterical womb-brains and being free of 
head (and thus also brainless?), is an uncanny horror: the boundary between inanimate 
and animate blurs when we encounter a headless woman, for she might still be animated 














































Words like “methodology” are very scary you know! - Donna Haraway  






Selecting specific texts for analysis for this project was an overwhelming task. 
For example, there are millions of search results for even just one of the many ‘Human 
Barbies.’ Searching for the emergence of ‘Human Barbie’ as a descriptor for women by 
plugging “Human Barbie” into Google yielded millions and millions of results. Sorting 
by date and then moving through more than 100 pages of Google results, I was still 
feasting on results from the previous few months. Only through following connections 
between various Human Barbies, not dates, was I able to narrow search results down in 
order to ascertain some sort of rough timespan for the emergence of Human Barbies, 
with a single article from 1997 mentioning cosmetic surgery and Barbie™-lifestyle 
enthusiast Cindy Jackson as a “Human Barbie” (see “Why are they famous? Cindy 
Jackson,” 1997). 
For Human Barbie data, then, I have an impossible feast; a constantly 
proliferating buffet of Human Barbie text and images. Other bodies of interest for this 
project are also part of the impossible feast, with text and images connecting to Elliot 
Roger, digital women, Slender Man, Kylie Jenner, sex robots and Gable Tostee 
proliferating expansively and partially through multiple spaces online. The proliferation 
of text and image enabled by the connectivity and ubiquity of the internet ensures an 
impossible feast. 
By contrast, feasting on (Female figure) has not been quite as impossible. She 
yields a finite number of results, many repetitions, duplicates or connective loops. 
Tracing her (young) internet emergence has been comparatively simple, and the 
collection of (current) textual data (while expanding) can be completed.116 Perhaps this 
                                                          
116 That is of course only if you interpret (Female figure) as a singularity. When you incorporate her 
inspirations and her technocultural contexts, she does become an impossible feast. 
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is due to her youth, or perhaps due to the tensions she enjoys. Nevertheless, her texts 
and images are not overwhelming in number or proliferation. But while (Female figure) 
lends herself to some ease of data collection, data selection is still an issue… 
 
“… deathly oneness…”117 
The selection of data for a research project (usually) necessitates a clearly 
outlined methodology that tells readers how data is selected, collected and analysed. 
Such clarity assumes a somewhat singular process that shifts, linearly, through data in 
order to create a unity to the data for the project, presumably in a best effort to produce 
a cohesive set of desired results, singular in outcome. 
Cyborg methodology, however, is noninnocent, so unity of data is an unlikely 
outcome, making the task of selecting text in an impossible feast difficult, and a 
struggle to, academically, justify. 
An answer to such a problem as the impossibility of my feast, as informed by 
Haraway, could be that it will not matter which texts are selected: “… any component 
can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be 
constructed for processing signals in a common language” (Haraway, 1991, p. 163). 
Methodologically then, any text or image can be used in this project as data for analysis 
if using the common language of cyborg metaphor. Texts, while not unified, are 
connected and networked. Cyborgian networks of power ensure that whatever texts or 
images are used in analysis will be connected, extensively or partially, through the 
research network. Whatever node is pinged, it is part of the network, multiply connected 
and still un-unified. And while noninnocent, there is still potential for “political 
                                                          
117 (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). 
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kinship” (Haraway, 1991, p. 156) in the connections between these texts and this is, at 
least in part, cyborg metaphor, a common language to process the signals. 
 
Data Trauma 
While the proliferating impossible feast of data connections can be an 
overwhelming and ever-present frustration/source of anxiety, missing out on 
connections to data has been traumatic. 
A member of the PhilosophyOfRape Reddit forum created an off-shoot 
Wordpress website/blog for the purposes of proliferating and expanding on the 
‘philosophy’ of the forum. I monitored the content, but after some initial rapid 
expansion, the site went quiet. During a patch of time when I was not fully connected to 
my data, the website moved into another period of rapid expansion then sudden 
deletion. I missed this expansion and deletion. Given the violence of the impossible 
feast I find myself in, feeling ‘traumatised’ by missing the loop of activity seems 
absurd. But not being connected into these events, missing their rapid proliferation and 
obliteration, was distressing. I am “needy for connection” (Haraway, 1991, p. 151) to 
data, despite the impossibility of consuming it all. The connection to the data is 
maddening, as is the disconnection from it. While all the data I have to consume 




On the 22nd of July 2015, the PhilosophyOfRape website began re-instating 
posts that had previously been removed by Wordpress. I was able to retrieve posts that I 
had missed connecting to. So while I experienced the ‘trauma’ of not having connected 
                                                          
118 As does the impossible feast of theoretical terms I have needed to select for analysis… 
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to this data, it had rebooted, and was able to resume its place in my network of data, not 
as a stalking Slender Man, but as a functional node in the network.  
PhilosophyOfRape is a different form of impossible feast. I had collected most 
of the Reddit forum (excluding links and videos that had already died by the time I got 
there), so the data was collectible in the sense that there were a finite number of forums 
and comments to collect when I asserted parameters around explicit 
‘PhilosophyOfRape’ online spaces.119 However, PhilosophyOfRape in particular 
morphed into several different incarnations (the forum, a Facebook page, two or three 
versions of a website…), each time (moderately) proliferating and then getting banned. 
PhilosophyOfRape data was constantly being removed and regenerating in different 
places.  
 
Too Full Again 
While I was relieved to re-connect with thought-to-be-lost PhilosophyOfRape 
data for the aesthetic sake of my research worldweave, such re-connections 
exponentially complicate cyborg analysis decisions. The feast the internet offers up is 
indeed impossible.  
When writing and analysing, some analytic meals are skipped for no real reasons 
other than they arrived at my analytic table too early or too late. As much as missing 
connections traumatised me, the impossibility of the feast became the more pressing 
issue for an embodied feminist researcher. As my research began to take shape, 
decisions about how to shape the most aesthetically pleasing worldweave became 
unavoidable.  
                                                          
119 As with (Female figure), once these parameters are removed, the feast becomes impossible again, with 
PhilosophyOfRape being expansively networked through other forums, sites and online movements.  
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As I wrote, problems such as the Fappening, the Snappening and #GamerGate 
became only partial connections, gateways to different problems, or the same problems 
reconfigured. The Fappening and the Snappening were online image hacking events 
where intimate images of women, particularly celebrity women, were hacked and 
dumped online (Massanari, 2017). Such events exemplify the exploitation of the 
technological blurring boundaries between public/private, and consent/non-consent, as 
well as the hyper-demand for access to women’s bodies, where unsophisticated 
protections on online storage facilities are used as an excuse to abuse and chastise 
women as irresponsible technology users (I sense a Slender Man again…) and thus 
constructing hacked women and their bodies as deserving of exploitation, just as the 
raped bodies of young black girls who go to parties120 are constructed as deserving of 
technoexploitation too. The events of these image hacks were key problems that needed 
some new thoughts through which to think their complexities. But, in the chaos of 
apocalypse, the problems of the Fappening and the Snappening have contributed to my 
research worldweave as critical to the network only through partial connections.   
Similarly, #GamerGate has been snipped and re-connected only partially. As 
mentioned in chapter four, #GamerGate is an online movement in the gaming 
community that targets women through the concern for ‘gaming ethics.’ The movement 
was founded after allegations made about a woman game developer by her ex-boyfriend 
suggested that she had exchanged sex for favourable reviews of her game (Massanari, 
2017). The #GamerGate movement then, claims to be about the ethical conduct of game 
developers and gaming media. However, all of the #GamerGate targets have been 
women, or men who defend these women. Women in the gaming community, 
particularly those who identify explicitly as feminist, are the target of abuse ranging 
                                                          
120 See chapter twelve for a discussion of the #Jadapose rape meme. 
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from abusive memes, to hacking and doxing (the practice of finding and revealing a 
user’s offline identity online), to rape, death and terrorism threats (Braithwaite, 2016). 
The violence of #GamerGate, and its connections to PhilosophyOfRape, Elliot Rodger 
and the generalised abuse of women online, was another analytic meal that I only 
nibbled at briefly before a fresher, or perhaps just chewier, meal arrived. 
The Fappening, the Snappening and #GamerGate are desperately problematic 
technologised events and movements. And while they move through my research 
partially, their seeming relegation to programs that run in the background is politically 
devastating. But their forms and functions did not make for an aesthetically pleasing 
worldweave, and ‘UNSURE,’ I snipped their connections, like a Weaver snips off ears. 
 
The Weaver as a Metaphor’d Practice 
for Decisions of Writing and Thinking 
The Weaver, as outlined in the opening chapter and through its infrequent 
appearances elsewhere through the research network, is a figure for the dissolution of 
categorisations and linear practices, devoid of politics, other than the politics of 
aesthetics. In ‘Perdido Street Station,’ The Weaver chooses to help the story’s 
protagonists slay the villainous Slake-Moths because of the moths’ disruption to the 
aesthetics of the Weaver’s worldweave; not because of any particular urgency to save 
lives for the sake of lives, but because Slake-Moths feeding on the mind-juices of the 
citizens of Bas-Lag was especially ugly and destructive to the worldweave.  
Such a figure as the Weaver helps make sense of cyborg thinking and decision-
making. Traditional researchers may impose fixed parameters on their collection and 
categorising of data, restricting what can and cannot be analysed. Parameters set limits 
on the amount of data collectible and collected, so as to produce distinct sets of data that 
can be organised into analytic categorises, like ‘discourses,’ ‘themes’ or ‘content.’ 
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Parameters set distinct boundaries, cordoning off areas to investigate as if cordoning off 
compartmentalises phenomena, movements or ways of speaking. Cordoning off data 
also helps, I imagine, to produce linear understandings of stories told linearly; the 
progression of ideas written down a page, a convention I problematised in the opening 
chapter of my research project. Data sourced from the internet is expansive and 
connected, fleeting and pervasive. Decisions about what to write about, what to write 
about it and how to write about it need to shift from traditional understandings of what 
data might be and how it might be understood. It matters what thoughts think decisions. 
Decisions to partially disconnect from problems like the Fappening, the 
Snappening and #GamerGate, for the aesthetic sake of the research worldweave, can 
feel like not ‘staying with the trouble’ of violence against women online fully and 
urgently. My feast is impossible. I am ‘UNSURE.’ I return to the particularly 
devastating moment when the Weaver “recognizes his kinship with the slake-moths” 
(Rankin, 2009, p. 253) after he and his strange allies have defeated them. The Weaver 
sits with the Slake-Moth corpses and mournfully plays with their guts, seemingly upset 
by the lost possibilities in their patterns and an ‘UNSURE’ realisation of his similarities, 
in form (bugs) and joys (dream-consciousness). For a cyborg researcher, the Weaver’s 
fraught kinship with moths and their guts feels uncannily familiar: a feminist searching 
through women’s dismembered, disembodied, hyper-embodied bodies online, mourning 
the possibilities lost, ‘UNSURE’ of the threads and the questions and of what might 












The Weaver thought in a continuous, incomprehensible, rolling stream of awareness. 
There were no layers to the Weaver’s mind, there was no ego to control the lower 
functions, no animal cortex to keep the mind grounded. For the Weaver, there are no 
dreams at night, no hidden messages from the secret corners of the mind, no mental 
clearout of accrued garbage bespeaking an orderly consciousness. For the Weaver, 
dreams and consciousness were one. The Weaver dreamed of being conscious and its 
consciousness was its dream, in an endless unfathomable stew of image and desire and 
















































Chapter Twelve: Violations 
 
The Horrifying Adventures of the Roast Busters 
 The illumination of the New Zealand teenage sex/rape group calling themselves 
the Roast Busters has been solidified as one of the most significant sexual violence 
cases in recent history, both culturally and legally. In late 2013, the Roast Busters made 
media headlines for their Facebook videos and other online posts bragging about having 
group sex with drunk and/or underage girls. The group named themselves after their 
favourite sexual activity, ‘spit roasting,’ in which a young woman is cast in the role of 
the dead and roasting pig (see Gavey, 2013).  
 Technology was vital to the production of the Roast Busters. Far from just 
sharing videos and other posts online about their sexual conquests, the boys involved 
used Facebook and ask.fm in particular to connect with girls who wanted to “be 
roasted” and boys who wanted to “roast.” Significantly, social media posts that 
connected “roasters” with “roastees” became the focus of the police investigation 
(Malthus, 2014), with the constant connectivity of the Roast Busters founders (Beraiah 
Hales and Joseph Lavell Parker) to their social media accounts (including a Facebook 
page dedicated to their “roasting”) providing the police investigation with a plethora of 
what could be considered evidence. 
 The ask.fm pages of both Beraiah Hales and Joseph Lavell Parker are still 
online, in full, as of October 2018. Hales’ page links to his Facebook account, still 
seemingly live, while Lavell Parker’s Facebook page has been deleted. It is hard to 
account for these pages remaining online when others were obliterated (for example, the 
Roast Busters Facebook page and YouTube account, as well as various other social 
media accounts). While a lot of recording and cataloguing of Roast Buster activities 
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occurred through Facebook, the ask.fm accounts contains information that easily 
identifies the young women the Roast Busters encountered. Often, the full names of 
girls who had been “roasted” are used in connection to their school, friends and 
geographic location. In some cases, they are also loosely described, including their ages. 
When asked, Hales and other askers even provide Facebook and other social media 
links to girls’ accounts, explicitly identifying them as girls who have been “roasted.” 
The full name of a girl that was “gang-banged” by seven Roast Busters was publicly 
shared as she was described as “dirty” and as a “mutt” who became a “crazy ass bitch” 
who Hales’ said he wanted dead following her “roasting.” In addition, a 13-year-old girl 
was allegedly “roasted” by Hales and while the police have protected the girl’s identity 
in their official report, her name, age and the details of the allegations are mentioned 
repeatedly by Hales and ‘askers’ on his ask.fm page.  
 The main reason cited for girls involved with the Roast Busters not pursuing 
legal action was fear of retaliation and bullying from their peers (Malthus, 2014). The 
content of the ask.fm pages suggests that bullying was indeed a significant factor. 
Ask.fm, however, can be participated in anonymously, which calls into question who 
was actually participating in the exchanges. There is at least one suggestion evident on 
his ask.fm page that Hales knows that some of the questions being asked of him are 
being asked by a girl he knows. Nevertheless, the continued existence of the ask.fm 
pages of the Roast Busters is a continual re-victimisation of those victims. Details of 
their abuse, their bodies and what their peers may think of them are recorded, and are 
instantly accessible and sharable.  
 There are also repeated posts on Hales’ ask.fm page that claim he had sex with 
underage girls, and a claim he would have sex with even younger girls if they wanted to 
be “roasted.” There are multiple posts stating that, as a 16-year-old, he believes can 
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legally have sex with underage girls as long as they consent.121 On Hales’ ask.fm page, 
when accused of statutory rape, he takes up the title of Lord Epar. Epar is ‘rape’ spelt 
backwards, used as a way to avoid detection, as well as a memetic joke (see “Epar,” 
2003). Hales regularly claims on ask.fm to be a rapist while also simultaneously 
denying the claims that any sexual contact was rape, even with 13 year olds. Hales talks 
about how Roast Busting was his job, and seemed to consider it his duty. He was 
making money from his “roasting” by having other boys pay for the privilege of 
“roasting” a girl; a business venture where young women’s bodies became 
indestructible – commodified plastic bodies that could be used and abused and replaced 
with fresher bodies.  
 Hales’ and Lavell Parker’ ask.fm pages are full of denials and affirmations of the 
same events. Hales sometimes claims to have a child. Multiple times he talks about 
ejaculating on his mother’s face, and impregnating his sister. Both Hales and Lavell 
Parker claim to have “roasted” several girls while also stating they have never met those 
same girls. Hales and Lavell Parker also claim they love and have sex with each other 
(another homoerotic bond). While the extent of the ‘reality’ of the Roast Busters 
activities has been called into question – the Operation Clover report suggests such 
violations were amplified “boasts” rather than ‘real violence’ (Malthus, 2014) – the 
continued accessibility of the Roast Buster ask.fm pages maintains women’s violation 
(including women in his immediate family and individually identified and located 
young women). Digital violations (physically enacted on physical bodies or not) are 
recorded and instantaneously re-connectable.122  
                                                          
121 A belief that is singled out in the Operation Clover report as being one of the biggest problematics 
with the Roast Busters case (Malthus, 2014). 
122 Hales attempted to launch a music career via YouTube in 2017. Using the same name as is used on his 
ask.fm page enables fans of his music to locate and connect to Roast Buster activities. 
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The networked connectivity of the Roast Busters is not confined to their local 
activities: Through the ask.fm pages, the rape of young women is the predominant joke. 
In response to a question on Hales’ ask.fm page about his favourite sayings, he replies:  
 
Such a saying connects into a network of sexually violent memes usually containing the 
image of a sloth with sexually violent text surrounding it. The specific phrase that 
Hales’ uses adorns such a memed image (see “Rape Sloth – Unrape,” 2013; and see 
“Rape Sloth,” 2017 for more123). Rape as a meme-able joke is insidiously networked 
through communities that promote rape as a fun activity to do with friends, or as 
necessary for reclaiming Western civilisation.  
 
Return to the PhilosophyOfRape 
 As mentioned in the journey down the ethical rabbit hole of chapter four and my 
previous chapter eleven interlude, the PhilosophyOfRape was a Reddit forum dedicated 
to a ‘philosophy’ that raping women was normal, natural and necessary for the 
reclamation of Western civilisation. PhilosophyOfRape was a fully public pro-rape 
forum that directly encouraged men to rape women in order to “correct” women’s 
(feminist) behaviour, constructing a space for hostile ideas about women, violence and 
politics to congeal. The forum described who should and should not be raped, shared 
tips and hints for how to rape and discussed the philosophical justifications for rape. 
                                                          
123 Searching KnowYourMeme.com with the search term ‘rape’ yields many, many results. One such 
search result, #Jadapose, is explicated later in this chapter, but extra memes to illustrate the networked 
connectivity of sexual violence online include the ‘why are girls so scared of rape?’ meme, the ‘what 
rhymes with rape?’ meme, the ‘surprise buttsecks’ meme and the ‘high impact sexual violence’ meme. 
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Unlike other rape forums I had encountered through Reddit, the PhilosophyOfRape 
subreddit did not make any disclaimer about being a fetish forum, seemingly asserting a 
boundary where other subreddits had blurred their status as simultaneously serious, 
satirical and fetishistic. With a boundary asserted, other Reddit users discovered the 
PhilosophyOfRape subreddit and had started spamming it with pictures of animals and 
other cute and happy things in order to destroy the integrity of the subreddit until Reddit 
staff removed PhilosophyOfRape (the forum) and ThePhilosophyOfRape (the user) – 
assuming, of course, that the staff would remove them. The fluffy resistance was short 
lived and the cute animal spam was removed from the subreddit.  
 Not surprisingly, a few familiar user names began to pop up as moderators of the 
PhilosophyOfRape subreddit. The same users who are active participants in and 
moderators of subreddits like StruggleFucking and other sexually violent subreddits 
began to participate and eventually moderate PhilosophyOfRape. The user who created 
the PhilosophyOfRape subreddit (the user who called himself ThePhilosophyOfRape) 
was then added as a moderator to the StruggleFucking subreddit, a subreddit that 
explicitly claims to be a rape fetish community that participates exclusively in fantasy 
(although from my brief time there, there are some very blurry lines in that 
subreddit…). Members of StruggleFucking were not happy with the inclusion of 
ThePhilosophyOfRape as a moderator, as his presence challenged their legitimacy as a 
fetish community (a suggestion of rape ‘play’) by fixing PhilosophyOfRape as a serious 
ideological movement (the demand for rape ‘work’).  
As a momentary deviation, Reddit user ThePhilosophyOfRape still had a live 
account on Reddit and was still listed as a moderator of StruggleFucking as of October 





 Returning to PhilosophyOfRape, as time went by, more and more posts were 
made to the subreddit, mostly focusing on the application of the subreddit’s manifesto, 
outlined below in the opening address to the forum:124
                                                          
124 No surprise that, yet again, women in educational settings is a catalyst for misogyny. Women 
encountering and processing information (the bread and butter of a cyborg) is a strong catalyst for anti-
women sentiment…  
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In the flurry of multiple ways in which rape was constructed on the forum, the 
overarching claim was that it produced violent sex as both a basic (male) need that had 
to be facilitated, and as ‘correction’ for ‘sluts’ (especially feminist sluts). 
 For example, Reddit user [USER NAME REFERENCING SODOMIZING 
SOMEONE’S MOTHER REDACTED] (gosh) states that: 
“Men want sex, some men have somewhat of a conscience. 
Some women are horrible people, some women deserve punishment. 
My dick will be the gavel.” 
 Many posts on the forum concerned themselves with who exactly needed to be 
raped, much like how the Roast Busters discussed who they would ‘roast.’ Both groups 
debate the qualities they look for in a body to violate, even if their criteria are slightly 




For example, a user asks, “When does a female become ‘to young’ to be 
raped?”125 The answer: 
If she is old enough to make an educated statement on why she 
thinks one way (compared to just following footsteps), she is old 
enough to be persuaded to think properly. 
The exact number varies, but I’d say 9-15 is a descent range to 
start corrections. 
The response? “I can agree on that, I think 9 is just right if they seem to show signs of 
needing correcting.” In another post, girls as young as 6 years old are suggested for 
“correction,” so that they do not grow up to be typical Western feminist sluts.  
 A post entitled “you have a duty to rape” – a post explaining rape as a noble act 
needed for the betterment of society – was described by the user as motivational: 
i didn’t mean for it to sound so motivational postery, but it really 
is a noble act.thats why females enjoy rape so much, because 
they know they are being raped by the strongest of the strong, 
and therefore receiving the best genetic material for their 
offspring. thats whats really important to them. 
so honestly you are not JUST doing the human race a favor, but 
the female as well because deep down its what she wants. 
The same user wants to know what is so bad about rape, because “physically, it is not 
that bad of an experience. i feel for me, a straight male, being raped anally as a child 
was MUCH worse than the natural, loving and affectionate way that most women 
become raped.” 
                                                          
125 A good time to remind the reader that all spelling and grammar errors in data text are the 
individualised personal responsibility of the user quoted! 
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Throughout the posts and discussions in the PhilosophyOfRape subreddit, rape 
is constructed as a punishment that will ‘correct’ Western women’s (and ‘effeminate’ 
men’s) behaviours (returning them to an Olympia-like state, presumably), and as a treat 
that women enjoy. While women are no strangers to the blurred boundaries between 
punishment and pleasure (see for example Butler, 1988; Deckha, 2011; Morgan, 2011; 
Tong & Botts, 2018), the talk on PhilosophyOfRape acts like a catch-all for pro-rape 
ideology, rather than a distinct ideology (as outlined by, for example, Elliot Rodger in 
his autobiographical manifesto). Online pro-rape ideology is an apocalyptic movement 
where women’s bodies are multiply violated in hyperdimensional ways. All the 
arguments that have been used to justify and/or excuse rape over the last few centuries 
appear in one form or another (or another) through the PhilosophyOfRape forum. 
Trolling or not, the forum’s users engage in talk that calls upon and replicates 
misogynist understandings of women, sex and rape that pervade dominant discourse, 
particularly in the West (see Gavey, 2005), expanding on it, networking it and playing 
with it. Here we find ourselves at another point at which the joke (the trolling) and the 
seriousness (the violence) are indistinguishable. The joke of rape is a serious one.   
As another deviation (of importance), a comment of 
connective interest about a young woman discussed in a forum 
was: “She should had chosen a modelling career, 
r/CuteFemaleCorpses would love her.” CuteFemaleCorpses was 
one of the Reddit forums I encountered that contained the most 
jarring content: images of dead women’s bodies that were 
discussed in masturbatory terms by forum members. Much like 
PhilosophyOfRape, the ‘seriousness’ of CuteFemaleCorpses was 
difficult to understand, with some images clearly from television 
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and movies, and others with much murkier origins. The ambiguity 
of the CuteFemaleCorpses forum and the clarity of the above pro-
rapist death joke-threat produced, for me, an uncanny feeling that 
I have been in this loop before.126 The image of the female body 
raped and dead is the compulsive desire, sexually and politically, 
of both CuteFemaleCorpses and PhilosophyOfRape.  
To materialise the pro-rapist network further, I have provided two snapshots of 
the PhilosophyOfRape forum that record its expansivity: 
 
                                                          




Forum posts include “Pre-Rapes and Ways to Practice the Skills Used in a 
Correction. If you’re not ready for the big time yet but know a harlot that needs it bad, 
this is for you!”, “Need advice” (in which a user details how they got into a car accident 
with a “ginger teenager. Hot. Totally clueless” and wanted tips on how to use the 
insurance information he exchanged with her as leverage for sex), “Girls opressed me 
when i was young, i will do social justice raping them”, “Still haven’t quite raped Jill, 
YET….” (in which a user details his sexual violation of an unconscious woman and a 
commenter asks, “is this a true story or erotica”), “Scientist show women’s brains are 
wired to accept rape without resisting” (in which users claim some research has found 
that women’s “brains are meant to accept rape meekly.” The research they cite was 
actually about how freezing or going limp during rape is about the fear of death or 
injury and as such can be protective), “Raping trannies?” (where raping transgender 
people is discussed: “… rape would be a nice gesture, allowing them to feel even more 
like a woman than they ever did.”), “Summer Break is Here! It’s Time for Some RAPE 
TIPS!”, “Separating the Holy Rape of Philosophers from the Feral Rape of Primitive 
Nigger Rape Apes” and “Who did you rape? How?”… Once the group moved from 
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Reddit (after being banned) to Wordpress, the posts became less interactive and more 
instructional, with a singular blogger posting how-to articles, misappropriations of 
research and racist ‘opinion’ pieces. 
 The networking and formatting of Reddit produced some bizarre imagery in the 
PhilosophyOfRape forum (and others like it that promote violence against [insert 
subjugated group here]). On the right hand side of every Reddit page, Reddit beckons, 
“want to join?”; alongside every call to rape, Reddit asks us if we want to join in to help 
build and maintain pro-rapist structures: 
So while a social media site’s self-promotional practices are necessary for the 
proliferation (and thus success) of the site, these practices, when connected with 
neoliberal ‘freedom of speech’ and violent social movements, produce strange moments 
of enticement to join in, in seconds no less, to plug into this matrix and take this Red 
Pill: Creating a rapist account takes only seconds! Don’t suffer from rapist 
FOMO!127 
Indeed, members of PhilosophyOfRape describe the Red Pill experience: “Most 
incels are like me, they were raised in a lovely family, them, they woke up the matrix.” 
                                                          
127 FOMO means ‘Fear Of Missing Out,’ according to the cool kids (see “Fomo,” 2013). 
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Within a swirling multiplicity of processes that produce misogyny, the Philosophers 
frequently mentioned sudden realisations about reality, the moments the Red Pill kicked 
in and ‘reality’ became clear to them. The crystallising experiences tended to be 
described as rejections (social and sexual) from women, or witnessing women engaging 
with ‘sub-standard’ men; both experiences that Elliot Rodger cites in his manifesto. 
[RACIST USER NAME REDACTED] shares with us: “Rape is a corrective mechanism 
that legitimizes a man’s superiority. Deny it and deny reality.” As with a great many 
modern (and old-timey) anti-woman arguments, the ‘reality’ of men’s dominance and 
entitlement to dominance (Gavey, 2005; Ward, 1995) is utilised to simultaneously assert 
that dominance (the privilege of ‘reality’ – that Red Pill) and construct women yet again 
as hysterics (they cannot see ‘reality’ right in front of them – that Blue Pill). 
 The PhilosophyOfRape Red Pill asserts masculine ‘reality,’ producing a 
doubling-down on hegemonic masculinity that asserts dominant binaries and erects 
structures that maintain men’s dominance and women’s subjugation. Indeed, 
mainstream journalism profiles men who champion pro-rapist causes (see Jordan 
Peterson’s interview again (Bowles, 2018)) and offers technological solutions like sex 
robots to alleviate incel and pro-rapist rage128 (see Douthat, 2018) rather than 
                                                          
128 Replacing sex objects/women with robots is an essential plot point for both the HBO ‘Westworld’ TV 
series and the Channel 4 ‘Humans’ TV series. In both shows, raped robots emerge as violent leaders of 
robot rebellions. A key feature of ‘Westworld’ hosts is that they gather information through their 
interactions with human guests, so they come to understand the patterns of gendered interrelations and 
sexual violence against women extremely well, and that does not bode well for men: 
 
In The Meme-Time: An Informed Threat (see Gross, Nolan & Toye, 2016). 
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challenging how men come to view sex with any woman they want when they want as a 
human right and biological necessity that women must comply with, or die.  
As an example of the expansive connectivity of PhilosophyOfRape’s content, a 
singular extremely expansive and connective forum contradictorily demonstrates the 
fixity of pro-rapist ideology. In a post entitled “Qualifications of Rape?” a user details 
an incident in which he extorts sex out of a woman and thus wants to discuss what 
counts as rape. In response to a suggestion that “blue balls” are not as traumatic as rape, 
prolific incel blogger and pro-rapist user [CO-ALPHA REDACTED] states: 
… you miss the underlying context, which shows why it is so 
important to know why his blue balls are so much more harmful 
to humanity in general than her psyche. 
Modern Western women are monsters who want to fuck dumb 
and immoral men. So once she rejected him she made him into a 
man who isn’t that. So having sex with her was seen as rape by 
her. On the other hand, any guy who was deemed immoral and 
stupid enough could have thrown her on the floor and fucked her 
with no consent, just to be seen as her hero later. 
A woman’s hurt feelings mean nothing. That’s why all sane 
societies made rape a property crime and not a crime revolving 
around some “consent” nonsense. 
 
An Odd-ish Development 
As I was doing a general image search through Google Images for Jordan 
Wolfson’s ‘Colored Sculpture’ I encountered a bizarre connection in the network. 
Curiously, results from an extremely specific Tumblr.com tag – “[[found footage]]” – 
showed both a Tumblr post with a video and description of ‘Colored Sculpture’ from a 
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Tumblr user, and some pictures and a review of a movie call ‘Megan Is Missing,’ in a 
re-shared (from Instagram) post by another Tumblr user.  
One of the images from the ‘Megan Is Missing’ post was the same as the 
PhilosophyOfRape’s community avatar image. On the revitalised Wordpress site, the 
community utilised a photo of a terrified woman with her mouth forced open with some 
sort of metallic contraption. The image used by the pro-rape community was sourced 
from a horror film, as I had unexpectedly discovered though a bizarre and unique tag. 
‘Megan Is Missing’ is a ‘found footage’ horror movie, following the lives of two 
14-year-old girls who give the outward appearance of hard-working straight A students, 
but also engage in hard-drinking, hard-drugs and lots of sex. One of the girls chats to a 
boy online, then goes missing after arranging to meet him. From then on, the story is 
told through ‘found footage,’ detailing an extremely violent and torturous rape (Heller-
Nicholas, 2014; Jones, 2013). The movie, according to a message from the director, 
Michael Goi, shared through the film’s official website (www.meganismissing.com), is 
intended to be a politicised warning about the dangers of meeting people online, 
particularly for children.  
Such a weird data journey highlights the proliferation of sexually violent images 
to the extent that ‘coincidence’ transforms into expectation. There is seemingly nothing 
connecting ‘Colored Sculpture’ to ‘Megan Is Missing’ or PhilosophyOfRape, not even 
in the highly specific Tumblr tag they share. Their sharing of the tag connects them, but 
the connectivity of the tag itself is perplexing. How did ‘Colored Sculpture’ and ‘Megan 
Is Missing’ end up in an extremely disorganised and specific tag such as “[[found 
footage]]”? 
The image from ‘Megan Is Missing’ (iterated by PhilosophyOfRape) further 
blurs the boundary between ‘real’ and ‘not real,’ exploiting dramatisations of rape for 
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politicised promotion of ‘real violence.’ ‘Found footage’ as a genre, blurs the 
boundaries between fiction and non-fiction, as well as amateur pornography and 
voyeurism, consent and non-consent. The ‘found footage’ genre also plays into the 
modern ubiquitous participation in videoing and sharing all aspects of life online, with 
the internet being the stage (at the freak show) for sharing footage, consensually or 
otherwise. The horror of these ‘found footage’ movies is now replicated in the enabling 
of livefeed suicides (Luxton, June & Kinn, 2011), murders, kidnappings and rapes 
(Artwick, 2019), as well as the proliferation of these videos through the technology of 
the internet and technologised devices that allow for the mass, viral sharing of ‘snuff’ 
content previously difficult to come by, unless you went looking (Noble, 2017). ‘Found 
footage’ horrors are now constantly being produced with ease, consensually or 
otherwise, and are instantaneously accessible to anyone, anytime, anywhere, 
normalising the horror of brutalised bodies through technology. Perhaps the normalising 
of horror is a different way to conceptualise how forums like PhilosophyOfRape 
materialise. There are arguments that these forums are just a form of ‘trolling.’129 
However, ‘trolling’ seems to so often take the form of gendered violence. The troll’s 
‘joke’ is constantly becoming serious.  
 
                                                          
129 Indeed, prolific internet troll Joshua Ryne Goldberg was identified as the creator of the 
PhilosophyOfRape Wordpress blog.130 The information about the extent of his trolling was released when 
he was arrested by the FBI on terrorism charges (Potaka, McMahon & Bachelard, 2015). The terrorism 
charges related to the planning of bombings, not inciting violence against women. 
130 There is a trend, popularised in Trump times, to claim that events (like school shootings) are ‘false 
flags,’ which means that the government (or, increasingly, other interested parties) sets tragic events up, 
but the events never really happened (see Mele, 2016). These ‘false flag’ events are used, allegedly, to 
promote ‘liberal’ agendas like gun control and feminism. I guess, in this techno-era, the constant access to 
constantly evolving world and local events means simultaneously living them (by viewing them in real 
time) and not living them (not being there to experience in person). The simultaneous experience/not-
experience produces an uncanny effect of the boundaries between the real and the not-real breaking 
down. Constant technoconnectivity means the constant monitoring of what is ‘real’ and what is not… the 





sit on my face and let me eat my way to your heart! nom nom 
 
 Sites and Facebook pages that rate, in particular, women in terms of their 
appearance, sexual attractiveness and sexual availability are a staple of the internet. 
Facebook was originally started as a rating website for people to judge the attractiveness 
of others (Nurka, 2014), and is now the most used social network ever (Smith & 
Anderson, 2018). While the breadth of Facebook’s functionality has widened 
significantly over the years, pages that rate women are regular features of, in particular, 
university and high school student social interactions. New Zealand has its fair share of 
local rating pages – Otago University’s ‘Rack Appreciation Society’ (see Hume, 2014), 
Wellington College’s Facebook anti-women community (see Dooney, 2017), and in 
some ways, the Roast Busters. But such rating pages are all very similar, globally and 
locally, providing a space for users to submit photos of and/or stories about (mainly) 
women and rating these women on their sexual attractiveness and sexual availability. 
Sometimes women are knowing participants; sometimes they are not. 
 In the cacophony of data collection, such pages can often come to a cyborg 
researcher’s attention after they have been partially or totally obliterated, or made 
explicitly private. One fateful day, news broke about a Facebook community called 
‘Hotties of Melbourne University’ and thanks to the apathetic response of Facebook and 




 The format of the ‘Hotties of Melbourne University’ submissions included a 
photo of the submitted woman,131 her full name, the qualification she was studying 
towards and usually an attempt at a ‘humorous’ caption. Users would proceed to 
comment on the “hotness” of the submitted woman, including sex acts they might like 
to perform with/on her, where she might be at a certain time and linking to her 
Facebook profile or tagging male friends who might like to view her on the community 
page. Some submissions already provided detailed information about where a woman 
might be, and when, so that users (men) could view and/or approach the woman in 
person.  
 
In The Meme-Time: LOL Exploitation – Reproduction of a ‘Hottie.’ 
  
There were only a few instances (on a very active community) of people calling 
the group “creepy” and in particular calling out the practice of pin-pointing the location 
of the women featured. Many of the women were tagged by their friends when their 
                                                          
131 There were a number of submissions featuring men on the ‘Hotties’ community page too, but most of 
these submissions were joke submissions, with the men involved sometimes submitting themselves, or 
friends would submit images of the men dressed up in costumes or doing something silly. The explicitly 
serious male submissions tended to have very few comments (and the comments are mainly from men). 
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submissions appeared, and would comment alongside the community users, usually 
quite playfully, providing flirtatious responses to requests for phone numbers and 
declarations of love. Many of the responses from featured women were also horrified 
exclamations and other confused expressions, as well as questions about who had 
submitted them to the community. Typically, reactions from the women featured were 
ambiguous: none really seemed to object too strongly, at least publicly on the page. At 
one point, a featured woman, tagged into the conversation by a friend responds, 
“I need to ask them to take this down. I have a job now 
It was like you posted this yesterday HAHAHA.” 
And then she proceeded to reminisce about the old days when they would take webcam 
photos of themselves dressing up. Private photos reflecting private moments, even if 
shared publicly on personal Facebook pages, seem to have become ‘rightful’ fodder for 
rating pages – products for consumers to browse. Prolific Reddit troll Violentacrez was 
notorious for mining personal Facebook pages for images of teenage girls to be 
catalogued in his popular ‘Jailbait’ subreddit and promoting sexually explicit 
discussions of the featured girls (see Chen, 2012). While Violentacrez did not seem to 
explicitly individually identify and physically locate the girls in the images he mined, 
the ‘Hotties’ community’s structure mimicked the ‘Jailbait’ subreddit but extended the 
structure by explicitly encouraging the individualised identification of women and 
locating their bodies online, through image mining, tagging, linking and commenting, 
and offline, through physically locating individualised women’s bodies. The ‘Hotties’ 
page and the ‘Jailbait’ subreddit traded in similar commodified products (beep goes the 
barcode scanner). The images, names and physical locations of women were considered 
public property, rightfully shared with community members in the online marketplace 
of women’s bodies. 
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 Aside from tagging friends who might like to view any given “hottie,” the 
prevailing responses to the women featured in the community were requests/commands 
to engage in sex acts and the description of what users would do to be able to just be 
physically near the featured women. There were numerous descriptions of the kinds of 
torture some users claim they would take to their genitals just to hear a featured woman 
“fart through a walkie talkie.”132 A user suggested he would murder his family and eat 
them just to showcase some of a woman’s dead skin cells on his mantle. The comments 
were seemingly made as jokes, emphasising how much they enjoyed the featured 
women, satisfied customers of the freak show, and seemingly trying to one-up each 
other for how ridiculous a scenario they could come up with to express their 
‘appreciation.’ As ‘funny’ as these comments may be to some, they are steeped in 
violence not dissimilar from the kind of violence that enable/d Elliot Rodger, the Roast 
Busters and the pro-rapists. Within these comments/‘jokes’ manifests a network about 
the torturous-ness of women and their bodies within the heterosexual script and the 
violence heterosexual bodies must undergo in order to perform the script. 
 The quote that opened this section exemplifies heteronormative violence. In 
response to a woman’s photo featured on the community page, a user, using what seems 
to be his own individualised and identifiable name, implores the woman: 
 
Technological (anti)social connectivity has enabled this individually identifiable man to 
say to this explicitly personally identified and physically located woman that she should 
let him eat her; a cannibalistic compliment, a noble threat.133 
                                                          
132 There are so many moments when the weirdness of my research crystallises, and this is certainly one 
of them. Staying with the trouble indeed… 
133 There is arguably an emerging trend where performing oral sex on women is the mark of a ‘good guy’ 
who deserves more (hetero)sex than other unprogressive guys who do not ‘value women.’ 
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 The Roast Busters similarly discussed girls they had “roasted,” girls who wanted 
to be “roasted” and girls who ‘should’ be “roasted”; another cannibalistic metaphor for 
sex acts with women’s bodies, where women/girls are seemingly invited to submit 
themselves to/for the acts as the ultimate heterosexual achievement: woman as the 
dominated (and indeed, cooked for consumption) animal. Such acts are constructed as a 
privilege for women/girls to be a part of, the internet and technological communications 
serving as the virtual smorgasbord where users can select which meat/woman they wish 
to consume. Women can be consumed online intensely and at speed, as demonstrated by 
pages like ‘Hotties of Melbourne University,’ where information about women is served 
up and shared by multiple people, simultaneously, instantaneously and with little to no 







#Jadapose: A Memetic Rape 
The #Jadapose hashtag produced an image of the sexual assault of an African-
American teenage girl as a meme in the middle of 2014 (see Bates, 2014; Williams, 
2015). A photo of Jada, the teenage girl, was taken after she was sexually assaulted by 
two boys at a party. She was unconscious after consuming a spiked drink, her body 
assaulted and then photographed. The photograph shows her lying unconscious on the 
floor, her pants removed, one leg bent at an odd angle and one hand resting on her 
stomach. The photo was shared on social media and became accompanied by the 
hashtag ‘#Jadapose,’ with internet users replicating the pose of Jada’s sexually assaulted 
Revenge porn, hacking and ‘hottie’ pages 
provide detailed information about how to find 
specific, individual women fit for consumption. 
What happens when the pro-rapists 
(assuming the Venn diagram here is not a 
complete circle) use that information to locate 
specific targets of ‘corrective’ rape? 
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body. Jada discovered the image of herself, and the replication of it, and realised what 
had happened to her, about a month after her rape occurred and image was taken and 
shared. She came forward to challenge the perpetrators and those who shared in the rape 
through producing the #Jadapose meme. Counter hashtags were created, such as 
#IAmJada and #Jadacounterpose that shared expressions of support for Jada and sexual 
assault victims (Williams, 2015) and organised commitments to changing rape culture 
and ‘teaching boys’ not to rape.  
The #Jadapose meme online produced and enabled the proliferation of not only 
images mocking, trivialising and celebrating a sexually assaulted young black woman’s 
body, but also a proliferation of the ways in which young black women and their bodies 
are talked about particularly in sexually violent situations. A young black woman’s 
violated body was utilised for embodied entertainment purposes online, and talked 
about in ways that positioned her as deserving of not only the sexual violation, but also 
deserving of mass humiliation online, reproducing, instantaneously and expansively, 
racist configurations of the black woman’s body and sexual violence (see Benard, 2016; 
Collins, 2000; Irving, 2007). Responses to her sexually assaulted body moralised about 
personal responsibility (she ‘should have known better’ than to have gone to a frat 
party. She ‘should have known better’ than to have consumed so much alcohol). The 
assault, and its meme-ification online, were produced as justified consequences of not 
embodying the ‘good’ neoliberal individual woman. The meme-ing of Jada’s sexual 
assault online, and others like it,134 enables the assault, and the bodies, to be connected 
to exponentially. The simple click of a virtual button now does the work of 
                                                          
134 The 2012 Steubenville gang rape is one of the most prominent (see Penny, 2013), but New Zealand 
has its own claims to fame with the Roast Busters and numerous Facebook groups/pages detailing sexual 
encounters (consensual or otherwise). 
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conversations and texts that previously more slowly snowballed into dominant 
discourse.   
The #Jadapose meme rests upon the replication and embodiment of a sexually 
assaulted female body as a deserved joke at the expense of femininity, and in particular, 
black femininity. The construction of the black female body as object for deserved 
violation becomes memed: rapidly spread and replicated through technotools (like the 
internet, social media) that permanently retain the image and its multiple meanings, and 
the processes through which the meme-ing occurred: the drugging, the rape, the 
reproduction through sharing and the reproduction of rape through the production of the 
meme image. More than just (as if it is ever a ‘just’) participating in the joke by sharing 
and copying Jada’s raped body, the body of Jada is inhabited, if just momentarily, to 
produce the meme image, arguably yet another violation of her body as people pretend 
to be her body in its abused state. Such embodiment calls upon ideas of how bodies like 
Jada’s deserve the violence and the mocking simultaneously, enabling the production of 
the meme image as a construction of female (black) bodies as sites of deserved sexual 
violence that can be indestructibly replicated ad infinitum. The rape itself, not just the 
meme-ing, is up for replication. The violation and mocking of women’s bodies (again, 
particularly black women’s bodies) is up for embodied replication. The embodied 
experience of deserving rape is a replicable joke. 
While the sharing of sexual assaults online is not rare,  
the deliberate public135 meme-ing of the contorted, 
half-naked, 
unconscious 
                                                          
135 How public the #Jadapose rape/meme became is no doubt significant here. What gets memed behind 





of a black teenage girl 
represented 
a shift away 
from the traditional 
body-as-meme activities 
(like ‘planking’ where people lie flat in weird places), 
and from the production and reproduction of the original image 
(as with other online assaults, revenge porn, non-consensual porn and hacked images) 
and towards the embodied replication 
of the image as a violent joke. 
Meme-ers took up the position of Jada, simultaneously literally, by copying the pose, 
and embodied-ly, by inhabiting the aftermath of her rape as depicted in the photo, 
perhaps as another uncomfortable embodied stint in which the boundaries between the 
‘freak’ and ‘freak-viewer’ are intolerably breached and violently resolved, re-asserting 
the dominance/subjugation binaries so as to proliferate violence against women this 
time through embodied memes. Jada’s meme-ing was serious work that disciplined 
bodies like Jada’s, constructing such bodies as deserving of and inviting the sexual 
violence they receive (by consuming drinks, knowing boys and perhaps just being 
‘women’), as well as constructing rape as a hilarious joke; embodying the raped, 
unconscious woman’s body becomes a fun thing to do with your friends on a Saturday 
night.136  
 
                                                          
136 Yes, this applies to both online meme-ing and offline raping. 
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 Panic! at the Dinner Table 
Communities like the PhilosophyOfRape, the Roast Busters and the ‘Hotties of 
Melbourne University’ page and hashtags like #Jadapose extend the architecture of 
online misogyny (as built in the apocalypse) and heteronormativity (thrashed around by 
a ‘Colored Sculpture’) further into women’s bodies to enact control. Such communities 
build and re-build and re-build not just the structures but the aesthetics that maintain 
misogyny and heteronormativity to structure, shape and maintain women’s bodies as 
inanimate objects to violently violate. Emerging then is a panic architecture of women’s 
bodies. Sexually violent online communities are characterised by the technourgency to 
re-assert the traditional subjugated woman’s feminine body – a tight and controlled 
inanimate body to play with roughly. Through the foregrounding of the violent violation 
of women’s bodies, whether by “roasting,” raping or rating, such sexually violent text 
constructs digital scaffolding and architectural designs of women’s bodies in order to 
keep building and re-building them in ways that assert the constraints of the old binaries 
(on women’s bodies and their movements) and maintain woman as subjugated. The 
woman’s body built through panic architecture becomes Olympia with her eyes 
removed and her clockworks unmoving, mechanically and aesthetically a woman’s 
painted and shaped body but her animation ripped from her, lest she becomes 
awakened. The panic architecture of women’s bodies through sexually violent 
communities resolves the uncanniness of technowomen who may have found ways to 
be embodied beyond the constraints of the heterosexual matrix that asserts the 
dominance of man and the subjugation of woman. Panic architecture re-builds and re-
shapes such bodies as rigidly heterosexual and thus dominated again. The compulsion to 
build and maintain the architecture of the classic binaries (how the binaries are 
structured and what those structures look like) that subjugate women is performed 
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through expansive text, networking and prolific clicking, structuring women’s bodies 
online through the massive and extensive amplification and reproduction of the 
violences that can be done to them, far exceeding the functions of discourse or images, 
so as to build and re-build them as indestructible (in the abusable and replaceable 








Panic architecture comes with a warning though: be mindful of what you are building, 














Chapter Twelve Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
Here is a mixed metaphor from the PhilosophyOfRape forum: 
“Modern Western women are deranged feral animals who lack the capacity to 
understand or want consent. Anybody can fuck them at any time. They are 
public urinals in the shape of feral cats.” 
 
 


























Chapter Thirteen: Zero Days Left (Time’s Up) 
 
Instead of women dominating my research I fell into that apocalyptic rupture 
where women are classified and unified by the violence done to them. And perhaps in 
the flat circle of time there is no unification otherwise possible (yet). Technological 
advances allow for the instantaneous and intensive proliferation of Panoptical 
surveillance, where ‘others’ are policed in and through technologies, continuously 
enabling new ways for women’s bodies to have violence perpetrated against them. 
Online, text is policed through technomechanisms like reblogs, comments, ‘likes,’ 
‘upvotes’ and ‘going viral,’ reporting and hashtagging. The myriad of multiple ways to 
connect and produce online and through technology allows for the instantaneous 
proliferation of text and ways of talking that position people as ‘others’ continuously 
and in multiple and partial ways. Slender Man stalks and takes young women; Elliot 
Rodger and his incel followers demand power over heterosex and women’s bodies; the 
PhilosophyOfRape forum advocates for the “correction” of women through rape. So 
much for the disembodiment of the internet… Women’s bodies are very much so the 
target of hatred, control and domination online.  
The internet is also where women’s bodies proliferate in more positive but still 
troubling ways; from selfies and body-positive hashtag activism, to body shaping, to 
Human Barbie and (Female figure), women’s bodies feature prominently throughout 
internet text and images. The proliferation of the connections between and to women’s 
bodies through rapidly advancing technologies produces a multiplicity of ways to shape 
and re-shape women’s bodies, constrain women’s movements and of re-asserting 
binaries that render women intolerably singular again. 
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But women have possibilities in technotimes that can exploit and upend and 
redo. I had to deal with the violent and prolific and urgent reassertion of the binaries 
(the panic architecture of women’s bodies) and the multiple ways these reassertions can 
now manifest and how they can constrain and transform women's bodies. I had to deal 
with the violences of this earth before I could look towards another earth. 
A workshop of sci-fi readers (Rapoport, 1977) suggested that people believed 
the sci-fi trope of moving to another planet (or just into space somehow) would enable 
humans to live differently than they do on earth. There was seemingly an assumption 
that the social ills that the oppressed so often need/desire to escape from would not 
transfer to the new planet (or spaceship) and social utopia would therefore be possible.  
But through most sci-fi stories, the narrative tends to veer back to the earth-
philic; there are unknown dangers in space, including… your father (poor Darth 
Vader…)! Or even worse… your mother (yaass Xenomorph queen)! Better to stay on 
earth and deal with the regular old horrors of gender and race and violence. 
At the end of the movie ‘Another Earth,’ Rhoda encounters her ‘other earth’ 
double. Rhoda’s need/desire to visit the other earth (or have her victim visit it) suggests 
her compulsion for the utopian narrative many dreamed of in Rapoport’s (1977) sci-fi 
fan workshop: another earth must surely be better than this one; life worked out 
differently on another earth; another earth is a salvation. But Rhoda’s uncanny 
encounter with her double suggests otherwise. While her double is dressed very 
differently (her thick black overcoat and boots contrast starkly to Rhoda’s jumpsuit and 
beanie), she does not appear happy; for if Rhoda wanted so desperately to rocket herself 
to another earth, what could have propelled Rhoda’s other earth double to want to leave 
her earth? Rhoda, I imagine, is stuck; her life (and all its variants) bound in, to borrow 
again from Haraway (1991), a spiral dance of trauma, where violences recur, even if 
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their form shifts and changes. Rhoda knows what she wants to re-do (Rhoda’s idea of 
utopia is one in which a certain series of events did not occur), and what she wanted to 
give: life back to someone else (hoping that the trauma was not repeated on the other 
earth). And yet her double has appeared to her; an escapee of another life possibly not 
so well lived/endured as either Rhoda dreamed (or possibly much better lived – we do 
not found out). Quite explicitly, through an uncanny moment (the climax of multiple 
uncanny moments through the movie), the idea of the utopian ‘other earth’ is not 
necessarily dashed, but at least disrupted, as we question how these two Rhodas came to 
share an earth. Another earth is no guarantee of a better life or a more just life, just the 
potential of a different one. 
New spaces, new places, new people? The internet, in all its glory, was surely an 
earthbound attempt at the sci-fi dream of another earth, a doubling of our ‘selves’ into 
another space. Move people through new frontiers and their politics will surely change 
for the better, in the interest of utopic social connections (whatever those are). There is a 
particular up-take in utopic-other-earth thinking through the 2010s, given the current 
global (Trumpian) political climate and the discovery of the possibly liveable 
TRAPPIST-1 system (see www.trappist.one to explore). Can we blamed for dreaming 
about rocketing ourselves into another solar system to escape Trump and his brand, or 
[insert any other horror here]?  
Even though technologies open space for sci-fi dreams of new unburdened 
bodies and politics in new unburdened places, it should come as no surprise that when 
you open up the ‘new frontier’ known as the internet and look at what is going on in 
that ‘new world,’ from porn to social media to politics, the terrain of that strange but 
familiar online space starts to form as fraught and as violent, compelling us towards the 
urgent proliferations of the violences against women that define them and their bodies – 
352 
 
an earth-philic trouble that needs staying with. When a cyborg works/plays she grabs 
onto whatever urgencies manifest and those urgencies are mostly about the dire 
conditions of the woman's body. Instead, in this chapter, the unlucky thirteenth, we pre-
empt a meeting of a re-doubled uncanny woman's body. Like Rhoda in ‘Another Earth,’ 
we turn to experience a doubling of women's bodies from perhaps another earth lousy 
with possibility and emergent transformations. The doubling is not necessarily alien, or 
a drastic transformation, just a transformation that offers new imaginations, new 
possibilities, new thoughts to think thoughts. She makes feminism and woman strange 
and alien again. 
 
Locked in a Deadly Embrace 
According to Chandor (1981), a ‘Deadly Embrace’ is when “all processes within 
a computer are competing for resources at the same time. Until external intervention 
removes one process and allows the others to be reactivated, only one process can 
continue and all action is frozen” (p. 57). Competing for the computer’s resources, 
multiple processes block each other from advancing and completing their processes, 
slowing or freezing the computer. With the advances of computer technologies, the 
‘deadly embrace’ seems a rarer occurrence, with academic computer science work on 
the issue coming mainly from the 1970s (see for example Llewellyn, 1973). At the very 
least, computer systems are now able to cope with significantly more processing than 
they were in the 1970s, handling more tasks faster and more efficiently than the 
machines of the past.  
Aside from just sounding cool (always important), the concept of the ‘deadly 
embrace’ enables a metaphoric examination of ‘processes’ that compete for the 
resources of the woman’s body. Viral hashtag movements like #MeToo are examples of 
technologised ‘competing’ for domain over the woman’s body and sexuality in 
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competition with the processes of dominant masculinity and individualised, fragmented 
processes of 21st century Western feminist politics.  
The #MeToo hashtag was started by African-American activist Tarana Burke in 
2006, but was appropriated and went viral in late 2017 through allegations that emerged 
from multiple celebrity women against Harvey Weinstein (Jaffe, 2018). Through the 
#MeToo movement, the woman’s body (individual and cultural) is being contested as a 
site of sexual violence. The #MeToo hashtag aims to unify women’s experiences of 
sexual assault and harassment by demonstrating just how many women can say “me 
too” when the subject of sexual assault and harassment is raised.137 Specifically, the 
hashtag enables an understanding of how normalised women’s lived experience of 
sexual violation is globally. Women’s bodies are central to the #MeToo movement, 
with their violation central to the protests of and challenges to dominant constructions 
of Western heterosexual interrelations and the parts that women’s bodies play in those 
interrelations.  
With a now (white) celebrity profile, #MeToo became a massive global 
movement of women connected through the internet. While #MeToo has become a 
catchcry for feminist organisation and movement, the use of the hashtag drew (and 
continues to draw) significant backlash. Aside from the inevitable anti-feminist 
responses about evidence, innocence and men’s fear of being accused (that panic 
architecture that re-asserts the binaries), responses from within the movement have been 
tense too. For those not ready or willing to share their experiences of sexual 
violence/harassment (or those who assert they have not experienced any such 
behaviour), the #MeToo movement engages in individualised participation where 
                                                          
137 A prominent precursor to #MeToo was the #YesAllWomen hashtag that was created response to the 
#NotAllMen movement that sought to inform #YesAllWomen feminists that “not all men” are 
sexist/misogynist (see Nicholas & Agius, 2018). 
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specific bodies become visible when they do not participate just as when they do. For 
example, American singer Ariana Grande was touched inappropriately by a pastor, live 
on international television, at singer Aretha Franklin’s funeral, as he told racist jokes 
about her name (see Woodsome, 2018). Grande has been expected to make a #MeToo 
statement, politicising the events for the good of the movement, as if it is her 
responsibility to politicise her experience of sexual harassment (for a discussion see 
Johnson, 2018). Sharing how individualised women’s bodies have been violated is 
becoming a normalised process of ‘good’ feminism; the personal responsibility of 
individualised women to share their experiences is constructed as too politically 
important and as if sharing is a practice that does not have negative social/political 
repercussions. Celebrity women’s assault stories are now being catalogued (for example 
Rife, 2017). It is not merely enough to say “#MeToo,” but the details of such assaults 
are forming networks of abused bodies. #MeToo as a hashtag movement for the 
amplification of women’s voices politically online has expanded beyond its supportive 
and cathartic networking aims into a vast network of contested stories about contested 
bodies. Whether women share or do not share, they run the risk of being accused of not 
understanding how their bodies have been violated – from women being told they are 
being uncritical of their own experiences if they believe they have not ever been 
harassed or assaulted (see McDonald, 2017), to women being told that their #MeToo 
story does not meet the threshold for harassment or assault (see Andrews, Peigne & 
Vonberg, 2018). As well as making women’s fraught positions on the subject even more 
fraught (see James, 2017; McGuire, 2017; Putnam, 2018 for some stories, and 
Gopinathan Sah, 2018 for a poem), the demand for individualised #MeToo details also 
enables the discussions about what counts as sexual harassment, violence and rape; 
what counts as complicit; and what counts as punishment and atonement (see 
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Tomaszewski (2018) for some ‘fact-checking,’ for example). The ‘what counts as’ 
conversations are individualised distractions from women’s lived experiences of sexual 
violence, re-routing – I have been in this closed loop before – the problem back to 
women and their deficiencies. Women are reproduced yet again as too intellectually 
inferior or too sensitive to understand the masculine-defined line between flirting and 
rape, too deviant to ever be rapable or too hysterical to comprehend normalised sexual 
behaviour. #MeToo and related hashtags – acknowledging that there are thousands upon 
thousands of hashtags in an ever-expanding mass of signals that organise around 
women’s sexualised bodies and contest their meanings – multiply without necessarily 
hyperconnecting in politically potent ways. Such hashtags are embodied processes of 
politicising the sexually assaulted woman’s body, functioning to claim space as the 
dominant representation and construction of the woman’s body, but their networkability 
is being re-routed through neoliberal individualism, producing singularised accounts 
and singularised bodies yet again.  
Neoliberal individualism’s co-opting of intersectionality seems, to a feminist 
cyborg, to be producing a deadly embrace for feminist politics, where our various 
hyphen states stall, log-jammed within political systems, waiting for the next hyphen to 
be processed. The intersection metaphor that intersectionality is founded upon is one 
that conjures the image of traffic jams and road rage; we, the othered, all converge on 
the same political point despite arriving from different destinations, and going in 
different directions, but we cannot all go through the intersection at the same time, or 
we crash into each other. Individualised #MeToo bodies, rather than moving through 
embodied networks to transform gendered interrelations, compete for resources as 
individualised signals, jamming the system, locking feminist politics in a deadly 
embrace. Deadly embraces, whether in computers or in women’s politics, result in a 
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loss of time, a loss of data, and not to mention “the inconvenience caused to users” 
(Llewellyn, 1973, p. 223). In networked cyborg politics, your wires might get a little 
fried, your systems a little over-loaded, but you cannot smash your fellow nodes to 
smithereens. It matters to women’s body politics which thoughts think women’s body 
politics. 
Llewellyn (1973) suggested that computers with more multi-programming 
capabilities were more susceptible to the deadly embrace, just how women, in their 
multiple, partial, simultaneity might be more susceptible to having their more multiple 
and fragmented politics overridden by more robust and established programs like 
masculinity. Crucially, these kinds of hashtags, like #MeToo, occur simultaneously on 
the internet with vast networks of misogyny and pro-rape ideology, competing for the 
same resource: the (hetero)sexualised woman’s body. Misogynist movements and 
memes (like #Jadapose) have the advantage of extending the architecture of dominant 
tried-and-true misogynist foundational constructions of sexualised women’s bodies, 
enabling relatively coherent (in an architectural sense of the word, not in the sense of 
meaning-making) understandings of the sexualised woman’s body that build and shape 
reinforced technoarchitectural designs of women’s deficiency, women’s sexual 
deviance and men’s domination. Women-led movements (like #MeToo) are produced 
as significantly more fragmented and unclear in their goals or strategies, mimicking the 
noninnocent and multiple experience of femininity and woman as an ‘other.’ The 
attempt at the unification of bodies under the umbrella hashtag of “#MeToo” may 
mount somewhat of a challenge to the relative singularity of dominant misogynist 
constructions, but #MeToo hashtag politics is a process still burdened by the weakened 
potency of networked connection through individualised accounts and the lack of ways 
of speaking for women where it is possible to articulate the simultaneity and 
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multiplicity of women’s lived experience. The troubles of women’s #MeToo 
technopolitics – neoliberal individualism (a constraint on the thoughts we can think 
with) and ineffability (the incapacity to locate language to speak with) – work to 
dismantle the networked non-hierarchical power structures that might enable ‘woman’ 
as potently multiple, partial and fragmented, producing instead that deadly embrace 
characterised by jammed signals, a “problem of interference between communicating 
parallel processes” (Llewellyn, 1973, p. 223) where women’s politics are rendered 
singular and subjugated again. 
So women’s experiences (specifically here technowomen’s experiences) are 
constantly simultaneous, partial, contradictory, especially compared to the more 
singular, dominant processes of dominant masculinity that can streamline 
understandings without creating too much of a deadlock in its own internal functioning. 
When women enact politicised processes through individualistic thoughts, there are too 
many processes completing through a centralised (masculine, individualised) system 
that then shuts these processes down in a deadly embrace. It matters what ‘thoughts 
think thoughts.’  
 
Caught in Our Stuxnet 
According to Llewellyn (1973), the way to wriggle free of a deadly embrace is 
to build a control system that can deal with the multiplicity. A cyborg might in an 
unspecified future have some suggestions for how to build a new system (if she is not 
indeed a new system herself…), but exploiting the current system is an urgency she can 
urgently attend to. 
A zero-day vulnerability is a bug or a hole in computer software that enables 
someone else to execute code on the machine without anyone knowing. It is a security 
flaw that the developers of the software are not aware of and thus there is no fix for it 
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(Ablon & Bogart, 2017). Such vulnerabilities can be exploited by programmes and 
viruses deployed by hackers and other technosavvy users (like governments) who might 
want to disrupt a system or take over control of it.  
Stuxnet, which exploited a zero-day vulnerability, was the first digital weapon 
known to have physically destroyed its target: an Iranian nuclear facility (Collins & 
McCombie, 2012). Described as a technological response to a political problem, 
Stuxnet exploited software vulnerabilities within an Iranian nuclear power plant, 
slowing down the technical progress of nuclearisation, but speeding up or exacerbating 
political progress as an act of cyberwarfare launched through joint efforts from the 
United States of America and Israel against Iran (see Makuch, Tucker & Reibling, 
2016b). Stuxnet worked by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities and networking through 
systems, exploiting more and more vulnerabilities as it moved through and between 
computers, USB drives, printers and any other exploitable technologies (Collins & 
McCombie, 2012). While Stuxnet is ancient by cyberwarfare standards now, it serves as 
a neat technometaphor for technowomen’s potent connections online that might help re-
route out of the deadly embraces women find themselves in. Perhaps patriarchal western 
masculinity is a zero-day vulnerability to be exploited. Women online have, through 
some networks, slowed masculinity down. #MeToo as a technomovement has 
challenged the ubiquity of sexual violence against women, resulting in a few 
individualised instances of the beginnings of what might eventually look like justice for 
women (like the arrest of Harvey Weinstein for example). Blogs like 
straightwhiteboystexting.org are also building networks of women resisting the 
architectures of misogyny, heteronormativity and women’s bodies built online, re-
routing women’s body politics through potent connectivity, irony, contradiction and 
humorous play. And such potent connectivity is speeding up women’s politics (and in 
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some ways dismantling them, but let me have a moment here) through the 
hyperconnectivity of online conversations, about what the heck a ‘woman’ is, or could 
be. A feminist Stuxnet aims to, with technical masculine progress slowed and feminist 
politics pinging around computers and devices, eventually halt the technical progress of 
abusing and deleting women by exploiting the inbuilt vulnerabilities of patriarchal 
western masculinity: too-fixed identities, the economy, wind through your comb-over 
and other things the patriarchy gets uppity about. 
Masculinity, in the Stuxnet technometaphor, is the PLC (programmable logic 
controller) (Collins & McCombie, 2012). A PLC controls the critical infrastructure of 
the physical world by programming computers that control the physical machinery of 
that infrastructure (Makuch, Tucker & Reibling, 2016a). PLCs are technologically weak 
and extremely hackable, and yet are the core component of most of the West’s critical 
infrastructure (for example, water supplies, power grids and so on). When PLCs were 
first designed, technological security was not considered of significance, as they were 
built in a time when connectivity was (comparatively) extremely low. So PLCs are 
“foundationally insecure” (Makuch, Tucker & Reibling, 2016a). It seems that while 
systems that connected into the PLCs were increasingly strengthened, the PLCs 
themselves, due to their robust functionality – the design seems to have remained 
unchanged for decades (Makuch, Tucker & Reibling, 2016a) – remained 
technologically static and thus resistant to alteration, even in the name of security. 
Western patriarchal masculinity remains similarly resistant to alteration, despite 
repeated hacks that disrupt its security and functionality from feminist technopolitics 
(from gaining the right to vote to #MeToo). Masculine PLCs may control the 
infrastructure, but they have become easily hijacked.  
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Through the writing of this research, I have explicated the technometaphorical 
masculine construction of online amplified misogyny, heteronormativity and women’s 
bodies. Such panic architecture rebuilds technowomen as inanimate and subjugated, 
resolving the uncanny experience of a technowoman, an animate inanimate object. The 
panicked, compulsive, continuous necessity to resolve technowoman suggests that a 
feminist Stuxnet has already launched, perhaps in the imploded shape of a cyborg, 
exploiting heretofore unknown and unexperienced masculine vulnerabilities and 
generating new networks through which to move – a cyborg working/playing, 
undetected, in the machine; recovering scrap metal, ideas and bodies to start building 
fictionalised architecture that tests possible body politics. Technowomen’s politicalised 
architecture fiction provides a thought through which to think technowomen as building 
structures to support women and their bodies outside of the heterosexual matrix; 
constructing a new system that more survivably processes multiplicity, partiality, 












Chapter Thirteen Appendage: Un-Wholly Thoughts 
Most research projects would pick a topic, like sexually violent memes for 
example, and investigate the topic in depth to narrow down to specific analytic points 
(discourses and so on). However, my project has jacked into movements and bodies to 
open up networks that expand in multiple, partial, simultaneous and contradictory ways 
to understand women’s embodied embeddedness in the 21st century technophilic West. 
The limitations of linear Western writing formats to produce legitimate Western 
Knowledge™ have constrained the expansive, multiple and hyperconnected politics of 
cyborg embodiment. Since I am not defining, manufacturing and commodifying 
knowledge here, but rather building a network open for connection, I produce an 
architectural fiction for how to write a cyborg through the impositions of linearity and 
clarity in academia. My project uses technometaphors and technofigures to explore 
technophilic worlds and produce technounderstandings of those technoworlds that 
embrace their multiplicity, partiality, simultaneity and contradictions. Technology 
shapes bodies and bodies shape technology. Technothoughts think technobodies and 
technobodies think technothoughts. It matters what ‘thoughts think thoughts.’ 
Sci-fi technowomen like (Female figure), Human Barbie and the two (perhaps 
more?) Rhodas from ‘Another Earth’ send response-able questions through the network, 
potently pinging nodes and exploiting the connectivity of machines through Stuxnet-
technowarfare – “Who renders whom capable of what, and at what price, borne by 
whom?” (Haraway, 2016, p. 23) – How do women and their bodies recover in a 21st 
century characterised by proliferating technoconnectivity? – How do women’s bodies 
work when unplugged from the heteronormative matrix? – What happens when 
impossibilities become possible? – How might women play in the ‘glistening guts’ of 
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machines? – How might women materialise language for their embodiment on another 
planet? 
At the end of ‘Another Earth’ Rhoda meets her Earth 2 edition – just as (Female 
figure) and Human Barbie have multiple editions – and we are left with open questions, 
not a resolved and closed ending. Their meeting is uncanny: technowomen looking back 
























Chapter Thirteen Appendix: 
Wholly Thoughts Enforced by Agent Smith 
 
 
Theory: Feminist Poststructuralism  
For the current study, like many a feminist poststructuralist project (for example, 
Bartky, 1998; Haraway, 1995; Sawicki, 1991), Foucault (1980; 1984a; 1984b; 1995) was a 
gateway theorist to ways of thinking power, knowledge and bodies. His work on biopolitics 
(Foucault, 1980; 1995) brought to the forefront how power shapes bodies – a key concept for 
feminists to build upon. For example, conceptualising power as functioning like capillaries 
shifts understandings of how we come to occupy and experience certain subject positions 
through our everyday, mundane lived experiences. For me, the notion of capillaried power 
calls into question the categories of dominant/subjugated, and opens such binaries up to more 
complex understandings of power and how densely power and knowledge work to shape 
docile bodies, and in particular, docile women’s bodies, from their positioning as ‘other to’ 
men. For Foucault (1984a), the body “is an inscribed surface of events” (p. 83), where power 
shapes and scars the body, keeping it disciplined. Foucault’s bringing of the body into the 
relationship between power and knowledge has been crucial for feminist theorists to develop 
and extend. 
Foucault’s (1984a) work on genealogy also allows for feminists to engage the history 
of talk about women and their bodies, bringing historical power struggles to the surface and 
enabling understandings of a subject’s emergence, in present day and possible future contexts. 
Genealogical reviews of the histories of talk/text about women and their bodies bring to the 
fore the multiplicities and contradictions of women’s experiences and embodiment, like the 
tension between women’s health and ill-health (Johnson, 2010; Silverstein & Perlick, 1995; 
Ussher, 2008) and the competing demands on women’s bodies to enact gendered 
performances (Balsamo, 1995; Bartky, 1998; Braidotti, 2011; Haraway, 1991; Potts, 2002). 
Such discursive histories matter to feminist work as they understand and challenge women’s 
troublesome experiences in the modern world, and open space for new ways to think women, 
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their bodies and their politics. So, for feminist theorists, Foucault’s work has raised questions 
in particular about women’s resistance to dominance, and the dangers of resistance. How do 
we resist if power is capillaried? What happens when we resist? 
Once through the Foucault gateway, I engaged with feminist theorists who utilised 
Foucault’s work to orient more closely towards women and their experiences. Foucault’s ideas 
of power and knowledge, docile bodies and resistance were foundational for feminists for re-
thinking the complexities of women’s positioning, opening space for the multiplicities of 
women’s experiences to be accounted for, rather than categorised as deviant or deficient, as 
compared to men’s fictively homogenous experiences. In resistance to unified understandings 
of women and their experiences, particularly as outlined in traditional psychological research, 
I engaged with feminist poststructuralist works that disrupted binary categorisations, and thus 
allowed for contradiction and multiplicity. Feminist theorists like Sandra Bartky (1998), 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and Rosi Braidotti (2003; 2006) drew attention to the ways in which 
women’s experiences, and their bodies, were shaped, multiply, by power – socially, 
economically, technologically. For example, Bartky (1998) outlined the ways in which women 
internalise patriarchal surveillance to discipline their bodies, taking up subjugated positioning 
in dominant patriarchal discourse, normalising particular (harmful) gendered performances. 
From removing body hair to taking up space in public, Bartky argues that women’s bodies are 
disciplined into feminine subordination through capillaried and panoptic patriarchal power. 
For Bartky (1998), Foucault was “blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of 
embodiment that is peculiarly feminine” (p. 27), so she pulls Foucault’s groundwork through 
women’s embodied experiences to bring to the fore how women and their bodies so acutely 
experience discipline through patriarchal power. 
Similarly, Grosz (1994) helps us understand the breakdown of women’s bodies into 
fixable, interchangeable components, constantly needing to be adjusted so as to continually 
acquiesce to patriarchal surveillance. The body becomes an object that speaks to social, 
cultural, political and historical experiences of dominance and subjugation (Grosz, 1994), 
again pulling through Foucault’s ideas about biopower and genealogy in order to re-route 
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them more specifically through women, their bodies and femininity. In particular, Grosz 
(1994) was interested in the vast potential for women’s (body) politics when we can start to 
produce language for women and their bodies beyond the binaries that confine them; the 
possibilities of the body as a political object are endless, terrifying and exciting. 
Alongside Bartky and Grosz, Rosi Braidotti also questions what bodies might do 
outside of the taken-for-granted binaries, particularly through new technologies. Braidotti 
(2006) suggests that women “have been cannibalized by the new technologies” (p. 199), 
situated within technological advancements that produce and reproduce power/knowledge in 
both old and new ways, and thus subjugating women in both old and new ways. Like Grosz, 
Braidotti (2003) is also interested in the breakdown and reconfiguration of boundaries, 
particularly those binaries most explicitly implicated in (phallocentric) social hierarchies. 
Through my thesis, Braidotti’s varied work performs certain tasks, her ideas 
functioning as moving components that enable, in particular, Haraway’s work to be 
figuratively privileged within my own work. Braidotti appears at points in the text where the 
connections between the cyborg and her feminist poststructuralist kin need to be explicitly 
wired. As such, rather than closely and dutifully following in the footsteps of the feminist 
poststructuralist foremothers, I instead build them into the cyborg text, multiply, partially and 
contradictorily, where they can enliven particular connections, like how Braidotti understands 
the connections between metaphors and figures (on pages 9 and 10), or explicates how 
Haraway’s cyborg can untangle (and re-tangle) connections that transform power 
relationships beyond taken-for-granted hierarchies and instead through networks (page 12). 
Feminist theorists like Bartky, Grosz and Braidotti then become like the nuts and bolts that 
hold key structures and networks of the cyborg together, helping to explicate Haraway’s 
complex and multiple cyborg so that she may be deployed for research purposes. 
Through my previous research with online pro-anorexic communities, I situated 
myself theoretically within feminist poststructuralism that opened space for the multiplicities 
and contradictions of women’s embodied experiences (Connor & Coombes, 2014; Connor, 
Coombes & Morgan, 2015). Anorexia has been described as a disorder of paradoxes, so 
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feminist theorising of the disorder can become about making space for paradoxes not as 
problems but as sites of complexity opened to analysis of the social power relations that 
condition their possibility. Pro-anorexia specifically occupies fraught positioning as heavily 
policed disorder online. As a movement, pro-anorexia has only become possible through the 
invention of, and increased access to, the internet. The distinct connection between pro-
anorexia, a disorder explicitly produced through the body (and in particular, the woman’s 
body), and technological advancement, suggests an approach that entangles together not only 
biology and politics (like Foucault’s biopolitics and the feminists who explicate it), but also 
distinctly draws upon technology to theorise women’s embodiment in the Eurocentric 21st 
century West.  
So I have continued to perform research from a position of being embedded in the 
rapid expansion of technoculture in the 21st century West, as a woman, an online citizen and 
feminist researcher in psychology. Being embedded within such an accelerating expansion as it 
happens in real time highlights how the inadequacies of dominant psychological 
methodologies, epistemologies and ontologies become frustrating (for instance, as they reveal 
their incapacity to deal with the excesses of constantly proliferating and partial online text) 
and, in some ways, dangerous (for instance, when the imperative for neoliberal ‘informed 
consent’ sends a feminist woman researcher to ask permission from users in online spaces set 
up explicitly for violence against feminist women (see page 115)). As a user of the internet, I 
experience a technoculture emerging where images of women proliferate through the internet. 
Women’s bodies become images for use and abuse in multiple, contradictory ways that move 
more quickly and flexibly than the static images of analogue life. In order to account for my 
own positioning as a feminist woman experiencing women’s online embodiment, I take up 
Haraway’s (2016) incitement to create new thoughts to think women’s body politics with.  
Given the dominance of images of women online, one new trajectory for critical postfeminist 
analysis opens up the question of what happens if we privilege ‘figures’ that move and ‘do’? 
Rather than analysing images that seem relatively static as representations of appearance and 
political positioning, the purpose of this research is to creatively trial how women might 
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engage in ways to think and write themselves differently through more agentic, dynamic 
figures to produce critical postfeminist analyses of complex and dynamic nodes in networks of 
gendered social power relations which articulate women’s embodiment online. 
 
Cyborg 
I have previously explored the possibilities of the cyborg for research purposes, 
building the figure of a pro-anorexic cyborg by mobilising Haraway’s (1991) cyborg through 
the forms, functions and content of pro-anorexic communities (Connor & Coombes, 2014; 
Connor, Coombes & Morgan, 2015). The pro-anorexic cyborg figure produced through such an 
analysis drew attention to the ways in which women and their bodies, power and technology 
are becoming networked, opening new understandings of the possibilities for politicised 
embodiment in the 21st century. The 21st century West has become characterised by rapidly 
shifting social, cultural and political upheavals, and with those upheavals come new, as 
Foucault (1984a) might suggest, inscriptions upon bodies, and my previous research explored 
how the inscriptions were functioning for online women who identified themselves as pro-
anorexic. In the current project, engaging Haraway’s cyborg for simulating online movements 
and engagements through partiality and hyperconnection, for blurring the boundaries 
between online worlds and academic conventions and between discursive and digital 
technologies, becomes fit for the purpose of trialling new ways to engage with women’s body 
politics online. 
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is a feminist figure for women’s technologised embodiment 
in the late 20th and early 21st century. She emerged during the 1980s West, characterised by 
the tensions between capitalism and socialism, patriarchal technologies and feminist social 
movements, human and machine. Politicising the connections between the (woman’s) body 
and technologies engages a radical challenge to the production of knowledge in a time when 
knowledge production is rapidly and radically changing through the proliferation of 
connections online. Politicising these proliferating connections is a central aim of this thesis. 
While Haraway’s cyborg explicitly targeted capitalism as it proliferated through the 1980s, my 
approach shifts to capitalism’s freakish excess, neoliberalism, as the problematic ‘ism’ of the 
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2000s onwards. Neoliberalism extends capitalism to more explicitly make flesh global 
economic demands and, simultaneously, reproduces those demands as social ideology (for 
example, the demand for personal responsibility). Cycling body-commodities back through the 
economy again, and again, neoliberalism’s endless feedback loop tightens and intensifies the 
boundedness of the responsible neoliberal individual while amplifying the multiplicities of the 
social-economic demands of being continually produced and reproduced as an embodied 
commodity. As such, the 21st century neoliberal West has thrown up two key contradictory 
phenomena: increasing hyperindividualism and exponential hyperconnection (see chapter 
four on ethics, as well as pages 90-92 for the example of the man floating in space, and pages 
355-357 for the #MeToo example). Both the intensification of individualised thinking and the 
massive techno-connectivity of people, places and things have emerged through rapid 
technological advancements that have seen basic and increasingly affordable technological 
resources (capitalist commodities) move from beepers to smartphones in an extremely short 
space of time. New forms of hyperconnected hyperindividualism are being produced. They 
urgently need critical analytic attention as they emerge within the context of violence against 
women, whether through Instagram filters or pro-rape forums. One of the aims of this research 
is to engage technology’s rapid and increasing ease of intervention directly into our lives and 
bodies as a key concern for feminist researchers, particularly as these technologies will shape 
bodies in new and possibly alarming ways that earlier feminist theorists (for example, Bartky’s 
(1998) writing on patriarchal femininity) would not have encountered. Revisiting Haraway’s 
(1991) marginalised 20th century cyborg in the 21st century, where we are indeed becoming 
cyborg in even more mundane and spectacular ways than Haraway dreamed, opens 
opportunities to test out her politics in a technoworld characterised by techno-urgencies.  
 
Cyborg as a Doing Figure 
In a foreword to Katie King’s ‘Networked Reenactments: Stories Transdisciplinary 
Knowledges Tell’, Donna Haraway discusses how King “provides a feast of reading pleasures in 
this book, asking only that the reader learn to taste from a menu that ranges out of the 
gustatory comfort zone of many disciplined eaters” (King, 2011, p. xi). My own work presents a 
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similar challenge to readers, shifting the metaphor from gastronomy to digital consumption, 
asking them to connect into ports (and thoughts) and occupy networks not typically accessed 
by academics and researchers. As I occupy the space of cyborg researcher doing cyborg work, I 
open connections for (cyborg) readers to do likewise. For example, my analysis of the Roast 
Busters, pro-rape forums and the ‘Hotties of Melbourne University’ Facebook page (in chapter 
twelve) collects up and constructs the dynamic technologised architecture of sexually violent 
online text and movements, rather than sectioning off discourses and themes that traditional 
“disciplined eaters” might be more accustomed to consuming as analytic produce. Placing such 
an unusual academic meal on the table allows for connections beyond the confines of a 
traditional reading practice. For instance, where readers might not be clear about what it is 
they are consuming, and why, the possibilities prompt questions and challenges about how we 
have come to understand what clarity is and how it has come to be so privileged in academia, 
particularly when we, as feminists, are clear that women’s experiences (and the experiences of 
other ‘others’) are anything but characterised by clarity.  
In many instances I do indeed connect the user in abrupt ways, jacking them into 
networks they might otherwise rather avoid. For example, in chapter seven, I open a 
connection into an embrace with Slender Man and Gable Tostee, wiring technological myth 
into stark technological embodiment. The discomfort between such a connection is understood 
through the density of the social, cultural and historical connections, where the ease and speed 
of the proliferation of the Slender Man mythos through technology, the normalised role of 
technology in 21st century sexual encounters and the technologised renewals of gendered 
relations that subordinate women (as sick, as sluts, as sick sluts), produces anxieties about our 
dependent use of technology more acutely felt by a reader occupying the network, rather than 
a reader reading about the network. Doing cyborg work enables continuous shifting of 
positionings, for the writer and for the reader, where attention can be drawn to how we 
respond to urgencies produced through technologies. Much research about the dangers or 
delights of technology sanitise our embodied experiences of technology by either focusing on 
the dangers and minimising the delights that keep us jacked in (for example, Brown and 
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Tiggemann’s (2016) research on negative body image and social media), or by focusing on the 
delights (like the benefits of blogging for cancer survivors (de Boer & Slatman, 2014)) and 
minimising the dangers to issues of individual, neoliberal responsibility (see, for example, the 
Burke Winkelman et al. (2015) list of ‘dos and don’ts’ for online women). With the massive 
number of connections to be made online, their embodied experience can be simultaneously 
dangerous and delightful, becoming a site for critical analysis of the politics of these 
connections. For example, the viral movement of Jordan Wolfson’s (Female figure) through the 
internet engaged in the simultaneous delight and danger of imagining high technology, 
women’s bodies and art. The connections between technology, bodies and art blur so 
profoundly within the installation itself, but also call into question our own bodily, 
technological blurrings as viewers of images online, hyperconnected to other viewers, 
particularly if that art becomes delightfully dangerous, like a stripper-witch with shark teeth 
and a firm grip. The possibilities for connection online form a formidable source of embodied 
tension, let alone assessing the quality of such connections. Such embodied technoconnectivity 
presents a significant challenge to the traditions of methodology designed to assert boundaries 
around processes and data. New methodological thoughts are needed to critically think the 
proliferation of simultaneous connections through technology.  
 
A Cyborg Methodology 
The Impossible Feast is a term for describing the constant production and 
consumption of content online, where content is continuously available to connect to 
(CyborgAnthropology.com, 2012). We can consume massive amounts of information, text and 
imagery before reaching satiation, and even if we do become ‘full’ of data, more and more and 
more content is continually being produced online. Stepping away from the buffet table that is 
the internet only means that the informational food continues to pile up, always ready for us to 
resume consumption. 
The idea of the ‘Impossible Feast’ makes explicit the challenges of proliferation that 
technotimes present. Conceptualising the online world through this technologised metaphor 
for proliferation and consumption enables a research shift towards how we are embedded 
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within technoculture, even as psychology researchers, and how our embeddedness can inform 
theoretical and methodological movements away from traditional methodologies that may be 
updated for contemporary technotimes, but are not born from technotimes. We can, and do, 
update traditional methods in psychology, but as a practice of augmenting established 
techniques for contemporary use. However, augmented methods are not developed from 
within technotimes, and are as such not informed by and produced through the urgencies of 
now, limiting their capacity to address the simultaneity and proliferation of connections in 
technoculture. As researchers in psychology, we are trained to narrow our focus as we ask a 
specific research question about a particular topic. We start broadly, working through 
literature and filtering down to a so-called ‘gap’ in the literature that (supposedly) needs filling 
with a research question. A traditional psychological feast is rarely impossible to consume, as 
it is academic convention to extensively explore the available literature on the topic, 
summarise it and specify the research question (and then, of course, answer – or at least 
address – it). But what happens when the academic feast becomes impossible through the 
proliferation of connections online, the constant generation of excesses overflowing from the 
so-called gaps? Through reflexively and explicitly politicising knowledge as produced and 
productive, discourse analysis, and its kin, have posed challenges to the processes of ‘gap-
filling’ in knowledge, where ‘gaps’ are seen as opportunities to ask questions whose answers 
will serve as fillings, however temporarily. But even discourse analysis, and its kin, cannot 
keep pace with processing technologised hyperconnections and excesses that are continuously 
being produced as the internet expands exponentially. A traditionally identified gap can now 
shift so dramatically so quickly online that augmented traditional methods can be nullified 
within seconds, particularly within online communities and movements that are produced 
through, and productive of, misogyny and violence, as they are, by necessity, quick on their 
digital feet. Online communities and movements born from technotimes can be understood 
and questioned through methodology that was born of the same technotimes in ways that 
traditional methodologies cannot account for, like proliferation of connections, and the 
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simultaneity and partiality of those connections, as well as the impossibility of connecting to 
all the connections that might enable totalised, unified understanding of online phenomena.   
So, as a feminist woman researcher in psychology in the 21st century West, engaged in 
the online world as much as anyone else (see Perrin, 2015), I have a seat at the table of the 
Impossible Feast, troubled and excited by the textual meals I can connect to so easily and so 
massively. For a feast that is indeed impossible, I call upon a once-impossible figure – the 
cyborg. Born in science fiction, the popular culture cyborg is a hybrid of biology and 
technology – part human, part machine. The cyborg imagined the seeming impossibility of a 
consanguineous union of the human body with mechanical technologies. With this imagining 
came new anxieties about the augmentation of the human body and mind (still very much 
conceptualised as split) through technological intervention. From ‘The Terminator’ franchise 
conceptualising of the terror of technological takeover through cyborgs (or perhaps androids, 
for the purists) to the villain-turned-heroine Nebula of the Marvel Cinematic Universe, cyborgs 
have complex functions in the West’s technoculture. Increasingly, technologised prosthetics 
aid the disabled to change the functionality of their bodies, even enhancing their bodies 
beyond the ‘normal’ human body (like former athlete Liam Malone, discussed on pages 93-94). 
People are implanting devices into their flesh to perhaps restore and maintain the body’s 
functions (through pacemakers) or to consolidate their technologies into their bodies via a 
singular microchip that controls access to multiple resources (like finances or unlocking a 
door). Voluntarily microchipping your body in particular speaks to the impossibility of the 
feast we find ourselves at in the 21st century West. The ways in which we can engage with our 
world technologically have been so vast and complex, explicitly technologising the body has 
become a viable and practical option for making quick connections in a hyperconnected world. 
Since we can technologise the body, the figure of the cyborg offers a methodological 
conception of how we can technologise research too. 
Constantly proliferating connections are certainly problematic to account for in 
current academic conventions. In terms of psychological research for the purposes of 
completing a doctoral degree, microchipping myself and associated others for ease of data 
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transfer was not an option (practically, ethically). Indeed, neither was the more practical 
option of presenting my research in website form, where connections and connectivity could 
be explicitly exploited, proliferations more comfortably enjoyed and embedded within their 
technocontext. Privileging proliferation presents a methodological challenge to an academia 
that is characterised by the assertion of conventional boundaries around knowledge and 
knowledge production. Through privileging the multiplicities and partialities of technocultural 
connections, the dominance of singularity (unified understandings) in knowledge production 
collapses under the weight of proliferating connections. For me, the multiplicity, simultaneity 
and contradiction of Haraway’s (1991) cyborg, as well as her privileging of text, opens space 
for how to write theoretically and analytically while governed by (obsolete in technotimes) 
academic boundaries, yet still challenging those boundaries by embodying the impossible feast 
and its effects. 
The questions I wanted to ask from my embedded positioning as a feminist researcher 
online become emergent in the sense that they configured themselves around exceeding the 
binary logic that has both amplified the violence that inhabits a unified definition of woman 
(Malabou, 2011) and simultaneously produced women’s bodies as sites of heteronormative 
pleasures for men. Questions emerge as they entwine themselves through multiple partial 
connections, crafted from meagre pickings of an impossible feast of online data, their critical 
excesses and appendages, and my affective, embodied, located readings rather than appearing 
(for instance) as textual realisations of (relatively) stable discourses. Such emergent questions 
required more methodological and analytic flexibility in order to build in online phenomena 
that would have necessarily been left out of a more traditional research process. For example, 
throughout my thesis I use online textual strategies, like memes, puns, clickbait and other 
internet speak, to produce a more flexible and dynamic analytic strategy than traditional 
analysis would provide, pulling the experience of the internet through the research 
unapologetically to continually remind the reader of the proliferating social and textual shifts 
produced online, as well as the questions about what these technologised connections might 
do to bodies; the site of the research is continually remembered, while simultaneously other 
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texts and contexts are brought into play for analytic purposes that foreground the expansive 
and partial hyperconnectivity and ambiguity of online textuality. In my thesis, the function of a 
particular online textual device might involve connecting, for example, the reader to extra 
context (like the blood-blurred lyrics of ‘When A Man Loves A Woman’ on page 275), or re-
rendering online violence through a feminist cyborg (as in the ‘Reproduction of a Hottie’ on 
page 338), or even as illustrations of the textual journey that awaits the reader (‘Delight in 
Descent’, page 175, warns of the deterioration of traditional academic formatting, if not also of 
the deterioration into some disturbing theoretical undoings). Strategies that alert the reader to 
the boundaries blurring through multiple connections within technologically mediated worlds 
can produce discomfort, particularly as attention is drawn to the inadequacy of methodological 
conventions for keeping pace with the socio-textual movement and proliferations online. By 
pulling online textual strategies through this thesis, I politicise the forms and functions of 
online textuality that are so readily mobilised for violence against women, ironically 
appropriating these forms and functions for my own feminist analysis of the state of affairs 
online.  
Such ironic strategies are indeed, as Haraway (2004) suggested, dangerous. A meme, 
for example, is partial, simultaneous and contradictory – open to interpretation, manipulation 
and radical change. Memes are fragmentary in form, and fragment text/image in function. 
These instances become sites of challenge just as important as the meme itself – another key 
feature of a meme’s function, perhaps most typically exemplified through this thesis in the 
form of explicit puns, and online through misogynist memes. These are very serious jokes and 
occur in the chaos of ever-proliferating text online where their seriousness is simultaneously 
urgent and throw-away; dismissed as not-real violence due to its production online, not in the 
‘real world.’ By pulling these online textual strategies through my research, the cyborg enables 
me to blur the boundaries of these worlds to draw attention to their simultaneity: the 
seriousness of the joke. 
The cyborg, as a methodology, then, is fragmentary, partial and emergent, so it 
necessarily builds up, breaks down and expands and contracts as the research progresses and 
375 
 
new phenomena to connect to are introduced. Such a methodological upheaval produces work 
that is fragmentary, partial, multiple and contradictory. In the Apocalypse chapter of this 
thesis, for example, the chaos of converging connections produces analytic understandings 
that dip in and out (and sideways) of clarity. My experience of engaging with the Massive 
cover, through multiple positionings (as student, employee, researcher and so on), was an 
experience of partiality, multiplicity, contradiction and connection. To make sense of such an 
expansive and ever-shifting online experience, I drew upon the science fiction trope of the 
apocalypse to account for the chaos I experienced from my own positioning as feminist 
researcher working online, and as a technocitizen in the 21st century West. The apocalypse 
conjures imagery of worlds breaking apart, whether through earthly disaster (like asteroids or 
climate change), catastrophic transformations (like zombies) or invasions (like aliens looking 
to conquer). In an apocalypse, social and/or physical integrity is destroyed, either suddenly or 
unsurprisingly, but new possibilities can emerge for re-building society. Theoretically, there 
have been few feminist scholars to address what the apocalypse is and how we come to 
imagine so many ways our world could end (through books, movies and music, for example). 
One suggestion, by Viola (1990), is that the stories and imagery of the apocalypse give 
language to anxieties about and resistances to the current state of our world. With such a 
suggestion in mind, I began to undo my own experience of a student magazine cover that was a 
node for multiple, partial and contradictory troubling connections through my research 
adventure. In response to the Massive magazine cover image, I pull together, and apart, the 
multitude of connections that build up my encounter with the image, drawing attention to the 
complexity of my own hyperdimensional positioning within multiple partial and contradictory 
networks. The metaphor of the apocalypse brings together my multiple complex positioning, 
embedded in the “state of affairs” (Keller, 1996, p. 13) as a feminist technocitizen, as well as 
being an embodied analyst of the “state of affairs” as a feminist researcher online. The 
understanding of the apocalyptic “state of affairs” brings with it the science fiction politics that 
privilege the ‘doing’ of the work science fiction imagines. The dream/nightmare of the 
apocalypse can be understood as an opening for (re)inscribing the possibilities of undoing and 
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redoing a world. I remind readers through the thesis of the politics of being “UNSURE” like a 
giant hyper-dimensional arachnid playing the guts of fallen kin; frequent nods to the unclear 
positionings that the multiplicities, simultaneities, partialities and contradictions of cyborg 
times (feminist academic or otherwise) produce.  
 
Analytic Strategies and Yet More Figures 
With the constant proliferation and movement online, I sought to engage analytic 
research strategies that were dynamic and shape-shifting. Constructing figures that move 
through the research, collecting and re-configuring partialities, multiplicities and 
contradictions as they move, enables more complex understandings of complex problems, 
particularly for women in technotimes where articulating embodied responses continues to be 
difficult (due to historically being denied ways to talk our bodies and our experiences) and is 
perhaps becoming more difficult (in the excess of ways bodies can be experienced through 21st 
century technologies). I used the example of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s heroine in ‘The Yellow 
Wallpaper’; a character who blurs into the wallpaper of the room she is confined to during an 
isolation aiming to ‘cure’ her ‘disorder.’ She becomes a dynamic figure of a woman through 
body horror and wallpaper, engaged in movement and shape-shifting (even material-shifting) 
that resists her positioning and also revels in it; she becomes excess, contradiction, 
impossibility. Figures exceed metaphors, so rather than the idea that something is like 
something else (as in a metaphor, in an endless chain of deferring meaning), figures enable us 
to imagine embodying more dynamically and responsively how to think politics for our time. 
In particular, technofigures are critical in these technotimes, where technological 
advancements are so prolific in the West. Building figures that move and ‘do’ creates space for 
the impossibilities women experience through their bodies. 
The figure of Human Barbie, for example, draws attention to the complexity of 
women’s embodiment through technology beyond the metaphor of hu(wo)man as plastic doll 
– a potent metaphor in and of itself, but there are excesses to account for. Human Barbie is 
deployed through my research as an example of how the simultaneity and multiplicity of a 
metaphor mobilised through technological interventions, through the physical body, and 
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through the connectivity of the internet, produces politicised women’s embodiment that 
contradicts, is partial and as such challenges how women can be subjugated by forms of 
violence enacted in and through bodies. As critics of Haraway’s cyborg like to point out, the 
cyborg is built from patriarchal technologies. Building a body explicitly through patriarchal 
technologies so that the body performs perfectly the patriarchal ideal Western woman’s body 
starkly analyses the freakery demanded of Western women and their bodies in the 21st 
century. This is the first time in history where technologies to dismantle and reconstruct the 
woman’s body are readily available to the general public, through photo editing filters or now-
mundane cosmetic surgery procedures. As these patriarchal technologies blur with women’s 
bodies, we might be tempted to dismiss such blurrings as the ongoing subjugation of women 
and internalised misogyny that reproduces the kind of feminine disciplinary practices that 
Barkty (1998) analysed. Human Barbie simultaneously participates in and rejects dominant 
patriarchal constructions of women and their bodies. She has become Barbie™. However, 
Barbie™ has had a great many jobs and roles over her lifetime, not including the roles and jobs 
that children have given her as they imagine her life through their own play time. Human 
Barbie plays too, rejecting traditional roles and, indeed, rejecting decency (like her racist 
comments mentioned on page 295 of this thesis). Human Barbie challenges the idealised 
Western woman’s form and function by taking the idealised woman’s body too far while 
rejecting the required docility of such a body. Human Barbie challenges us then to think with 
different thoughts how we understand and inhabit technologised bodies in the 21st century 
West. The shape and politicised functions of our human forms are now so plastic (figuratively, 
literally) that the spaces we occupy, and how we occupy them, become too complex, connected 
and changeable for such fundamental binaries as dominant/subjugated to evade questioning, 
perhaps even collapsing under the weight of technological hyperconnectivity. The binary is so 
challenged that dominance and subjugation cannot even be understood through the 
intervention of resistance, as the partiality of compliance and resistance becomes explicitly 
possible through the proliferating hyperconnectivity that the technoworld now offers to the 
average technocitizen. Similarly, Human Barbie is in no way a clear and unified figure: her 
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hyperconnected and partial politicised embodiment rejects the clarity of the idealised Western 
woman’s body, taking up the idealised body so explicitly and specifically that the (patriarchal) 
clarity we previously had about the ideal Western woman’s body disintegrates into a chaos of 
body parts, gender roles and technology. I suggest, on page 298 of this thesis, that Human 
Barbie is both a critique and harbinger of violence against women. We are “UNSURE” because 
our waters are so muddied with hyperconnections. Human Barbie, as a metaphor unifying 
understandings of her body as simulating a child’s toy, only hints at the challenges she poses. 
Human Barbie, as a figure, pulls us into how we can embody multiplicities, partialities and 
contradictions; the politics of non-innocence and being “UNSURE” when we reject 
(patriarchal) clarity and embrace feminist hyperconnection through the cyborg. 
 
Jacking Into Possible Futures 
 Trialling cyborg methodology as a partial, contradictory figure for enabling feminist 
poststructuralist analytic engagement with 21st century technoculture from within, has meant 
recognising that the cyborg, playing seriously with boundaries, is an exploiter of dead links in 
dominant discourse, able to connect in and use patriarchal thinking to her advantage, perhaps 
replacing some dead links with feminist connections. So, in this thesis, I traced the blurry 
boundaries of Haraway’s cyborg to plug her into the 21st century as theory, as methodology, as 
a figure with which to do research. She becomes a new thought to think with for feminist 
researchers engaged in technoculture and embodiment in the 21st century West. The 
connections forged, and still forging, between bodies and technologies raise new questions 
that traditional research approaches might find difficult to address or to answer even if 
augmented for technotimes, like questions about how we experience the proliferation of 
connections between bodies that technological advances now enable. For example, in chapter 
nine of this thesis, I write analysis of the online world of Elliot Rodger interweaving 
hyperconnected proliferation, gender and violence against women. Rodger utilised the 
internet to share and organise his understandings of heteronormativity, promoting his violent 
ideology in hypermasculine online communities, and, after his death, becoming a 
simultaneously heroic and pathetic figure within the ‘incel’ community. Rodger’s videos and 
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manifesto have inspired memes, video games and online philosophising that continually, years 
after his death, proliferate more and more connections to violent text and imagery against 
women, including the explicit connections made to individually identified women mentioned 
in Rodger’s manifesto or victims of Rodger’s violence. Elliot Rodger exceeds our traditional 
understandings of domestic (gender) terrorists, as technologised hyperconnection proliferates 
his ideology and violence at extreme speed. The intertwining of the three connections 
analysed, raises the question of how rapid proliferation of violence against women shapes 
woman’s experience of the 21st century.  
I interrogated these fraught connections in chapter four of this thesis, where I outline 
my own responses to hyperconnection in my encounters online through the ethics of 
Haraway’s cyborg. Little research conducted on the internet addresses the expansivity of the 
online world explicitly, let alone building such expansivity into its research framework. But the 
expansivity of the internet is one of its key features – removing it from consideration, or 
treating it only as a qualifier, disables a critical node in the network. The impossibility of the 
feast is critical to understand if we are to even begin to address the kinds of violences that can 
reappear but differently online (like a great many forms of violence against women). For 
example, the dominant response to women experiencing domestic violence is that they “should 
just leave” – a moral imperative not so easily followed for women in their complex daily lives. 
Similarly, women online are told to block, report, ignore those who harass them, or are again 
told to leave (see again Burke Winkelman et al., 2015). However, we are gathering a plethora 
of examples of violence against women that exceeds the notions of blocking, reporting, 
ignoring or leaving. The subject of the #Jadapose meme (as outlined in chapter twelve) was 
not even aware of her memed sexually violated body until much later, and the meme images 
that remain online are unlikely to violate website terms of service in ways that would get the 
images removed. Such a violent memeing is permanently present online, easily catalogued 
through a hashtag. The ease of (continued) connectivity to violence against women online, like 
the #Jadapose meme, blurs with the embodied replication of violence against women and girls, 
where inhabiting the sexually violated body of a black teenage girl becomes online 
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entertainment that also reiterates the racialised sexual exploitation of particular women’s 
bodies – raising, and responding to, the question of what happens when violence against 
women becomes boring. 
So, in this thesis, the analysis builds up through multiple and partial connections, 
accumulating, converging and diverging through different figures and shifting 
technometaphors. The movement of analysis replicates the movement of partial, hyperlinked, 
connected nodes of social power relations as networks within technoculture. One such 
example is the technometaphor of Panic Architecture. Panic Architecture accumulates 
throughout the analysis chapters, beginning (in this thesis) as a technometaphor for exploring 
the structures of online misogyny through an image that materialised on the cover of Massive 
magazine, detailed in chapter five of this thesis (Apocalypse), which then morphs into making 
sense of the online structure of heteronormativity (chapter nine – Elliot Rodger), and again 
shifts towards understanding the building of women’s bodies online, particularly in the context 
of sexual violence (chapter 12 – Violations). So throughout the thesis, the technometaphor of 
Panic Architecture is re-routed through different (but not necessarily distinct) online 
phenomena as an explication of how such phenomena can shift in online environments while 
maintaining the structures that produce/promote violence against women. Such an analytic 
approach works to pick up parts as it moves along, augmenting the analysis as it moves 
through multiple different, but deeply connected online phenomena and communities. As a 
process of research that jacks-into hyperconnectivity, cyborg methodology is moving: 
affectively connecting and disconnecting feminist analyses into the network. This thesis 
contributes a new technologised methodology for feminist poststructuralist academic analysis 
through the build-up of connections, partially, simultaneously and multiply, to make sense of 
the political entanglements of women’s bodies and technology in urgent technotimes.  
Situating cyborg methodology within science fiction genre engages in a textual 
strategy that privileges openings and creatively imagining futures rather than coming to 
conclusions as is the case in the detective genre. Offering an exemplary case of the way in 
which Squire’s (1990) genre arguments enable cyborg methodology’s relevance to 
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fictionalising the science of psychology, this thesis also opens up new possibilities for feminist 
psychological research practices. Having harvested data, snipped connections, jacked-in 
elsewhere, enlivened dead links and forged new ones, multiple trajectories for following this 
thesis through to other possibilities are imaginable. A technologised research approach for 
technologised times opens ports of connection that are responsive to technologised shifts, 
allowing for a feminist researcher to jack into a tangle of connections and inhabit their 
complexity. Possible futures might include jacking into further lines of inquiry, like women’s 
political protest movements online, or maintaining the ongoing diverse connections between 
women’s bodies and technology, including moments of disconnection. Another possible future 
could be to build a ‘greener’ cyborg; one that might better survive the cultural upheavals of 
climate change (on page 79 I ask: ‘If inscribing war-power onto bodies produces cyborgs, what 
does climate change do to a body?’). The science fiction genre, as exemplified through ‘The 
Matrix’ trilogy (and beyond), is a genre for imagining ‘what if’ in expansive, explicitly 
technologised ways. In the final scene of the ‘The Matrix’ (the first movie of the trilogy), Neo 
warns us he does not know the future. Instead, he tells us he is going to open a world of 
possibilities, and how we jack into that world is up to us, presumably dependent upon the 
politics and experiences most salient to us at any given moment. Neo wants us to know that 
the possibilities are endless when boundaries are broken down, particularly in the pursuit of 
challenging powerful structures that shape our experiences in violent ways. By the end of the 
trilogy, after many divergent battles, the world Neo fought for is rebooted, but still tense with 
the potential for violent change as The Oracle and The Architect exchange threats – an ending, 
but not The End. Indeed, in 2019, it was announced that ‘The Matrix’ trilogy would continue 
with a fourth movie, morphing into (at least) a tetralogy nearly two decades after the last 
movie premiered, and as such opening up more possibilities for radical politics in even more 
technologically expansive times, just as Neo promised.  
Science fiction opens space (literally) to embrace the potential for radical change 
(‘District 9’), redemption (‘Another Earth’) and imagining the processes of re-routing power 
(‘Westworld’) explicitly through technological connectivity. How such imaginings work/play 
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depends on the body politics at stake. A feminist cyborg, contradictory and partial, can become 
a key figure (among many possible figures) for engaging in feminist politics through thoughts 
that matter to women’s simultaneous and multiple experiences of their embodied lives, 
blurred at their boundaries by proliferating technologised connections and so critically at 
stake in the 21st century West. For Haraway (2016), “it matters what thoughts think thoughts” 
(p. 12); it mattered that she preferred the cyborg to the goddess (Haraway, 1991) – a science 
fiction figure of the technotimes to re-think the technotimes, to politicise and re-imagine the 
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Now Streaming Consciousness: 
Psychology, Technology and Memes 
 
The idea for this paper came from being asked at my confirmation event what I 
meant by “simulated consciousness” through cyborg metaphor. From time-to-time, I 
have been asked to explain how I use particular words and phrases that I have 
appropriated in many instances, as any cyborg does. But I had never had to articulate 
my use of the phrase “simulated consciousness” before. It can be difficult to account for 
the appropriation of psychological terms, particularly when conducting research not 
through the privilege of dominant psychological talk, but rather through the political 
appropriation and technologising of dominant discourse. So, in this paper, I interrogate 
consciousness, dust it off, and re-imagine it through cyborg politics. 
The Problem of Consciousness 
 The concept of ‘consciousness’ seems to have been a tricky one for psychology 
to theorise. Arguably, for every concept in psychology, there are multiple and varied 
theorisations; but articulations of consciousness seem particularly elusive. Traditionally, 
psychologists (and associated others) have looked for consciousness in the brain. There 
has been a desire to find a particular pattern, or a specific location, or key to the cabinet 
of consciousness (Baars, 2002; Dennett, 2001; Koubeissi, Bartolomei, Beltagy & 
Picard, 2014). However, these scientific efforts, proficient at producing screeds of 
information about the various functions and patterns in the brain, have yet to yield the 
key to consciousness, perhaps making a fundamental mistake in assuming there is a key 
to find in the first place. 
 Alongside these scientific efforts, philosophers have also long debated 
consciousness. Damasio (2000) suggests that “at its simplest and most basic level, 
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consciousness lets us recognize an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a concern 
for the self” (p. 5), describing it as the “unified mental pattern that brings together the 
object and the self” (p. 11). This idea of a unified mental pattern desiring life as a 
theorisation of consciousness may feel more real than the coldly calculated mappings of 
the brain’s neurons, but it still tends towards the individual, as psychology so often does 
(Lock, 2001).  
According to Reggia (2013), theories of consciousness are either monistic or 
dualistic, continuing psychology’s tradition of either reducing to one, or creating a 
binary. Monistic theories that assert one realm of existence (basically, all or nothing 
approaches), talk about consciousness through functionalism, or behaviourism, or 
identity and so on (Reggia, 2013). Dualistic theories, on the other hand, talk about 
consciousness as the interaction between an “objective material universe” that we 
perceive and a “subjective non-physical universe” like consciousness (p. 113). So, 
theorisations either look to reduce consciousness to functions in the brain at a 
biologically mechanical level, or they approach consciousness as a mind-body 
interaction. As Nagel (1974) suggests: “Without consciousness the mind-body problem 
would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless” (p. 322). 
Perhaps then, this is the problem: seeking consciousness in either the individual brain, 
or the interaction between mind-body, are places we should give up looking.  
The main thrust of these scientific inquiries is this notion of the individual. 
According to Damasio (2000), “in all the kinds of self we can consider one notion 
always commands center stage: the notion of a bounded, single individual that changes 
ever so gently across time, but, somehow, seems to stay the same” (p. 134). So there is 
here an assumption of fixity, a core to an individual’s consciousness that maintains 
itself in relation to its experiences and interactions with the world: a singular, 
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individualised, unified, bounded self that is the core of consciousness. Damasio (2000) 
also claims that “singular individuality depends on the boundary” (p. 136) that encases 
consciousness. So even the philosophers who seek to shift consciousness beyond 
function, fall back into individualism and the quest for the core, fenced-off, neon-
signposted thing that is human consciousness.  
Chalmers (2014) stated that where “there is information processing there is 
consciousness.” This idea of consciousness as a process (or multiple processes) of 
information integration, to a cyborg, seems more promising. While cognitive 
psychology holds more rigid ideas of what information processing might be than I do, 
there is an acknowledgement here of the flux and non-fixity of what consciousness 
might be if considered a process rather than a particular function in the brain or mind-
body interaction. Now there are cognitive philosophers theorising consciousness as a 
more socially complex concept. O’Regan and Noë (2001) suggest that “we tend to 
overlook the complexity and heterogeneity of experience, and this makes it seem as if in 
experience there are unified sensation-like occurrences” (p. 960). So, while psychology, 
as a science, continues to privilege the singular, the individual, the unified, there are 
academics who are starting to move beyond this bounded subject and towards a more 
fluid, multiple, partial conceptualisation of consciousness. O’Regan and Noë (2001) 
suggest that consciousness is “something we do” (p. 960) rather than something that is 
located in the brain. Noë (2012) in particular theorises consciousness as something that 
“we achieve, that we do, that we enact” (para. 6). This resonates with the etymology of 
the word ‘conscious’ which from its Latin birth meant ‘knowing with’ (Lewis, 1960), 
suggesting a long forgotten theorisation of consciousness as about connectivity. Today, 
there are theorists playing seriously with the idea that human consciousness is not 
necessarily fixed within the human brain. Instead, there is an acknowledgement of the 
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interconnectivity and interrelation of that in which we are embedded (perhaps 
physically, socially, culturally, historically, politically) and mediated by perception.  
The Problem of Simulated Consciousness 
 If consciousness as a psychological phenomenon is a theoretical enigma, then 
simulated consciousness is a theoretical disaster. In investigating theorisations of 
simulated consciousness, I was confronted with a great many dead ends as I was 
continually re-directed to ‘artificial intelligence.’ To my surprise, the concepts of 
‘artificial intelligence (AI)’ and ‘simulated consciousness’ have been conflated, with the 
theorisation of simulated consciousness incorporated into work on AI so intimately that 
it is now assumed that when we speak of simulated consciousness, we are actually 
speaking about AI. My understanding had always been that the two concepts were 
connected, but distinct: AI as the systematic, rational reproduction and extension of 
mechanical human functionality, and simulated consciousness as the replication of 
human flexibility of thought, adaptability and creativity. Moreover, in psychology, 
intelligence and consciousness are not the same theoretical concept. Yet theoretically 
and practically both AI and simulated consciousness are addressing the same issue of 
replicating what we assume as essential to humanness in machines. This conflation is a 
fundamental theoretical error. The error is compounded by another fundamental error of 
presuming to theorise and produce the simulation of human consciousness before ever 
approaching an adequate theorisation of human consciousness. While it is not a new 
modus operandi of psychology to forge forward without adequate theory, this remains a 
problematic way to conduct research, theoretical, practical or otherwise. Creating either 
artificial intelligence or a simulated consciousness in a machine then seems to be about 
reverse engineering consciousness in something else in the hope of understanding 
human consciousness.  
449 
 
 With this conflation of AI and simulated consciousness come some important 
theoretical problems. Conflating ‘simulation’ with ‘artificial’ (two concepts that like 
‘intelligence’ and ‘consciousness’ have different meanings…) suggests that ‘fake’ and 
‘simulated’ are isomorphic to such an extent that ‘simulated consciousness’ is 
equivalent to ‘faked conscious,’ or at least that it is produced by circumstances that are 
‘not real’ (assuming too, that real is equivalent to ‘natural’). Simulation does not 
necessarily mean artificial or fake, but rather it can be seen as produced, reproduced and 
reconstructed. 
 Conflating simulated consciousness with artificial intelligence also means 
conflating the ethical issues that each may entail. For example, discussions of ethical AI 
inevitably lead to the doomsday predictions of ‘The Terminator,’ or at the very least the 
concern that AI machines will replace human workers, exacerbating the rich-poor gap. 
Whereas there are more complex debates about the ethics of machine consciousness, 
perhaps as depicted in the movie ‘Her,’ where the ethics of a machine that simulates 
embodied feelings are called into question. Along with cinematic fiction, research, 
psychological or otherwise, tends to focus on the ethical dilemmas of AI, such as 
whether we should be attempting to give machines human intelligence, as if human 
intelligence (or consciousness) has the moral high ground. If we cannot use 
consciousness ethically, why should machines? 
Perhaps ethical questions about consciousness as an embodied performance are 
the right ones to be asking, now. In the 21st century West, we are enmeshed with our 
technologies, constituting ourselves (bodies and all) in and through technology, blurring 
the boundaries between binaries like human/machine that previously gave the illusions 
of being in their own distinct categories (Haraway, 1991). Noë (2012) suggests that “… 
as we develop prosthetic, cyborgian ways of enhancing ourselves technologically… we 
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will enhance or develop or at least change the character of our consciousness. I think 
that much is right in this kind of science fiction fantasy” (para. 12). We have already 
extended our consciousness through technology as our phones and computers store and 
retrieve vast amounts of information instantly. This is information that we previously 
would have had to learn or memorise, or store in a physical file system that would have 
needed to be physically searched. So, by way of the simplest example, in the sense of 
information processing, we are simulating consciousness through our technologies, 
enabling us to do more than ever before.138 
Cyborg Simulated Consciousness 
The idea that consciousness and the brain are like computers, or that computers 
are like consciousness and the brain, becomes a chicken-and-egg-esque discussion of 
which is mimicking which. This seems a bizarre debate to be engaged in, as, for me, 
through cyborg theory, consciousness and technology emerge together, blurred at the 
boundaries and moving in flux. 
The cyborg here undoes consciousness in (at least) two ways. Firstly, the idea of 
consciousness as locatable inside individual brains makes a cyborg laugh. The idea of 
the rational unified subject is dismantled through connectivity and interrelation. Being 
in possession of a thought or desire is nonsensical, as thoughts and desires are produced 
through interrelations and networked technologies of power. A bounded self, unified, is 
a freak of nature in the “constant flush of interrelating bodies” (Schaefer, 2014, p. 8). 
When we are young, a ‘self’ is constructed through us, discursively: 
                                                          
138 And also, perhaps, less… for example, I have seen sitting at my computer for weeks, reading and 
writing and crafting this paper, performing all sorts of weird and wonderful mental, conscious 




The word ‘I’ is initially essential to distinguish one physical 
person from another, but very rapidly becomes used to say things 
like ‘I think’, ‘I like’, ‘I want’, ‘I believe’, ‘That’s mine’ and so 
forth, as though there were a central self who has opinions, 
desires and possessions (Blackmore, 2003, p. 6).  
So interrelations with the world are reconfigured through discursive practices that 
cordon us all off as a series of individual ‘me’ and ‘you’ bodies as if this affords us the 
agency to get what we want and need to satisfy that supposed inner desire to stay alive. 
Through cyborg theory, however, these unified, bounded individuals are a political 
illusion, employed to exercise power over those deemed un-unified, and maintain power 
for those who enjoy the privileges of unification. But in particular, this ‘sense of self’ 
dissolves online, into a simulated consciousness where online interactions produce ways 
of thinking and enacting power relations, and resistance, through a constant 
connectedness in/of text and image and interrelation. So the rational, neoliberal 
individual is dismantled in favour of a more textually authenticated connected 
consciousness online. 
Which brings us to the cyborg’s second undoing of consciousness: the 
proliferation of consciousness explicitly through technology. In the West, we are 
embedded in a techno-culture where technological skills are now a birth right (for the 
unified), with more and more techno-toys and apps marketed towards parents with 
infants, and New Zealand primary schools increasingly demanding parents purchase 
laptops or iPads for their children as essential classroom materials. So technology as a 
simple tool is an out-dated concept. Access to and thriving through technology 
determines power, not necessarily skill level (as we are all assumed to have the skills, 
and access, to participate in technological life). 
452 
 
But this is more than the use of a tool. This “establishes a dialectical rapport of 
reciprocal inventing of tools by the humans, and the humans by its tools” (Popoveniuc, 
2013, p. 148). Technology constructs our bodies, and consciousness, not merely through 
its intervention into our lives, but through our embodiment as techno-citizens. The 
proliferation of connections and interactions through technology proliferates 
connectedness and connectivity, which proliferates consciousness online.   
Through technology, then, human consciousness is extended and reconfigured, 
as technological advances have “extended the human central nervous system itself at a 
global level, abolishing both space and time” (Popoveniuc, 2013, p. 146). We now 
stream our consciousness online, sharing interrelations with others all over the world, 
interacting with past connections and permanently streaming content online for future 
connection. Here, consciousness is streamed globally, timelessly, for the construction of 
an ever-flowing, boundless simulated consciousness online. So the idea of a unified 
subject, individualised, making decisions based on what is ‘morally right’ and ‘good,’ is 
disintegrating/ed. 
Through cyborg metaphor, consciousness is the accumulation of and connection 
to nodes in the network, to construct a multiple, simultaneous, contradictory simulation 
of consciousness. For example, through the processes of connection, threads and forums 
on sites such as 4Chan or Reddit, appropriate and re-produce their own form of 
consciousness. The interrelations and connections through technology have simulated a 
consciousness in these subcultures that renders them inaccessible to those who have not 
been connected to the process of their production. As an internet user, and as a 
researcher of online phenomena, I know my memes. But still, this is a simulated 
consciousness that I have not been involved in producing, so I cannot live stream into 
that consciousness as it is unintelligible. I can connect to peripheral nodes, but I do not 
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have access to certain streams of simulated consciousness due to the subcultural 
specificity of the streaming which produces both a unity and “endless variety” 
(Edelman, 2001, p. 112) to consciousness, both in traditional psychological 
understandings of the concept, and this simulated, technologised re-imagining. But for 
the cyborg, there is nothing unified about the unity, as it is the co-production, 
interrelation and connectivity that produces a shifting and morphing blurred boundary 
of how consciousness can be done through technology. 
Memes as Consciousness 
 In order to participate in the “tyranny of clarity” (Haraway, 2004, p. 333), 
perhaps this example of memes can enable further understanding of the simulation of 
consciousness online. There is this idea that memes (in the traditional Dawkins sense) 
“play an important role in yielding some kind of software that results in human 
consciousness” (Wah & Nordin, 2013, p. 517). In an evolutionary sense, memes are 
about the passing on of particular behaviours and adapting them based on 
environmental factors (Dawkins, 1989). This is essentially the spreading and adapting 
of survival strategies, socially, to advance the species. So “… the winning memes drive 
brains to become better at imitating those particular behaviours” (Blackmore, 2003, p. 
5). What this means online then, is that successful memes such as those that mock or 
perpetuate certain behaviours and stereotypes can reproduce not only the behaviours 
meme-ed, but also the meme-ing itself: the proliferation of affirmative (abusive or 
supportive) simulations of consciousness online. 
Memes, in the traditional sense, are structured, however fluidly, so as to ensure 
their reproduction (Dawkins, 1989). This is the same for online memes, as, ironically, 
any discussion of memes leads to the discussion of how difficult it is to discuss the 
meaning of a meme or how it emerges. Online memes hold their own highly flexible 
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structure whereby users of the meme understand it intricately and use that structure to 
produce divergences of that meme that are still classified as part of the meme. But this 
structure is multiple, partial and contradictory. It is not fixed, and it diverges depending 
its connectivity, and converges with multiple ways of talking. 
Like online memes, we struggle to talk about what human consciousness might 
be, or how it might be defined. We “think we know what our own consciousness is like 
and we then extrapolate to others” (Blackmore, 2003, p. 1). This is how memes work as 
consciousness online: we think we understand a meme, then we extrapolate to diverge 
the meme and produce and reproduce text and imagery that further proliferates the 
meme and its meanings.  
According to Edelman (2001), “some psychologists suggest that consciousness 
is marked by the presence of mental images and by their use to regulate behavior. But it 
is not a simple copy of experience…” (p. 112-113). This conceptualisation of 
consciousness could almost seamlessly be used to describe memes, the internet’s 
driving force (its desire to stay alive… that and cats, of course. And a cat meme is best 
of all). Memes are typically the mass-proliferation of endlessly differing or diverging 
imagery and/or text. Memes mock or reify behaviours or interactions or thoughts or 
feelings. But they are not simple copies of these 
behaviours/interactions/thoughts/feelings; they are modern frames of reference for 
organising behaviours and thoughts, connecting to particular thoughts and feelings and 
interactions. Memes dominate the internet, proliferating rapidly, lingering and re-
inventing. There is a unity to memes even as they are endlessly multiple and 
contradictory. Edelman (2001) describes how consciousness creates a “scene,” which is 
an “ordered set of categorizations of familiar and nonfamiliar events, some with and 
some without necessary physical or causal connections to others in the same scene” (p. 
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118), with the advantage of providing us with the ability to construct a scene that uses 
past learning to help shape new events even when the events (or nodes in the network) 
seem unrelated. We know a meme when we see one, but we cannot quite pin it down to 
define or describe it. This is the same problem we encounter when we work with the 
psychological concept of consciousness. When we attempt to describe a meme, or 
explicate its parameters, the joy of the meme can be destroyed, its connectivity severed 
or at least re-routed through nodes that change how it can be connected to, and this 
changes the consciousness that it simulates. Perhaps this is also the problem of 
consciousness: defining what it is like to be something, when what it is like to be 
something is multiple, partial, simultaneous, contradictory, is an exercise in the 
perpetual, transformative nonsensical.  
Perhaps the metaphor the hard sciences is looking for to explain consciousness 
is the meme; that is, the production through technology, not the function of the 
technology itself. The consciousness, if we presume to locate it anywhere, is in the 
connectivity and the interrelations.  
 
